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1
The Puzzle
Peripheral Developing Countries Implementing 
International Banking Standards
Emily Jones
On 19 January 2016, three days after economic sanctions were lifted, Iran’s central 
bank governor announced that he would move quickly to implement the latest set 
of international banking standards. Companies across the world had been lining 
up to explore opportunities in Iran and the government was keen to attract them, 
but Iran’s banking sector was perceived as a critical weakness. By implementing 
international regulatory standards, the governor sought to reassure the inter nation al 
community that Iranian banks were soundly (Bozorgmehr, 2016; Financial Tribune, 
2017; Saul and Arnold, 2016).
Iran is not alone: many countries around the world are implementing inter­
nation al banking standards. What is puzzling is that in most cases, governments 
are choosing to regulate a vital part of their economy on the basis of international 
standards over which they had no influence. International banking standards 
are designed behind closed doors by a select group of regulators from the world’s 
largest financial centres who belong to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (hereafter Basel Committee), which takes its name from the small 
medieval town in Switzerland where the members meet. The standards are 
intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk­taking international banks 
with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet these stand­
ards are being implemented by governments across the world, including in many 
countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to venture 
into international markets. Why is this?
In this book we focus on the responses of regulators in low­ and lower­middle­
income countries to the most recent, and most complex, iterations of inter nation al 
banking standards. These countries are the least likely to adopt the standards as their 
banks tend to be small and focused on the domestic market, and it is far from obvi­
ous that the standards are the best way to address the financial stability risks and 
challenges of financial sector development these countries face. Yet regulators in 
many of these countries are moving to implement the standards. What is going on?
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Drawing on a wealth of primary evidence from eleven countries in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, we show how regulators’ decisions over whether to 
adopt international standards are made not only in light of technocratic concerns 
about what regulation is optimal for the banks they oversee, but also based on 
political considerations. As in advanced economies, banking regulation in devel­
oping countries is very important and intensely political. It is important because 
bank failures are costly for firms, workers, and taxpayers. It is intensely political 
because how banks are regulated influences how credit is allocated in the econ­
omy, and this in turn affects which groups in society get to derive value from 
processes of economic growth.
What is striking about the politics of banking regulation in low­ and lower­
middle­income countries is that international considerations loom large. We show 
how the impetus to converge on international standards stems from large banks 
and regulators in these countries looking to bolster their reputation in the eyes of 
international investors and regulators in other jurisdictions; the flow of ideas 
from international policy circles; and politicians and banks on a quest to attract 
international capital and integration into global finance. Our first contribution, then, 
is to show the precise ways in which the decisions of regulators based in Washington, 
DC, London, Beijing, and the capitals of other major financial centres decisively 
shape the decisions of regulators based in Accra, Hanoi, Ouagadougou, and other 
developing countries on the periphery of the global financial system.
Yet recognizing the powerful impact of international factors does not mean we 
can simply dismiss regulators in peripheral developing countries as standard­
takers, compelled by pressures from other governments, international organiza­
tions, and incentives generated by markets to implement the standards set by 
regulators from the world’s most powerful countries (Drezner, 2008). Integration 
into global finance does expose peripheral developing countries to external pres­
sures that constrain regulatory choices, but it also provides new opportunities for 
some domestic actors.
Our second contribution is to show that there is tremendous variation in the 
responses of regulators in peripheral developing countries to international stand­
ards, and to account for it. Very few regulators in peripheral developing countries 
have adopted these international standards tout court. Instead we see regulators 
responding in very different ways. Some regulators are ambitious in their adop­
tion of international standards, keeping abreast of developments in the Basel 
Committee and adopting the major elements of international standards as they 
are issued. Other regulators are more cautious, taking a slower and highly se lect­
ive approach, only adopting some elements and tailoring them to their local con­
text. Some eschew the latest standards entirely, sticking with regulations based on 
the much simpler standards issued by the Basel Committee in the 1980s.
To explain cross­country variation in regulators’ responses, we identify the 
incentives that they face to diverge from international standards. High among 
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these are concerns among politicians about a loss of control over the domestic 
financial system and the ability to direct credit in the economy; concerns on the 
part of regulators about the viability and desirability of implementing standards 
that are calibrated for more complex financial systems; and opposition from 
small domestic banks. As peripheral developing countries are embedded in the 
inter nation al financial system to different extents and in different ways, and 
their domestic politics and institutions vary, regulators face different mixes of 
incentives. Building from the existing literature and our case studies, we develop 
analytical framework that explains why it is that some configurations of domestic 
politics and forms of integration into global finance generate processes of conver­
gence with international standards, while other configurations create processes 
of divergence.
While we focus on banking regulation, our findings speak to other scholarship 
exploring the ways in which decisions made by governments and firms in the core 
of the global economy powerfully shape, although do not determine, decisions 
made by their counterparts in the periphery (e.g. Phillips, 2017). More broadly, our 
work contributes to scholarship that seeks to understand the global economy from 
the vantage point of actors in the periphery, rather than the centre, which yields 
fresh insights into how the global economy functions as a system. Scholars of 
international political economy are increasingly researching the ways in which 
large emerging economies like China, Brazil, and Mexico interface with the global 
economy. Yet scant attention is paid to smaller countries, particularly small devel­
oping countries, and the ways in which actors in these countries navigate the 
global economy (Acharya, 2014). 
Core–periphery dynamics in global finance
Following a dramatic increase in the globalization of markets for goods, services, 
capital, and information since the 1980s, national economies are more integrated 
than ever, generating an unprecedented level of economic interdependence.1 
Within this interdependent system, economic wealth and power is heavily con­
centrated in relatively few countries. As at 2017, the largest four countries (US, 
China, Japan, and Germany) accounted for half of the world’s total economic 
output, while the largest twenty countries accounted for more than four­fifths.2 
With the fragmentation of production processes, economic power is increasingly 
1 The slow­down in cross­border flows of trade and finance after 2008 led some to speculate that 
globalization is in retreat, but dramatic increases in cross­border data and information flows suggest 
that it has simply entered a new digital phase (Lund et al., 2017).
2 Author’s calculations based on World Bank data for 200 countries. GDP and population data 
averaged over 2015–17. Data available at: https://databank.worldbank.org.
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concentrated at the firm level too. The vast majority of international trade occurs 
in global value chains led by transnational corporations and these production 
systems generate one in five jobs worldwide (UNCTAD,  2013; ILO,  2015). 
Unsurprisingly, the world’s largest firms are overwhelmingly based in the world’s 
largest economies. As at 2013, there were 8,000 companies worldwide with a rev­
enue of more than US$1 billion and half were headquartered in the US, China, 
Japan, and Germany (Dobbs et al.,  2013, p. 22). The global economy then is a 
hierarchical, interdependent system, with a distinct core and periphery, in which 
economic power is concentrated among relatively few countries and firms.
With attention in academic and policy circles focused on dynamics in countries 
in the core of the global economy, it is easy to overlook how many governments, 
firms, and citizens are located in countries on the periphery. It is conceptually and 
empirically challenging to precisely delineate between the core and periphery, as it 
is dynamic and evolving, as the recent experiences of East Asian countries like 
South Korea and China powerfully illustrate. These countries were peripheral to 
the global economy three decades ago but are now part of the core.
Yet even a cursory glance at the data indicates the magnitude of the periphery: 
180 countries, home to 2.9 billion people, account for less than one­fifth of the 
world’s economy.3 In more than one hundred countries, governments manage 
economies less than 1 per cent of the size of the US economy.4 While some of 
these peripheral countries have small populations and high incomes, like Malta 
and Iceland, the vast majority are low­ and lower­middle­income developing 
countries, like Nicaragua and Zambia.
Nowhere is this concentration of wealth more pronounced than in inter nation al 
finance. The globalization of finance has taken a quantum leap since the 1980s, 
spurred on by the deregulation of banks and liberalization of cross­border capital 
flows. Financial flows reached dizzying heights by 2007, with US$12.4 trillion mov­
ing between countries on the eve of the global financial crisis, equivalent to 23 per 
cent of global GDP (Lund et al., 2017). Although new financial centres are emerging, 
financial assets remain heavily concentrated in the US, and to a lesser extent the UK 
(Oatley et al., 2013), and, as in other sectors of the global economy, have seen the 
emergence of very large firms. Some banks are so large, complex, and intercon­
nected that twenty­nine of them, including Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, have 
been classified by regulators as ‘systemically important’ on a global level (FSB, 2016). 
In 2017, the world’s ten lar gest banks had combined assets of more than US$28 
trillion, and thirty­seven of the world’s largest one hundred banks were located in 
just three countries (the US, China, and Japan) (Mehmood and Chaudhry, 2018).
The flipside of this heavy concentration of global finance is that more than 150 
countries account for less than 10 per cent of all liquid financial assets around the 
3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
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world.5 These peripheral countries are integrated into this hierarchical system of 
global finance to an ever­greater extent, a trend that is particularly pronounced in 
developing countries. Following waves of privatization and lib er al iza tion in the 
1980s and 1990s, foreign bank presence increased and by 2007 accounted for more 
than half of the market share in sixty­three developing countries (Claessens and 
van Horen, 2012). In the wake of the global financial crisis, many European and 
some US banks have retrenched, closing their operations in peripheral countries. 
However, this has not reduced the amount of foreign bank presence, as the space 
they left has been filled by banks from China, Canada, and Japan, as well as rapidly 
expanding regional banks (Enoch et al., 2015; Lund et al., 2017).
As a result of these changes, developing countries now have a higher level of 
foreign bank presence than industrialized countries, making them particularly 
vulnerable to financial crises and regulatory changes in other jurisdictions. This 
heightened interconnectedness was powerfully illustrated during the 2007–8 
global financial crisis which, unlike previous crises, affected all types of countries 
around the world (Claessens, 2017). Although there are exceptions and regional 
differences, few peripheral countries have been left out of this trend of increasing 
financial integration.
Concentrations of power and wealth in the financial system generate distinct 
core–periphery dynamics (Bauerle Danzman et al., 2017; Ghosh, 2007). As finan­
cial globalization has intensified, market movements in the financial core have 
had ever­increasing effects on financial markets on the periphery (e.g. Aizenman 
et al., 2015; Akyuz, 2010; Reddy, 2010; Rey, 2015). This was illustrated by the ‘taper 
tantrum’ in 2013 as moves by the US Federal Reserve to normalize interest rates 
led to an outflow of capital from emerging economies. In general, a reduction in 
demand for capital in the core generates capital inflow bonanzas in the periphery, 
and banking crises when increased demand in the core leads these flows to 
reverse (Bauerle Danzman et al., 2017; Rey, 2015).
Similarly, as core countries are home to the world’s largest banks and other 
financial market actors, regulatory decisions in the core shape the worldwide 
behaviour of these actors, affecting financial markets in the periphery. For 
instance, changes in the regulatory and enforcement landscape in core countries 
have significantly contributed to a reduction of correspondent banking relations, 
particularly in Europe and Central Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific 
(IMF, 2017).
Low­income countries are positioned particularly precariously in global finance. 
Increased levels of integrated into the global economy have left low­income 
5 Author’s calculations. Data on liquid liabilities in millions USD (2000 constant) for 178 coun­
tries, calculated as a five­year average (2013–17) extracted from the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development Database: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global­financial­ 
development­database.
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countries more exposed and vulnerable to international shocks. However, as they 
have resource­constrained governments and many economically vulnerable citi­
zens, they have the least resources to cope with them (IMF, 2011).
While dynamics in the core have major impacts on the periphery, dramatic 
changes in the periphery rarely impact the core. A banking crisis in a country in 
the core reverberates throughout the system because countries in the core are 
intimately connected to many other countries and hold many of their financial 
assets. Conversely, because peripheral countries are connected to only a few other 
countries and any one peripheral country holds a relatively small proportion of 
the assets of core countries, a banking crisis in a peripheral country has a limited 
impact on other countries (Oatley et al., 2013).
Peripheral countries: excluded from global  
financial governance
The fortunes of peripheral countries are increasingly shaped by market dynamics 
and regulatory decisions in the core of the global economy, but peripheral coun­
tries are chronically under­represented in many of the international bodies set up 
to govern the global economy. Again, this is particularly true in global financial 
governance, and most pronounced for low­ and lower­middle­income countries 
(Griffith­Jones and Persaud, 2008; Jones and Knaack, 2019).
In the 1970s, in response to growing financial interdependence and the height­
ened risk of cross­border financial contagion, central bank governors from the 
world’s largest financial centres came together to form the Basel Committee. 
They came together to agree minimum regulatory and supervisory standards for 
inter nation ally active banks. As financial globalization intensified, other standard­
setting bodies were created, including for securities (the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions), insurance (the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors), and accounting (the International Accounting Standards Board). 
At the end of the 1990s, leaders of the G7 countries created the Financial Stability 
Forum (the forerunner of the Financial Stability Board) to bring these disparate 
standard­setting bodies together in a bid to improve cooperation and inter nation al 
financial stability.
By design, peripheral developing countries found themselves at the margins of 
these standard­setting bodies. The remit of these bodies was to promote financial 
stability in the core of the global financial system and membership has been 
restricted to regulators from the world’s largest financial centres. Much of the 
regulation flowing from the Bank of International Settlements, the Financial 
Stability Board, the Financial Action Task Force, and other standard­setting bodies 
is designed to regulate the world’s largest international banks.
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Membership of the Basel Committee was expanded to incorporate ten emerging 
market economies following the global financial crisis.6 However, even among 
Basel members, regulators from emerging and developing countries are less 
engaged in Basel Committee proceedings than their counterparts from industri­
alised countries. In global regulatory politics, institutional capacity and regulatory 
expertise are important sources of power (Slaughter, 2004; Baker, 2009; Posner, 
2010; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). In Basel Committee proceedings, an incum­
bent network of well­resourced regulators from industrialized countries continues 
to dominate the regulatory debate (Chey, 2016; Walter, 2016).
The vast majority of developing countries are not members of the Basel 
Committee, and have minimal input in the standard­setting processes. Only 
two of the world’s eighty­four low­ and lower­middle income countries have a 
seat at the standard­setting table: India and Indonesia. Although the Basel 
Committee has a long­standing Basel Consultative Group that is designed to 
promote dialogue between members and non­members, it is dominated by 
developed countries.
Thus, as Pistor (2013) notes, through the prowess of the financial institutions 
they house and their control over the key decision­making processes, regulators 
from the world’s largest economies determine the rules of the game when it comes 
to global finance.
International banking standards: ‘best practice’  
for peripheral developing countries?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the under­representation of peripheral developing coun­
tries in standard­setting processes results in standards that are ill­suited for regu­
lating banks in many developing countries, particularly those with nascent 
financial markets, resource­constrained regulators, and relatively small banks. 
There is consensus in academic and policy circles that in financial regulation ‘one 
size does not fit all’. International banking standards are the product of technical 
discussions and political compromises among regulators from countries in the 
core of the financial system. Even for these countries, there is a divergence 
between international standards and the sui generis regulations that would be 
most appropriate to each jurisdiction’s industry structure, pre­existing financial 
6 After the global financial crisis regulators from the world’s largest developing countries (those 
belonging to the G20) were invited to join the Financial Stability Board and related committees. The 
Basel Committee now covers twenty­eight jurisdictions, including regulators from several large 
developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. The cur­
rent membership comprises forty­five members from twenty­eight jurisdictions, including the G20 
countries. See: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm.
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regulation, and political preferences (e.g. Barth, Caprio, and Levine,  2006; The 
Warwick Commission, 2009). The gap between international standards and the 
regulations that would be optimal at the national level is greatest for developing 
countries, particularly low­income developing countries, as the continued dom in­
ance of developed countries in decision­making results in standards that are 
poorly calibrated for their financial sectors and regulatory capacities.
Should banking regulators in countries in peripheral developing countries base 
their regulations on international standards? The answer is not obvious. An eff ect­
ive ly regulated banking sector is of vital importance for peripheral developing 
countries, and effective regulation has become even more important as integration 
into global finance has intensified. Banking crises have high costs in terms of lost 
economic growth, unemployment, and the fiscal costs of bailouts (Amaglobeli 
et al., 2015). Opening up the financial sector exacerbates the risks of banking crisis 
and sharpens the need for sound regulation (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013).
The general argument in support of modelling national regulations on ‘inter­
nation al best practices’ is that effective regulations are costly to design. Rather than 
spend precious resources designing their own sui generis regulations, resource­
constrained governments can save time and effort by adopting the tried­and­tested 
practices of regulators in other countries. Yet practices that have been effective in 
one context will not necessarily be effective when transposed into a different one 
(Andrews et al.,  2013). Financial systems differ greatly even among advanced 
industrialized countries (e.g. Haber and Calomiris, 2015; Zysman, 1984) and regu­
lations need to be carefully calibrated to reflect local economic and institutional 
contexts if they are to be effective (Barth et al., 2006; Barth and Caprio, 2018).
The mismatch between international standards and the regulatory needs of 
peripheral developing countries has grown wider with time, as international 
standards have become increasingly complex and targeted at reducing specific 
forms of risk­taking that are most prevalent in large international banks. The first 
set of international banking standards (Basel I) were agreed by the Basel 
Committee in 1988 and, along with the accompanying Basel Core Principles, they 
were relatively simple and straightforward to use. They were widely adopted 
across the world and are still used by many Basel member countries for the regu­
lation of smaller domestic banks (Hohl et al., 2018).
As international banks grew in size and developed increasingly sophisticated 
financial products, the Basel Committee responded with increasingly complex 
regulatory standards. Basel II (agreed in 2004) and III (agreed in stages between 
2010 and 2017) were designed for regulating internationally active banking groups 
with complex business models that are subject to a variety of risks, including 
the ones posed by their own operational complexity (Restoy, 2018). Under Basel I, 
the regulatory capital a bank needed to hold could be calculated ‘on the back of a 
small envelope by a competent clerk’, but ascertaining the capital requirements 
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for a large bank under Basel II can easily require over 200 million calculations 
(Haldane, 2013, pp. 3–4).
Basel standards have been widely criticized for failing to effectively regulate 
banks in the core of the global economy, so it is unclear that they are ‘best prac­
tice’ even for regulating the world’s largest banks. Critics point out that Basel II 
espoused a regulatory approach that ceded too much discretion to banks and 
ultimately contributed to the global financial crisis (e.g. Admati, 2016; Bayoumi, 
2017; Haldane,  2013; Lall,  2012; Persaud,  2013; Romano,  2014; Tarullo,  2008; 
Underhill and Zhang,  2008). Substantial reforms were made following the 
global financial crisis, embodied in the Basel III standards. While experts agree 
that Basel III is an improvement on Basel II, the overall level of capital that 
banks are required to hold remains far too low to ensure stability and banks are 
still allowed to use complex, potentially flawed, and gameable internal models 
(e.g. Admati,  2016; Admati and Hellwig,  2014; Haldane,  2013; Hoenig,  2013; 
Lall, 2012; Romano, 2014).
In addition to these broad criticisms of the Basel approach, regulators in develop­
ing countries face particular challenges when they look to implement the standards. 
These are not a consequence of the regulatory stringency demanded by Basel II and 
III standards, as pre­existing capital and liquidity requirements in developing 
countries are often higher than the minimums stipulated. Instead implementation 
challenges arise from the excessive complexity of the standards, and the fact they are 
not designed with less developed financial markets in mind. Although the Basel 
standards do offer a menu of options to regulators, the full range of options proposed 
by the Basel Committee is not properly thought through for low­income countries, 
resulting in their adoption of overly complex regulations for the level of economic 
development and complexity of their financial system (World Bank, 2012).
Overall, the available evidence, which we review in detail in Chapter 2, sug­
gests that while there are strong arguments for strengthening the regulation and 
supervision of banks in peripheral developing countries, it is far from clear that 
the Basel standards and accompanying Basel Core Principles are the most effective 
approach (Barth and Caprio, 2018). The Basel Core Principles and the simplest set 
of international standards (Basel I) are widely regarded as useful for low­ and 
lower­middle­income countries, but many experts question the appropriateness of 
the more complex Basel II and III standards, arguing that financial stability may be 
achieved through simpler regulatory approaches. Indeed, many question the 
appropriateness of Basel II and III for smaller banks even in the core of the finan­
cial system (Buckley, 2016). It is striking that, while regulators in many developing 
countries are moving to implement Basel II and III standards across their com­
mercial banks, many regulators from Basel Committee countries only subject their 
largest banks, typically those with balance sheets of US$20–30 billion, to the full 
suite of international banking standards (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017).
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The puzzling response of peripheral developing  
countries to Basel standards
Given the concerns outlined above, the international policy advice to regulators 
in developing countries, particularly in smaller, low­income developing coun­
tries, is to proceed cautiously with Basel II and III. The World Bank, IMF, and 
Financial Stability Board advise developing countries with less internationally 
integrated financial systems and/or with substantial supervisory capacity con­
straints to ‘first focus on reforms to ensure compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles and only move to the more advanced capital standards at a pace tailored 
to their circumstances’ [emphasis added] (FSB, IMF, WB, 2011, p. 14). Yet, periph­
eral developing countries are moving ahead to implement Basel II and III to a 
greater extent and at a faster pace than this policy advice appears to warrant.
Data on the implementation of international standards in countries outside of 
the Basel Committee is patchy, but the evidence we have suggests that Basel 
standards are being widely implemented, including in many developing countries 
(Hohl et al., 2018).
Data on implementation of Basel standards in forty­five low­ and lower­income 
countries reveals substantial variation (Figure 1.1). In practice Basel standards are 
compendia of different regulations, and regulators can choose how many of the 
different components to implement. As at 2015, out of a possible total of twenty­
two components of the latest and more complex international standards (Basel II, 
II.5, and III), regulators in nineteen of the forty­five countries were not imple­
menting any, preferring to stay with simpler Basel I or sui generis standards. 
Regulators in a further twenty­one countries had implemented between one and 
nine components, while regulators in five countries had implemented between 
ten and thirteen. Thus, while many regulators in low­ and lower­middle­income 
countries on the periphery are engaging with the latest international standards, 
they are doing so in very different ways.
Strikingly, there is substantial variation even among countries in the same geo­
graphic region. For instance, among countries in Eastern Africa, regulators in 
Kenya were implementing nine components in 2015, including aspects of the very 
latest Basel III standards, while neighbouring Tanzania, Rwanda, and Ethiopia 
were implementing the much simpler Basel I standard. Similarly, in West Africa, 
Nigeria, Liberia, and Guinea had adopted components of Basel II and/or III, but 
Ghana, Gambia, and the eight francophone countries in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) had not.
What explains these patterns of convergence and divergence? Why is it that 
governments in some peripheral developing countries opt to converge on inter­
nation al standards, while governments in other countries opt to maintain diver­
gent standards? This is the question at the heart of this book.
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Our argument in a nutshell
We examine the political economy of banking regulation in eleven peripheral 
developing countries and regions, four of which are classified as low income 
(Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and WAEMU) and seven as lower­middle income 
(Angola, Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Vietnam).7 Low­ and 
lower­middle­income countries are in many ways the least likely to adopt the latest 
and most complex international standards (Basel II and III). They have nascent and 
relatively small financial sectors and their regulatory institutions are particularly 
resource­constrained.
Drawing on a wealth of primary evidence, including interviews with more 
than 200 regulators, bank employees, and experts, we trace the responses of each 
of these countries and regions to international banking standards since the late 
1990s. We find that regulators in our case study countries and regions have 
7 The eight countries belonging to the WAEMU follow harmonized banking regulations and we 
study them as a single case. Seven of the eight countries are low income. As at 2019, the World Bank 
defines low­income economies as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas 














































































































































































































































Figure 1.1 Implementation of international banking standards in low­ and lower­
middle­income countries.
Note: ** denotes a country that is studied in this volume
Source: Data from FSI Survey 2015 covering one hundred jurisdictions outside of the Basel Committee, 
supplemented with data from case studies in this volume. Income categories are according to World Bank 
classifications for the same year
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responded in very different ways to international banking standards, with their 
level of engagement increasing over time. At the start of our research project in 
2015, only three of the eleven jurisdictions had implemented any components of 
Basel II and III (Pakistan, Kenya, and Nigeria). By January 2019, Ethiopia was the 
only country that had not implemented at least one component (Figure 1.2).
Of course, implementation on paper may not lead to substantive compliance 
in practice. Regulatory authorities may issue regulations that are in line with 
inter nation al standards, but they may be intentionally lax in their enforcement, 
exercising regulatory forbearance. Scholars have labelled such situations as forms 
of ‘cosmetic’ or ‘mock compliance’ (Chey, 2016, 2006; Walter, 2008). Alternatively, 
regulatory authorities may be diligent in their supervision but lack the resources 
to properly monitor and enforce regulations. For their part, banks may comply 
with the regulations and bring their behaviour into line with regulatory require­
ments, they may endeavour to comply but fail because the regulations are too 
complex or cumbersome, or they may intentionally act to circumvent the regula­
tions. Such practices have been documented among Basel Committee members, 
prompting scholars to question whether the standards change regulatory behaviour 
in meaningful ways.8
In this book we are careful to distinguish between the implementation of inter­
nation al standards and substantive compliance with them. We use the terms 
‘adoption’ and ‘implementation’ interchangeably, to refer to the incorporation of 
international standards into domestic regulations through enabling domestic 
legislation, the issuance of domestic regulations, and guidance. We use the term 
‘compliance’ to refer to the enforcement of these regulations by the relevant 
authorities and behavioural changes by banks. Empirically it is relatively straight­
forward to identify the extent to which a country is implementing international 
standards, as domestic regulations can be compared to international standards. It 
is much harder to gauge the level of substantive compliance. We focus on the for­
mer, seeking to understand why regulators in peripheral developing countries are 
adopting international standards, but also draw on a range of qualitative evidence 
to gauge levels of enforcement and substantive compliance.
Drawing on the rich empirical material from our case studies, we develop an 
analytical framework which sets out the political economy conditions under 
8 On Basel I implementation by Basel Committee members see (Chey, 2014; Quillin, 2008). On the 
failure of the US and EU to implement Basel II and III, respectively, see (Quaglia, 2019).
Ethiopia (0) Angola (5)
Vietnam (3) Bolivia (5) Nigeria (6) Tanzania (8) Rwanda (10)
Kenya (7) Ghana (8) WAEMU (10) Pakistan (14) Higher Levels of
Basel II and III
Implementation
Figure 1.2 Implementation of international banking standards in case study countries 
(January 2019).
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which we expect to see trajectories of convergence, divergence, or subversion in 
countries on the financial periphery. These are briefly set out below, and fully 
elaborated in Chapter 3.
Incentives to converge
We identify four factors that provide strong incentives for regulators in peripheral 
developing countries to converge on international banking standards, above and 
beyond concerns about mitigating financial risk. Indeed, we find that concern 
about mitigating financial risk is rarely the main driver of convergence.
The first originates from politicians pursuing a development strategy that iden­
tifies integrating into global finance as a major aspect of their country’s  economic 
development strategy. In much the same way as politicians in the past sought to 
emulate East Asia’s tiger economies by creating national champions in the manu­
facturing sector to reap gains from international trade, a new generation of politi­
cians is looking to pos ition their countries as international financial centres like 
Singapore and Mauritius in order to reap gains from global finance. Politicians 
promote the implementation of the latest international banking standards in a bid 
to signal to potential international investors that their country’s financial services 
sector is world­class.
The second stems from large, internationally oriented domestic banks that are 
seeking to expand into new international markets. As newcomers to international 
markets, banks from peripheral developing countries face a reputational deficit, 
and international third parties do not have sufficient information to readily ascer­
tain whether they are soundly regulated. The adoption of international standards 
is a mechanism for banks to signal to regulators in host countries that they are 
soundly regulated. Regulators face strong incentives to adopt international stand­
ards in order to facilitate the international expansion of large domestic banks.
The third incentive stems from the engagement of regulators with their peers 
from other countries that are implementing international standards. The expan­
sion of cross­border banking has been accompanied by the creation of trans­
nation al professional networks, through which bank regulators come together to 
exchange experiences and ideas about how best to regulate banks. Regulatory 
authorities also engage with each other through home–host supervisory relation­
ships, as they work together to supervise international banks. We explain why 
regular interactions with peers who are implementing international standards 
generate strong incentives for regulators to follow suit.
Finally, regular interactions with international financial institutions like the 
IMF and World Bank can provide strong incentives for regulators to implement 
international standards. The IMF and World Bank provide extensive technical 
assistance and training, including in the area of bank regulation and supervision. 
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While regulators often face strong incentives to follow the advice of these institutions, 
particularly when their country has an ongoing assistance programme, we find 
that the advice from these institutions is not consistent with regards to inter­
nation al standards, sometimes encouraging extensive adoption and sometimes 
advising against it.
Incentives to diverge
Working in opposition to these incentives are four factors that generate incentives 
for regulators to diverge from international standards. The first of these originates 
from politicians pursuing interventionist financial policies, where the state plays 
an important role in allocating credit. The Basel framework is premised on 
market­based allocation of credit, with the government only stepping in to address 
market failures. Policy­directed lending and the general use of financial inter­
medi ar ies as instruments of government policy are identified under the Basel 
framework as distorting market signals and impeding effective supervision. Thus, 
in countries where the government relies extensively on policy­directed lending, 
the Basel framework is unlikely to be an attractive basis for regulation.
Second, where politicians used their control over banks to allocate credit 
to political allies, or when powerful economic elites use banks to allocate credit to 
their own businesses and curry favour with politicians, these groups are likely to 
oppose the implementation and enforcement of international banking standards. 
Third, regulators may be sceptical about the applicability of Basel standards for 
their local context, particularly the more complex elements of Basel II and III. 
Fourth, banks with business models focused exclusively on the domestic market 
in peripheral developing countries are likely to oppose the implementation of 
complex regulations because of the additional compliance costs this generates. 
Opposition is likely to be strongest from small, weak banks, for whom the costs of 
compliance are highest.
Dynamics of convergence and divergence
As the political, economic, and institutional environment differs across periph­
eral developing countries, regulators experience incentives to converge and 
diverge through different channels and with varying levels of intensity, prompting 
them to respond differently to international standards. We explain why the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence are likely to differ depending on which 
actors champion implementation and their relative power in domestic regulatory 
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politics. We distinguish between different pathways to convergence, divergence, 
and mock compliance, and identify the salient features of these pathways.
Our analytical framework focuses on three main actors: the regulator (usually 
situated within the central bank), large banks, and incumbent politicians. 
Regulatory outcomes are the product of the relative power position of these 
three actors and are shaped by the wider domestic and international context in 
which they are embedded. A striking feature of our empirical findings is that 
convergence and divergence dynamics in peripheral developing countries are 
driven mainly by politicians and regulators. In stark contrast to their counter­
parts in industrialised countries, banks are rarely the most dominant actor in 
regulatory politics, particularly in the low­ and lower­middle­income countries 
we focus on. While there are some exceptions, the underdeveloped nature of the 
formal economy and relatively small size of the banking sector leave individual 
banks, and the banking sector as a whole, with much less power to shape regula­
tory outcomes than in many advanced economies. Yet this does not mean that 
financial market players have little purchase on regulators’ decisions. Far from it. 
Operating in a context of capital scarcity, regulators and politicians in peripheral 
developing countries are particularly attuned to the ways in which international 
regulators, banks, and investors will react to their decisions. As we explain below, 
inter nation al finance has an outsized impact on regulatory outcomes (see also 
Mosley (2003a)).
It is this dynamic that sets regulatory harmonization between the core and 
periphery apart from regularity harmonization among core countries. In ex plan­
ations of regulatory harmonization among core countries, the interests of large 
domestic banks loom large. For instance, in his seminal work, Singer (2007) 
argues that regulators face a dilemma of increasing regulatory requirements in 
order to mitigate the risk of financial crisis, or easing those requirements and 
enhancing the international competitiveness of the domestic financial sector 
(Singer, 2007, p. 19). In this chapter we show how regulators in the periphery face 
a different dilemma, namely that of implementing overly complex and costly 
international standards in a bid to attract international finance and help their 
banks expand abroad, or eschewing those standards to focus on regulations better 
attuned to supporting their financial sector development.
Strikingly, and in contrast to our initial expectations, we find that the presence 
of foreign banks does not provide regulators in peripheral developing countries 
with strong incentives to converge on international standards. Rather than lobby 
for the adoption of complex and costly global standards to gain a competitive 
edge over domestic banks, we explain why foreign banks typically adapt their 
business models to the local context, adopting a similar stance to domestic banks 
when it comes to regulation in their host jurisdiction.
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Contribution to scholarship
Our primary contribution is to develop a new framework that specifies the channels 
of regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and on the periphery 
of the global financial system, and to probe its explanatory power through 
 in­depth analysis in eleven countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
We draw on, and contribute to, the literature on the diffusion of global norms. 
Our comparative country case studies that reveal how international regulatory 
norms interact with the domestic politics of regulation in a variety of developing 
country contexts. We parse out the specific ways that cross­border relationships 
between regulators, politicians, and banks in peripheral developing countries and 
a variety of international actors generate incentives to converge on international 
standards. In complementary work, we draw on these insights and use spatial 
econometrics to reveal how these cross­border relationships help explain patterns 
of regulatory convergence in the global economy (Jones and Zeitz 2019).
Scholars have previously drawn attention to the ways in which international 
organizations like the IMF and World Bank have promulgated international 
standards and the development of financial markets (Lavelle, 2004; Mosley, 2010, 
2003b; Wilf, 2017); highlighted the incentives that markets generate to converge 
on international standards (Simmons,  2001); revealed the ways in which other 
states harness the reputational dynamics in global markets to pressure conver­
gence (Sharman,  2009, 2008); and the ways in which transnational networks 
generate processes of learning and emulation that drive convergence (Dobbin 
et al., 2007; Porter, 2005).
This literature is important in identifying the mechanisms through which 
international standards spread from the core to the periphery, but tells us little 
about how actors in peripheral countries engage with these processes and why 
these mechanisms generate convergence in some peripheral countries but not 
others. In Jones and Zeitz (2017) we show that there is a correlation between level 
of financial sector development and the extent of Basel adoption, which suggests 
that regulators’ decisions are strongly influenced by the suitability of the Basel 
standards to their country’s level of financial sector development, but this doesn’t 
explain why countries with similar levels of development respond differently to 
international standards.
We also contribute to a substantial literature on the politics of financial regula­
tion in developing countries and emerging economies. This literature helped us 
identify the ways in which domestic politics and institutions are likely to shape 
responses to international standards. A few scholars have looked specifically at 
how individual developing countries respond to international financial standards 
and shown how reformist coalitions can drive the adoption of international 
standards, often in the face of entrenched vested interests (Walter  2008 and 
Chey  2007,  2014). Haggard and Maxfield (1996) and Martinez­Diaz (2009) 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
  19
examine the politics surrounding capital account liberalization and bank ownership, 
respectively, and highlight the role that financial crises have in reconfiguring 
domestic politics and generating reforms. Others show how varying distribution 
of power among firms, banks, and governments shapes regulatory outcomes 
(Haggard and Lee, 1995) and how political economy dynamics help account for 
variation in the strength of regulatory institutions (Hamilton­Hart,  2002). We 
contribute to this literature in showing the ways in which integration of sub­
national actors into global finance and international policy networks influences 
the politics of financial regulation within developing countries.
Our approach is inspired by the new interdependence approach in inter nation al 
political economy, which draws attention to the global economy as a hierarchy of 
interdependent networks (Farrell and Newman, 2016, 2014; Oatley, 2016; Oatley 
et al., 2013; Quaglia and Spendzharova, 2017). This literature seeks to capture rela­
tions of interdependence in ways that have not been possible in the open economy 
approach that has dominated international political economy in recent years. We 
contribute to a strand of this literature that is starting to grapple with core–periphery 
dynamics in global finance (Bauerle Danzman et al., 2017).
Our second contribution is to draw attention to the politics of financial regula­
tion in peripheral developing countries and, in doing so, link debates in inter­
nation al political economy to a set of countries that scholars rarely engage with, 
and shed light on a topic that is rarely examined by scholars in area studies.
There is a vast, and growing, literature on the politics of financial regulation 
within and among countries in the core of the global financial system (see for 
instance Botzem,  2014; Büthe and Mattli,  2011; Haber and Calomiris,  2015; 
Helleiner, 2014; Kapstein, 1989; Lall, 2012; Lavelle, 2013; Oatley and Nabors, 1998; 
Perry and Nölke, 2006; Porter, 2005; Quaglia, 2019, 2014; Singer, 2007; Tarullo, 
2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008; Young, 2012; Zysman, 1984). Scholarship on the 
politics of financial regulation in emerging economies and developing countries 
is equally insightful yet much less extensive and has tended to focus on the largest 
emerging and developing countries (Chey,  2014; Haggard and Lee,  1995; 
Hamilton­Hart,  2002; Hutchcroft,  1998; Knaack,  2017; Lavelle,  2004; Martinez­
Diaz, 2009; Naqvi, 2019; Walter, 2008). This reflects a tendency among scholars of 
international political economy, and international relations more broadly, to focus 
on countries with the largest economies on the grounds that they exert systemic 
influence over the global economy and the way it is governed (Drezner, 2008). 
Yet, as Acharya (2014) forcefully argues, the result is that the discipline ‘does not 
reflect the voices, experiences, knowledge claims and contributions of the vast 
majority of societies and states in the world, and often marginalizes those outside 
of the core countries of the West’.
A particularly striking gap in the literature is the dearth of attention paid to the 
politics of financial regulation in African countries, and low­ and lower­middle­
income countries in other regions. Economists have studied the financial 
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regulation in these countries from various vantage points and sought to identify 
reforms that will support development, including Beck (2011), Murinde (2012), 
and Gottschalk and Griffith­Jones (2016). Yet few political scientists have examined 
the politics of financial regulation, despite the central role played by the financial 
sector in economic development. Notable exceptions include Boone (2005), who 
seeks to explain variation in financial sector reforms across African countries and 
attributes this to differences in the strength, diversity, and autonomy of private 
capital vis­à­vis the state. Lewis and Stein (1997) study the politics of financial 
reform in Nigeria and attribute failure to weaknesses in the capacity of state insti­
tutions and private banks. More recently, Dafe (2017) examines how sources of 
capital shape the policy stances of central banks in Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda, 
while Soares de Oliveira and Ferreira (2018) analyse the evolution of banking in 
Angola. For almost all of our case study countries and regions, our chapters are 
the first attempt to systemically analyse the politics of financial regulation.
Policy implications
Our research has substantial policy implications. There is an emerging consensus 
among international policymakers that countries outside of the Basel Committee, 
particularly low­income and lower­middle income countries, should be cautious 
in their embrace of international standards and adopt a proportional approach 
(Barth and Caprio, 2018; Hohl et al., 2018; Restoy, 2018). Yet this well­intentioned 
advice overlooks the powerful reputational, competitive, and functional incen­
tives generated by financial globalization. that, as we show, may lead regulators 
to adopt international standards even if they are ill suited to their local context. 
We show how, in today’s world of globalized finance, regulators in peripheral 
developing countries cannot simply ignore international standards even when 
they are not appropriately designed for their jurisdiction, as this carries significant 
reputational risks. Financial regulators in peripheral developing countries face 
the challenge of harnessing the prudential, reputational, and competitive benefits 
of international banking standards, while avoiding the implementation risks and 
challenges associated with wholesale adoption.
Our research shows that there is room for manoeuvre at the national level. 
Regulators can take a selective approach to implementation, only implementing 
the components of the international standards that serve a useful regulatory pur­
pose in their jurisdiction, and they can fine­tune these elements to suit the pecu­
liarities of their local financial system. For example, the Central Bank of the 
Philippines has recalibrated the capital requirements associated with lending to 
small­ and medium­sized enterprises to ensure that banks are not unduly dis­
suaded from lending to them.9 Given the high costs of retrofitting international 
9 Discussion with senior regulator from the Philippines, via Skype, September 2018.
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standards and acute resource­constraints that regulators in peripheral developing 
countries face, there is a strong rationale for greater sharing of information and 
experiences among peripheral regulators on the various ways to adapt inter­
nation al standards to better suit their needs.
Our research also provides a compelling argument for reforming international 
standard­setting processes so that international standards better reflect the interests 
of countries on the financial periphery. So far, the international standard­setting 
community has adopted a minimalist ‘do no harm’ approach when it comes to 
international banking standards, seeking to establish where there have been nega­
tive unintended consequences for developing countries and only then looking 
for remedies (e.g. FSB, 2012, 2014). Much more could and should be done at the 
design stage to ensure that international standards work for peripheral develop­
ing countries. While international experts are increasingly advising developing 
countries to take a proportional approach to the implementation of international 
standards (Hohl et al.,  2018; Restoy,  2018), regulators in developing countries 
are left the onerous task of figuring out exactly how to modify international 
standards to suit their local context. Instead, proportionality could be built 
much more systematically into international standards at the design stage, so 
that this resource­intensive task adjusting standards is not left to the regulators 
with the least resources. Related to this, standard­setting processes could be 
opened up to more meaningful input from regulators from peripheral develop­
ing countries. While consultative mechanisms exist, they fall far short of pro­
viding peripheral developing countries with a voice in standard­setting processes 
(Jones and Knaack, 2019).
Structure of the book
This book is divided into three parts.
Part I: Introduction, cross­country variation,  
and analytical argument
Following this introduction, Chapter  2 analyses in more detail the context for 
banking regulation in peripheral developing countries, the evidence on the merits 
and demerits of Basel standards for developing countries, and ways in which 
peripheral countries are, in practice, responding to Basel II and III. Chapter  3 
provides an analytical framework for understanding the political economy of 
implementing international standards in developing countries. It builds from the 
existing literature and the case studies in this volume to identify the conditions 
under which we can expect countries to converge on, diverge from, or subvert 
international standards.
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Part II: Case studies
In Chapters 4 to 14, we present our eleven country case studies, using the analytical 
framework to guide our analysis. Each chapter follows the same format, to 
facilitate cross­case comparison. Each chapter starts by providing an analysis of 
the key features of the financial sector and salient political economy dynamics, 
noting any major shifts over time. It then assesses the extent to which the country 
has based its national regulations and supervisory practices on international 
standards, looking specifically at the adoption and implementation of Basel I, II, 
and III and compliance with the Basel Core Principles. The heart of each case 
study is a political economy explanation for these regulatory decisions, which 
engages with the analytical framework. Each case study concludes with a sum­
mary of the main insights.
We present our case studies according to the extent to which they have converged 
on international standards, starting with the highest adopters, and the specific 
pathway through which convergence and divergence occurred. This sequence is 
summarized in Table 1.1 and followed by short summaries of each case study.
Policy-driven convergence
In three cases, politicians championed convergence on international standards. In 
Chapter 4, Natalya Naqvi explores the politics of adoption in Pakistan, which has 
the highest level of implementation among our case study countries. The impetus for 
converging on international standards has come from different actors over time. 
Table 1.1 Pathways to convergence and divergence among case study countries
Country Pathway Outcome (number of Basel II 
and Basel III components 
implemented out of max. 18)
Pakistan Policy­driven convergence Ambitious implementation (14)
Rwanda Policy­driven convergence Ambitious implementation (10)
Ghana Policy­driven convergence Ambitious implementation (8)
WAEMU IFI­driven convergence Ambitious implementation (10)
Tanzania Regulator­driven convergence Selective implementation (8)
Kenya Regulator­driven convergence Selective implementation (7)
Bolivia Regulator­driven convergence Selective implementation (5)
Nigeria Regulator­driven mock compliance Mock compliance (6)
Angola Politically driven mock compliance Mock compliance (5)
Vietnam Politically driven mock compliance Mock compliance (3)
Ethiopia Policy­driven divergence No implementation (0)
Notes: Ambitious implementation = includes at least one of the more complex components (internal 
models under Basel II and/or liquidity or macroprudential/liquidity standards under Basel III); 
Selective implementation = standardized approaches under Basel II and only microprudential capital 
requirements under Basel III; Mock compliance = on paper, not enforced.
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The adoption of Basel I adoption in the 1980s was driven by the World Bank and 
IMF. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the adoption of Basel II was driven first by 
politicians promoting the expansion of financial services, and then by banking 
sector regulators. Most recently, as banks have internationalized, they have cham­
pioned the implementation of Basel III. Pakistan is one of the few cases where all 
three major actors—politicians, regulators, and major banks—are now aligned 
behind the implementation of the standards, leading to a high and ambitious 
level of implementation.
As Pritish Behuria shows in Chapter 5, for many years, the Rwandan government 
showed little interest in moving beyond Basel  I.  However, in 2015, the govern­
ment’s stance changed and politicians made a formal commitment to the rapid 
adoption and implementation of Basel II and III. This exuberance for adopting 
global standards is puzzling given that Rwanda’s financial sector remains largely 
underdeveloped and the government is aiming to become a developmental state. 
The motivations behind this policy shift are to reduce risk in the financial sector, 
encourage harmonization of financial sector regulation across the East African 
Community (EAC), and develop a service­based economy, including by making 
Kigali a financial hub. The adoption and implementation of the latest inter­
nation al banking standards has become a strategic policy priority for Rwanda’s 
economic leadership.
In Chapter 6, Emily Jones explores the stop­start dynamics of Basel implementa­
tion in Ghana, a pattern that reflects party politics. Moves to implement Basel and 
other international standards have coincided with periods when the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) has been in office. The NPP has a vision for positioning Ghana as a 
financial services hub for West Africa and strong ideological and ma ter ial con­
nections to international finance. In 2017 the NPP government embarked on a 
radical reform of the banking sector, implementing major elements of Basel II and 
III and catapulting Ghana to among the most ambitious implementers of Basel 
standards among our case study countries. In contrast, the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) focused on directing finance to the productive sectors of the 
economy and supporting indigenous banks and the implementation of inter­
nation al standards was not a policy priority during their periods in office.
IFI-driven convergence
In Chapter 7 Ousseni Illy and Seydou Ouedraogo examine the politics of imple­
mentation in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). As 
with Ghana and Rwanda, after implementing Basel I for many years, WAEMU 
moved to adopt Basel II and III standards in 2016 and began implementation in 
2018. Given the weak development of the financial sector in the Union and its 
poor connectedness to the international financial system, this reform was unex­
pected. The adoption of Basel standards has been championed by the Central 
Bank of West African States (BCEAO), under the influence of the IMF, which has 
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strongly encouraged implementation. National governments and domestically 
oriented banks have not played an active role, complicating the implementation 
and enforcement of the new regulations. The Central Bank is embedded in regu­
latory peer networks, has close links with the IMF, and is insulated from domestic 
political pressure because of its supranational position.
Regulator-driven convergence
In Tanzania, Kenya and Bolivia, regulators have championed the implementation 
of international standards, although they have often been more circumspect and 
cautious than the politicians and policymakers that championed adoption in the 
first group of countries. Tanzania has been a slow and cautious adopter of Basel 
standards, as Hazel Gray explains in Chapter 8, although recent moves to imple­
ment the standards have led to a higher level of adoption. Tanzania only finished 
implementing risk­based supervision in 2009 and opted for selective implementa­
tion of Basel II and III standards beginning in 2017. From 1991 to 2008 Tanzania 
liberalized its financial sector under the influence of the IMF and World Bank, 
but a significant gap emerged between the formal commitment to adopting Basel 
standards and the actual pattern of implementation and enforcement. It was only 
from 2009 onwards that Basel implementation was prioritized. This was the result of 
a number of factors including the appointment of a new Governor at the Bank of 
Tanzania (BoT) with strong connections to the international policy community, and 
the influence of regional commitments to regulatory harmonization. The central 
bank adopted a selective and tailored approach to Basel adoption, with different 
regulatory requirements for development banks. Domestic and foreign banks 
initially showed little interest in implementation but their preferences have shifted 
because of pressures from parent banks and anti­money laundering concerns.
In Chapter 9, Radha Upadhyaya examines adoption in Kenya. The impetus for 
Basel implementation has come from the regulator, the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK), which is highly independent, has strong links to international policy 
networks, and is very receptive to international policy ideas. Since 2003, the 
incumbent politicians have also been keen to adopt the latest international stand­
ards in order to attract investment into Kenya’s financial sector. Meanwhile, as the 
banking sector is relatively well capitalized, there has been little opposition from 
banks, with some international and large local banks being mildly in favour of 
Basel II and III adoption. In the Kenyan case the regulator has been the driving 
force for Basel adoption, supported by internationally oriented politicians and 
banks. Although they were early movers, Kenyan regulators have also taken a 
selective approach to implementation.
In Chapter 10, Peter Knaack explores why Bolivia had very ambitious plans 
to implement Basel standards, but these only partly came to fruition. A novel 
financial services law promulgated by the regulator in 2013 established the legal 
framework for a wholesale adoption of Basel II, including all advanced 
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internal­ratings based components, and elements of Basel III. It is puzzling to see 
such a wholehearted embrace of Basel standards by a domestically oriented left­
wing government that follows a heterodox approach to economic policymaking. 
Basel adoption has been driven by a regulatory agency that is embedded in trans­
nation al technocratic regulators networks and actively seeks to implement inter­
nation al standards. Bolivian regulators wrote a wide range of Basel rules into the 
draft legislation. But Bolivian politicians, prioritizing the twin goals of financial 
stability and inclusive growth, grafted onto this legislation significant interven­
tionist policies. Thus, Bolivia’s Basel adoption is pulling in two directions: adher­
ence to Basel Committee­style best practices and, concurrently, financial 
interventionism to stimulate economic growth and financial inclusion.
Regulator-driven mock compliance
In another three countries, Nigeria, Angola and Vietnam, we find evidence of 
mock compliance, where the standards are implemented on paper but not enforced 
in practice. In Chapter  11, Florence Dafe examines Nigeria’s engagement with 
international standards where regulators have gradually adopted Basel I, II, and 
III, although implementation and enforcement has been slow. The impetus for 
Basel adoption has come primarily from regulators, who are embedded in inter­
nation al policy networks. They consider Basel II and III the most appropriate set 
of regulatory standards to stabilize and manage risk in Nigeria’s large, inter nation­
alized banking sector. While Basel adoption was not a salient issue among Nigeria’s 
politicians, Nigeria’s large internationally active banks welcomed the implementa­
tion of Basel II as an important means to enhance their competitiveness and signal 
soundness to markets. However, implementation and enforcement has been slow 
as regulators have conflicting preferences: while promoting Basel II adoption, they 
are reluctant to move quickly to implement and enforce the new standards because 
it might trigger regulatory interventions in several fragile domestic banks. These 
banks play an important role in providing employment and access to finance for 
the private sector, and their resolution would meet with resistance from politicians 
and lead to a loss of confidence in Nigeria’s banking sector.
Politically driven mock compliance
In Chapter  12, Rebecca Engebretsen and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira examine 
Angola’s adoption of Basel standards. As in other resource­rich countries, the 
financial sector in Angola plays a key role in facilitating outgoing financial flows. 
The banking sector is also highly politicized, as loans are extended, often without 
collateral, and bank licences issued to political insiders. The political allocation of 
credit has been an important avenue for securing political support for the regime. 
The result has been strong opposition to the ratcheting up of bank regulation and 
supervision. Yet a balance­of­payments crisis in 2009, falling in oil prices from 
2014, and changes in the global regulatory environment together meant that 
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divergence from international standards was no longer an option. For Angolan 
banks to maintain their links to the global financial market, the country needed 
to signal its readiness to regulate the sector in line with international standards. 
The result has been an upsurge in regulatory efforts since 2009, and especially since 
2014. Yet, because the politicized nature of the banking sector has not changed, 
standards are either not implemented or are implemented but not enforced, lead­
ing to a situation of ‘mock compliance’.
In Vietnam the implementation of international banking standards has been 
the subject of contestation between reformist and conservative factions within 
the governing political party, as Que­Giang Tran­Thi and Tu­Anh Vu­Thanh 
explain in Chapter 13. In any given period, the speed of implementation has been 
affected by which of these factions dominates regulatory decision­making, as well 
as the health of the banking sector. The adoption and implementation of Basel 
standards in Vietnam has gone through three distinctive periods: from 1999–2006, 
the reformist faction pursued international regulations in order to discipline 
state­owned banks and improve the functioning of the financial sector. From 
2006–13, the central bank (SBV) formally adopted Basel II but a domestic bank­
ing crisis effectively halted implementation. More recently there has been a return 
to pro­Basel preferences. However, interventionist financial policies, high imple­
mentation costs, the low internationalization level of the banking sector, and the 
lack of competent technocrats inside both the SBV and domestic private banks 
have all contributed to a high level of regulatory forbearance.
Policy-driven divergence
In Chapter 14, Toni Weis explains why Ethiopia has chosen to diverge from inter­
nation al standards and not to adopt any aspect of Basel II or III. Ethiopia has the 
least internationalized banking sector among our case countries. Despite signifi­
cant exposure to the Basel standards through donors and the IMF, banking super­
visors at the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) have little use for Basel II and III. 
Ethiopia’s decision to diverge from international the Basel framework results from 
a strong preference for political control over the financial sector. The Ethiopian 
government seeks to emulate the example of East Asian ‘tiger’ economies, for 
whom financial repression was a key tool in the pursuit of rapid industrialization. 
However, as Ethiopia’s domestic banks struggle to sustain transformative growth, 
pressures for greater financial openness (and, by extension, for increased regula­
tory convergence) are beginning to mount.
Part III: Conclusion
The book ends with a short Conclusion (Chapter  15) that distils comparative 
insights from across the case studies, identifies areas for future research, and 
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offers policy recommendations. It makes the case for reforming the key institutions 
of global financial governance to increase the voice and influence of actors from 
countries on the periphery.
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The Challenges International Banking 




The effective regulation of banks in peripheral developing countries is vitally 
important, just as it is in advanced and emerging economies. But regulators are 
charged with supervising financial sectors that differ in important ways to those 
of large industrialized economies like the US and EU, and even large emerging 
economies like China, India, and Brazil. This chapter explains how the regulatory 
context differs and why these differences pose specific challenges for regulators in 
low and lower-middle income counties in deciding whether, and how much, of 
the latest set of international standards to adopt.
This chapter provides an overview of financial sectors in peripheral developing 
countries, highlighting the ways in which they differ from financial sectors in 
countries with more industrialised economies. It provides a brief overviews of 
the genesis and evolution of international banking standards, setting out the 
criticisms that have been levelled against their use in more advanced economies, 
before explaining why implementation challenges are acute in many peripheral 
developing countries, particularly low-income countries. The chapter then ana-
lyses patterns of Basel implementation around the world, situating the responses 
of regulators in our case studies, within these broader trends.
As this chapter shows, although Basel standards are commonly referred to as 
‘international best practice’ or ‘the gold standard’ there is surprisingly little evi-
dence to support this claim. While it is important to have minimum standards 
for the regulation of the world’s largest internationally active banks to prevent a 
regulatory race to the bottom and ensure global financial stability, there is very 
little evidence that the principles and standards that emanate from the Basel 
Committee are an effective basis for banking regulation in low and lower-middle 
income countries. As one well-regarded team of experts states ‘While many 
countries have followed the Basel guidelines and strengthened capital regulations 
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and empowered supervisory agencies to a greater degree, existing evidence does 
not suggest that this will improve banking-system stability, enhance the efficiency 
of intermediation, or reduce corruption in lending’ (Barth et al., 2012).
As international banking standards are soft law (Brummer,  2012) and non-
member countries are under no formal obligation to adopt them, it is puzzling 
that regulators in many countries outside of the Basel Committee are adopting 
them. In Chapter  3 we explain how international and domestic politics help 
address this puzzle.
Regulating finance in peripheral developing countries
Financial sectors in low- and lower-middle-income countries differ in im port-
ant ways from financial sectors in more industrialised economies. A striking 
feature of financial sectors in low- and lower-middle-income countries is 
that  they are typically much smaller relative to the overall economy than in 
more developed economies. The size of the financial sector in the economy 
is  commonly assessed by looking at the level of domestic credit to the pri-
vate sector relative to GDP. On this measure, the size of the financial sector in 
high-income countries is, on average, almost eight times larger than in low-
income countries, and three times larger than in lower-middle-income countries 
(Table 2.1).
Financial sectors in low- and lower-middle-income countries are dominated 
overwhelmingly by banks. In low- and lower-middle-income countries banks 
provide almost all of the credit to the private sector, while in high-income 
countries banks provide just over half of credit, with a variety of non-bank financial 
institutions providing the rest (Table 2.1). Related to this, stock markets are much 
less developed. It is only as countries develop and financial sectors deepen that 
domestic private bond markets and stock markets grow, followed by the expan-
sion of mutual funds and pension funds (Sahay et al., 2015).
Another difference is in the level of access to financial services (Table  2.1). 
Fewer than one in five households in African countries have access to any for-
mal banking service—savings, payments, or credit (Beck et al., 2009). Of course, 
inclusion can be a double-edged sword, and financial exploitation is a common 
feature of life for many low-income households, so expanded access is no guarantee 
of increased welfare (Dymski, 2007).
The differing nature of financial sectors between countries in the core and per-
ipheral developing countries results in different policy priorities and regulations. 
This is vitally important to acknowledge as it helps explain why international 
standards designed by regulators from advanced economies are often poor fit for 
low- and lower-middle-income countries.
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For financial sector regulators in the core of the global financial system, the 
primary challenge is to reduce excessive risk-taking and high levels of leverage in 
their largest banks which makes them a source of instability. These banks are 
highly complex and opaque, and, rather than intermediating funds, their income 
is largely derived from trading assets and selling complex financial products. This 
is reflected in the balance sheets of the largest US and UK banks, where derivates 
account for 30 to 40 per cent of assets (Buckley,  2016). These institutions are 
radically different in nature to local community banks, whose primary function is 
to mobilize savings and convert them into loans to firms and households. As we 
discuss below, Basel standards have become increasingly focused on the important 
task of regulating risk-taking in the world’s largest banks. As a result, the stand-
ards have become less relevant for the regulation of the traditional commercial 
banks that dominate the financial sectors in most, although not all, peripheral 
developing countries. Many African financial systems are smaller than a mid-
sized bank in continental Europe, with total assets often less than US$1 billion 
(Beck et al., 2009).
Financial stability is also an important policy objective for regulators in per-
ipheral developing countries, but the sources of instability differ. At the level of 
individual domestic banks with relatively straightforward business models, 
sources of fragility stem from ‘traditional’ problems such as the under-reporting of 
non-performing loans, related-party lending, and obtaining an operating license 
on a fraudulent basis. These challenges are addressed in the Basel Core Principles 
rather than the most recent iterations of Basel II and III standards, which is why 
many international policymakers encourage regulators in peripheral developing 
countries to focus first and foremost on compliance with these principles.

































High 143 58 118 20 66
Upper-Middle 108 98 58 15 50
Lower-Middle 42 98 53 8 18
Low 18 100 NA 3 4
Source: Extracted from World Development Indicators database, World Bank (2017), five-year 
averages (2013–17)
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At the systemic level, interconnectedness with global finance is a major source 
of financial instability in peripheral developing countries. As recent studies have 
shown, changing patterns of demand for capital in the core of the global financial 
system have a dramatic impact on the flows of capital to and from the periphery 
(Akyuz, 2010; Bauerle Danzman et al.,  2017; Rey, 2015). A pressing question 
for regulators in developing countries is how best to use regulatory instruments, 
such as capital controls, to reduce these sources of financial instability that come 
from aboard (see for example Griffith-Jones et al.,  2012; Gallagher,  2015; 
Grabel,  2017). Yet these sources of instability are not fully addressed in the 
Basel framework.
For policymakers in peripheral developing countries, financial stability is not 
the only policy priority; they also look to expand credit provision to the real 
economy, and to expand access to financial services. In many low- and lower-
middle-income developing countries, a major problem is not that banks are 
 taking too much risk but rather that they are taking on too little risk, investing 
in high-yielding, risk-free, government securities rather than lending to the pri-
vate sector. Analysis in twenty-one countries in Sub-Saharan Africa revealed 
that  government securities averaged 21 per cent of bank balance sheets in 2017 
(Bodo, 2019). In some countries, including Angola, Burundi, and Sierra Leone, 
the levels were well above 30 per cent (IMF, 2018, p. 9). In such places, lend-
ing  to  governments has become central to banks’ business strategies, rather 
than intermediating funds between depositors and private firms. Even where 
banks do lend to the private sector it doesn’t always go to the most productive 
sectors. In many countries, banks have redirected credit away from production 
to trade and consumer financing, fuelling credit-financed consumption booms 
(Chandrasekhar, 2007).
Regulations are an important mechanism for shaping the incentives that banks 
face, and hence the purposes to which credit is channelled in the economy. 
Relatively minor changes such as adjusting loan classification and capital require-
ments so as not to bias against agricultural or loans to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises can be important (Beck et al., 2009). National development banks and 
activist financial policies can play a useful active role in directing finance towards 
productive sectors (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2018). Yet the mandate of the Basel 
Committee and the standards it designs focus exclusively on financial stability 
and do not consider other regulatory objectives like improving access to credit for 
the productive economy or financial inclusion (Jones and Knaack, 2019).
More broadly, while policymakers in many developing countries are looking to 
find ways to expand and deepen the financial services sector, in many advanced 
economies there is a consensus that the financial sector is too big, heightening the 
risks of financial crises and attendant costs, and acting as a drag on economic 
growth (Arcand et al., 2012; Sahay et al., 2015).
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Basel standards: a good ‘fit’ for peripheral developing countries?
Given the differing priorities between regulators from major industrialised countries 
and their counterparts in low- and lower-middle income countries, we can start to 
understand why international standards might be ill-suited for low and lower-
middle income countries. We now turn to examine in more detail the mismatch 
between international banking standards and the regulation that is needed in 
peripheral developing countries.
The genesis of Basel standards lies in the costly failure of an internationally active 
bank in 1974, which prompted the central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G10) 
countries to create the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In its forty-
plus-year history, the Basel Committee has formulated a series of cross-border 
prudential rules that are designed to enhance financial stability worldwide. Basel 
standards are part of a wider suite of international soft law standards and norms, 
which are not legally binding and do not have formal enforcement mechanisms. 
While most pronounced in international finance, international soft law stand-
ards have proliferated in many issue areas over the past two decades and they 
increasingly shape national regulations across the world (Brummer, 2010; Newman 
and Posner, 2018).
In this section we examine the various elements of the Basel framework in 
turn: the Basel Core Principles and the three iterations of prudential regulatory 
standards (Basel I, II, and III). For each, we explain what they are designed to do 
and the main criticisms levelled against them, focusing on those most pertinent 
to low- and lower-middle-income countries.
Basel Core Principles: rationale and criticisms
The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (hereafter ‘Basel 
Core Principles’) were issued by the Basel Committee in 1997 and have been 
widely adopted. The twenty-nine Basel Core Principles cover central aspects of 
what the Basel Committee believes to be an effective supervisory system, includ-
ing supervisory powers, the need for early intervention, and bank compliance 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012).
The Basel Core Principles are designed to be a flexible, globally applicable 
standard, with assessment criteria designed to accommodate a diverse range of 
banking systems. They take a proportional approach, which allows assessments 
of compliance with the Core Principles that are commensurate with the risk profile 
and systemic importance of a broad spectrum of banks (from large internationally 
active banks to small, non-complex deposit-taking institutions) (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision,  2012). The Basel Core Principles focus on the overall 
quality and approach of supervisors, and while they are quite prescriptive, they 
still provide national regulators with considerable discretion. For instance, they 
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require that the bank supervisor ‘sets prudent and appropriate capital adequacy 
requirements’ but they explicitly state that these do not need to be based on Basel 
standards, although for internationally active banks, capital requirements must be 
‘not less than the applicable Basel standards’ (Principle 16).
Although compatible with a wide range of regulatory approaches, the Basel 
Core Principles are only designed to assess the safety and stability of the banking 
sector. They do not evaluate supervisors or regulations against other policy 
ob ject ives such as financial sector deepening or financial inclusion. Moreover, 
state intervention in credit allocation is perceived as problematic: policy-directed 
lending and the general use of financial intermediaries as instruments of govern-
ment policy are identified as distorting market signals and impeding effective 
supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  2012). In line with the 
underlying market-based approach to credit allocation, the Basel Core Principles 
expect the institutions charged with responsibility for bank supervision to have 
operational independence, so they are free from political interference, and have 
the relevant legal powers to ensure compliance (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2012). Thus, while the Basel Core Principles are generally applicable 
in countries where governments pursue market-based credit allocation, they 
are  much less relevant to countries pursuing policies of policy-directed credit, 
including the types of financial sector policies used by many of the East Asian 
tiger economies, which some governments in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries are looking to emulate.
The Basel Core Principles have become the de facto minimum standard for 
the sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems 
around the world. In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
IMF and World Bank started to include the Basel Core Principles in their 
 regular Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAPs). Yet, despite their 
widespread acceptance as the international benchmark for evaluating bank 
supervision, there is surprisingly little evidence that compliance with the Basel 
Core Principles actually improves the financial stability or the wider performance 
of the banking system (Ayadi et al.,  2015; Das et al.,  2005; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2010; Podpiera, 2004; Sundararajan et al., 2001). The paucity 
of evidence supporting the Basel Core Principles has led several leading 
experts to question the desirability of the Basel Committee’s approach to bank-
ing supervision (Ayadi et al.,  2015; Barth et al.,  2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2010).
Basel I: Rationale and criticisms
Alongside the Basel Core Principles, the Basel Committee has issued a series of 
minimum standards for capital adequacy regulations. The Basel Accord on the 
International Convergence of Capital Measures and Capital Standards (Basel I) 
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was agreed in 1988 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988). While some 
scholars argue that Basel I standards were designed to provide the public good 
of  financial stability (Kapstein,  1989), others argue that Basel I standards were 
motivated by a redistributive logic amidst fierce competition between banks in 
the United States and Japan (Chey, 2014; Drezner, 2007; Oatley and Nabors, 1998; 
Simmons, 2001).
The key idea behind capital adequacy requirements for banks, including Basel 
I, is to ensure that each bank finances a minimum portion of its loan portfolio 
with shareholders’ equity (capital) rather than debt. The basic business model of 
a commercial bank is to take on liabilities by way of short-term debt provided 
by  retail depositors and the wholesale money markets and use them to make 
medium- and long-term loans to businesses and households. This is an important 
social function as banks, particularly in developing countries, can help channel 
credit to productive economy. Yet it also exposes banks to risks. A bank may 
 mis-judge the creditworthiness of its borrowers (credit risk) or an unexpected 
withdrawal of funds by short-term lenders, which exhausts its liquid assets 
(Armour et al., 2016, p. 290).
Capital requirements are the standard regulatory mechanisms for addressing 
these risks: the higher the level of a bank’s capital (shareholders’ equity), the less 
the risk of balance sheet insolvency, because any losses the bank incurs on its assets 
will first fall on its shareholders (Armour et al., 2016, p. 290). Thus ‘leverage’—the 
ratio of the bank’s debt funding to its funding through equity or capital—is always 
a central issue in regulation. The more equity, the safer the bank, but a bank funded 
entirely by equity would achieve no transformation (Armour et al., 2016, p. 291). 
Capital requirements place a restriction on a bank’s leverage, constraining the 
extent to which a bank can finance itself through debt, but aim to do so without 
quashing the bank’s incentive to engage in maturity transformation and lending 
to the productive economy.
Basel I focused on requiring banks to hold capital against credit risk, the risk 
that borrowers will not repay. In recognition that some assets are riskier than 
others, the Basel Committee agreed that the level of capital that banks were 
required to hold would be risk-weighted, so that higher amounts of capital would 
be held against risker assets. Rather than calculate the credit risk associated with 
each asset on the bank’s balance sheet, Basel I simply categorized assets into five 
groups, and assigned risk weights ranging from 0 to 100 per cent. For instance, 
cash and gold held in the bank is risk-free and attracted a risk weight of 0 per cent, 
residential mortgages attracted a risk weight of 50 per cent, and loans to firms 
attracted risk weights of 100 per cent. Overall, Basel I required banks to finance at 
least 8 per cent of their total risk-weighted assets with capital.
Within a few years of Basel I being issued, there were calls for its reform. A key 
criticism was that the standards only focused on credit risk. With the expansion 
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of the investment banking activities of large banks, it became clear that trading 
risk (the risk that securities banks hold, for market making or proprietary trad-
ing, suffer a decline in market value) was an important source of fragility. In 1996, 
the ‘market risk amendment’ to Basel I was designed to bring trading risks ex pli-
cit ly within the Basel framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996). 
As large banks became more complex, the risk of employee fraud rose, prompting 
calls for operational risk (the risk  of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
in tern al processes, people, and systems, or  from external events) to be in corp -
orated too. Critics further argued that the five categories for establishing credit 
risk were too crude. Basel I did not sufficiently differentiate between assets and it 
did not cover all types of assets (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson,  2010). For 
instance, risk weights did not differentiate between loans made to small, risky 
firms and large, highly rated multinationals (Barth et al., 2006). The shortcom-
ings of Basel I led to the negotiation of Basel II standards.
Basel II: Rationale and criticisms
Basel II was agreed in 2004, after several years of intense negotiations in the 
Basel Committee and heavy lobbying by large banks (Lall,  2012; e.g. Tarullo, 
2008; Young,  2012). Under Basel II, the Basel Committee kept several basic 
parameters of Basel I in place, including the definitions of eligible capital and 
the 8 per cent minimum capital adequacy requirement. But they made several 
dramatic changes, including to the system for risk-weighting assets. Crucially, 
under Basel II, responsibility for risk-weighting and risk assessment was moved 
from regulators to credit ratings agencies and banks. The market risk amend-
ment of 1996 introduced the principle that, subject to supervisory permission, 
banks could do the risk-weighting on the basis of their own historical data 
relating to losses and on the basis of their own evaluation models. This permission 
was extended to the assessment of credit risk and operational risk assessment 
in Basel II.
Basel II sets out nine different approaches for risk-weighting and risk assessment 
(Table 2.2). These can be divided into two general types. Under the ‘standardized 
approaches’ the key parameters for assessing risk are either given to banks by the 
supervisor or generated by third parties (private credit rating agencies or export 
credit agencies) (Powell, 2004). These include the simplified-standardized approach 
for assessing credit risk; the standardized approach for assessing credit risk; the 
basic indicator approach and standardized approach for assessing operational risk; 
and the standardized approach for assessing market risk.
The remaining four approaches allow banks to use their own internal models 
























Table 2.2 Capital adequacy requirements under Basel II
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approaches for assessing credit risk. Under the foundation IRB approach banks 
are allowed to estimate probabilities of default for each borrower, while under the 
advanced IRB approach banks also estimate other parameters, such as loss given 
default and exposure at default. For operational risk there is the advanced meas-
urement approach and for market risk there is the internal models approach.
In addition to revised capital adequacy requirements (Pillar 1), Basel II intro-
duced a supervisory review process that built on and integrated many of the Basel 
Core Principles (Pillar 2). It also introduced financial disclosure requirements 
that require banks to disclose their financial condition and risk-management 
processes to investors, in order to improve market discipline (Pillar 3).
General criticisms of Basel II
Basel II has been widely criticized for dramatically increasing the complexity of 
the regulatory framework and exacerbating many of the risks leading up to the 
global financial crisis.
The most controversial aspect of Basel II was the introduction of internal 
model-based approaches, which has been likened to ‘allowing banks to mark 
their own examination papers’ (Haldane cited in Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards, 2013, p. 119). These approaches were enthusiastically embraced 
by large banks, as the costs of compliance were marginal (they already had 
sophisticated in-house systems for assessing risk) and they enabled the banks 
to  hold lower levels of capital than they would have under the standardized 
approaches. The system worked poorly in the run-up to the 2008 crisis, especially 
for the risk-weighting of items on the trading book. The risk weights that banks 
assigned to their assets, and hence the amount of regulatory capital they needed 
to hold declined, at the same time as the risk profile of their investments dra-
matically increased. As many critics argued, the fatal flaw was to shift responsi-
bility for assigning risk weights from regulators to banks, enabling the banks to 
calibrate the models to their advantage (Admati, 2016; Bayoumi, 2017; Haldane, 
2013; Lall, 2012; Persaud, 2013; Tarullo, 2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008).
The reliance of standardized approaches on external credit ratings agencies 
(e.g. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s) was also criticized for leading to mechanistic 
reliance on ratings by market participants, resulting in insufficient due diligence 
and poor risk management on the part of lenders and investors. In addition, 
under Basel II, loans to highly rated clients attracted lower capital charges, which 
negatively affected the many small banks and small corporate clients with low or 
no ratings, even though they were not necessarily riskier, and were certainly less 
significant in systemic terms (Underhill and Zhang, 2008). The implementation 
of Basel II can thus reduce the scale of lending to (low or unrated) small- and 
medium-sized enterprises.
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A further problem with Basel II is that its more market-sensitive risk measure-
ments can exacerbate financial cycles (Persaud, 2013; Repullo and Suarez, 2008). 
While banking regulation should act as a check on the financial cycle, the switch to 
a ‘risk-sensitive’ approach amplified the global financial crisis (Persaud, 2013, p. 61).
Specific challenges for developing countries
Beyond these general criticisms, Basel II poses specific challenges for regulators 
and banks in developing countries. An immediate challenge arises from the 
sheer complexity of the Basel II standards. Supervisory capacity is a particularly 
acute constraint in developing countries, and can be a major deterrent to moving 
from relatively simple compliance-based supervision under Basel I to risk-based 
supervision under Basel II (Beck,  2011; Fuchs et al.,  2013; Gottschalk,  2010; 
Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk, 2016). To effectively supervise the standardized 
approach to credit risk for instance, supervisors face the additional tasks of 
monitoring credit rating agencies and the appropriate use of their ratings by 
banks. In a survey conducted by the Financial Stability Board, national supervisors 
from emerging and developing countries cited a shortage of high-quality human 
resources as the most important constraint to the implementation of Basel II 
and III (FSB, 2013). Where supervisory resources are particularly constrained, 
implementing a simpler regulatory framework may lead to more effective banking 
supervision.
Regulators in some emerging countries seek to implement internal ratings-
based approaches, hoping to improve banks’ own internal risk management 
(Powell, 2004). However, supervisors run the risk that banks will use their com-
parative advantage over supervisors in resources, expertise, and experience to 
calibrate the models to their advantage, as they have in more developed countries. 
Full compliance with the internal model-based approaches relies on highly skilled 
regulators using judgement and discretion, thereby placing an even bigger onus 
on regulators to be independent, immune from lawsuits, and willing to challenge 
the well connected (Calice, 2010; Murinde and Mlambo, 2010).
Recognizing that not all banks (or regulators) have the capacity to use internal 
models, the Basel Committee provides national authorities with a range of different 
options to consider when implementing the standards. In many Basel member 
countries only the largest banks are authorized to use internal models (Castro 
Carvalho et al.,  2017). The simplified-standardized approach was specifically 
introduced for regulators in developing countries in recognition of the additional 
resource constraints they face. However, as a World Bank report notes, for small 
and lower-income countries, the full range of options proposed by the Basel 
Committee is not properly thought through, resulting in the adoption of overly 
complex regulations for their level of economic and financial development 
(World Bank, 2012).
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Weaknesses in financial sector infrastructure, particularly gaps in the availabil-
ity of credit ratings and credit information, can also frustrate efforts to implement 
Basel II. Many countries outside the Basel Committee do not have national ratings 
agencies and the penetration of global ratings agencies is limited to the largest 
corporations (Murinde, 2012). The development of a local credit ratings industry 
is not straightforward—as well as effective reporting and corporate governance 
frameworks for companies, it requires strong accounting and external auditing 
rules, credit bureaus, and the efficient and compliant collection and sharing of 
borrowers’ data (Stephanou and Mendoza,  2005). Where credit ratings are not 
available the standardized approach can still be used for assessing credit risk, but 
the risk weights applied to bank assets are very similar to Basel I, undermining 
the incentive for regulators to move from Basel I to Basel II.
The absence of external credit ratings may also impede implementation of 
the  internal model-based approaches to assessing credit risk under Basel II. 
Although banks use their own internal models to generate credit ratings under 
these approaches, supervisors need to validate these models, and they commonly 
benchmark the ratings generated by banks against those generated by external 
ratings agencies in order to do so. Where the market or external ratings are 
shallow, validation becomes harder.
Basel II aims to encourage market discipline as a ‘counterweight’ to the 
increased discretion accorded to banks in the estimation of their own capital 
requirements. However, it is only likely to be useful in countries where banks 
are publicly listed and capital markets are sufficiently deep and liquid for the 
market to act as a source of discipline (Powell, 2004). As we have seen above, 
capital markets are in their infancy in many low- and lower-middle-income 
countries.
Basel III: Rationale and criticisms
The global financial crisis prompted soul-searching among regulators and led 
many regulators and experts to call for a major overhaul of international banking 
standards.
Designed in the wake of the crisis, Basel III seeks to correct many of the defi-
ciencies in Basel II, but many argue it doesn’t go far enough. While some aspects of 
Basel III have been welcomed by regulators from developing countries, particularly 
the greater emphasis on systemic sources of risk, Basel III is even more complex 
and challenging to implement than Basel II. Basel II revises capital standards and 
introduces new liquidity standards (Table 2.3). While an improvement on Basel II, 
the overall level of capital banks are required to hold still falls far below the min-
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Under Basel III, the basic capital requirement remains 8 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets, but stricter rules are introduced on the eligibility of capital instruments 
that can be included (definition of capital)1 and new capital buffers are designed 
to make banks hold higher levels of capital. The capital conservation buffer (2.5 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets) applies to all banks all of the time and is designed 
to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress.2
While the capital conservation buffer is microprudential in nature as it seeks to 
improve the stability of individual banks, the other buffers are macroprudential as 
they aim to reduce systemic risk. The countercyclical buffer allows regulators to 
increase capital requirements by a further 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets 
when they judge credit growth to result in an unacceptable build-up of system-
wide risk. Finally, the additional buffers apply to global systemically important 
banks (G-SIBs) and domestic systematically important banks (D-SIBs). This buffer 
varies between 1 per cent and 3.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets for G-SIBs while 
national regulators determine the size of the buffer for D-SIBs (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2013a).3
Basel III also introduces measures to strengthen the capital requirements for 
trading risk, specifically for the counterparty credit exposures arising from banks’ 
derivatives, repurchase, and securities-financing activities (counterparty credit risk).4 
A flaw in Basel II had been to assume that the securities held by banks would 
be traded in deep and liquid markets, so any potential loss the bank faced from 
holding securities assets on its books was temporary. The global financial crisis 
showed that this was not the case for many assets on bank trading books, and 
banks were exposed to the risk of default by the counterparty. While a welcome 
addition to Basel III, many argue that the methods for assessing counterparty 
credit risk remain problematic (Armour et al., 2016, p. 298).
Given all the challenges with accurately assigning risk weights, Basel III intro-
duces a simple leverage ratio of capital to non-risk-weighted assets to act as a 
‘back-stop’ to the risk-based capital framework (Basel Committee on Banking 
1 The Basel minimum capital requirement comprises two main components: shareholders’ equity 
(called ‘core equity Tier 1 capital’ or CET1 in the Basel nomenclature). Under Basel I and II, only one-
quarter of the 8 per cent (i.e. 2 per cent) had to be contributed through CET1. Under Basel III, that 
increases to 4.5 per cent (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Under Basel II, the remain-
der of the 8 per cent capital could be shareholders’ equity or subordinated debt. The inclusion of 
 subordinated debt has been heavily criticized as it does not improve the ratio of shareholder equity to 
assets. The use of subordinated debt is not removed in Basel III, although its use is restricted (Armour 
et al., 2016, p. 305).
2 While banks can draw on this buffer, they face restrictions on pay-outs to shareholders and 
employees.
3 Overall, then, Basel III raises the CET1 requirement from 2 per cent to 7 per cent (4.5 per cent 
minimum CET1 plus 2.5 per cent capital conservation buffer) for all banks, and up to 13 per cent for 
G-SIBs, plus an additional 2.5 per cent if an asset bubble is developing (the countercyclical buffer).
4 These were introduced under Basel 2.5, and modified under Basel III.
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Supervision, 2010). However as it is set at only 3 per cent of assets, it has been 
criticized for being ‘dangerously low’ (Admati, 2016; Admati and Hellwig, 2014).
Basel III also introduced liquidity standards for the first time. The objective of 
the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is to ensure that banks have an adequate stock 
of assets that can be converted easily into cash to meet their liquidity needs in a 
thirty-day stress scenario (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013b). The 
net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is a longer-term measure to reduce the likelihood 
that disruptions to a bank’s regular sources of funding will erode its liquidity 
position in a way that would increase the risk of its failure (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2014).
General criticisms of Basel III
Basel III is a clear improvement over its predecessors, as it requires banks to hold 
more, higher-quality capital and introduces macroprudential standards that address 
systemic risks in the financial sector. Yet many argue that the changes fall far short 
of what is needed. The vice-chair of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) called Basel III a ‘well-intended illusion’ (T.M. Hoenig, 2013).
A major flaw is that Basel III continues to allow banks to use complex, potentially 
flawed, and gameable internal models (Admati, 2016; Haldane, 2013; T. Hoenig, 
2013; Kashyap et al., 2008; Romano, 2014; Tarullo, 2008).5 It also continues to rely 
on the assessments of credit rating agencies, despite a wealth of evidence that 
these are often an unreliable assessment of risk. Attempts by the Basel Committee 
to reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies have been dropped following 
intense lobbying by banks and credit ratings agencies (Binham, 2015).
A further problem for Basel III, and indeed for its predecessors, is that regulatory 
capital ratios are based primarily on accounting conventions that can be quite 
arbitrary and vary by jurisdictions. Balance sheet disclosures tend to obscure 
significant exposures to risk, allowing much risk to lurk ‘off balance sheet’, and to 
manipulate the disclosures, particularly since auditors are subject to their own 
conflicts of interest and are unlikely to challenge managers (Admati, 2016).
Overall, then, leading financial sector experts agree that while Basel III 
makes modest improvements on Basel II, it fails to address the sources of finan-
cial in stabil ity and has done little to avert future crises. Basel III is still based on 
a system of risk-weighting which arguably distorts bank portfolios away from 
business lending and towards government lending and other investments 
(Admati, 2016). Many argue that much simpler metrics, including leverage ratios 
5 The Basel Committee has acknowledged that banks’ internal models can be deeply flawed and has 
introduced a common ‘output floor’ for risk estimates (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016; 
Maxwell and Smith-Meyer,  2017). Basel III also tightens some input estimates for modelling, and 
removes the internal ratings-based approach for operational risk entirely (Coen, 2017).
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that require banks to hold higher levels of equity, are more effective forms of 
regulation (Haldane, 2013).
Specific challenges for developing countries
Over and above these concerns with the efficacy of Basel III standards for regulating 
the world’s largest banks, regulators of low- and lower-middle-income countries 
face specific challenges in implementing Basel III.
Basel III adds a further layer of complexity and compliance costs, exacerbating 
the implementation challenges associated with Basel II (as an indication, Basel I 
was thirty pages long and the full compendium of Basel III standards runs to more 
than 1800 pages). Some elements of Basel III are relatively straightforward to 
implement, including the new definitions of capital, the capital conservation buffer, 
the simple leverage ratio, and the standard for domestic systemically important 
banks. Others are more challenging, including the macroprudential elements.
The introduction of macroprudential standards is generally welcomed by regu-
lators from developing countries. However, macroprudential standards under 
Basel III need to be adapted to reflect the main sources of systemic risk in many 
developing countries, which often stem from external macroeconomic shocks 
including fluctuations in commodity prices, volatile capital flows, and a high level 
of interconnectedness among banks (Gottschalk,  2016, p. 61; Kasekende et al., 
2012; Repullo and Saurina,  2011). Many developing countries already impose 
some form of liquidity requirements. However, Basel III liquidity standards are 
calculated on more sophisticated methodologies than for most other Basel stand-
ards and the assumptions underpinning them do not always hold in countries 
with less-mature financial markets and banking systems, so the standards need to 
be modified to suit the local contexts (Beck, 2011; Ferreira et al. 2019; Fuchs et al., 
2013; Gobat et al., 2014).
The implementation of Basel III is likely to be impeded by a paucity of credit 
information as macroprudential standards require regulators to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of interconnected risks in the financial sector. Credit 
registry data is important for evaluating the systemic importance of financial 
institutions, which is vital for establishing which banks should be subject to 
additional capital buffers (the D-SIB standard). Such data is also important for 
making decisions about countercyclical buffers (World Bank,  2012). Regulators 
may not have the powers or resources to implement macroprudential elements 
of  Basel III. In many countries, national authorities lack dedicated units for 
conducting macroprudential surveillance, and even where they do exist they 
often face many practical challenges, including gathering data and specifying 
models to be used in stress-testing (Murinde, 2012; Ferreira et al. 2019). While 
there are good arguments for strengthening regulatory authorities, moves to do 
so may generate opposition, as we discuss in Chapter 3.
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More generally, there are concerns that Basel III further increases the incentives 
of banks to direct credit away from productive sectors of the economy that are 
key for inclusive economic development (Beck,  2018; Bodo,  2019; Gobat et al., 
2014; Rojas-Suarez and Muhammad,  2018). Implementation of such complex 
standards may also take scarce resources away from other priority tasks of the 
regulatory agency (Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk, 2016; Barth and Caprio, 2018). 
Implementation of Basel II/III does not necessarily address underlying weak-
nesses in the regulatory system or the political entrenchment of vested interests 
and, where regulators are under-resourced, can open up more opportunities for 
banks to evade regulations. In sum, the global standards embody a complex 
financial regulatory regime, not necessarily a strong one (Basel Consultative 
Group, 2014; Powell, 2004).
How peripheral countries are responding to Basel II and III
So how are peripheral developing countries responding to international standards? 
How much of the Basel framework are they implementing?
Given the deep-seated challenges facing Basel standards, even in countries 
that are members of the Basel Committee, regulators rarely apply the full suite of 
Basel standards to all banks. Regulators from countries on the Basel Committee 
typically adopt a proportional approach, only applying the full suite of Basel 
standards to large internationally active banks, with balance sheets of more than 
US$20–30 billion (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017). In the United States, small banks 
with less than US$500 million in assets are exempt from Basel III and are regulated 
under standards similar to Basel I (Masera, 2014). In Brazil, the central bank has 
divided banks into five different categories, and only applies the Basel III framework 
to the six largest internationally active banks, with more than US$10 billion in 
assets abroad. Similarly, in Hong Kong, the regulator allows banks with total 
assets of less than US$10 billion and a simple and straightforward business model 
to hold capital against credit risk in accordance with a modified version of Basel I, 
while banks with small trading books are exempted from the Basel market risk 
capital framework (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017).
For developing countries, Barth and Caprio (2018) argue that the Basel approach 
is too cumbersome and costly for countries with small financial sectors, particularly 
countries with banking systems with total assets of less than US$10 billion. 
Meanwhile, the Financial Stability Board, World Bank, and IMF explicitly advise 
countries with limited international financial exposure and supervisory capacity 
constraints to ‘first focus on reforms to ensure compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles and only move to the more advanced capital standards at a pace tailored 
to their circumstances’ (FSB et al., 2011, p. 7).
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As we show in this section, the Basel framework is being widely applied and 
regulators outside of the Basel Committee vary rarely implement regulations that 
are not based on the Basel framework in some way. However, implementation is 
highly selective, with regulators implementing some elements and not others, and 
there is a high level of variation across countries.
Patterns of Basel implementation
Data on the implementation of the Basel framework is patchy for countries 
 outside of the Basel Committee. The available data suggests that compliance 
with the Basel Core Principles varies tremendously across countries and are 
generally correlated with levels of economic development. A study based on 
137  Financial Sector Assessment Programme reports between 2000 and 2004 
showed that  compliance rates averaged 89 per cent in high-income countries, 
64  per cent in upper-middle-income countries, 54 per cent in lower-middle-
income countries, and 52 per cent in low-income countries (IMF, 2008). More 
recent analysis of compliance across seventeen African countries based on 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme reports between 2007 and 2012 revealed 
variation even among countries at similar levels of development. Three of the 
seventeen African countries had compliance rates with Basel Core Principles 
of  less than 50 per cent; a further eight had compliance rates between 50 and 
80  per cent; while six had compliance rates above 80 per cent (Marchettini 
et al., 2015, p. 28).
With regards to the implementation of Basel I, II, and III, there is also substan-
tial variation. Basel I standards spread rapidly around the world and within ten 
years were being implemented by more than one hundred countries outside of the 
Basel Committee (Quillin, 2008; Stephanou and Mendoza, 2005; Tarullo, 2008). 
A recent survey of regulators in one hundred countries outside of the Basel 
Committee shows that Basel I is still the basis for national regulations in many 
countries: of the one hundred countries, sixty had national regulations based on 
Basel I, while ten had national regulations based on Basel II, and thirty on Basel 
III (Hohl et al., 2018).
Another survey, conducted by the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) in 2015 
provides the most detailed data we have on Basel II and III implementation in 
countries outside of the Basel Committee.6 It provides insights into which elem-
ents of Basel II and III are being implemented and identifies countries where 
6 This survey covers a similar number of countries to Hohl et al. (2018) but is not directly com par-
able as it covers a different set of countries and uses a different set of criteria for differentiating 
between countries.
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 preparations are underway but implementation is yet to happen.7 Regulators in 
ninety of the one hundred responding jurisdictions stated that they were either 
implementing at least one component of Basel II or had taken steps to do so, 
including drafting new rules. Only ten reported that they had not taken any steps 
to implement Basel II. Similarly, eighty-one of the one hundred responding juris-
dictions reported that they were implementing at least one component of Basel III, 
or had taken steps to do so, leaving only seventeen that had not begun the imple-
mentation process.
The FSI data from 2015 reveals some regional variations. The highest imple-
mentation is in Middle Eastern and North African countries, where all twelve of 
the reporting jurisdictions were implementing at least one element of Basel II, 
and nine were adopting at least one component of Basel III. Latin America and 
the Caribbean had the lowest levels of adoption, with only thirteen of twenty-
eight responding countries implementing at least one component of Basel II, and 
only five implementing at least one component of Basel III. These trends broadly 
correspond to the trends reported in the survey by Hohl et al. (2018, p. 8).
A striking insight from the FSI survey data is that while many countries are 
converging on international standards, regulators are taking a highly selective 
approach to implementation. As at 2015, the one hundred countries responding 
to the FSI survey were implementing an average of four of the ten components of 
Basel II and one of the eight components of Basel III. As we might expect, the 
extent of implementation is correlated with income levels (Figure 2.1). On average, 
regulators in high-income countries outside of the Basel Committee were imple-
menting double the number of components of the Basel II compared to their 
counterparts in low- and lower-middle-income countries.
Jones and Zeitz (2017) used the FSI data to analyse the adoption of Basel II 
and found a robust and positive correlation between a country’s financial sector 
development and the extent of Basel II adoption. This suggests that regulators’ 
decisions are strongly influenced by the suitability of the Basel standards to their 
country’s level of financial sector development. Yet, even among high-income 
countries where implementation levels were highest, regulators were implement-
ing just under half of the components of Basel II, ten years after the standard had 
been agreed by the Basel Committee.
7 For Basel II the survey examines ten subcomponents: (1) standardized approach to credit risk; 
(2)  foundation-internal ratings-based approach to credit risk; (3) advanced-internal ratings-based 
approach to credit risk; (4) basic indicator approach to operational risk; (5) standardized approach to 
operational risk; (6) advanced measurement approach to operational risk; (7) standardized measure-
ment method for market risk; (8) internal models approach to market risk; (9) Pillar 2 (Supervision); 
(10) Pillar 3 (Market Discipline). For Basel III the survey covers eight subcomponents: (1) liquidity 
coverage ratio; (2) definition of capital; (3) risk coverage (for counterparty credit risk); (4) capital 
conservation buffer; (5) counter-cyclical capital buffer; (6) leverage ratio; (7) domestic-systemically 
important banks; (8) global-systemically important banks.
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Which components of Basel II and III are being adopted?
Disaggregating the FSI data provides insights into the specific components of 
Basel II and III that are most and least likely to be adopted by regulators outside 
of the Basel Committee.
With regards to Basel II, regulators are more likely to adopt standards for credit 
risk and operational risk than market risk (Figure 2.2). This stands to reason, as 
many peripheral countries have banks with very small trading books. Relatively 
few jurisdictions allow banks to use the heavily criticised internal model-based 
approaches. Regulators in fifty-nine jurisdictions required banks to assess credit 
risk according to the standardized approach and, of these, only seventeen author-
ized banks to use internal model-based approaches. Interestingly, the number of 
countries using internal model-based approaches did not increase between 2010 
and 2015, possibly reflecting the criticism attributed to these approaches in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
As Basel III was relatively new at the time of the 2015 FSI survey, it is harder to 
discern trends. However, the data indicates that the more familiar micropruden-
tial components of Basel III were being implemented more frequently than the 
newer macroprudential components (Figure 2.3).
Among the microprudential elements of Basel III, thirty-four of the one hundred 
jurisdictions responding to the survey had adopted the new definitions of capital 
and twenty-four had adopted the capital conservation buffer. These components 
were a modification of Basel II and relatively straightforward to implement. 
The new Basel III standards for assessing counterparty credit risk had only 








Figure 2.1 Implementation of Basel II and III by income category (countries outside 
of the Basel Committee).
Source: Data from FSI Survey (2015). Income categories are according to World Bank classifications 
for the same year
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been implemented by ten jurisdictions, presumably reflecting the small size of 
trading books in banks in many peripheral countries. The 2015 data shows a 
relatively rapid take-up of the leverage ratio, the ‘back-stop’ to risk-weighted capital 
measures, which had been adopted by thirteen of the forty-one jurisdictions, 
even though it was only introduced in 2018. Hohl et al. (2018) find similar trends, 
with regulators in countries outside of the Basel Committee prioritizing the 
implementation of the Basel III definitions of capital and related capital buffers 
(Hohl et al., 2018, p. 11).
Although liquidity standards were a new addition to the Basel framework, 
the 2015 and 2018 data shows that regulators have moved relatively quickly to 
implement the liquidity coverage ratio (Hohl et al., 2018, p. 12). This may reflect 
the fact that many countries already had domestic quantitative liquidity rules 
well before their introduction in the Basel framework, making it relatively 
straightforward to implement. Regulators proceeding far more slowly in adopt-
ing the net stable funding ratio, probably because it is challenging to implement 
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Figure 2.2 Which components of Basel II are being implemented?
Source: Data from FSI Survey (2015)
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in countries that do not have well-developed capital markets, leaving fewer 
options for banks to source the term funding needed to comply with the standard 
(Hohl et al., 2018, p. 10).
Recent reports show that, in addition to taking a highly selective approach, 
regulators use other strategies to modify the standards to better fit their local 
context. Regulators have often made overall capital requirements more stringent 
than Basel standards. They have also relaxed rules in other areas where, in their 
view, the adoption of applicable Basel standards may not be warranted based 
on  the risk profile or business model of banks in their jurisdictions. Specific 
ex amples of modifications to Basel standards include (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017; 
Hohl et al., 2018):
 • raising minimum risk-weighted capital requirements above 8 per cent
 • exempting banks with small trading books from market risk and counter-
party credit risk requirements and simplifying risk calculations (e.g. only 
considering foreign exchange rate risks in market risk calculations)



































Counter cyclical Capital Buffer
Risk Coverage (counterparty credit risk) 
Figure 2.3 Which components of Basel III are being implemented?
Source: Data from FSI Survey (2015)
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 • exempting small banks from capital charges for operational risk
 • regulating large commercial banks according to Basel III risk-based capital 
requirements, but applying Basel I to small banks and/or specialized banks 
(e.g. development finance banks)
 • exempting some banks from liquidity standards (e.g. development finance 
institutions)
 • imposing leverage requirements that are higher than the Basel III require-
ment of 3 per cent.
Our case studies
This section provides an overview of the varying responses to Basel standards 
among our eleven case study countries and regions, and highlights the key attri-
butes of their financial sectors, noting the ways in which they differ. In doing so it 
provides a context for the analysis of Basel convergence and divergence in subse-
quent chapters.
Varying responses to Basel standards
There is a striking variation among our case study countries in their responses to 
the Basel framework. There is limited public data on compliance with Basel Core 
Principles. A study of Financial Sector Assessment Programme reports between 
2007 and 2012 covers seven of our case study countries and reveals substantial 
variation. Among the seven countries, two had compliance rates with Basel Core 
Principles of less than 50 per cent (Angola and Ghana); a further three had 
compliance rates between 50 and 80 per cent (Kenya, Nigeria, and WAEMU); 
while two had compliance rates above 80 per cent (Rwanda and Tanzania) 
(Marchettini et al., 2015, p. 28).
While Ethiopia remains on Basel I, regulators in the other case study countries 
and regions have opted to implement components of the more complex and 
recent Basel II and III (Table 2.4). Ethiopia aside, all are implementing compo-
nents of Basel II and, with the further exceptions of Vietnam and Angola, they are 
also implementing components of Basel III. While no regulator has implemented 
all eighteen of the key components of Basel II and III, Pakistan comes close, as 
regulators have implemented fourteen. At the other end of the spectrum, regu-
lators in Vietnam have only implemented three.
Regulators have tended to implement the less complex elements of Basel II and 
III, in line with the broad trends established above. Among the ten countries and 
regions implementing Basel II, all regulators have implemented the standardized 
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approaches to credit risk, and, with the additional exception of Bolivia, they have 
also implemented the standardized approaches to operational and market risk. 
Only Pakistan has authorized the use of internal models. Regulators in all countries 
except Ghana and Ethiopia have implemented the supervisory review process 
introduced under Basel II, which built on and integrated many of the Basel Core 
Principles (Pillar 2). The same group of regulators have also introduced financial 
disclosure requirements, which require banks to disclose their financial condition 
and risk-management processes to investors, in order to improve market dis cip-
line (Pillar 3).
There is more variation in the implementation of Basel III (Table 2.5). Among 
the eight countries and regions implementing aspects of Basel III, seven have 
implemented the revised definitions of capital, six have implemented capital con-
servation buffers, and five have implemented the leverage ratio. Three countries 
have implemented requirements for domestic systemically important banks, while 
two have implemented the countercyclical buffer, and two have implemented 
liquidity requirements.
Do financial sector differences explain responses?
We might reasonably expect variation across our case studies in their responses to 
Basel standards to be the result of differing levels of financial sector development. 
Yet, analysis of the key financial sector attributes across our case study countries sug-
gests this is not the case. There is no obvious correlation between the level of finan-
cial sector development and the extent of the Basel framework that is being adopted.
Table 2.4 How extensively are case study countries 
implementing Basel II and III? (January 2019)
Country






Pakistan 9 5 14
WAEMU 5 5 10
Rwanda 5 4 9
Ghana 3 5 8
Tanzania 5 3 8
Kenya 5 2 7
Nigeria 5 1 6
Bolivia 3 2 5
Angola 5 0 5
Vietnam 3 0 3
























Table 2.5  Which components of Basel III are case study countries implementing? (January 2019)
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Rwanda
–
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Our case study countries differ markedly (Table 2.6). A first striking difference 
is in the level of general economic development and the size of their economies. 
Per capital incomes range from Angola with a GNI per capita of over US$4,000 
per year to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso where it is just over US$400. Our cases 
include relatively large countries like Nigeria with a total GDP of US$472 billion, 
and Rwanda with a GDP of just US$8 billion.
The size of the financial sector varies from US$233bn in liquid assets in 
Vietnam to only US$4bn in Burkina Faso and US$1bn in Rwanda. Relative to the 
size of the economy, the financial sector is smallest in Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Pakistan, which all have domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
below 20 per cent, and largest in Bolivia, Kenya, and Vietnam, where it ranges 
from 30 per cent to 113 per cent. Vietnam stands out as having a very large finan-
cial sector in absolute terms and relative to its economy.
Financial sectors in all our case study countries and regions are overwhelm-
ingly bank dominated, with banks providing almost all of the credit to the private 
sector. Data on the size of stock markets is patchy, but the available data shows 
that stock markets remain in their infancy in Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, and Bolivia 
(total stock market capitalization of less than 20 per cent of GDP), although they 
play more of a role in Pakistan, Kenya, and Vietnam (between 20 per cent and 
30 per cent of GDP).
Looking more closely at the nature of the banking sector, there is a striking 
difference in ownership patterns. While there is no foreign ownership of banks in 
Ethiopia, all banks in Burkina Faso are foreign owned. Aside from these extremes, 
Ghana, Angola, Pakistan, and Tanzania have substantial levels of foreign owner-
ship, while levels are lower in Vietnam, Rwanda, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Kenya. 
While banks provide substantial amounts of credit to government and state-owned 
enterprises, levels also vary, from a high equivalent to 26 per cent of GDP in 
Pakistan, to a low of only 1 per cent in Bolivia.
The health of the banking sector soundness also varies markedly. The ratio 
of capital to assets ranges from a low of just over 7 per cent in Bolivia to a high of 
more than 14 per cent in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda.8 Levels of non-performing 
loans also vary, and do not necessarily correlate with levels of capitalization. While 
banks in Bolivia hold relatively little capital, they also have very few non-performing 
loans (less than 2 per cent of loans). Conversely, banks in Ghana hold relatively 
high levels of capital but they also have the highest levels of non-performing loans 
(over 15 per cent of loans).
Finally, our case study countries and regions vary in terms of citizens’ access to 
formal financial services. The number of bank branches and ATMs per people is 
highest in Bolivia, where there are more than twelve branches and thirty-seven 
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Angola LMIC 4,332 124 41 20 100 – 54 16 8.6 9.6 10.3 18
Bolivia LMIC 2,940 34 21 57 88 16 16 1 7.1 1.6 12.6 37
Nigeria LMIC 2,632 472 88 14 100 11 19 6 10.0 7.8 5.1 16
Vietnam LMIC 1,948 196 233 113 100 28 5 16 8.3 2.5 3.7 23
Ghana LMIC 1,902 56 12 14 100 7 69 11 14.0 15.4 6.9 10
Pakistan LMIC 1,452 266 99 16 100 25 52 26 8.4 11.0 10.0 9
Kenya LMIC 1,312 66 24 32 100 25 36 13 15.5 7.1 5.5 10
Tanzania LIC 896 48 10 14 100 4 47 6 11.4 8.3 2.4 6




LIC 640 12 4 28 100 – 100 7 – – 2.8 3
Ethiopia LIC 604 64 – – 100 – 0 – – – 2.9 0
Notes: Because of missing data, data is averaged over five-year period (2013–17). In the few cases where data is missing for all five years, the last available data point is used (from 2011 or 2012). We use 
Burkina Faso as an illustration of the financial sectors in the WAEMU region, as it was a focal country for our WAEMU case study.
Source: Extracted from World Development Indicators Database, World Bank (2017)
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ATMs per 100,000 people, and lowest in Burkina Faso, where there are only three 
bank branches and three ATMs per 100,000 people.
What is striking about these trends is that it is hard to argue that the extent 
of Basel adoption maps onto levels of financial sector development. On many of 
these measures, Pakistan has a relatively developed financial sector and, as we 
might expect, a relatively high level of Basel implementation. At the other end of 
the spectrum, Ethiopia has a low level of financial sector development and is the 
case study with the lowest level of Basel implementation. Yet WAEMU and 
Rwanda, which have the smallest, and in many ways the least developed, financial 
sectors, have relatively high levels of Basel adoption. Conversely, Vietnam, 
Angola, and Nigeria have financial sectors that are among the most developed in 
our sample, yet relatively high levels of Basel adoption. As we show in the remain-
der of this volume, it is only by studying the political economy dynamics within 
countries that we can explain variation in the implementation of international 
banking standards.
Conclusion: why do regulators on the periphery differ  
in their responses to Basel standards?
In this chapter we have argued that the regulatory context in low- and lower-
middle-income countries differs in important ways from the context in more 
advanced countries. For this reason, international banking standards, designed 
in  standard-setting bodies heavily dominated by regulators from advanced 
economies, are ill suited in many ways to the regulatory needs of low- and lower-
middle-income countries. Over time this gap has widened as regulators on the 
Basel Committee have sought to address the ever-more complex activities of the 
world’s largest banks.
We have shown how, despite the manifold criticisms levelled against Basel 
standards, particularly Basel II and III, they are still being implemented by regu-
lators across the world. Regulators have not adopted the standards in their entir-
ety: implementation is usually highly selective, with regulators choosing to adopt 
only some components of the standards and taking steps to modify the standards 
to suit their local contexts. Yet levels of implementation, including among low- 
and lower-middle-income countries, are higher than appears warranted on the 
basis of expert opinion about the merits and demerits of the standards. Moreover, 
there is substantial variation in responses to Basel standards across low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, which is difficult to attribute to differences in 
their financial sectors.
Why is it that regulators in many low- and lower-middle-income countries are 
opting to converge on international banking standards? And why do some regu-
lators opt to converge on international standards but others opt to diverge? In 
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Chapter 3 we set out a framework to account for this variation, identifying the 
specific factors that drive regulatory convergence and divergence among periph-
eral developing countries.
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Why do regulators in peripheral developing countries, particularly low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, respond differently to international banking 
standards? Why do some regulators implement substantial parts of the most 
recent and complex international standards, while others eschew them? This 
chapter sets out an analytical framework that explains why regulators in periph-
eral developing countries respond in different ways to international banking 
standards. It builds from the existing literature and the case studies in this volume 
to identify the conditions under which we can expect countries to converge on or 
diverge from international standards.
We explain how the interplay of international and domestic politics shapes the 
decisions that regulators make. We identify four factors that generate incentives 
for regulators to converge on international standards: politicians pursuing a devel-
opment strategy that prioritizes integration into global finance and expansion of 
financial services sectors; domestic banks looking to enhance their reputation as 
they expand into international markets; regulators with strong connections to 
peer regulators in other countries who are implementing the standards; and sus-
tained engagement with the IMF and World Bank through lending programmes 
and technical assistance.
Working in opposition to these incentives to converge are four factors that 
generate incentives for regulators to diverge from international standards: politi-
cians pursuing interventionist financial policies, where the state plays an important 
role in allocating credit; politicians and business oligarchs using banks to direct 
credit to political allies; regulators who are sceptical about the applicability of 
Basel standards for their local context; and banks with business models focused 
on the domestic market for whom there are high costs and few benefits from 
implementing the standards, particularly if they are relatively small and weak.
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As the political, economic, and institutional context differs across peripheral 
developing countries, regulators experience these incentives through different 
channels and with varying levels of intensity, prompting them to respond in dif-
ferent ways to international standards. We distinguish between different pathways 
to convergence and divergence according to whether they are policy-driven, pol-
itically driven, regulator-driven, bank-driven, or IFI-driven, and we identify the 
salient features of these pathways. We also explain why, when faced with strong 
and competing incentives to converge and diverge, regulators are likely to respond 
with ‘mock compliance’.
Our analytical framework focuses on three main actors: the regulator (usually 
situated within the central bank), large banks, and incumbent politicians. Regulatory 
outcomes are the product of the relative power position of these three actors 
within society, and are shaped by the wider domestic and international context in 
which they are embedded. Central to our argument is the observation that banks 
are rarely the most dominant actor in regulatory politics in peripheral developing 
countries, particularly the low- and lower-middle-income countries we focus on. 
While there are some exceptions, the underdeveloped nature of the formal econ-
omy and relatively small size of the banking sector leave individual banks, and the 
banking sector as a whole, with much less power to shape regulatory outcomes 
than in many advanced economies. Yet this does not mean that financial market 
players have little purchase on regulators’ decisions. Far from it. Operating in a 
context of capital scarcity, regulators, politicians, and banks in peripheral 
developing countries are particularly attuned to the ways in which regulators, 
banks, and investors in other countries will react to their decisions, and, as we 
explain below, this has an out-sized impact on regulatory outcomes (see also 
Mosley (2003)).
It is this dynamic that sets regulatory harmonization between the core and 
periphery apart from regularity harmonization among core countries. In 
explanations of regulatory harmonization among core countries, the interests 
of large domestic banks loom large. For instance, in his seminal work, Singer 
(2007) argues that regulators face a dilemma of increasing regulatory require-
ments in order to mitigate the risk of financial crisis, or easing those require-
ments and enhancing the international competitiveness of the domestic 
financial sector (Singer, 2007, p. 19). It is these trade-offs that shape the nature 
of regulatory harmonization among core countries. In this chapter we show 
how the decisions of regulators on the periphery are shaped by power relations 
between regulators, politicians, and banks, and the extent and nature of the 
connections of these actors to global finance and networks of global financial 
governance.
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Three key actors: regulators, banks, and politicians
In this section we examine the role and relative power position of regulators, 
banks, and politicians in regulatory decisions in peripheral developing countries. 
In the next section we explain how specific factors create incentives for these 
actors to converge on or diverge from international banking standards.
Regulators
Just as in many advanced and emerging economies, the task of regulating and 
supervising banks in many peripheral developing countries has been delegated to 
an independent government body that operates at arm’s length from the executive 
and legislative branches. This is part of a wider trend that accompanied waves of 
privatization and liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, often under the guidance 
of the World Bank. Responsibility for bank regulation and supervision was typic-
ally moved to the central bank or a specialized regulatory institution, with sub-
stantial operational independence.
The scope of the regulator’s powers and the de jure and de facto independence 
that it has from the executive branch varies across peripheral developing countries. 
In general, regulatory authorities have the formal authority to impose and enforce 
a wide range of regulations on banks, although their actions are circumscribed by 
the scope of their legal powers, their resources and expertise, and, as we discuss 
below, political considerations. When it comes to international banking stand-
ards, independent regulatory authorities usually have the powers to implement 
the standards without consulting the legislative or executive branch, by issuing 
regulatory directives and guidelines which banks are then legally obliged to follow. 
However, as Basel standards have become more complex, regulatory authorities 
have needed additional powers to be delegated, and this has required new primary 
legislation.1
In deciding how the banking sector should be regulated, and whether inter-
national standards should be implemented, we expect regulators to draw on a 
1 For example, the implementation of Pillar 2 of Basel II requires national supervisors to have the 
powers to ensure prompt corrective action, the legal mandate to impose higher capital requirements, 
and the ability to conduct supervision at a consolidated level, while Pillar 3 requires the oversight of 
confidentiality rules (Stephanou and Mendoza, 2005). Under Basel III regulators may require add-
itional legal authority to intervene on the basis of macro-prudential factors rather than institution-
specific factors. They may also need quick specific additional powers. Implementation of the new 
‘definitions of capital’ requires that supervisors have sufficient powers to make judgement calls about 
the point at which a bank is deemed to be unable to continue on its own. Where foreign banks have a 
systemically important local presence, supervisors may require increased supervisory powers over 
branches and the ability to require conversion of branches into subsidiaries to implement the require-
ments on D-SIBs, and prevent banks in host jurisdictions from circumventing the higher loss ab sorb ency 
requirements (Fuchs et al., 2013).
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combination of expert technical knowledge and normative beliefs. Designing 
banking regulation is intrinsically difficult as regulators face challenges of imper-
fect information and profound uncertainty (Haldane,  2012). Technical officials 
navigate uncertainty by drawing on a combination of technical knowledge and 
normative beliefs to diagnose problems and identify solutions (Chwieroth, 2007). 
Over time, particular normative frameworks and sets of policy ideas come to 
dominate an institution, shaping the manner in which external demands and 
events are interpreted and the responses that the staff will entertain and, potentially, 
implement (Chwieroth, 2010, p. 10). In the area of financial regulation, scholars 
have shown how economic ideology, particularly faith in self-correcting market 
mechanisms, has deeply influenced regulators’ approaches to banking regula-
tion, contributing to the global financial crisis (see, for instance, Cassidy, 2010; 
Gorton, 2012).
Regulators in peripheral developing countries operate in a context that is 
different in important ways to that of their counterparts in more advanced 
economies. As discussed in Chapter 2, many are tasked not only with ensuring 
financial stability, but also supporting the development of the financial sector and 
wider economy. While all regulators face an asymmetry of resources and infor-
mation vis-à-vis the banks that they regulate, in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries, regulators operate in environments of institutional weakness and, in 
many cases, acute human and financial resource constraints. This makes it chal-
lenging to design and effectively enforce anything but the simplest forms of bank 
regulation (Abdel-Baki, 2012; Fuchs et al., 2013; Gottschalk, 2016, 2010; Gottschalk 
and Griffith-Jones, 2006). While this might lead us to expect regulators in low- and 
lower-middle-income countries to generally oppose the introduction of inter-
national standards, particularly the most onerous and complex elements, 
powerful ideational and reputational incentives may lead regulators to champion 
adoption, as we explain below.
Banks
Even when regulators have a high level of operational independence on paper, 
they are rarely fully independent in practice. Studies of financial regulation in 
advanced industrialized countries, particularly the US, have drawn attention to 
the ways in which private banks can ‘capture’ regulators (Johnson and Kwak, 2011; 
Lall, 2012; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Pagliari and Young, 2014; Stigler, 1971). In the 
US, for instance, the financial industry exercises a powerful role in regulatory 
decisions, including through lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving 
doors between the industry and regulators (e.g. FCIC, 2011). Fragmentation among 
regulatory institutions helps the industry exercise this power (Lavelle, 2013).
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While much of the literature has conceived of the relationship between the 
financial industry and state as a one-way street, with banks exercising power over 
regulators, others have argued that the relationship is one of mutual dependence. 
The sheer size of the financial sector relative to the rest of the economy in many 
industrialized economies means that regulatory decisions often reflect the inter-
ests of the sector, yet in large and lucrative markets, banks ultimately rely on the 
goodwill of the regulator to operate (Culpepper,  2015). In many European 
countries, a series of formal and informal ties between the political system and 
the banking system2 enable banks to exercise a significant influence over the 
regulatory process through their political connections but also make banks recep-
tive to political guidance (Monnet et al., 2014).
The ability of big banks to capture regulators is not limited to industrialized 
countries. Maxfield (1991) studies Mexico and Brazil and shows how the relative 
strength of bankers’ alliances decisively shapes regulatory policies. In Mexico, a 
strong alliance between bankers, industry, and the central bank resulted in a set 
of policies that prioritized bank interests, promoting macroeconomic stability 
and the free flow of capital. In Brazil, in contrast, a weak alliance of bankers 
coupled with a strong state-planning authority led to a set of growth-oriented 
policies, including extensive intervention in financial markets. Pepinsky (2013) 
makes a similar argument, and shows how powerful financial sectors in Mexico 
and Indonesia successfully influenced regulatory policies and maintained restric-
tions on foreign ownership in the banking sector. Boone (2005) shows how strong 
and relatively autonomous financial sectors in South Africa and Mauritius made 
regulators more vulnerable to the demands of private finance.
A striking and important difference in low- and lower-middle-income coun-
tries is that the size of the banking sector is much smaller relative to the wider 
economy than in upper-middle- and high-income countries (see Chapter 2). As a 
result, while individual banks may be influential because they are linked to 
powerful politicians (discussed below), the financial sector doesn’t have the struc-
tural power that we see in many advanced economies. Moreover, in a context 
where the wider economy is underdeveloped and dominated by small informal 
enterprises and smallholder agriculture, lending to government and state-owned 
enterprises is central to the business strategy of banks.
In this book we distinguish between domestically oriented and internationally 
oriented banks, arguing that they have very different incentives when it comes to 
banking regulation and the adoption of international standards. The salient fea-
ture of domestically oriented banks is that, irrespective of whether they are owned 
by domestic or foreign shareholders, their business model focuses on the 
2 For instance, German public saving banks (Sparkassen and Landesbanken) that held some 
33 per cent of the assets of the German Banking sector in 2009 remain owned and controlled by 
regional governments.
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domestic market. As we explain in more detail below, for banks reliant on the 
domestic market, the adoption of complex international standards has high costs 
and few benefits. Although domestically oriented banks stand to lose from the 
implementation of international standards, they rarely had sufficient power to 
decisively influence regulatory outcomes.
In contrast, internationally oriented banks focus their business strategy on 
international markets. For reasons we explain below, internationally oriented banks 
gain reputational advantages from the implementation of international standards 
and, unlike domestically oriented banks, they are more likely to have the power to 
decisively shape regulatory outcomes. Where they are present, large, internation-
ally oriented banks shape regulatory outcomes. Yet relatively few low- and lower-
middle- income countries have such banks, as they tend to be associated with 
more developed financial markets. This variation helps explain different responses 
to international standards.
A striking finding of our empirical chapters is that the presence of foreign 
banks, particularly those headquartered in Basel Committee countries, does not 
create pressures to converge on international standards. We might expect inter-
national banks to champion convergence as when they have to comply with dif-
ferent regulatory requirements across the jurisdictions in which they operate this 
can generate uncertainty and complexity, particularly for globally systemically 
important banks (Bauer and Drevon, 2015). It is also plausible that foreign banks 
will champion the implementation of international standards to put them at a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller domestic banks, as the latter struggle to 
comply with complex regulatory requirements. Yet, in our case studies, we find 
no evidence of foreign banks championing convergence on international stand-
ards. Where regulators have decided to implement Basel standards, there are 
examples of foreign banks providing technical assistance to domestic banks, and 
even to the regulatory authorities, but they haven’t been strong advocates for 
implementation. Indeed, some international banks have cautioned regulators 
against implementing some of the more complex elements of Basel III, arguing 
that they are ill suited to their context.3
Politicians
Politicians exert influence over regulatory decisions directly, through their 
policies and oversight of the regulatory authority, and indirectly, through their 
political connections to banks. As several of our empirical cases powerfully illus-
trate, the existence of an independent regulatory authority does not preclude the 
influence of policy or politics. In a vital government institution like the central 
3 Interview with senior official from a large pan-African bank, via telephone, June 2015.
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bank, senior officials are selected for their expertise, but they are also likely to be 
appointed on the basis of their broad alignment with the policy objectives of 
incumbent politicians. The more prevalent the appointment of such ‘technopols’ 
(people with a hybrid status as technocrats and politicians—see Domínguez, 1997) 
in the regulatory agency, the greater the influence that government policy is likely 
to have over regulatory outcomes. In several countries, the appointment of senior 
officials in the regulatory authority, including the appointment of central bank 
governors, is a decision for the executive branch.
While politicians may not take an interest in the complex technical details of 
international banking standards, they do set the overall policy stance towards the 
financial sector. Financial sector policies vary substantially across peripheral 
developing countries. Politicians may adopt an interventionist approach, using a 
variety of policy instruments to direct the allocation of credit in the economy in 
line with specific policy objectives. Alternatively, they may pursue policies that 
allocate credit purely on the basis of market prices, focusing on policy measures 
to improve market efficiency.
The policy-orientation of governments has important path-dependent effects 
on the institutional set-up for banking regulation. Where the government has a 
history of interventionism, often as part of a wider developmental state model, 
the executive branch is likely to have retained a high level of oversight and control 
over bank regulation and supervision, and regulatory authorities are likely to 
have a lower level of independence. In contrast, where the country has pursued a 
more market-oriented approach, it is more likely to have an autonomous regulator.
In general, it is reasonable to expect that the degree of alignment between 
international standards and pre-existing regulatory institutions will shape national 
responses to international standards, as has been shown for the adoption of inter-
national standards in advanced countries (Quillin, 2008). Specifically, for peripheral 
developing countries, we might reasonably expect countries that have historically 
pursued market-oriented policies and have an independent regulatory authority 
to be more receptive to the market-oriented Basel standards than countries where 
governments have historically pursued interventionist approaches.
Over and above this general trend, we explain below why politicians seeking to 
attract international capital to their country and the creation of an international 
financial centre may perceive the implementation of banking and other inter-
national standards to be a vital part of their country’s economic development 
strategy, leading to a particularly powerful dynamic of convergence on inter-
national standards. As Reddy (2010) notes, eagerness to develop a thriving 
international financial centre is likely to result in an approach to regulation that 
puts self-regulation by market participants at its heart.
Politicians may also exert influence over regulation to further the interests of 
specific banks to whom they are politically connected. In countries where eco-
nomic and political power is highly centralized, banks may be owned by powerful 
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elites and used to further business and political interests. Hutchcroft (1998) shows 
how, in the Philippines, powerful families with sources of economic income out-
side of the state were able to dominate politics and the business sector, through 
family-owned conglomerates. As part of their wider business strategy they set up 
or acquired ownership stakes in domestic banks, using them to provide credit to 
their own businesses, and to shore up their connections to politicians. The regula-
tor had very little power to enforce bank regulations vis-à-vis these powerful, 
politically connected banks (Hutchcroft, 1998).
Powerful politicians may also have direct ownership stakes in banks, or other-
wise exercise influence over the business operations of banks in order to shore up 
their political power. In countries where state-owned banks dominate the bank-
ing sector, these banks provide incumbent politicians with a high level of discre-
tionary control over credit allocation in the economy. While this control may be 
used to pursue policy objectives, as in the developmental state model, it may also 
be used for political patronage. Arriola (2013) shows how incumbent politicians 
in several different African countries have used discretionary powers over finance 
to make credit allocation contingent on political allegiance. While Arriola argues 
that this is particularly likely to happen when banks are state owned, politicians 
may also use ownership stakes in private banks to further their political goals. 
During processes of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s in African countries, 
bank licenses were often granted in ways that shored up political patronage sys-
tems, ensuring enduring links between politicians and banks (Boone, 2005).
Thus, to explain responses of regulators to international banking standards, we 
need to understand the interests and preferences of regulators, banks, and politi-
cians, as well as the relations between them, a relationship that is often more 
complex than it may at first appear. While we conceive of bank regulation as a 
three-way game between regulators, large banks, and incumbent politicians, it is 
the politicians and regulators that exert the greatest influence over regulatory out-
comes. This in turn implies an important role in our explanatory framework for 
policy ideas about how banks should be regulated; for party politics and political 
systems; and for the material interests of political elites. This distinguishes our 
analytical framework from the frameworks that scholars use to explain regulatory 
outcomes in industrialized economies, in which the business interests of large 
banks loom large (Culpepper, 2015; Helleiner and Porter, 2010; Lall, 2012; Mattli 
and Woods, 2009; Oatley and Nabors, 1998; Pagliari and Young, 2014; Singer, 2007; 
Underhill and Zhang, 2008).
International context
The connections between national politicains, regulators, and banks to international 
financial players and networks of global financial governance also play an 
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important role in our anlaytical framework. As the interconnectedness of periph-
eral developing countries with global finance has increased, so too has the respon-
siveness of national regulations to an array of international interests and actors. 
There is a long history of engagement between peripheral developing countries, 
particularly low- and lower-middle-income countries and the World Bank and 
IMF. Widespread reforms in the 1980s and 1990s under structural adjustment loans, 
as well as in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, aimed to create regulatory 
institutions and practices explicitly aligned with the work of the Basel Committee 
(Hamilton-Hart, 2003; Mathieu, 1998). These reforms were very contentious and 
often only partially implemented (Killick et al., 1998; Mosley, 2010). Even where they 
were implemented, they often failed to strengthen the financial sector (Mathieu, 
1998). Yet for many developing countries they ushered in a step-change in how 
the financial sector was structured and regulated,4 reducing the level of state 
intervention and creating independent, arm’s-length regulatory institutions. This 
created conditions that were more conducive to, although not sufficient for, the 
implementation of Basel II and III standards in later years.
More recently, engagement with international private finance has increased. 
Peripheral developing countries have increasingly opened up to foreign banks 
and cross-border flows of portfolio finance, and, more recently, governments 
have tapped into international capital markets to finance their own activities. 
Increased exposure to international finance renders peripheral developing coun-
tries particularly vulnerable to changes in the international environment, whether 
that is shifts in international credit cycles, or in the regulations that prevail in the 
financial core (Bauerle Danzman et al., 2017; Rey, 2015). With integration, regu-
lators, banks, and politicians become acutely aware of, and responsive to, the 
preferences of international investors and credit rating agencies, as well as regu-
lators in other jurisdictions. As we explain below, this engagement generates 
specific incentives for regulators, banks, and politicians in peripheral developing 
countries to converge on international banking standards.
Although the exposure of peripheral developing countries to international 
finance has increased, we should not expect external pressures and incentives to 
generate uniform responses across peripheral developing countries (Boone, 2005). 
Peripheral developing countries are embedded in international finance in differ-
ent ways and to different extents and, as we argue below, domestic political econ-
omy dynamics condition countries’ responses to these external pressures and 
incentives.
4 See also Lavelle (2004) who argues that programmes of the International Financial Corporation, 
World Bank, and IMF were also key in fostering the development of equity markets in developing 
countries.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
       77
Convergence: drivers and political underpinnings
We now turn to the specific factors that drive convergence and divergence. In this 
section we explain the causal mechanisms that underpin the four factors we iden-
tify as providing strong incentives for regulators in peripheral developing coun-
tries to converge on international banking standards, and then do the same for 
the four factors we identify as driving divergence. These drivers of convergence and 
divergence are summarized in Figure 3.1.
Politicians seeking international capital
Politicians seeking to attract international capital into the financial services sector 
can be a strong driver of convergence on international banking standards. 
Following the rapid growth of East Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, many 
other developing countries looked to manufacturing as the pathway ‘out of the 
periphery’ (Haggard, 1990). In the past decade the viability of late developers cul-
tivating an export-oriented manufacturing sector has been heavily questioned 
(e.g. Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2017). Perhaps in response, politicians are 
increasingly looking to drive development through the expansion of financial 
services. In some of our case studies politicians are working hard to position 
their country as an international hub for financial services, looking to emulate 
Singapore or Mauritius. In other cases, politicians are championing the adoption 
of international standards in order to attract international investment into 
banking, with the aim of increasing competition and reducing the cost of credit 
Drivers of convergence Drivers of divergence
←→
1. Politicians seeking 
international capital
2. Regulators engaging with 
peers
3. Domestic banks expanding 
into international markets
4. Sustained engagement with the 
World Bank and IMF
1. Politicians pursuing 
interventionist financial policies
2. Politicians and business 
oligarchs using banks to direct 
credit to allies
3. Sceptical regulators
4. Fragile domestic banks
Figure 3.1 Drivers of convergence and divergence in peripheral developing countries.
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to the private sector. This may be part of a drive to liberalize the banking sector 
and break ties between the banking sector and related patronage structures 
(Walter, 2008).
The implementation of international banking standards is perceived by politicians 
as an important mechanism for signalling to potential investors that their bank-
ing sector is soundly regulated. Scholars have shown how reputational signalling 
has become important for developing countries, and moves to give central banks 
independence were often driven by politicians’ desire to signal creditworthiness 
to international investors, in a context of growing financial interdependence (Ghosh, 
2007; Maxfield, 1997). Similar reputational dynamics underpin the implementa-
tion of international banking standards. It is hard for international investors, and 
actors like credit rating agencies that intermediate the relationship between 
investors and peripheral developing countries, to reliably assess how well a finan-
cial sector is regulated. International investors and other market participants 
appreciate simple metrics such as compliance with international standards for 
providing a straightforward assessment of national performance that can be easily 
integrated into risk-return calculations (Mosley, 2003). We find that, for politicians 
seeking to improve their country’s reputation in the eyes of international invest-
ors, implementing Basel and other international financial standards is an obvious 
way to signal commitment to transparency and more stringent regulation.
The incentive to implement Basel standards is particularly strong for countries 
seeking to establish themselves as financial centres, as they deliberately cultivate 
their image as secure and stable investment destinations as this enables them to 
attract a greater volume of lucrative business (Sharman, 2009). The reputational 
payoffs for compliance with international standards are comparatively high and 
governments may thus be willing to bear the costs of compliance (Brummer, 2012, 
p. 147; Ercanbrack, 2015, p. 214).5 Enhancing its reputation as a sophisticated 
international financial centre is a major driver for Mauritius’ high implementa-
tion of Basel II and III, as well as other international financial standards.6
In general, the greater the emphasis that politicians place on attracting and 
retaining international investment in the financial services sector, the stronger 
the incentives that regulators face to converge on international banking standards.
Domestic banks expanding into international markets
Regulators may also adopt international banking standards to facilitate the expan-
sion of internationally oriented domestic banks into new markets. Relatively few 
5 However, for international financial activity that thrives on secrecy and regulatory forbearance, 
regulators may deliberately opt against adoption of international standards to signal commitment to 
continuing this approach. See (Goodhart, 2011).
6 Discussions with senior government officials, Oxford, June 2016.
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banks headquartered in low- and lower-middle-income countries have international 
operations, but this is changing, particularly with the expansion of regional 
banks across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While many regional banks are 
headquartered in upper-middle- and high-income countries, a growing number 
are located in low- and lower-middle-income countries. In the Africa region, for 
instance, Togo (a low-income country) is the home supervisor of Ecobank, a major 
pan-African bank that operates in thirty-six countries, often with a systemically 
important presence. Similarly, Nigeria and Morocco (both lower-middle-income 
countries) are the home regulators of major pan-African banks, while Kenya (also 
lower-middle-income) is the home regulator for several banks that are active 
across the East African region (Enoch et al., 2015).
For home regulators of these internationally oriented domestic banks, imple-
mentation of international standards is an important mechanism for reassuring 
host regulators that their banks are soundly regulated at the parent level. Because 
of the risk of cross-border financial contagion, host regulators will seek assurance 
that a bank is soundly regulated at home before they issue a license allowing a 
foreign bank to operate in their jurisdiction. International standards can provide 
an ‘epistemic signpost’ that reassures host regulators that there is a high quality of 
regulation and supervision at the parent level (Brummer, 2010, p. 264). In the EU, 
member states are allowed to restrict access to third-country banks whose 
home country regimes do not meet EU standards. Similarly, in the US, the Federal 
Reserve has the authority to issue banking licenses to foreign banks only if they 
are ‘subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis 
by the appropriate authorities in its home country’ and if they are ‘well-capitalized 
and well-managed’ on a global basis (Alexander et al., 2006, p. 146). In the 2000s, 
compliance with Basel Core Principles and implementation of the latest Basel 
standards were the common reference point for EU and US regulators in making 
these assessments.7 Thus, while not an explicit condition for market entry, 
implementation of the international benchmark has been, as a matter of practical 
regulatory policy, an important mechanism for entering these markets.
There is evidence that, during the 1990s and early 2000s, regulators in emer-
ging economies in Asia adopted Basel standards to help their banks gain entry 
into European and US markets (Chey, 2007; Ho, 2002). In the Middle East, regu-
lators perceive compliance with the latest Basel standards to be vital for enabling 
Gulf banks to obtain regulatory legitimacy and approval, particularly in North 
American and European markets (Ercanbrack, 2015, p. 214).
Even where adoption of Basel standards is not a pre-requisite for market entry, 
regulators may adopt Basel standards to boost the reputation of their internation-
ally active banks. Knaack (2017) argues that improving the reputation of China’s 
7 Reliance on Basel as a signal of high-quality domestic banking regulation has waned since the 
global financial crisis, as both the EU and the US have come to distrust each other’s modifications of 
Basel III.
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internationally active banks is an important explanation for China’s recent 
over-compliance with Basel standards, particularly Basel III. The Executive 
Director of the Reserve Bank of India gave a similar explanation for Basel adop-
tion in India: ‘Any deviation [from global standards] will hurt us both by way of 
reputation and also in actual practice. The “perception” of a lower standard 
regulatory regime will put Indian banks at a disadvantage in global competition’ 
(Vishwanathan,  2015). As Goodhart (2011, p. 186) notes, soon after the Basel 
standards were first developed, the Basel Committee found that ‘the recommenda-
tions and standards developed and intended only for large G10 international 
banks became regarded by all other countries, and their banks, as reputationally 
binding’ [emphasis added].
The implementation of Basel standards may also be supported by locally 
incorporated banks that are tapping into international credit markets (Alexander 
et al., 2006; Chey, 2014; Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2006). For banks issuing 
bonds to finance their operations, their cost of borrowing on international 
markets is largely determined by their credit ratings. In turn, there is anecdotal 
evidence that the major international ratings companies consider compliance with 
the latest Basel standards as being ‘positive for bank creditworthiness’ (Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2015). For instance, in its assessment of Colombia, Fitch Ratings 
argued that the country’s failure to fully align with Basel III standards meant that 
‘they trail international peers that use more conservative and globally accepted 
capital standards’ (Wade, 2018).
In general, the higher the number of domestic banks with international 
operations, the stronger the incentives that regulators face to converge on inter-
national banking standards.
Regulators engaging with peers implementing standards
Regulators may also face strong incentives to implement international standards 
as a result of their engagement with peers in other countries who are already 
implementing them. Given that regulators in peripheral developing countries 
face particularly acute constraints in designing financial regulations, we expect 
them to learn from and emulate the practices of regulators in other countries. In 
general, the higher the level of engagement that senior officials have with peers 
who are implementing international standards, the stronger their incentives to 
follow suit.
Research on the diffusion of global norms provides insights into the specific 
ways in which transnational networks drive policy transfer, distinguishing 
between process of learning and emulation. We expect regulators to look to and 
draw lessons from the experiences of regulators in countries similar to theirs, 
and to apply these lessons in designing their own policies (Dobbin et al., 2007). 
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Learning is based on an evidence-based evaluation of practices in other countries 
and a progressive move from less effective to more effective policies. While this 
may take place, hard evidence of the efficacy of a policy in another jurisdiction 
may not always be available. Sociologists have drawn attention to the ways in 
which policies may still diffuse across borders, driven by a quest for normative 
acceptance and legitimacy rather than technical efficiency, as policymakers 
emulate the policies of those they perceive to be leaders in their field.8 While 
processes of policy transfer are usually used to describe a move towards more 
effective policies, this is not inevitable. As Sharman (2010) shows, policy transfer 
can also be dysfunctional, leading to worse policy outcomes.
Transnational professional networks are a powerful vector for the transmission 
of regulatory practices around the world. They provide a forum for regulators to 
discuss the common challenges they face and to learn from each other’s experi-
ences, and they can play an important role in shaping regulators’ decisions. As 
Ban (2016) powerfully shows, in Spain and Romania the extent to which bureau-
crats engaged with international professional networks promulgating neoliberal 
ideas greatly shaped the policies these countries pursued. The highly technical 
and practical nature of the discussions within international financial networks 
fosters common knowledge and ‘shared understandings’ among the officials 
involved, which shape regulatory decisions at the national level (Porter,  2005). 
Crucially, international standards or norms—like Basel standards—become focal 
points around which discussions converge and, through this process, become 
widely accepted as ‘best practices’ (Simmons et al., 2006). Transnational networks 
can also be sources of coercive pressure, as Bach and Newman (2010) show in 
their study of insider-trading legislation: lead regulators backed by significant 
market power, such as the United States’ SEC in securities, may use asymmetries 
within transnational networks to promote the global export of their domestic 
policies.
Financial sector regulators are particularly likely to follow decisions made 
by  their peers, as their professional incentives dissuade them from following 
an experimental approach to regulation and encourage herd behaviour (Romano, 
2014). Following ‘international best practices’ and the practices of successful peers 
helps insulate regulators from attribution and attendant costs, in the event of a 
financial crisis at home (Gadinis, 2015, p. 52). In some instances, there may be 
powerful socialization effects at work within peer networks. Where networks 
promulgate specific financial standards, non-implementation may result in social 
reproach from peers for failing to deliver on the group’s regulatory programme or 
shared norms (Brummer, 2012; Martinez-Diaz and Woods, 2009). Engagement in 
8 See discussion of this literature in Sharman (2010).
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transnational networks is a major driver of the diffusion of Basel II standards 
across the globe Jones and Zeitz (2019).
Transnational networks are not the only forum through which regulators in 
peripheral developing countries engage with their peers. Where national author-
ities supervise internationally active banks, this requires them to be in regular 
contact with supervisors in other jurisdictions. The existence of home-host com-
munication and cooperation is much easier when there are common regulatory 
standards and supervisory practices, and this creates a powerful incentive for 
regulators to converge on and implement international standards (see for instance 
Cassidy, 2010; Chwieroth, 2010; Gorton, 2012).
In general, the higher the level of engagement in transnational regulatory net-
works, particularly in networks where Basel standards are actively promulgated, 
the stronger the incentives that regulators face to converge on international bank-
ing standards.
Sustained engagement with the World Bank and IMF
Regular interactions with international financial institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank, either through lending programmes or technical assistance, can pro-
vide strong incentives for regulators to implement international standards. While 
deep institutional reforms occurred under World Bank and IMF loans in the 
1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and IMF have remained closely involved in 
the design of financial sector reforms in many peripheral developing countries.
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the World Bank and 
IMF placed greater emphasis on strengthening supervisory capacity in developing 
countries, making the strengthening of regulation and supervision a condition in 
loans, and embedding long-term technical advisers in the banking supervision 
departments of central banks. Since the early 2000s, the IMF, World Bank, and 
Financial Stability Board have also conducted regular joint reviews of countries’ 
supervisory practices under Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs), and 
this includes a review of the compliance with Basel Core Principles. The IMF and 
World Bank have funded regulators to attend training courses that promote Basel 
standards. In Africa, two ‘AFRITAC’ training centres funded by the IMF provide 
trainings and country-level technical assistance in East and West Africa with 
the explicit aim of supporting national regulatory authorities to comply with the 
Basel Core Principles, and to move from Basel I to Basel II and III.
There are more subtle forms of engagement too. As some of our case studies 
illustrate, there is often a revolving door between the IMF and World Bank and 
key institutions in peripheral developing countries, including central banks and 
ministries of finance. It is common for senior officials to spend part of their career 
in the IMF or World Bank, before returning to more senior posts in their home 
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institutions. In addition to equipping officials with the technical skills to implement 
international standards, it is reasonable to expect that intense and regular 
engagement with IMF and World Bank staff leads to the diffusion of norms and 
ideas, helping to create regulatory institutions where the ideas and beliefs of 
senior staff are aligned with those prevailing in the IMF, World Bank, and closely 
related institutions.
Yet the IMF and World Bank have not universally championed the implemen-
tation of Basel standards. While the IMF and World Bank have enthusiastically 
supported compliance with the Basel Core Principles, their advice on the imple-
mentation of Basel II and III has been more circumspect. For instance, in its 
response to a Financial Stability Institute survey, Belize states that it is not imple-
menting Basel II on the direct advice of the IMF (FSI, 2015, p. 4). A close read of 
FSAP reports reveals other instances in which the FSAP team has actively dis-
couraged the implementation of Basel II, including in Rwanda, Barbados, and 
Cameroon. As our case studies show, in some instances peripheral countries have 
proceeded with Basel implementation against the advice of the IMF.
In general, we expect regular and extensive engagement with the IMF and 
World Bank to result in higher levels of implementation of the Basel Framework, 
although this may fall short of support for implementing the full suite of inter-
national standards.
Divergence: drivers and political underpinnings
While the international economic and political context in which peripheral coun-
tries are embedded can generate strong incentives for regulators in peripheral 
countries to implement Basel standards, they often face strong incentives to 
diverge from them. Four are particularly important: politicians pursuing inter-
ventionist financial sector policies, politicians and business oligarchs using banks 
to direct credit to allies, skeptical regulators, and fragile domestic banks.
Politicians pursuing interventionist financial sector policies
Where governments use interventionist measures to direct credit to specific 
sections of the economy or particular societal groups, this is likely to create incen-
tives to diverge from the implementation of Basel standards. In many countries 
around the world, governments intervene in the allocation of credit through price 
or quantity rules in order to achieve specific policy objectives by providing com-
petitive advantage to certain economic sectors. While often associated with the 
state-led industrialization strategies of fast-growing East Asian countries, policy-
directed lending has been central to industrialization in many advanced countries. 
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In countries including Japan, South Korea, France, and Germany, a credit-based 
financial system allowed the state to exert influence over the economy’s investment 
pattern and guide the development of productive sectors (Zysman, 1983; Haggard 
and Lee, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Naqvi et al., 2018). In the wake of the global 
financial crisis there has been a resurgence in interventionist financial policies, 
including renewed interest in national development banks, as governments have 
sought to channel credit into productive, longer-term projects.
Interventionist approaches were the norm in peripheral developing countries 
in the post-independence period, but many governments abandoned them in the 
1980s and 1990s, often under the pressure of structural adjustment programmes 
(Mathieu, 1998). However, governments in some peripheral developing countries 
are pursuing interventionist financial sector policies, including Ethiopia and 
Bolivia, countries we examine in this book. In general, interventionist financial 
sector policies sit at odds with core aspects of the Basel framework.
The Basel Core Principles and Standards are premised on market-based alloca-
tion of credit, with the government only stepping in to address market failures. 
The Basel framework requires a formally independent regulator that operates at 
arm’s length from the institutions it regulates (banks), as well as from the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government. Under this framework, the regula-
tor’s core role is to ensure the market works effectively by refereeing the allocation 
of credit by private institutions, and to limit excessive risk-taking. While such an 
approach is presented as apolitical, as Ghosh (2007) argues, the creation of 
independent regulatory institutions with narrow mandates is a political decision 
to prioritize a specific and narrow policy agenda, such as financial stability. In 
contrast, interventionist financial policies seek to channel credit on the basis of 
policy priorities rather than market prices, and deliberately seek to disrupt the 
market allocation of credit. Under such systems the government’s core function is 
not that of referee, but that of a player, selectively allocating credit to specific 
industries (Zysman, 1983).
The market-orientation of the Basel framework is reflected in the Basel Core 
Principles, which emphasize the need for supervisors to have operational inde-
pendence, free from political interference, and the relevant legal powers to ensure 
compliance. Policy-directed lending and the general use of financial intermediaries 
as instruments of government policy are identified as distorting market signals 
and impeding effective supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2012). Basel II standards place even greater emphasis on market actors and price 
signals than Basel I, with credit ratings agencies and banks accorded central roles 
in evaluating risks, and the third pillar of Basel II dedicated to improving market 
discipline, including through new public disclosure requirements. In countries 
where the government relies extensively on policy-directed lending, the Basel 
framework is unlikely to be an attractive basis for regulation.
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Reformist politicians may promote the implementation of Basel standards as 
part of a wider agenda to move away from an interventionist to a market-oriented 
approach to the financial sector. Such moves are likely to provoke opposition 
from local elites who have been privileged within the existing system (Mosley, 
2010). The implementation of Basel I in the developmental states of East Asia, as 
part of a wider market-based reform agenda, generated substantial resistance 
(Chey, 2014; Walter, 2008).
In general, the greater the level of interventionist financial policies in a country, 
the stronger the incentives that regulators face to diverge from international 
banking standards.
Politicians and business oligarchs using banks  
to direct credit to allies
Where politicians and business oligarchs use banks to direct credit to their allies, 
they are likely to oppose the introduction of international standards. Politicians may 
use their control over banks to allocate credit to political allies, while powerful 
economic elites may use banks to allocate credit to their own businesses and curry 
favour with politicians. Where such politically based lending is pervasive, regulation 
is typically lax, with regulators exercising a high level of forbearance. This may 
include the non-enforcement of regulations on non-performing loans extended to 
politically connected individuals, overlooking breaches to single obligor limits and 
related-party lending, and failing to follow due process when issuing bank licenses.
It is common for regulatory institutions in developing countries to face acute 
resource constraints, and in some cases this may be intentional. Hutchcroft (1998) 
explains why the central bank in the Philippines was one of the strongest gov-
ernment institutions and widely respected for maintaining a high level of macro-
economic stability, yet it housed a banking supervision department that was 
weak and where regulatory forbearance was the norm. He argues that this was 
due to the economic interests and political priorities of the powerful oligarchs. 
Underlying political economy dynamics also help explain why Singapore and 
Malaysia had strong regulatory institutions, while in Indonesia they were very 
weak (Hamilton-Hart, 2003).
Where political lending is pervasive, politicians and powerful economic elites 
are likely to resist moves to increase the quality of regulation and supervision and 
allocate more resources to regulators, moves that are required for the implemen-
tation and enforcement of international banking standards. In China, for instance, 
the introduction of Basel I was opposed by powerful groups within the party-state 
apparatus that benefited from politically directed credit allocation. Implementation 
only began in earnest after the Asian financial crisis alerted the leadership to the 
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risks associated with an unreformed financial sector (Walter, 2010). In Malaysia 
and Thailand, powerful family-owned banks strongly resisted disclosure require-
ments that are an integral part of the Basel framework, as this would have revealed 
high levels of related-party lending (Walter, 2008).
Our case studies are a reminder that it is important to distinguish conceptually 
between interventionist financial sector policies, where credit is allocated on the 
basis of objective policies, and politically directed lending where credit is allo-
cated on the basis of political favours to individuals. These two conceptually dis-
tinct phenomena are often conflated in the literature, reflecting an (often implicit) 
assumption that interventionist policies will be accompanied by high levels of 
politically directed lending, while systems of market-based credit allocation will 
be accompanied by low levels of politically directed lending (e.g. Arriola, 2013; 
Barth et al., 2006). Yet it is equally possible for politically directed lending to be 
pervasive under market-based systems of credit allocation, and for it to be negli-
gible under interventionist systems, as several chapters in this book highlight.
In general, the more that banks are used by politicians and business oligarchs 
to allocate credit to allies, the stronger the incentives that regulators face to diverge 
from international banking standards.
Sceptical regulator
Given all the debate surrounding the appropriateness of Basel standards for low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, particularly Basel II and III, it is very plausible that 
the regulatory authority will be a source of resistance to the introduction of inter-
national standards, particularly the more complex elements of Basel II and III.
Supervisory capacity is a particularly acute constraint in many developing 
countries, and can be a major deterrent to moving from relatively simple 
 compliance-based supervision under Basel I to risk-based supervision under 
Basel II (Beck,  2011; Fuchs et al.,  2013; Gottschalk,  2010; Griffith-Jones and 
Gottschalk, 2016). Even national authorities in developed Basel member juris-
dictions have found implementation of the new Basel standards challenging 
because of human resource constraints, above all the advanced, internal-ratings 
based approaches of Basel II and the macroprudential elements of Basel III 
(Bailey, 2014; BCBS, 2013).
The complex approaches of Basel II and III can also exacerbate information asym-
metry between supervisors and banks, giving banks greater opportunity to game the 
regulations.  These concerns are even more salient in developing countries, where 
human and financial resources are scarcer, and where remunerative differences and 
brain drain to the private sector pose significant challenges for regulatory author-
ities  (Abdel-Baki,  2012; Fuchs et al.,  2013; Gottschalk,  2016, 2010; Gottschalk and 
Griffith-Jones, 2006). Barth and Caprio (2018) argue that the Basel standards are too 
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cumbersome and too costly for countries with small financial sectors, particularly 
countries with banking systems with total assets of less than US$10 billion.
In particular, we expect regulators to oppose the implementation of components 
that are irrelevant given the conditions in their financial markets (such as the 
requirements for counter-party credit risk in countries where banks do not have 
substantial trading books; and liquidity requirements where there is a shortage of 
assets that meet definitions of high quality) or overly complex given data avail-
ability and resource constraints (such as internal model-based approaches for 
assessing risk).
It is also plausible that regulators will block the implementation of international 
standards when this is likely to publicly expose weaknesses in the banking sector, 
and, in an extreme case, may even lead to banks being closed or trigger a financial 
crisis, for which they may be held accountable.
In general, the greater the resource constraints and technical challenges associ-
ated with implementing international standards, and the weaker the banking sec-
tor, the stronger the incentives that regulators face to diverge from implementing 
international standards.
Fragile domestic banks
Banks with business models focused exclusively on the domestic market in per-
ipheral developing countries are likely to oppose the implementation of complex 
regulations because of the additional compliance costs this generates. An interest-
ing finding from our empirical studies is that in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries, this often applies irrespective of whether these banks are foreign-owned 
or domestically owned. Opposition is likely to be strongest from small, weak banks, 
for whom the costs of implementation are highest.
In general, and unlike their counterparts in developed countries, banks in 
most developing countries are expected to be able to easily meet the levels of cap-
ital and liquidity required under Basel II and III, although adjustment costs vary 
greatly depending on the business characteristics of banks, variations in national 
tax regulations, and the availability of a sufficiently diversified portfolio of high-
quality liquid assets.9 The reason for this is that banks in developing countries 
typically hold capital well above the minimum international standards as a result 
of national regulatory requirements and the risky nature of the financial sector in 
which they operate. This does not mean that capital is necessarily of high quality 
as other factors, including accounting weaknesses, may put the quality of capital 
9 See for instance (Abdel-Baki,  2012; Frait and TomŠÍk,  2014; Gobat et al.,  2014; Kasekende 
et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013). Another study of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru suggests that 
major banks in these countries already meet the Basel III capital adequacy ratios (Galindo et al., 2011).
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into question, but it does mean that nominal compliance with the Basel standards 
ought to be within reach. In Africa, for instance, more than one third of national 
regulators impose higher capital standards than required under both Basel II and 
Basel III (Kasekende et al., 2011).
However, the adjustment costs for banks of moving from Basel I to Basel II 
and III can be extremely high, particularly for smaller banks that have relied on 
relationship-based lending.10 In particular, banks need to train staff and upgrade 
information technology systems to bring their risk management into line with 
Basel standards. As Rajan and Zingales (2003) explain, in the absence of disclos-
ure requirements and proper enforcement, financing is typically relationship-
based. Incumbent financiers use connections to obtain information to monitor 
loans, and various informal levers of power to cajole repayment. Disclosure and 
impartial enforcement tend to level the playing field and reduce barriers to an 
entrance into the financial sector. The incumbent financier’s old skills become 
redundant, while new ones of credit evaluation and risk management become 
necessary. For banks focused on serving the domestic market, the implementation 
of international standards, particularly the more complex elements of Basel II 
and III, entails high costs and few gains.
Local subsidiaries of international banks may have more sophisticated risk-
management systems, and greater technical expertise, reducing the costs of com-
pliance relative to small domestically owned banks. We might reasonably expect 
this to lead foreign subsidiaries to champion the implementation of international 
standards, in order to gain a competitive edge over domestic banks. Yet our case 
studies don’t bear this out. Instead, the local subsidiaries of international banks 
are ambivalent or even circumspect about the desirability of fully implementing 
Basel standards. Even if a bank has the internal systems to readily comply with 
Basel II and III, the situation in the wider economy, including a lack of readily 
available credit information and limited access to high-quality liquid assets, may 
impede compliance. Moreover, the structural features of the wider economy ren-
der banking sectors in many low- and lower-middle-income countries highly 
profitable and lacking in real competition, despite a high number of foreign and 
local banks (see Chapter 2). In such an environment, there is less incentive for the 
subsidiaries of international banks to try and use the introduction of complex 
regulations to gain a competitive edge.
Opposition to the implementation of international standards is likely to 
be particularly high among banks that are financially weak, poorly governed, 
or have lent extensively to politically connected clients. Basel implementation 
10 Tarullo (2008, p. 167) suggests that the costs to an individual bank of compliance with some of 
the more complex elements of Basel II (internal model approaches to credit risk) are US$42 million 
per institution.
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is likely to engender particularly strong opposition from banks during an eco-
nomic downturn.
In general, the higher the prevalence of weak domestic banks, the stronger the 
incentives that regulators face to diverge from international banking standards.
Pathways to convergence, divergence, and mock compliance
In the sections above, we set out the key actors and the factors that generate 
incentives for regulators in peripheral developing countries to converge on, or 
diverge from, international banking standards. A logical implication of the pre-
ceding discussion is that in countries where regulators face incentives to converge 
that are stronger than incentives to diverge, we expect greater levels of convergence 
on international standards than when incentives to diverge outweigh incentives 
to converge.
In line with the preceding discussion, we expect convergence to be high where a 
country has traditionally pursued a market-based approach to credit allocation and 
where the political and business elite pursue a development strategy that prioritizes 
integration into international finance and the expansion of the financial service 
sector; where regulators have substantial autonomy and are embedded in an 
international policy environment that encourages adoption of international stand-
ards; and where large domestic banks have a substantial international footprint.
Conversely, we expect divergence to be high in cases where a country has a his-
tory of interventionist policies towards the financial sector, or where politicians 
and business oligarchs extensively use banks for political ends; where the regula-
tor is sceptical about the applicability of Basel standards for their local context 
and does not prioritize engagement in international policy networks that encour-
age the adoption of Basel standards; and where there are a substantial number of 
weak and poorly governed domestic banks.
Of course, country contexts are not static. In this section, we explore pathways 
of convergence and divergence, and explain why trajectories are likely to differ 
depending on which actor is driving the process. We also discuss the ways in 
which regulators are likely to respond when they face strong incentives to both 
converge and diverge, arguing that the outcome is likely to be mock compliance 
or stalled implementation.
A summary of the argument is reflected in Table 3.1.
Pathways to convergence
Countries can embark on a process of convergence with international standards 
























Table 3.1 Pathways to convergence, divergence, and mock compliance



































✓ – – − – –  –  Policy-driven Convergence
– ✓ – – – –  –  Regulator-driven  
– – ✓ – – –  –  Bank-driven  
– – – ✓ – –  –  IFI-driven  
– – – – ✓ –  –  Policy-driven Divergence
     ✓    Politically driven  
– – – – –  ✓ –  Regulator-driven  
– – – – – –  ✓  Bank-driven  
✓ – – – ✓ –  –  Politically driven Mock compliance
– ✓ – – – ✓  –  Regulator-driven  
Note: ✓ denotes the factor driving the process of convergence or divergence
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with a strong vision of integrating their countries into global finance and expand-
ing the financial services sector, perhaps with the support of local business elites. 
Politicians may face resistance from the regulator, particularly if the regulator 
has limited expertise and resources, and from small domestic banks, particularly 
if they are used to a lax regulatory environment. For these groups, the costs of 
adjustment to a new regulatory regime can be very high.
In this scenario, we expect politicians to make bold and ambitious public 
statements about the implementation of international standards to signal their 
reformist intentions to international and domestic audiences. However, imple-
mentation may be slow and targets frequently missed, as the regulatory authorities 
and domestic banks resist implementation. This scenario is unlikely to be stable, 
as politicians can take policy decisions that shift the preferences of the regulatory 
authority and banks over time. For instance, politicians may decide to reform and 
strengthen regulatory institutions, including by appointing governors to the central 
bank that are aligned with their strategy, providing them with additional resources 
and greater powers. Politicians may also take policy decisions that lead to the inter-
nationalization of the banking sector, shifting bank preferences in favour of imple-
menting international standards. Over time we expect the consistent pursuit of 
convergence by politicians to result in high levels of Basel implementation.
Regulator-driven convergence is led by regulators, and is particularly likely 
when the regulatory authority has a high level of independence, and when senior 
officials engage extensively in international policy discussions and aspire to senior 
positions in international financial institutions organizations. In this situation, 
the regulatory authority is likely to adopt a normative identity focused on the 
championing of ‘international best practices’.
Where regulators initiate convergence, they are may meet resistance from 
domestically oriented banks and ambivalence or opposition from politicians. 
Whether the reform initiative is successful depends on the level of independence 
the regulator has from the executive branch and whether it has sufficient resources 
and power to compel banks to comply. If for historical reasons the regulator has 
substantial independence that is widely respected by politicians, then the regula-
tor may succeed in issuing regulations in line with international standards, and 
enforcing them.
In situations where banks and politicians form an alliance against regulatory 
reforms, the regulator may champion an ambitious level of convergence, but is 
unlikely to be able to follow through. This scenario can persist as a relatively 
stable equilibrium unless politicians change their policy stance and start to favour 
the internationalization of the financial sector, or domestic banks expand overseas 
and press for convergence. Regulators on their own are rarely powerful enough to 
shape the preferences of the other key actors (politicians and banks).
Bank-driven convergence occurs when large domestic banks champion the 
implementation of international standards as part of a drive to expand into new 
international markets. These proposals are likely to be met with opposition from 
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smaller banks, and inertia or opposition from the regulator and politicians. In 
this situation, individual banks may voluntarily comply with the standards, while 
they continue to advocate and lobby for formal implementation by regulator. 
Where these banks have a high level of political influence, they may well succeed 
in gradually shifting the preferences of politicians and/or the regulator in favour 
of implementation. In particular, once banks have expanded overseas, home 
regulators have an incentive to implement international standards in order to 
facilitate cross-border supervision with host supervisors.
Finally, IFI-driven convergence occurs when implementation is championed by 
the IMF or World Bank. Where these are opposed by regulators, politicians, and 
banks, little meaningful implementation is likely to occur, unless it is made a con-
dition for accessing financial support, in which case implementation may happen 
on paper, but is unlikely to fully occur in practice. However, if the regulatory 
authorities are supportive of implementation, then an alliance between inter-
national financial institutions and senior technocrats may be sufficiently powerful 
to convince politicians to push reforms through.
Pathways to divergence
Unlike processes of convergence, where regulators have to take the active step of 
aligning with international standards, divergence is the default option. Divergence 
occurs when a new set of international banking standards is agreed by the Basel 
Committee, but the regulator takes no steps to align domestic regulations with 
the new standards. Over time, as the Basel Committee issues more standards, the 
gap between national regulations and those prevailing at the international level 
widens, and divergence becomes more pronounced.
It is unlikely a regulator will actively change national regulations so that they 
are less aligned with international standards. As discussed above, the reputational 
gains from implementing international banking standards in the eyes of inter-
national investors and regulators in other jurisdictions can be substantial. 
Deliberate decisions to undo regulations based on international standards is 
likely to be interpreted as a signal of weak prudent regulation, with the attendant 
risk of capital flight. This is a similar logic to that outlined by Boylan (2001) who 
explains that newly elected governments will be reluctant to reverse central bank 
independence lest they pay the high costs associated with transgressing this sort 
of reputational mechanism: the massive outflow of foreign capital from their 
economies (Boylan, 2001, p. 57).
Divergence, then, occurs when politicians, regulators and banks are ambiva-
lent towards international standards so there is no champion for implementation, 
or when one or more of these actors successfully thwarts their implementation. 
Policy-driven divergence occurs when the pursuit of interventionist financial 
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sector policies creates a mismatch between the need for the regulator to ensure 
that government and state-owned banks make informed, impartial policy-based 
decisions in the direct allocation of credit, and the role envisaged for the regulator 
under the Basel framework. When interventionist policies are the main mechanism 
for allocating credit in the economy, we expect a high level of divergence to occur, 
and for this to be a relatively stable equilibrium, as regulators, politicians, and banks 
are all vested in this arrangement. In countries where there is a hybrid approach 
and only some institutions allocate credit in this way (such as national development 
banks), the regulator may exempt these institutions from complying with Basel 
standards, even if other banks are regulated under them. Indeed, governments in 
advanced and emerging economies have exempted their development banks from 
full compliance with Basel standards (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017; Hohl et al., 2018).
Politically driven divergence occurs when political and business elites have a 
vested interest in maintaining an opaque and highly personalized system of credit 
allocation. This is also likely to be a fairly stable equilibrium as an alliance of pol-
itical and business elites is likely to have sufficient power to block any initiatives 
to implement international standards.
Regulator-driven divergence occurs when the regulator seeks to block the 
implementation of international standards out of concern that they are ill suited 
to the domestic context. Sceptical regulators are likely to advocate cautious and 
selective implementation of the standards and tailoring to suit the local context. 
Even when regulators have relatively little power, and convergence is being driven 
by politicians and internationally oriented banks, this strategy of selective 
adoption is likely to be successful. Politicians and banks are looking to use the 
implementation of the latest international standards as a signal to international 
investors, credit rating agencies, and regulators in other countries that regulation 
is sophisticated and effective. Precisely because they are relying on the implemen-
tation of standards as a heuristic shortcut for assessing the quality of regulation 
and supervision, these third parties are unlikely to differentiate between full and 
selective adoption of the latest international standards.
Bank-driven divergence is likely to occur when a critical mass of domestic 
banks are weak and poorly governed, and implementation of international stand-
ards is likely to publicly expose their fragility. Domestic banks are likely to advo-
cate for a delay in implementation and, where they are particularly fragile, we 
expect regulators and politicians to support them, fearing reputational, economic, 
and political fall-out if they proceed with implementation. In situations where 
regulators want to regulate internationally oriented domestic banks according to 
international standards, they may opt to create a segmented regulatory regime, 
where international standards only apply to specific parts of the financial sector. 
For instance, many members of the Basel Committee exempt smaller banks from 
the purview of Basel II and III, only applying the full suite of Basel standards to 
large, internationally active banks (Castro Carvalho et al., 2017).
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Mock compliance
Specific sets of dynamics occur when regulators simultaneously face strong and 
conflicting incentives to converge on and diverge from international standards. 
In this situation, regulators may issue regulations that are aligned with international 
standards, but intentionally fail to enforce them. Scholars have labelled such situations 
forms of ‘cosmetic’ or ‘mock compliance’ (Chey, 2014, 2006; Walter, 2008).
Politically driven mock compliance occurs when politicians want to implement 
international standards in order to signal creditworthiness to international 
investors, yet are concerned that implementation will limit their ability to direct 
credit for policy or political reasons. Regulator-driven mock compliance occurs 
when the regulator wants to implement international standards in order to support 
the international expansion of domestic banks and enhance their professional 
standing in the eyes of their peers, yet is concerned that implementation will 
expose hitherto undisclosed weaknesses in capital provisioning by domestically 
oriented banks.
Whether mock compliance is a sustainable strategy depends on the incentives 
and information available to the third parties to whom implementation is intended 
to signal sophisticated and robust regulation. Forms of mock or cosmetic compli-
ance can be quite sophisticated and hard to detect without detailed scrutiny of 
national regulations. Japan, for instance, managed to circumvent the implementa-
tion of Basel I standards by maintaining national accounting standards that enabled 
banks to hold much less regulatory capital than intended by Basel I standards 
(Chey, 2014). Conversely, in situations where a country has a reputation for lax 
regulation and widespread regulatory forbearance, claims to be faithfully imple-
menting and enforcing more complex regulations based on international standards 
are unlikely to persuade third parties unless there is an overhaul of the regulatory 
institution and a demonstrable change in the incentives of politicians and busi-
ness elites. Paradoxically, even where mock compliance is suspected, credit rating 
agencies and even international creditors may not have an incentive to investigate 
or punish mock compliance: the global financial crisis has exposed the perverse 
incentives that persist in financial markets, particularly among intermediaries.
Conclusion
This chapter has set out a framework for explaining why regulators in peripheral 
developing countries respond very differently to international banking standards. 
It has identified the key actors, drivers of convergence and divergence, and 
explained how this leads to specific trajectories of convergence on and divergence 
from international standards, as well as instances of mock compliance.
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In the case study chapters that follow, we use this framework to explore the 
political economy of Basel implementation in eleven low- and lower-middle-income 
countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While the real world never maps 
perfectly onto an abstracted explanatory framework, our case study countries can 
be classified according to the extent to which they align with the dynamics 
described above (Table 3.2).
In four cases (Pakistan, Rwanda, Ghana, and West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) implementation of Basel standards has been ambi-
tious, and included some of the more complex elements of Basel II and/or III. In 
the first three cases, convergence was the result of politicians perusing policies to 
attract international capital into the financial services sector. In WAEMU it was 
the result of sustained engagement with the IMF, and a regulator that was very 
supportive of Basel implementation. In a further three cases (Tanzania, Kenya, 
and Bolivia) convergence was championed by regulators and resulted in selective 
adoption of the standards, with regulators implementing the more straightforward 
elements of the Basel framework. In three cases (Nigeria, Vietnam, and Angola) 
we see mock compliance, where international standards are implemented on 
paper but not enforced. In Nigeria mock compliance is driven by conflicted 
incentives within the regulatory authority, while in Angola and Vietnam it is 
driven by conflicted incentives on the part of politicians. Finally, we have one case 
of divergence (Ethiopia), which is driven by interventionist policies towards the 
financial sector.
In Chapters 4 to 15 we examine each case in turn.
Table 3.2 Matching case study countries against the explanatory framework
Country Pathway Outcome (number of BII and BIII 
components implemented)
Pakistan Policy-driven convergence Ambitious implementation (14)
Rwanda Policy-driven convergence Ambitious implementation (10)
Ghana Policy-driven convergence Ambitious implementation (8)
WAEMU IFI-driven convergence Ambitious implementation (10)
Tanzania Regulator-driven convergence Selective implementation (8)
Kenya Regulator-driven convergence Selective implementation (7)
Bolivia Regulator-driven convergence Selective implementation (5)
Nigeria Regulator-driven mock compliance Mock compliance (6)
Angola Politically driven mock compliance Mock compliance (5)
Vietnam Politically driven mock compliance Mock compliance (3)
Ethiopia Policy-driven divergence No implementation (0)
Notes: Ambitious implementation = includes at least one of the more complex components (internal 
models under Basel II and/or liquidity or macroprudential/liquidity standards under Basel III); 
Selective implementation = standardized approaches under Basel II and only microprudential capital 
requirements under Basel III; Mock compliance = on paper, not enforced
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Pakistan
Politicians, Regulations, and Banks Advocate Basel
Natalya Naqvi
Introduction
In the 1950s and 60s, Pakistan was held up as the poster-child for late development 
and state-led industrialization, and considered on a par with South Korea. Since 
then, the two have followed markedly different development trajectories. Since the 
1990s, Pakistan was among a set of developing countries that wholeheartedly 
implemented IFI sponsored liberalization reform, resulting in a dramatic trans-
formation from a state-led ‘developmentalist’ model up until the 1970s, to a 
‘neoliberal’ model based on Washington Consensus principles after the 2000s. 
As part of these reforms, Pakistan transformed its tightly controlled, highly seg-
mented, public bank-dominated financial system into an almost fully privatized, 
deregulated, and liberalized one by the 2000s. One of the key tenets of Pakistan’s 
new development model is the promotion of services exports, especially financial 
services, by encouraging the internationalization of the banking sector, making it 
an especially interesting case to observe the causal mechanisms of adoption of 
international financial standards. The Pakistani case also shows how liberaliza-
tion pressures from international financial institutions in one period can create 
path dependencies, leading to policy-driven convergence over time. Pakistan is 
also one of the few cases where all three major actors (politicians, regulators, and 
banks) faced strong incentives to converge on international standards by the 
2000s. This led to substantive compliance, compared to cases like Nigeria or 
Vietnam where one or more of the major actors had conflicting incentives, result-
ing instead in mock compliance (Table 4.1).
As part and parcel of banking sector internationalization, Pakistan is one of the 
highest adopters and implementers of Basel I, II, and III and the Basel Core 
Principles (BCPs), but with different actors driving adoption over time. Starting 
from a domestically oriented model, over the course of the 1980s to 2000s, 
Pakistan’s politicians were the initial drivers for convergence. Subsequently, regu-
lators pushed for Basel adoption, and finally, once the banks’ interests became 
aligned with those of politicians and regulators, all three major actors pushed for 
a concerted convergence on Basel standards.
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While Basel I and BCP adoption in Pakistan was a result of IMF and World Bank 
conditionality, over the course of the late 1980s and 2000s, Pakistani politicians, 
whether civilian or military, increasingly shifted away from prioritizing state-led 
industrial development, to embrace a more international orientation and cham-
pioning financial services exports in particular. A liberalized, privatized, and 
internationalized banking sector was seen as vital to this development strategy, 
even though the specifics of Basel adoption fell under politicians’ radar and were 
not as politically salient an issue as other reforms like bank privatization. The 
adoption of international banking standards was seen as important for inter-
nationalizing the banking sector, but regulators also made instrumental use of 
Basel standards to force bank consolidation.
As part of IFI conditionality and financial liberalization, the independence and 
regulatory power of the Pakistani central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 
was greatly strengthened. At the same time, internationally oriented politicians 
began to appoint former IFI bureaucrats to key posts at the SBP, generating strong 
peer incentives for officials to international standards. By 2000 the SBP took over 
from the IFIs in becoming the main actor driving through Basel I and then II 
adoption. Initially this was done against the wishes of the domestic banks, which 
viewed the adoption of international standards as a heavy burden, but were not 
politically powerful enough to oppose the SBP, either because they were still in 
the process of privatization, or were loss-making because of the financial crisis of 
the 1990s. During this period, foreign banks were the SBP’s main partners in 
pushing forward adoption and helping local banks to implement. By 2007/8, 
however, the situation dramatically reversed, with the domestic banks taking the 
lead on adoption, while the SBP lost some of its steam after international financial 
standards were discredited in Pakistan for failing to stop the global financial crisis. 
By this point, not only had the highly internationalized domestic private banks 
incurred massive sunk costs by investing in costly Basel-related infrastructure, 
but they had emerged as a powerful interest group because of the transfer of own-
ership to domestic industrial conglomerates or foreign investors, as well as the 
Table 4.1 Pakistan: key indicators
Pakistan  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 1,584
Bank assets (current US$) 120.1 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 43.1
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 28.1
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 16.5
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 28.6
Polity IV score (2017) 7
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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fact that the new development model’s emphasis on financial services placed 
them at a privileged position in the economy, giving them leverage over the SBP. 
The banks now saw staying up to date with international standards as a vital 
signalling mechanism to preserve their global position. For its part, although the 
SBP was less zealous about Basel III than it had been about Basel II, in order to 
compensate for Pakistan’s FATF blacklisting, it not only went ahead with Basel III 
adoption, but modified certain elements to make them even more stringent than 
the original standard. Therefore, in Pakistan after 2007, incentives for conver-
gence were salient for all three sets of major actors, which explains the high 
degree of adoption and implementation.
The following analysis is based on central bank, IMF, World Bank, and other 
official documents, speeches of central bank governors, news articles from major 
local business newspapers, and twenty-seven semi-structured, off-record inter-
views. The interviews were conducted in Karachi between December 2016 and 
January 2017, with bank CEOs, CFOs, and risk managers, at large and medium 
domestic private banks, foreign banks, a domestic public bank, a microfinance 
institution, current and former senior officials at the central bank, consultancies 
which specialized in helping banks with Basel implementation, as well as with 
industry associations Pakistan Banking Association, Pakistan Business Council, 
and Karachi Chambers of Industry.
Political economic context
Pakistan is a lower-middle-income country with a high degree of external vulner-
ability due to a periodic balance of payments crisis and a development model that 
prioritized attracting foreign investment. After the late 1980s, Pakistan’s develop-
ment model began changing wholescale from a ‘developmentalist’ state-led model 
based on import substitution industrialization, to a ‘neoliberal’ model based on 
‘Washington consensus’ principles (Zaidi,  2015). While Pakistan is no longer a 
primarily agricultural economy, industrial growth has stagnated since the 80s, 
and the economy has become increasingly services based (Zaidi, 2015).
The financial system
Until the late 1980s, Pakistan had a typically ‘repressed’ financial system, with a 
high degree of policy directed lending through public development finance insti-
tutions (DFIs), a nationalized commercial banking system, and credit planning 
(Janjua, 2004, 2003).
Financial liberalization and deregulation began in 1988 under an IMF structural 
adjustment program (Janjua,  2003). DFIs and policy lending were phased out, 
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and four of the five nationalized commercial banks were privatized with only 
National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) left in the public sector, entry restrictions on 
foreign banks relaxed, and bank licensing liberalized (Naqvi,  2018). Significant 
changes in the regulatory framework were also made. Prior to the 1990s, regula-
tory functions were shared between the Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Banking 
Council (PBC), SBP, and the Corporate Law Authority (CLA). On the recom-
mendation of the IMF, in 1997, the PBC was abolished in 1997, making the SBP 
sole regulator of the banking system (Janjua, 2004).
Post-liberalization financial structure
By the mid-2000s, the financial sector was highly liberalized and almost completely 
privately owned (Naqvi, 2018). The new ‘outward-oriented’ development strategy 
envisioned a financial sector that was highly profitable and internationally 
competitive in order to contribute to GDP, and in particular to increase financial 
services exports (Government of Pakistan, 2007; International Trade Centre with 
Government of Pakistan, 2007). The new strategy depended on attracting foreign 
investment into the domestic financial sector, as well as encouraging domestic 
banks to internationalize in order to profit from fees-based activities in their 
foreign branches. SBP governor Muhammad Yaqub captured this change in strat-
egy in a 1993 speech in which he stated that he was determined to transform the 
banking industry ‘[in]to a service industry from a bureaucratic machinery’ 
(Yaqub, 1993, cited in Janjua, 2003, p. 286).
By the 2000s, the post-liberalization Pakistani financial system was highly 
concentrated, consisting mainly of five large domestic commercial banks, MCB, 
UBL, HBL, ABL, and NBP, which together account for about 80 per cent of all 
profits in the banking sector, and 60 per cent of bank deposits (Munir and 
Naqvi, 2015). These five banks were internationally oriented: although domestic 
for regulatory purposes, they became partially foreign owned, with majority 
shareholdings of UBL and HBL being sold to foreign investors (Munir and 
Naqvi,  2015). These banks also had an extensive historic network of foreign 
branches in countries ranging from the UK, Europe, and the US, to Asia Pacific, 
the Middle East, and Africa (HBL UBL, MCB, ABL, NBP company accounts), 
which catered mainly to the Pakistani diaspora. After bank licensing was deregu-
lated, a variable number of small private banks emerged, but these never man-
aged to capture significant market share, since they could not compete with the 
extensive branch network of the five large commercial banks. Although the 
number of foreign banks increased (see Figure  4.1), their activities remained 
limited to investment banking, or in some cases consumer finance, as they could 
not compete with the large commercial banks in capturing deposits either. The 
large increase in foreign ownership of bank assets therefore reflects increased 
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foreign shareholding of the large five banks rather than the dominance of foreign 
bank subsidiaries.
Following a period of crisis while they were being privatized, the commercial 
banks became extremely profitable, especially between 2004 and 2007, and again 




























































Figure 4.1  Pakistan: foreign ownership in the banking sector.
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Figure 4.2  Pakistan: bank profitability.
Source: Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus, Bureau van Dijk (2018)
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the banks remained profitable through heavy investments in risk-free but high-
yielding government bonds (Naqvi, 2018).
Political economy of governing elites, regulators, and banks
The two main political parties, the PPP and PML-N, which have shared power 
since the return to democracy in the 1990s, shared a similar ‘outward-oriented’ 
financial agenda under the strong influence of the World Bank and IMF. During 
the 2000s under the military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf, banking regulation 
was delegated to the newly autonomous SBP, which carried the pace of financial 
reforms forward. Since the resumption of democracy under PPP in 2008 and 
then PML-N in 2013, financial sector policy has not shifted. In comparison to the 
dramatic changes that have taken place in the Pakistani financial system during 
the 1990s, especially bank privatization, Basel adoption remains a relatively 
uncontroversial de-politicized topic, with low visibility in electoral politics.
The domestic banks had little political influence the 1970s and 90s because they 
were under government ownership, or in the process of privatization. At the same 
time, institutional reforms under IMF programmes drastically increased the SBP’s 
authority and autonomy, giving it the upper hand in enforcing bank regulation. 
However, once privatization was completed by the mid-2000s, the situation 
reversed dramatically.
The highly concentrated five large commercial banks articulated their interests 
to the SBP through the well-organized Pakistan Bankers Association (PBA). 
Although the PBA represents both domestic and foreign banks, it is dominated 
by the large privatized commercial banks. Not only were the banks politically well 
connected, but the government’s strategy of promoting banks’ foreign profits also 
ensured their privileged position in the economy, as did their high profitability 
from 2004 onwards, increasing their leverage over the SBP.
Pakistan’s adoption and implementation of  
Basel I, II, and III, and the Basel Core Principles
Pre-Basel I financial regulation
Prior to the introduction of Basel I standards in the late 1990s, Pakistani regu-
lators had in place a number of regulations for the purpose of maintaining financial 
system stability, including strict bank and branch licensing, bank-wise credit ceil-
ings, minimum paid-up capital, and a liquidity requirement (Janjua, 2004, 2003). 
These regulations began to be phased out as they were replaced with the various 
Basel Accords, but minimum paid-up capital requirements were maintained and 
continued to be raised.
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Basel I
Pakistan was a relatively late adopter of Basel I, waiting nine years after it was 
agreed internationally to introduce it into domestic regulation. In 1997, all com-
mercial banks, NBFIs, and foreign banks were instructed to adopt the system of 
risk-weighted capital in line with the Basel accord through BPRD Circular #36 of 
4 November 1997. After a significant delay following the BCBS’s 1996 amendment 
to Basel I to include a capital charge for market risk, the SBP amended the capital 
adequacy framework, in order to ‘align the regulatory capital requirement with 
the internationally accepted standards and institute a true risk-based capital 
adequacy framework’ in August 2004 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2004).
Basel Core Principles
A few years after the Basel Core Principles were announced by the BCBS in 1997, 
the SBP made moves to incorporate these into the domestic regulatory frame-
work (State Bank of Pakistan,  2005). In 2003 the SBP issued a ‘Handbook for 
Corporate Governance’, which was modelled directly on the Core Principles, as 
these were considered ‘international best practise’ at the time (Akhtar, 2006a). 
The new governance document provided guidelines for bank boards of directors, 
management, and auditors (see State Bank of Pakistan, 2003).
Basel II
Basel II adoption by Pakistan was extremely fast, showing the SBP’s enthusiasm 
for the new regulations. The SBP issued a ‘roadmap’ for Basel II implementation 
in March 2005 via BSD Circular No. 3 2005, less than a year after the BCBS 
replaced Basel I with Basel II, followed by detailed instructions in June 2006 via 
BSD Circular #8 of 27 June 2006.
Aside from the speed of Basel II adoption, two other patterns are striking. 
Firstly, unlike many other peripheral countries, which were selective in their 
adoption, Pakistan adopted nine out of ten Basel II components, compared to an 
average of four for non-BCBS member countries (Jones and Zeitz, 2019). Pakistan 
was ambitious in its adoption, going quickly for the most complex components, 
including Internal Rating Based (IRB) approaches. In addition, the components 
were introduced by the SBP in a largely unmodified form, with the instruction 
document following the original Basel II documents (BCBS, 2004) almost word 
for word, even giving detailed instructions for the calculation of risk weights for 
financial instruments that barely existed in Pakistan, such as collateralized OTC 
derivatives. Basel II regulations in Pakistan were not modified for specialized 
banks, DFIs, or smaller banks.
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Basel III
While Basel III adoption was still high compared to other non-BCBS countries, 
with Pakistan implementing four out of eight, compared to an average of just 
one out of eight components by 2015, the SBP took a more gradual approach 
compared to its speedy adoption of Basel II. Basel III began to be adopted with a 
three-year delay from when the BCBS issued the new accord in 2010, and the ini-
tial set of instructions contained only requirements to implement the core capital, 
leverage ratio, and capital conservations buffer, as the SBP wanted some time to 
consult with all the relevant stakeholders about the relevance of elements such as 
the countercyclical capital buffer, LCR, NSFR, and domestic systemically import-
ant financial institutions (D-SIFI). However, this gradual approach was combined 
with the SBP modifying certain elements of Basel III such as the CAR and capital 
conservation buffer to make them even stricter than the original requirements 
(FSI, 2015; State Bank of Pakistan, 2016) (Table 4.2).
Enforcement
Available assessments from IMF FSAPs and Article IV Consultations, World 
Bank reports, SBP self-assessments, and the US Department of State’s Investment 
Climate Statements, between 1998 and 2017, suggest that although compliance 
lagged during the initial phases of Basel I and II implementation during the late 
1990s and early 2000s because of capacity constraints, especially among small 
banks, since the mid-2000s compliance with implemented Basel II and III standards 
has been largely substantive. Pakistan is also judged by the IMF to have achieved 
‘a degree of compliance with most of the Core Principles’ (IMF,  2004, p.  28). 
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This was broadly confirmed by interviews with regulators at the central bank, the 
SBP, and independent consultants. Punishment for non-compliance includes 
limiting of banking activities, and eventually revoking of banking licences, which 
suggests that adopted standards were enforced. By the time interviews were con-
ducted in December 2016, both large and small banks were compliant with the 
Basel II and III provisions mandated by SBP regulations, but three large banks 
and one medium-size bank had already moved to the advanced approaches of 
Basel II, which were not mandatory. At the time of the interviews, four banks 
were compliant with the foundation internal-ratings-based approach, in terms of 
operational risk; all the large banks had moved to the standardized/alternative 
standardized approach; while two were trying to implement the advanced meas-
urement approaches (various interviews with consultancies and domestic banks). 
No exemptions were made in Basel I, II, or III compliance for specialized banks, 
DFIs, or small banks.
Political economy of Basel adoption
Basel adoption in Pakistan can broadly be divided into three distinct phases, the 
first being IFI led, the second central bank led, and third private bank led. While 
Basel I was first introduced to Pakistan as part of a wider regulatory overhaul 
under various World Bank programmes, the newly strengthened SBP soon took 
the reins and became an ardent advocate of Basel II. This was despite the fact that 
banks were initially reluctant because of the high regulatory cost of adoption. The 
financial crisis proved to be a turning point in the SBP’s attitude to inter n ational 
regulatory standards, with the perceived failure of Basel II in preventing the 
global financial crisis resulting in a much more cautious attitude to adoption. 
However, by this time, a new advocate for Basel II and then III had emerged; 
the  large internationalized domestic commercial banks that had initially been 
reluctant adopters of Basel standards. These banks now saw keeping up to date 
with the most sophisticated international standards as vital to maintaining their 
global position.
IFI-led adoption of Basel I and BCP (1998–2000)
During this first phase, the World Bank and IMF were the main players in driving 
through Basel I adoption as part of structural adjustment conditionalities 
(Janjua, 2004). Following the end of military rule, two main political parties, the 
centre-left, formerly socialist, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), supported by indus-
trial and rural workers, but also members of the landed elite, and the centre-right, 
fiscally and socially conservative Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), 
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which draws its support from influential industrialists and agriculturalists of 
the most populous Punjab province, have alternated in power over the course 
of the 1990s. Despite their divergent political stances and constituencies, they 
have shared a remarkably similar financial agenda, centralized around liberaliza-
tion and privatization. This was because these civilian governments, especially the 
PML-N government of 1997, were closely aligned with the IFIs in terms of inter-
national economic policy orientation (Zaidi, 2015). For example, full-time finance 
ministers were rarely appointed during this time, with civilian governments 
instead relying on advisors from the IMF and World Bank to ensure the imple-
mentation of conditionalities (Zaidi, 2015). Although the SBP was involved in the 
regulatory reform process, it did not have a very strong role in deciding the direc-
tion of reform because of its limited regulatory authority in the early 90s (World 
Bank, 1998). There is no available evidence to suggest that the then still national-
ized banking system had an important role to play either. During this time, the 
main opposition to regulatory overhaul came from the Federation of Pakistan 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, who feared that complex regulations 
would make access to credit more difficult (Janjua, 2004). However, in comparison 
to the controversial bank privatization programme, which saw many union protests 
(Munir and Naqvi,  2017), Basel I adoption remained a relatively de-politicized 
topic, with low visibility in electoral politics.
Adoption of Basel I and Core Principles occurred under the hard conditionali-
ties of the 1997 World Bank Banking Sector Adjustment Loan (BSAL) (World 
Bank, 1998) and the October 1997 IMF Exchange Credit Fund and Exchange 
Facility Fund programmes. One of the main ‘project objectives’ of the World 
Bank BSAL I, on which release of funds for the next BSAL was conditional, 
included revising capital adequacy rules to bring them in line with the Basel I 
minimum CAR of 8 per cent by 31 December 1997 (World Bank, 1998). The IMF 
programmes included a similar performance criterion to make prudential regula-
tions on capital adequacy consistent with international norms (Wilf, 2017). In the 
years following, all of the nationalized commercial banks became compliant, 
with only four of the small banks remaining non-compliant by 2002, while non-
compliant DFIs were gradually phased out (Janjua, 2004).
Central bank-led adoption of Basel I and II (2000–7)
During the 2000s, although the IMF and World Bank remained important in 
influencing Pakistan’s financial sector policies, the government, especially the 
newly independent central bank, took the reins of economic policymaking under 
the military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf. Under Shaukat Aziz, a former 
international investment banker, who was appointed finance minister in 1999, 
and then prime minister in 2004, the international orientation of the financial 
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sector was consolidated. Aziz’s vision revolved around globalizing the banking 
sector; both through attracting inward foreign investment and through outward 
internationalization of Pakistani banks. Since the resumption of democracy 
under the PPP in 2008 and then PML-N in 2013, financial sector policy has 
remained outward oriented.
During this period banking regulation was delegated to the newly autonomous 
SBP, which had started taking a much more proactive role in designing financial 
sector policy as its regulatory powers had been expanded, and autonomy increased 
under IFI structural adjustment. While the independent central bank had sole 
authority over financial regulation, its policies were in keeping with the general 
thrust of Aziz’s vision for the financial sector, because SBP governors were 
appointed by the Federal Government. Basel II adoption was given impetus by 
the appointment of two SBP governors between 1999 and 2009, Ishrat Hussain 
and Shamshad Akhtar, who were ardent advocates of adopting Basel II, influ-
enced by their IFI background. While the domestic banks were initially resistant 
to Basel II implementation because of the heavy costs it would entail, the foreign 
banks emerged as a key partner in Basel I and II implementation. The SBP had a 
great amount of leverage over domestic private banks during the early 2000s, as 
the large banks were still being privatized, and were at times loss-making, limit-
ing their political influence and economic importance.
By the 2000s, the SBP’s authority and independence was dramatically increased 
mainly as a result of IFI conditionalities during the 1990s. On the recommenda-
tion of the IMF, the SBP was made the sole regulator of the banking system in 
1991, given formal independence from the Ministry of Finance in 1994 (Janjua, 
2004). Furthermore, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the regula-
tory capacity of the SBP under the World Bank FSAL, between 1997 and 1999. 
An international consultant was hired in order to train the Banking Supervision 
Department in charge of prudential regulation and identify and recruit qualified 
supervision staff (World Bank, 1998).
Reflecting governing elites increasing outward orientation after the 1980s, the 
nature of SBP governors appointed by the Federal Government changed accordingly. 
Between 1947 and the late 1970s, the first six governors had domestic banking or 
civil service backgrounds, and the next five governors had only loose affiliations 
with the IFIs, for instance holdings consultancy assignments, or attending train-
ing courses. The appointment of career IMF bureaucrat Muhammad Yaqub in 
1993 reflected the clear shift towards outward orientation by the civilian govern-
ments of the 1990s. The appointment of Ishrat Hussain in 1999 and then Shamshad 
Akhtar in 2006, who had previously made their careers in the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank, respectively, by the Musharraf dictatorship, reflected 
the consolidation of the new financial sectors strategy under Shaukat Aziz. This 
was followed by the appointment of international investment bankers as governors 
from 2009 onwards (Munir and Naqvi, 2017).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
116      
Therefore, the nature and power of the SBP had changed dramatically by the 
early 2000s, from a nationally oriented developmentalist central bank, to one that 
was outward looking and deeply embedded in transnational regulatory networks. 
In particular, by 1999, the institutional reforms that gave it sufficient independ-
ence regulatory power had been completed, and coincided with the appointment 
of Ishrat Hussain who was an aggressive advocate for Basel I and II. At the same 
time, the commercial banks remained weak, while governing elites shared the 
SBP’s outward orientation, giving the SBP leadership an unprecedented degree of 
power. This was reflected in the speed with which Basel II was adopted, and the 
fact that all elements were adopted without modification.
Basel I and II adoption were important for the SBP in the new regime for three 
complementary reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, with the change in devel-
opment model and reorientation of financial sector strategy towards improving 
Pakistani banks global positioning (Dawn, 2007), Basel adoption came to be seen 
as a necessary signalling tool to attract foreign investors.
Secondly, liberalization of bank licensing in 1991 had led to the proliferation of a 
large number of small private banks (Zaidi,  2005). These were seen as lacking 
sufficient scale to become internationally competitive with cross-border banks 
post-liberalization. According to Hussain, ‘The financial institutions [small banks] 
are neither conducive to positioning Pakistan in the global financial markets nor 
helpful for efficient intermediation within Pakistan’ (Hussain,  2001a). The SBP 
therefore actively pursued a policy of encouraging consolidation in the banking 
sector through merger and acquisition during the first decade of the 2000s 
(Dawn,  2005). Basel I and II regulations proved a useful tool for this policy, as 
small banks found it much harder to meet the requirements, which then gave the 
SBP an excuse to revoke bank licenses, or force a merger. Between 2001 and 2006 
alone, twenty-one financial institutions were merged or taken over (Akhtar, 2006b).
Finally, in part because of their socialization at the IFIs, top officials at the SBP, 
especially governors Ishrat Hussain and Shamshad Akhtar, believed that Basel I 
and then II were better tools for risk management because of their socialization at 
the IFIs. They thought Basel would become especially important in protecting 
against the risks of globally interconnected financial markets, as the traditionally 
closed Pakistani financial system liberalized externally. In line with the thinking 
of the time, which SBP officials were familiar with because of their strong links 
with transnational regulatory networks, and in reaction to the previous era of 
state intervention, the governor believed in the philosophy underlying Basel II, 
namely that light-touch regulation and market discipline would be more effective 
in promoting financial stability. For example, according to Ishrat Hussain in a 
2001 speech, ‘Economic theory and international experience all suggest that the 
Central Bank should encourage such transparent, disclosure-based and market-
based regulation that the financial institutions themselves have the incentive to 
comply with the regulations for their own protection’ (Hussain, 2001b).
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This top-down pressure for implementation by SBP governors was complemented 
by ‘peer pressure’ on more junior officers in the Banking Policy Review department 
responsible for Basel implementation from transnational regulatory networks. 
In particular, SBP officials noted that they had experienced peer pressure from 
other central banks they interacted with often, including those in Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Bangladesh, for example through meetings of 
the FSB Regional Consultative Group for Asia, for which Pakistan has acted as 
co-chair, or meetings of SAARCFinance, a network of central bank governors of 
the SAARC region1 (Financial Stability Board, 2016).
When the Basel II regime replaced Basel I in 2004, the SBP was already well 
connected to transnational regulatory networks, and keeping abreast of current 
international developments and ‘best practice’. According to an interview with an 
SBP official responsible for Basel implementation, ‘we have constantly been 
observing international developments. There has been an accepted notion in SBP 
that all international standards should be complied with until it is seen that there 
is some kind of negative’.2 Following international regulators, Ishrat Hussain 
thought that Basel I had some ‘inherent rigidities’ that undermined its effective-
ness, which were remedied by Basel II (Hussain, 2005).
Meanwhile, the domestic banks, although not opposed to Basel II in principle, 
were reluctant to adopt the new standards too quickly because of the heavy costs 
this would entail. A survey conducted by the SBP in 2003 found that the majority 
of banks (49 per cent) thought that Basel II should not be implemented until 
2008, and that the Standardized Approach as opposed to the IRB would be suf-
ficient (State Bank of Pakistan, 2005). Not only did domestic banks initially lack 
the computerized systems and reliable data that adoption would have required, 
they also often had to hire expensive foreign consultancies and invest in expen-
sive software infrastructure in order to ensure compliance (interviews with various 
domestic banks and consultants). In 2004, Ishrat Hussain chastised the domestic 
banks for lagging behind in implementation: ‘I have very little doubt that the for-
eign banks operating in Pakistan will have any serious problems in making the 
transition successfully but I remain very much worried about our domestic 
banks . . . I see that our large banks have not yet woken up to attract the human 
resource of the right kind, set up the internal rating systems and the supporting 
technology’ (Hussain, 2004). According to interviewees, the SBP pushed ahead 
with Basel II adoption despite the banks’ complaints: ‘Ishrat’s response to bank 
complaints was that if you cannot do this [implement Basel II] then you have no 
business running a bank and I will find a buyer for you’.3 Falling behind on adop-
tion also carried severe penalties that included the imposition of heavy fines, 
limiting of banking activities, and eventually revocation of banking licenses 
1 SBP Official, Karachi, 6 January 2017. 2 SBP Official, Karachi, 6 January 2017.
3 CEO, Consultancy, Karachi, 27 December 2016.
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(Iqbal, 2005). According to interviewees, whereas before the 2000s banks never 
faced penalties for non-compliance with SBP regulation, under Hussain these 
penalties were rigorously enforced. During this period, the domestic banks were 
still in the process of privatization, or were loss-making because of the financial 
crisis of the 1990s, and so were not politically powerful enough to oppose the SBP.
Initially, therefore, the foreign banks were the SBP’s main partner in pushing 
the Basel agenda through, since they were required by their headquarters to 
become compliant. The foreign banks wanted domestic banks to implement Basel II 
both because they were engaged in correspondent banking relationships with the 
domestic banks, and they found Basel II compliance reassuring in this regard, but 
also because they did not want to be at a competitive disadvantage to domestic 
banks.4 Another important channel through which foreign banks aided Basel II 
implementation was through the transfer of personnel from early adopting for-
eign banks such as Citibank, American Express, and Bank of America to domestic 
banks. After the SBP made Basel II compliance mandatory, many domestic banks 
poached foreign bank-trained personnel because of the lack of local expertise on 
Basel II, in order to rush ahead with compliance.5
Under Shamshad Akhtar, the drive for Basel II implementation was strengthened. 
Akhtar was a strong advocate for Basel II, and described it as nothing short of a 
‘revolution’ in risk management (Dawn, 2006). The Pakistan Banks Association 
(PBA) had to argue with her from time to time to tone down her approach. 
According to a foreign banker, ‘the SBP under Shamshad was so over-ambitious 
that the PBA’s Basel committee had to work with local and foreign banks to help 
convince her to slow down. The local banks were having a lot of trouble in 
implementation’.6
In particular, while the large banks were more easily able to bear the costs associ-
ated with Basel adoption, and could afford to hold the required amount of cap ital, 
the small banks felt especially penalized.7 This was not a concern for the SBP as the 
policy of banking sector consolidation continued under Akhtar. According to an 
SBP employee who had worked closely with Akhtar, ‘It [Basel II and increases in 
minimum capital requirements] was a political move—we felt that some people 
wanted to get banking licenses and we didn’t want them to get it, and we thought it 
would be good if some of the smaller banks that were facing solv ency and liquidity 
problems merged. They protested but we implemented it anyway’.8
While Basel II implementation was not a part of IFI conditionality, the IMF 
praised these developments, arguing that the SBP’s establishment of a roadmap 
for Basel II implementation had contributed to strengthening the regulatory 
4 CEO, foreign bank, Karachi, 22 December 2016.
5 CEO, consultancy, Karachi, 27 December 2016.
6 CEO, foreign bank, Karachi, 22 December 2016.
7 Consultancy, Karachi, 20 December 2016. 8 SBP Official, Karachi, 6 January 2017.
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framework and been looked upon favourably by ‘the market’, citing a narrowing 
of Pakistan’s EMBI spreads relative to its peers as evidence (IMF, 2005).
Bank-led implementation of Basel II and III (2008–present)
The 2008 global financial crisis was another turning point for Basel implementa-
tion in Pakistan. Although the SBP’s implementation drive lost some steam 
because Basel II’s failure in preventing the global financial crisis discredited the 
regulations, they were pressured to continue with Basel III implementation, and 
even over-comply with some components, in order to compensate for the nega-
tive reputational shock caused by Pakistan’s FATF blacklisting in 2008 and 2010.
Furthermore, by this point the large domestic privatized banks, now owned by 
domestic conglomerates or foreign investors, had emerged as a key player and 
had gained leverage over the SBP, both because of political connections and their 
important position in the economy, given the new development strategy. Since 
2004, the profitability of the largest five banks had been very high, strengthening 
their bargaining position. The five large domestic commercial banks now emerged 
as the leading advocates for Basel II and III adoption, with some banks even going 
above and beyond SBP mandated requirements. This was because the large five 
banks were highly internationalized, and saw keeping up to date with inter-
national standards as vital to maintaining and expanding their global position. 
This was not because they believed it helped them with risk management, but 
because they saw it as a vital signalling mechanism to reassure international 
investors and regulators. During this phase, the banks would actively lobby the 
SBP to offer more advanced approaches, while the SBP preferred a more gradual 
pace of adoption.
Ironically, at exactly the same time that large banks began to support Basel II 
adoption, Basel II itself became discredited in the eyes of both Pakistani regu-
lators and banks. This was mainly because they had prevented neither the 2008 
global financial crisis nor the 2008 domestic financial crisis experienced in 
Pakistan at the same time. Basel II was now perceived both as too complex and 
costly for the ‘vanilla’ Pakistani banking system. Furthermore, it was also per-
ceived as ignoring some of the most important risks in the Pakistani financial 
system; excessive concentration of bank portfolios in government securities, 
which made the whole system very vulnerable to government default, and excess 
concentration of lending in very few industrial conglomerates (interviews).
After the financial crisis, the SBP’s strong drive to implement Basel II lost some 
of its prior zeal, although by this point most banks were already compliant. A new 
SBP governor, Salim Raza, was appointed in 2009. Despite his international 
banking background, he was not as ardent an advocate of the Basel regulations as 
Hussain and Akhtar had been. In a speech shortly after his appointment, he 
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criticized Basel II regulations for ignoring systemic risk, and for an excessively 
‘light-touch’ approach that was ‘in vogue in advanced economies’ (Raza, 2009). 
The banks, on the other hand, suggested that the SBP was no longer keen on 
moving ahead with the adoption of Basel standards because they themselves did 
not feel able to regulate the more advanced approaches.9
In a reversal from the previous phase of adoption, the main actors driving 
adoption of Basel II and later III now became the five large privatized domestic 
commercial banks. While the PBA had previously worked to convince Akhtar to 
slow the pace of Basel II adoption, it now took an active role in Basel II and III 
adoption; for example, in 2013, private banks approached the SBP to ask for the 
adoption of the Alternative Standardized Approach for operational risk, even 
though the SBP had not offered it in the Basel II instructions (State Bank of 
Pakistan, 2013), and continued to lobby the SBP to offer more advanced approaches 
at the time interviews were conducted.10 This was not due to any belief in the regu-
latory superiority of the Basel Accords, but due to the market pressures inherent in 
a globalized and competitive financial environment. The large five banks wanted 
to maintain their historic network of foreign branches. In addition, Pakistani 
banks wanted to continue to internationalize by attracting foreign investment and 
making alliances with foreign banks (interviews with various domestic banks). 
The large banks believed compliance with the most advanced approaches would 
signal their relative sophistication to foreign investors and regulators, and set them 
apart from both their domestic as well as regional rivals in order to improve their 
international standing: ‘SBP pressure is equal across banks but we are trying to go 
further in order to get recognition from our international partners. We take Basel 
as an opportunity to up our game’.11
Pakistani banks’ preferences regarding Basel II shifted significantly after 2007, 
when Basel Committee members were required to be compliant with Basel II. The 
large domestic banks came to realize that now that Basel II had become ‘best 
practice’ in the developed world, compliance was vital for internationalization in 
multiple ways (interviews). This continued to be the case after Basel III was intro-
duced in BCBS member countries in 2013. A former SBP governor described 
the Basel regulations as ‘a necessity for Pakistani banks to internationalise’.12 In 
addition, most of the substantial work in acquiring appropriate platforms, hiring 
skilled personnel, and expensive consultancies for Basel II implementation 
had already occurred between 2004/5 and 2008 under pressure from the SBP.13 
This meant the banks had already incurred huge sunk costs in putting the 
9 Risk management, medium domestic commercial bank, 13 January 2017.
10 CEO medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 9 January 2017; Chief risk officer, large 
domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 28 December 2016.
11 CEO, medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 9 January 2017.
12 Former SBP Governor, Karachi, 21 December 2016.
13 Consultancy, Karachi, 27 December 2016.
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relevant infrastructures in place, and their incentives for further Basel II and III 
implementation changed accordingly.
Domestic banks found that compliance was important for their correspondent 
banking relationships, especially in major trading partner countries. According 
to one banker, ‘Any changes that happen in the west, especially the US, filter to 
the Pakistani banking sector because of our corresponded banking relationships’. 
This was because the Basel standards provide a ‘common standard that inter-
national partners can recognise’ which reassured their partners that appropriate 
risk management systems were in place.14 Another important reason was the 
maintenance or expansion of foreign bank branches. In this case, the pressure to 
become compliant comes from foreign regulators, who required compliance in 
order to continue operating in their jurisdiction. Banks even reported that some 
foreign regulators were pressuring them to report components of Basel III such as 
the LCR and NSFR, before the SBP had even mandated them.15 However, this 
only applied to those banks that had branches in jurisdictions that were already 
Basel III compliant. Those banks that had branches mainly in regions where regu-
lators were not concerned with Basel adoption, such as the Middle East, stated 
that the maintenance of foreign branches was not a relevant pressure for Basel II 
and III adoption.16 Some banks also found compliance helpful when making 
international alliances with foreign banks. For example, one domestic bank made 
an alliance with a US bank, whereby the Pakistani bank issued the US banks’ 
credit cards in Pakistan. According to the CEO of this bank, Basel II and III com-
pliance helped them to get the deal, as the US bank had their own due diligence 
requirements for choosing foreign partners, and ‘Basel compliance helps’.17
For its part, the SBP was not as eager to implement Basel III as it had been 
Basel II. In a 2012 speech to the Islamic Financial Services Board in Istanbul, the 
SBP governor Yaseen Anwar was sceptical about the effectiveness of Basel III and 
noted that the new complex international regulations were not well suited to the 
Pakistani financial system because they did not have a high degree of exposure to 
the complex financial products that were responsible for the 2008 crisis in the 
first place. He also noted the importance of ‘keeping in view our own local legal, 
regulatory and economic environment’ when implementing international stand-
ards (Anwar, 2012).
However, because of the international market pressures inherent in an ‘outward-
oriented’ approach to the financial sector, the SBP had to continue keeping up 
to date with Basel III adoption, and even over-comply with certain components. 
In particular, the SBP was worried about the negative stigma associated with 
14 CRO, large domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 28 December 2016.
15 Chief financial officer, large domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 21 December 2016.
16 Risk management, medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 13 January 2017.
17 CEO, medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 9 January 2017.
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Pakistani banks in the post-9/11 environment, as banks came under scrutiny for 
terrorism financing, but especially since Pakistan was blacklisted by the FATF 
between 2008 and 2010 and again from 2012 to 2014. The SBP combined a gradual 
approach to Basel III adoption with over-compliance since keeping up to date 
with the latest international standards was seen as an important counterweight 
to the blacklisting. According to an SBP official, ‘with 9/11 the financial sector 
has been under a lot of scrutiny so Basel helps developing countries establish 
internationally recognized financial systems. SBP ratios are even higher than 
Basel requirements. Frankly speaking, it is to demonstrate to the outside world 
that Pakistani banks are safe and sound because we have a lot of other challenges 
like the FATF’.18 It was also expected that it would not be much of a problem for 
most banks to meet the Basel III requirements, since SBP regulations had already 
been very stringent, and the capital adequacy ratio for the banking system was 
already at 14 per cent (State Bank of Pakistan, 2011).
Although the IFIs were no longer the driving factor behind Basel II and III 
adoption, they continued to support implementation. In 2013 the IMF even asked 
the SBP to raise the CAR (among other reforms) in exchange for a USD 5bn 
Extended Fund Facility (InpaperMagazine, 2013). In addition, the IFC now took 
on a more direct role, because of its direct investments in domestic banks. 
According to an interviewee at one such bank, ‘in 2014 we talked to IFC to invest 
in us and to give them comfort we wanted to be Basel compliant. Basel was one of 
the tick boxes for the IFC’.19 According to interviewees at commercial banks, 
pressure to implement Basel II and III also comes from the ADB, which now pro-
vides much of its financing in Pakistan through private banks rather than through 
the government. Basel compliance affects the allocations private banks receive 
from the ADB, since before entering into an agreement the ADB evaluates domes-
tic banks’ risk management. If they feel risk management is weak, they will not 
enter into an agreement with that bank, and being Basel compliant is an import-
ant way of allaying these fears.20
Conclusion
Pakistan moved from being domestically oriented country during the pre-1980 
era, to a ‘policy-driven’ pathway to Basel adoption due to the shift towards an 
internationally oriented development strategy by political elites between the late 
1980s and early 2000s, in conjunction with IMF and World Bank structural adjust-
ment programmes. However, Basel I and BCP fell under the radar of domestic 
18 SBP Official, Karachi, 6 January 2017.
19 CEO, medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 9 January 2017.
20 Risk management, medium domestic commercial bank, Karachi, 13 January 2017.
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politicians, and the initial push for changes in financial regulation came from the 
IFIs. This was reflected in the slow pace of Basel I adoption, and a lag in bank 
implementation, especially by smaller and public banks.
As Pakistan’s domestic political economy transformed because of the policy-
driven financial liberalization reforms initiated during the late 1980s, Pakistan 
gradually embraced international standards. Politicians championed initial con-
vergence and, in line with the argument in the analytical framework, this policy-
driven convergence generated incentives for the regulator and the banking sector 
to become more internationally oriented over time. By the early 2000s, the newly 
independent and powerful internationally oriented SBP took the reins for Basel I 
and II adoption despite difficulties in implementation for small banks. This was 
reflected in the sudden and wholescale adoption of Basel II, even in the face of 
initial pushback from the banks.
Finally, by 2007/8, the third major actor, the large private domestic banks, had 
completed their transformation from nationalized developmental institutions to 
privately owned, internationally competitive banks. These internationally oriented 
banks, which saw adoption of the most advanced approaches of Basel II and III as 
vital to maintaining their internationalized business model, took over as the main 
driver of convergence. This was in order to maintain their extensive foreign 
branch network, and to facilitate entry into new markets, to maintain credibility 
among international investors and partners, as well as to maintain correspondent 
banking relationships. The 2007/8 crisis discredited Basel II and later III among 
Pakistani regulators, and threatened to shift Pakistan onto a merely market-driven 
pathway to convergence, with domestic banks going above and beyond SBP 
mandated standards. However, the private banks successfully lobbied the SBP 
to continue keeping up to date with Basel adoption, as did the external shock 
of FATF blacklisting. Therefore after 2007/8, despite the SBP’s more cautious 
approach, Pakistan continued on its policy-driven pathway to convergence, which 
was reflected in ambitious Basel standard implementation and voluntary enforce-
ment by banks. As at January 2019, Pakistan had the highest level of convergence 
on Basel standards among our case study countries and regions.
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Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government has led 
the country through a remarkable economic recovery with annual GDP growth 
rates exceeding 6 per cent in most years. The RPF government’s economic strategy 
is to develop a service-based economy, which includes making Kigali (its capital) 
a hub of various kinds—from tourism to ICT—and also for finance. This differen-
tiates Rwanda from the East Asian developmental states and another aspiring 
African developmental state (Ethiopia) where financial sectors have been 
largely under government control (or owned by local nationals) (Oqubay, 2015; 
Wade, 1990). With the aim of becoming a financial sector hub, the RPF government 
has transformed its financial sector—liberalizing it and recently committing to 
rapidly adopt and implement Basel II and III standards. Since Rwanda’s financial 
sector remains largely underdeveloped, the government’s exuberance for adopting 
and implementing the most recent international banking standards seems out of 
touch with the capacities and status of the country’s financial sector, also contra-
dicting the aim of becoming a developmental state. In its position as a small 
country with limited resources, the RPF government has become an uncritical 
standard-taker in its financial sector. The government’s adoption of Basel 
standards signals a commitment to experimentation but highlights the priori-
tization of meeting (what they perceive as) best practices ahead of dealing with 
domestic contextual realities.
This chapter argues that the RPF government’s adoption and proposed imple-
mentation of Basel banking standards is ‘policy-driven’ convergence. Rwandan 
regulators have limited autonomy and leadership. Rwandan regulators support 
Basel adoption because it aligns with a broader economic objective (becoming 
a financial sector hub). Yet unlike dynamics in Ghana (another example of 
policy-driven convergence), the goal of implementing Basel standards is not a 
matter of political contention given that the dominant party (RPF) enjoys rela-
tively uncontested authority. Rwanda’s economic leadership (the president and 
senior ministers) drives Basel implementation because it is perceived to be an 
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instrument to achieve larger strategic goals: meeting global best practices, becoming 
a financial hub, reducing risk in the financial sector, and encouraging East African 
Community (EAC) harmonization and integration. The prevailing attitude 
among regulators is to meet standards first and then ‘adapt to challenges later’.1 
For Rwanda, this highlights a conflicted development strategy where leadership 
sets priorities for the economy and feedback is rarely acted upon until failure is 
proven to have occurred.
For the broader comparative study of Basel adoption in developing countries, 
Rwanda presents a surprising case among aspiring developmental states in its 
policy actions in the financial sector. Even though the policy lending that usually 
characterizes developmental states generates incentives for countries to divergence 
from international financial standards, in Rwanda incentives to converge out-
weigh incentives to diverge. Among instances of ‘policy-driven’ convergence, the 
Rwanda case demonstrates the difficulties associated with Basel implementation 
when few actors are placed in a position to contest strategic priorities set by the 
economic leadership.
Research for this chapter was conducted in June 2017. Forty-six interviews 
were conducted in Kigali with government officials including the National Bank 
of Rwanda (BNR)—the financial sector regulatory agency, representatives from 
all commercial banks (including risk managers), donors (including the World 
Bank and IMF), and financial sector consultants. This chapter also builds on the 
author’s previous fieldwork experience in Rwanda, which dates back to 2011. It 
begins with an examination of the political economy of Rwanda’s banking sector. 
It then discusses the evolution of Basel adoption and implementation in Rwanda, 
followed by a discussion of the political economy of Basel adoption in Rwanda. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the impact of policy-driven Basel adoption in 
Rwanda, describing how target-setting among economic leadership has exposed 
the weaknesses of the country’s financial sector and has imposed limits on the 
country’s developmentalist ambitions.
The political economy of the post-1994  
banking sector in Rwanda
Rwanda’s financial sector has grown substantially since 1994 and in recent years it 
has been among the fastest-growing sectors in the country (Behuria and 
Goodfellow,  2017). Rwanda’s development strategy—VISION 2020—prioritized 
the creation of a knowledge-based economy, with the liberalization of the finan-
cial sector perceived to be a foundation on which services-based development 
1 Interview, BNR regulator, Kigali, June 2017.
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would thrive (Government of Rwanda, 2000). In November 2015, the Rwandan 
government announced its intention to rapidly and concurrently adopt and 
implement aspects of Basel II and III banking standards. This occurred at a time 
when Rwanda’s financial sector expanded to eleven commercial banks operating 
in Rwanda, four microfinance banks, one development bank, and one cooperative 
bank, as of July 2017. The banking system comprises the largest share of financial 
sector assets at 66.3 per cent as of June 2016 (National Bank of Rwanda, 2016). 
Pensions, microfinance institutions, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives con-
tribute the remaining banking sector assets. Though the financial sector 
remains shallow and underdeveloped, it has expanded considerably from its 
pre-1994 size (Table 5.1).
Before 1994, there were three active banks in Rwanda: Banque Commerciale 
du Rwanda (BCR), Bank of Kigali (BK), and Banque Continentale Africaine du 
Rwanda (BACAR). Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda later became 
Banque Populaire du Rwanda (BPR). After the genocide, the government liberal-
ized the commercial banking sector and licensed two new commercial banks—
Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI) and Banque à la 
Confiance d’Or (BANCOR). Local Rwandans—closely tied to the RPF—became 
lead investors in these banks. In 1999, more than forty Rwandan investors and 
state-owned institutions (which owned a minority share) collectively established 
a new bank—Cogebanque.
In the early and mid-2000s, elite frictions within the RPF became public 
(Behuria, 2016; Reyntjens, 2013). During this phase, prominent Rwandan officials 
in private commercial banks were accused of embezzling funds. These events, 
and frictions between prominent RPF elites (and pressure from international 
financial institutions), contributed to decisions to liberalize the financial sector. 
During this period, commercial banks came close to bankruptcy and senior RPF 
Table 5.1 Rwanda: key indicators
Rwanda  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 784
Bank assets (current US$) 2.05 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 24.2
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) Data not available
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 21
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 4.4
Polity IV score (2017) −3
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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leadership became increasingly worried about the security of the financial sector.2 
The government recognized its political vulnerability and the limited capabilities 
that had been associated with relying on domestic elites in the sector and decided 
to rely on foreign investment in commercial banking, believing that increased 
competition would secure the sector’s growth. Yet through its state-owned bank 
(Bank of Kigali), the government chose to retain some control over the sector. 
Since state-, party-, and military-owned enterprises controlled a large share of the 
economy, the government also retained some control within the financial sector 
through operating as a large client for commercial banks. Thus, the government 
did not completely ignore the importance of some degree of state control of the 
financial sector but it had departed a great deal from the traditional role of the 
developmental state in the financial sector.
Today, Rwanda’s commercial banking sector can be divided into four categories: a 
state-owned commercial bank (BK), a large international investor-owned com-
mercial bank, several regional or pan-African bank subsidiaries, and one bank 
collectively owned by several Rwandan investors (Cogebanque). As of 2016, 
government-owned BK retained over 30 per cent of the market share of the 
domestic financial sector in several indicators including assets (34 per cent), net 
loans (38 per cent), customer deposits (37 per cent), and equity (39 per cent). 
Since 1994, the IMF and World Bank has often pressurized the Rwandan 
 government to sell its stake in BK. Government officials have also considered 
selling shares to international banks or strategic investors.3 In 2011, BK initiated 
an initial public offering of 62.5 million dollars on the Rwandan Stock Exchange 
(RSE).4 Despite 45 per cent of BK shares remaining in ‘free float’ on the RSE, the 
government retains a majority shareholding in the bank in partnership with its 
institutional partner—the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB). Though BK 
operates as the only state-owned bank in the sector, its role as an instrument for 
developmental state objectives is unclear. It is often the bank used for strategic 
investments but it also has among the highest interest rates for loans across the 
sector. BK continues to be the most profitable and the largest bank operating in 
Rwanda. According to an I&M Bank official—among BK’s largest domestic 
rivals—‘BK is four times our balance sheet’.5 Though BK dominates the sector, it 
is relatively small within the region and is barely within the top twenty banks 
operating in East Africa.6
Atlas Mara BPR is the only significant international investor operating in the 
sector. As of 2016, BPR was the third largest bank in the country (after I&M Bank). 
2 Interviews, BNR, Kigali, June 2017.
3 Interviews, BNR, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and BK, Kigali, 
June 2017.
4 Currently, shares in four banks are listed on the RSE: BK, I&M, KCB, and Equity.
5 Interview, I&M Bank, Kigali, June 2017. 6 Interview, small bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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In 2016, Bob Diamond and Ashish Thakkar’s investment company—Atlas 
Mara—completed the purchase of 62 per cent of BPR’s shares. This added to their 
existing presence in Rwanda since Atlas Mara bought the BRD’s commercial bank 
in 2015.7 Within Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa, Atlas Mara’s investments have 
experienced some initial difficulties. The bank’s cost-to-revenue ratio of over 
95 per cent was the highest in the country (Mwai, 2017). Atlas Mara has recently 
imposed significant employment cuts and centralized most of its operations. 
Headcount has shrunk by 25 per cent in the last year.8 A restructuring programme 
has been launched to improve profitability, reverse loss of market share, and shift 
the business to a more balanced retail and corporate customer base.9 In 2017, the 
cost-to-revenue ratio had reduced to 80 per cent.10 When Atlas Mara took over 
BPR, they ‘had a big surprise with very large numbers of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). Currently, the bank’s NPLs are 12.4 per cent and by the end of the year, 
the bank’s target is to reduce it to 6 per cent (with the average across commercial 
banks about 5.6 per cent)’.11
Several regional banks also operate in Rwanda. Out of such banks, I&M Bank 
(formerly BCR) has the largest market share. Other regional banks include Equity, 
KCB, GT Bank, Access Bank, Commercial Bank of Africa, Crane Bank, and 
Ecobank. Cogebanque is the only commercial bank in which Rwandans own a 
majority share (outside BK).
In comparison to other case studies in the Navigating Global Banking 
Standards project, Rwanda is relatively unique. The composition of its commercial 
banking sector includes one large government-owned bank (BK) with most other 
banks operating in Rwanda as subsidiaries of larger regional or pan-African banks. 
Though the sector is liberalized, the government remains a significant actor—
both through its ownership in the largest bank (BK) but also as the largest 
customer, with party- and military-owned enterprises remaining large recipients 
of loans. Though BK is very large within Rwanda, it is miniscule when compared 
to the size of the parent companies of local Rwandan subsidiaries. Thus, most 
commercial banks operating in Rwanda are better resourced with more access to 
capital and expertise than BK. The consequences of the adoption and implemen-
tation of Basel II and III banking standards will vary across these different banks 
and most commercial bank representatives were pessimistic, admitting difficulties 
associated with implementation in the short term.
7 The BRD had established a commercial bank for a few years. After its sale, its role is restricted to 
that of a development bank.
8 Interview, Atlas Mara BPR, Kigali, June 2017.
9 Interview, Atlas Mara BPR, Kigali, June 2017.
10 Interview, Atlas Mara BPR, Kigali, June 2017.
11 Interview, Atlas Mara BPR, Kigali, June 2017.
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Rwanda’s adoption and implementation of  
Basel banking standards
The RPF government has adopted a relatively conservative stance to banking 
regulation. This has been motivated by its desire to ensure financial sector stability, 
its position as a standard-taker in global banking regulation, and the hope that 
the implementation of global financial standards may contribute to making Kigali 
into a financial sector hub. Basel I standards were implemented in 1998. However, 
the Rwandan government was relatively slow with officially stating its intention to 
comply with Basel Core Principles (BCPs) or Basel II and III banking standards. 
Discussions of formally adopting Basel reforms began in the mid-2000s when the 
East African Community (EAC) argued for a common stance in relation to 
Basel standards. Despite limited discussions of formally adopting Basel II and III, 
Rwanda already complied with more than 80 per cent of BCPs and in some 
measures (like capital adequacy requirements), and Rwanda’s financial standards 
were much higher than those required in Basel II (Enoch et al., 2015). In 2015, 
Rwanda was ranked among the most compliant countries in Africa (with 
regard to BCPs).
In the last two years, the RPF government has formally announced its intention 
to adopt and implement most Basel II and III requirements. In November 2015, 
the BNR issued a directive, which required parallel reporting of Basel II capital 
requirements. By 1 January 2018, all commercial banks in Rwanda had to be fully 
compliant with Basel II and III (although only elements of both will be part of the 
regulation). Initially, observers (Andrews et al., 2012) had argued that there would 
be minimal impact because of already existing conservative regulatory measures 
in Rwanda. However, the implementation of Basel standards is already forcing 
commercial banks to significantly alter their operations.
The ambitious adoption of Basel banking standards is even more surprising 
given the rapid changes that have occurred in the banking sector over the last two 
decades. After the 1994 genocide, the financial sector was in severe difficulties, 
with the fleeing members of the previous government stealing over 30 billion 
francs or two thirds of the monetary base, including cash from the BNR vaults 
(Addison et al., 2001). The post-1994 government perceived liberalization of the 
sector to be necessary for stabilizing the economy. Official BNR reports (National 
Bank of Rwanda, 2011) highlighted the ‘direct control’ of the financial system as a 
hindrance to growth. Liberalization of the financial sector and the introduction of 
a flexible exchange rate system were introduced in the context of three economic 
stabilization programmes, pushed through by the IMF and the World Bank—the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (1990), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility-Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (1998), and the Policy Support 
Instrument (2010).
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Rwanda began adopting Basel I banking standards in 1998 (Table 5.2). Initially, 
Basel I was implemented with a focus on credit risk and there was limited atten-
tion to banking supervision, operational risk, and market risk. Since the Rwandan 
financial sector has a very limited range of products, market risk is marginal 
across commercial banks. An initial motive for adopting Basel banking standards 
was the decision to harmonize banking standards within the EAC. Within the 
EAC, Rwanda occupies a relatively unique position. Since Rwanda is land-locked 
and because it is a comparatively smaller country with a small market, the gov-
ernment perceives EAC integration as essential to access larger markets and to 
achieve its aim of becoming a services hub. President Kagame has been the lead-
ing champion of EAC integration in the region and government officials con-
stantly highlight the importance of regional integration, arguing that ‘we have to 
set an example for integration because without it, there are limits to our growth’.12 
Government officials see regional integration to be particularly significant in 
terms of the goal of becoming a financial sector hub. Their reasoning relied on 
two main factors, which they saw as the country’s comparative advantage: leader-
ship and domestic security.13 Though most consultants doubt that such advan-
tages could be enough to make Kigali a financial sector hub, government officials 
remain committed to the target.
In 1999, the Banking Supervision Department was created within BNR with 
the aim of streamlining and ensuring an efficient banking sector. The BNR Law of 
1981 was revised by the Banks Act of 1999, with BNR issuing several prudential 
regulations. The regulatory level of commercial banks’ share capital went up pro-
gressively from Rwf 100 Million to Rwf 300 million in 1995, to Rwf 1.5 billion in 
1999 and to Rwf 5 billion in 2006. In 1999, the Rwanda Central Banking Act was 
12 Interview, BNR official, Kigali, June 2017. 13 Interview, BNR official, Kigali, June 2017.




Basel I 1998 1998
Credit risk
No operational or market risk
Basel II and 
Basel III
November 2015 directive 
(Adoption)
January 2018 (Proposed 
implementation)
5/10 components (Basel II)
6/8 components (Basel III)
Standardized approach for market risk
Revised standardized approach for 
operational risk and capital buffers 
(including capital conservation buffer and 
domestic systemic important bank)
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revised to grant BNR independence to formulate and implement monetary 
policy and ensure financial stability. The 1999 Act was ‘strengthened to enhance 
regulatory frameworks, reduce regulatory forbearance, ensure market discip-
line and comply with the Basel principles of effective supervision’ (Rusagara, 
2008, p. 3). In 2003, IFRS-based accounting standards were introduced for the 
banking sector. In the same year, the CAR was increased from 8 to 10 per cent, 
the decrease of permissible deduction of accepted collateral from loan-loss 
provisions from 100 to 70 per cent, and the rules on insider lending, loan man-
agement, credit concentration, and the restructuring of the banking sector 
were strengthened.
To enable the central bank to focus on high-risk banks and high-risk areas in 
each bank, BNR adopted the Risk Based Supervision (RBS) framework in 2006. 
Adoption of RBS was to ensure compliance with and implementation of inter-
national best practices. A 2007 BNR Law and a 2008 Law on the Organization 
of Banking (LOB) have further strengthened the BNR’s regulatory authority. 
Since the 2008 LOB was enacted, BNR dedicated time to ensuring all new 
regulations aligned with the law. During this period, several new banks entered 
the sector. As a result, new commercial banks hired several BNR officials—including 
risk managers. The extent of regulation became less of a problem compared to the 
limited capabilities within BNR since new employees had to be hired once trained 
employees were hired elsewhere.14 In the late 2000s, all twelve of BNR’s risk 
managers gave notice within a short space of time and even in 2017, two former 
BNR officials joined new commercial banks.15 Consequently, retaining staff 
continues to pose a significant challenge for BNR.
The Rwandan government has also published two Financial Sector Development 
Program (FSDP) Strategies, which have been direct responses to two IMF 
Financial System Stability Assessment (FSAP) reports. After FSAP-1, in 2005, the 
government developed a strategic plan (2008–12) under FSDP-1. The FSAP-1 
(IMF, 2005) recommended that the government take several actions to improve 
compliance with BCPs. One report (Andrews et al., 2012) claims that over 90 
per cent of policy actions in FSDP 1 were completed. IMF (2005) highlighted several 
weaknesses in relation to enforcement, limited BNR staff, amending the CAR, 
strengthening regulations on lending, and harmonizing auditing and accounting 
standards to international levels. In 2007/8, Rwanda’s banking sector suffered a 
crisis, forcing BNR to redesign its prudential regulations on liquidity risk 
management (Sanya et al.,  2012). BNR regulators highlight that during this 
period, there was a ‘liquidity crunch’.16 This liquidity crisis continued until at least 
2010, occurring at a time when several new banks began operations in Rwanda. 
14 Interview, commercial bank risk manager, Kigali, June 2017.
15 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
16 Interview, BNR official, Kigali, June 2017.
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BNR’s banking supervision team ‘lost all of their staff ’, further highlighting the 
skills shortage within the financial sector.17
After FSAP-2 was conducted, FSDP-2 developed a roadmap between 2014 and 
2018 while also identifying 437 policy actions. FSAP-2 (IMF,  2011) highlighted 
that Rwanda’s capital adequacy requirements conform to Basel I principles. 
Though the minimum capital adequacy requirement is 15 per cent in Rwanda, the 
BNR did not apply a capital adequacy charge for market risk (as of 2011). The IMF 
(2011) also found several weaknesses in Rwanda’s banking sector reforms includ-
ing the need to speed up the process of introducing prudential regulation on the 
basis of new laws, strengthening the framework for cross-border supervisory 
cooperation, increasing the frequency of on-site examinations for the largest 
banks, and ensuring BNR staff remained updated with the skills and supervisory 
methods expected of them in relation to new laws and regulations. After FSAP-2, 
BNR initiated new requirements in banking supervision within commercial 
banks, calling for the establishment of separate risk departments. This was a 
significant challenge as there were few bankers within Rwanda with such expertise. 
In 2012, across the financial sector, the National Skills Survey found that ‘the 
financial services sector has a total skills gap of 6,312 labour units’, with over 
45 per cent of the gap comprising ‘technicians’ (Rwanda Development Board, 2012).
The decision to adopt and implement Basel II and III was taken after the 
FSAP-2 was published. At least in terms of capital adequacy requirements, 
the average among commercial banks operated above Basel 1 requirements. The 
cap ital adequacy ratio (CAR) in commercial banks stood at 13.7 per cent in 2006, 
16.2 per cent in 2007, and 15.9 per cent in 2008 (National Bank of Rwanda, 2009). 
After 2010, Rwanda’s CAR has stayed in excess of 20 per cent and is the highest in 
the region. Figure 5.1 illustrates the evolution of Rwanda’s CAR and non-performing 
loans (NPLs). Commercial bank representatives and BNR officials both admitted 
that NPLs are much higher and vary significantly among banks, as compared to 
these official statistics. Atlas Mara BPR, for example, has much higher NPLs than 
most other banks.
In 2011, BNR required banks to hold core capital of at least 10 per cent of risk-
weighted assets and total capital (core plus supplementary capital) of at least 15 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets. In 2016, several banking standards were above Basel 
II/III thresholds. For example, the leverage ratio increased at a rate of 1 per cent 
annually between 2014 and 2016—from 8 per cent to 10 per cent, which was 
significantly above Basel II/III thresholds (3 per cent) and BNR requirements 
(6 per cent). The key difference was the introduction of risk-weighting based on 
the external credit rating of the counterparty. But it was estimated that there would 
be ‘minimal effect due to virtual absence of rated counterparties to the Rwandan 
banking system’ (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 66).
17 Interviews, Rwandan risk managers (government and commercial), Kigali, June 2017.
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In 2013, consultations between economic leadership and BNR led to the 
establishment of a Basel steering committee, which included key BNR officials 
and three commercial bank risk managers (who were the most senior Rwandan 
regulators, two of whom had previously worked in BNR). Most decisions with 
regard to Basel II and III implementation have been taken after discussions with 
the committee. Commercial banks have been invited to take part in the consult-
ation process. Though commercial bank representatives agreed that there was 
consultation, they complained that discussions were ‘never reflected in the final 
document’.18 The establishment of the Steering Committee was a response to 
ensure different stakeholders had a voice in Basel adoption and implementation 
while also ensuring the government made full use of the expertise within the 
financial sector (which had become concentrated in commercial banks).
BNR decided to adopt Basel II and III rapidly and concurrently. By the end of 
2013, a draft of the regulatory framework was in place. In 2014, a kick-off event 
took place with all managing directors of commercial banks invited. In November 
2015, a directive was issued, which required parallel reporting of Basel II capital 
requirements. At this time, regulators at commercial banks ‘did not really know 
what to do’ and there were ‘capacity challenges’.19 As part of the 2015 directive, 
BNR required banks to hold a minimum total capital of 12.5 per cent of total 
18 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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Figure 5.1 Rwanda: capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and non-performing loans (NPLs).
Source: IMF (2018)
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risk-weighted assets and to hold 10 per cent of core capital to risk-weighted assets. 
Banks were also required to hold capital conservation buffers of 2.5 per cent. SIBs 
were obliged to keep additional systemic capital buffers of 1–3.5 per cent defined 
for different brackets (National Bank of Rwanda, 2016). As of 2017, it was not clear 
which banks would be categorized as SIBs (though BK, I&M, and Atlas Mara BPR 
said they expected to be named SIBs). Most older and medium-sized banks com-
plained about the added burden that would be associated with the capital conser-
vation buffer.20 One banker said that the buffer would ‘penalize all large banks in 
the sector and restrict attractiveness of the country. The return on equity in the 
region is already the lowest and it is nearly half of what it is in other East African 
countries’.21 Figure  5.2 illustrates the evolution of return on assets (RoA) and 
return on equity (RoE) in Rwanda. According to respondents from commercial 
banks, these official statistics overestimate the RoE.22 In Rwanda, the RoE has 
been particularly low because even in the fastest-growing sectors, investments 
have often not reaped profits. For example, in the high-growth tourism sector, 
there has been a danger of ‘over-supply’ in hotels with capacity utilization at 
20 Interviews, commercial banks, Kigali, June 2017.
21 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.







































































Figure 5.2 Rwanda: rates of return on assets (RoA) and equity (RoE).
Source: Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus, Bureau van Dijk, 2018
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below 50 per cent (International Growth Centre, 2016). Over one hundred hotels 
shut down in Kigali between 2013 and 2015 (Gahigi, 2015).
Though Basel II and III implementation would require some changes to capital 
adequacy requirements, the FSAP-2 (Andrews et al.,  2012) estimated that the 
effect would be minimal on commercial banks. To be Basel III compliant, Rwanda 
will retain the current 15 per cent total capital ratio (though the EAC agreed 
min imum standard is 14 per cent) (Government of Rwanda, 2013). Risk man-
agement may change significantly, as a result of Basel II and III implementation. 
‘Earlier, BNR was only concerned with credit risk. Now, there is more of an inter-
est in operational risk and we don’t have the systems or data for that in all the 
banks’.23 However, for many banks, operational and market risk remain negligible 
and ‘don’t really affect’ them.24 Yet the impact will be uneven across commercial 
banks. For Atlas Mara BPR, which has large numbers of daily transactions, 
operation and market risk will have an impact.25 One BNR regulator admitted 
that ‘it may affect growth in lending but the question is how resilient commercial 
banks are in moving from credit risk to adding operational risk and market risk’.26
BNR has now adopted most aspects of Basel III standards with the exception of 
risk coverage (for counterparty credit risk) and requirements for global systemically 
important banks (as it has no such banks in its jurisdiction). To improve reporting 
procedures between commercial banks and the central bank, BNR is establishing 
an electronic data warehouse. In May 2017, the regulation was issued, although 
there was a lack of clarity about whether it would be in effect immediately or 
starting January 2018. There was also some confusion about how the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and the Internal Liquidity 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) would be implemented across the finan-
cial sector. BNR officials said they were discussing how to implement ICAAPs in 
relation to risk exposure in the sector and highlighted the lack of skills within the 
country as a limitation.27 Some commercial banks were worried about the way 
ICAAP would be computed. ‘There is currently no framework for pillar 1 and my 
understanding is that there is no standardized framework worldwide for pillar 2. 
In particular, we are unsure of what parameters to use and there is a major 
challenge with non-quantitative risk types’.28 One consultant doubted the feasibility 
of implementing ICAAP programmes.29
In February 2018—a month after all commercial banks had to be compliant 
with Basel II and III standards—BNR issued a directive, which stated that all 
banks would have to submit approved annual ICAAP and ILAAP documents for 
23 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
24 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
25 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017. 26 Interview, BNR, Kigali, June 2017.
27 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
28 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
29 Interview, consultant, Kigali, June 2017.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
138 The Political Economy of Bank Regulation
review by March 2019, with larger banks having to prepare their first ICAAP and 
ILAAP documents by July 2018.
Some large banks (like BK and Atlas Mara BPR) were also worried about the 
implementation of IFRS 9, which all banks had to implement by January 2018. 
One banker said, ‘the impact of IFRS 9 will change the landscape of the market. 
We have a lot of data constraints and segmentation issues. We aren’t privy to 
high-level macrodata. This impacts how we construct our models. We also don’t 
have good historical data’.30
Unlike in Ethiopia, the RPF government fails to question donor-led models in 
the financial sector and nearly every regulator and commercial banker in the 
country said that there were long-term benefits in enacting Basel reforms. Though 
scholarship (Gottschalk, 2010) has shown that Basel adoption is not necessarily 
the best way forward for late developing countries, such arguments have not 
gained traction with Rwandan banking regulators. The Rwandan government’s 
uncritical stance towards Basel adoption can be interpreted both as a belief in 
such standards or ideological agreement with market-led reforms. Clearly, inter-
national consultants (employed by the IMF) have been influential in setting the 
parameters on which BNR’s regulation would be judged. However, Rwandan 
bankers—individually and as a group—are detached from regional or inter-
national banking networks. There is significant turnover of BNR staff and though 
some remain involved in discussions of Basel implementation, BNR simply acts 
as an agency charged with implementing Basel.
Rwanda’s policy-driven adoption of Basel banking standards has been ambi-
tious and has progressed without acknowledging negative consequences. The 
RPF government has enacted such reforms, assuming that it may result in a more 
secure financial sector. Yet it may have the opposite effect with commercial banks 
worried about the effect it may have in the short term.
The political economy of Basel adoption
Policy-driven Basel adoption in Rwanda follows closely in line with the project’s 
analytical framework. BNR regulators and banks are domestically oriented and 
have very limited access to international networks. In contrast, RPF politicians 
are internationally oriented and their services-based hub development strategy 
depends on attracting foreign attention and investment. The state-owned bank 
(BK) has ambitions of expanding in the region in the future but it is not on the 
horizon in the next few years. Though pan-African banks have a substantial pres-
ence in Rwanda, most invested primarily to increase their footprint in the region. 
Though BPR Atlas Mara is among Bob Diamond’s first investments in Africa, its 
30 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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investments are primarily focused on securing the Rwandan subsidiary’s financial 
difficulties in the immediate future. In line with the expectations of the project’s 
framework, Rwanda has adopted Basel banking standards but implementation 
remains confused and difficult. There is reason to doubt the effectiveness of 
implementation given BNR’s capacity and technology constraints. Commercial 
banks will also be limited by skills, technology, and finance constraints in their 
aim to meet Basel requirements. Despite this, BNR officials and even some 
respondents within commercial banks mentioned that they were preparing for 
‘full implementation and compliance’ by January 2018.31
The RPF’s economic leadership has been the main driving force behind Basel 
implementation. RPF economic leadership comprises President Paul Kagame, his 
economic advisors, the Special Policy Unit in the Office of the President, and key 
ministers who have led The Economic Cluster and have also worked in leadership 
roles in BNR, including John Rwangombwa, Francois Kanimba, and Claver 
Gatete. Rwangombwa is the current BNR governor and has served in this post 
since 2013. Prior to this post, he was minister of finance. Kanimba is a former 
BNR governor (2002–11) and was the minister of trade and industry until August 
2017 when he was replaced in a cabinet reshuffle. Gatete was the minister of 
finance from 2012 to 2018 and had previously served as BNR governor from 2011 
to 2013. Other leading officials (serving at the rank of minister) in The Economic 
Cluster include James Musoni (the former minister of infrastructure and minister 
of finance), Francis Gatare, and Clare Akamanzi.
During Kanimba’s stint as BNR governor, a decision was taken to adopt Basel 
standards and though implementation has only been embraced recently, BNR has 
retained a conservative stance on regulation since Kanimba took over the position 
in 2002. Successive governors have retained similar conservatism in their regulation 
of the financial sector. Thus, the economic leadership has taken the decision to 
adopt Basel standards but BNR is the agency charged with delivering that goal. 
BNR has some autonomy in the ways in which Basel standards will be imple-
mented but it will be judged by economic leadership in its task of becoming a 
leading adopter and implementer of Basel standards.
BNR has always been ‘quick to follow international best practices’, and since 
these were the standards that were offered to them, the target was to achieve those 
standards.32 Beck et al. (2011) cite this as a common experience among African 
countries where complex rules are adopted to follow international best practice 
(and out of fear that they would be penalized, e.g. in the form of higher inter-
national borrowing costs), even if those rules are not appropriate to the country’s 
needs. A BNR official said, ‘after FSAP-2 in 2011, the benchmarks that they would 
be assessed on were based on Basel II and III so though they didn’t tell us to 
31 Interviews, BNR and commercial banks, Kigali, June 2017.
32 Interview, consultant, Kigali, June 2017.
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implement Basel, we would be judged on that basis’.33 There have been few 
discussions about the vulnerabilities that may accompany the implementation of 
Basel banking standards.34 One IMF official highlighted the uncritical stance 
that almost all entities operating in the financial sector were taking on Basel 
implementation: ‘As more countries start adopting it, you kind of forget the 
question of whether it is a good thing or not’.35
Though some IMF and World Bank officials claim to have warned the gov-
ernment against implementing Basel banking standards, BNR officials did not 
remember such warnings.36 IMF and World Bank officials within Rwanda 
 supported the implementation of Basel banking standards. However, they 
stressed that discussions of its implementation were ‘not high on their agenda’.37 
The IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank (AfDB) funded training 
programmes in BNR’s bank supervision departments and for risk managers at 
commercial banks.38 The IMF has also provided technical assistance for the 
implementation of Basel banking standards with specific funding for building 
BNR’s supervisory capacities.39 IFIs have provided access to Basel standards and 
have influenced the parameters within which banking regulation has occurred. 
Few alternatives have been provided and the government has not sought other 
options, thus signalling Rwanda’s position as a standard-taker in international 
financial regulation.
Commercial banks voiced a number of complaints about the implementation of 
Basel banking standards. However, complaints varied among banks. Though the 
Rwanda Bankers Association (RBA) exists, banks have not developed a common 
stance with regard to Basel implementation. Though they acknowledged ‘the hurt’ 
that would be experienced in the short term, most said it would be better for the 
entire sector and their own individual banks in the long term.40 Most banks com-
plained about the pace at which Basel standards were being adopted. Some bank 
representatives criticized BNR for ‘copy and pasting Basel standards without reflect-
ing on their appropriateness in Rwanda’.41 Though BNR officials said they were tak-
ing a ‘flexible’ approach to implementing Basel reforms, commercial bankers 
complained ‘there was limited room to manoeuvre’ and BNR was ‘very punitive’.42
Across the sector, there was little resistance to the implementation of Basel 
reforms. One commercial bank representative said, ‘you can’t win a fight against 
your regulator. There’s no bank that will do that. Even less in Rwanda’.43 Larger 
33 Interview, BNR, Kigali, June 2017. 34 Interviews, BNR, Kigali, June 2017.
35 Interview, IMF, Kigali, June 2017.
36 Observations made by former World Bank consultant, June 2017.
37 Interview, IMF, Kigali, June 2017. 38 Interviews, IMF and World Bank, Kigali, June 2017.
39 Interview, IMF and World Bank, Kigali, June 2017.
40 Interviews, commercial banks, Kigali, June 2017.
41 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
42 Interviews, BNR and commercial banks, Kigali, June 2017.
43 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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banks were very critical about the implementation of the capital conservation 
buffer and the additional requirements that would be in place for SIBs. Most 
banks, which operated as subsidiaries in Rwanda, were not worried about Basel 
implementation given that their parent companies had either already enforced 
Basel implementation across their subsidiaries or were in the process of doing so. 
Two representatives from regional banks mentioned that they had been forced to 
be compliant with Basel II and III because their parent company had ordered it.44 
However, they were worried about the pressure that would accompany ensuring 
there were returns on these new investments. Since the return on investments in 
Rwanda remained low compared to the region, risk managers in commercial banks 
said it was ‘difficult to see how to get return on investment in the current market 
when we also have to ask for capital injections from our group headquarters’.45 
Another regional bank representative said, ‘If I had to raise capital locally, it would 
be a struggle. Parent companies may give capital but how do we get returns?’ Among 
commercial banks, there was a consensus that the market was ‘highly capitalized 
without potential for gaining significant returns’.46
BK—as a majority state-owned bank and the biggest commercial bank in the 
country—was in a difficult position. BK officials saw Basel implementation as 
the right way forward in the long term. However, they were worried about the 
difficulties and financial burden that would accompany implementation in the 
short term. Though some representatives from commercial banks argued that 
the BNR ‘may overlook some (of BK’s) discrepancies’, there is no evidence that 
such partiality is being practised.47 While EAC harmonization and the imple-
mentation of Basel would help BK expand operations abroad, it was not part of 
BK’s strategy to meet Basel banking standards for that purpose. Instead, the 
government was more hopeful that large foreign banks could choose to invest in 
Rwanda because of BNR’s decision to enact best practices.48 In some ways, BK 
had the most to lose from Basel implementation because they could not avail of a 
parent company’s expertise or funds and largely relied on the domestic market for 
both skills and resources. After the implementation of Basel, the difficulties BK 
faced had quickly surfaced. To meet the requirement of maintaining high capital 
buffers—as part of Basel II and III requirements—BK announced that it would 
list 222.2 million shares on the Rwandan and Nairobi Stock Exchanges, with the 
aim of raising $67.3 million (Herbling, 2018). This would dilute the Rwandan 
government’s ownership of the country’s largest bank, suggesting that Basel 
implementation had already begun to limit the developmentalist functions of the 
state. The RPF government was acting against the short-term interest of its own 
44 Interviews, commercial banks, Kigali, June 2017.
45 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
46 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
47 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
48 Interview, former BNR official, Kigali, June 2017.
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state-owned bank through which most strategic projects are being financed, 
highlighting the inconsistencies that have characterized the country’s develop-
ment strategy and the government’s attitude to the financial sector (Behuria, 2018).
The composition of the private sector also presents significant challenges to 
domestic banks in their implementation of Basel reforms. Though regulators may 
be able to direct banks to change the composition of their loan-books, a more 
significant problem is that very few companies take up large portions of each 
bank’s loan-book. Difficulties with some investments by large institutions (e.g. the 
RSSB) contributed to the liquidity crunch in the late 2000s.49 Even today, there 
are a ‘few big institutions taking up 20 per cent of deposits. If one is in trouble, it 
is difficult to raise liquidity’.50 The RSSB itself holds about 40–50 per cent of the 
liquidity in the banking sector.51 The concentration of the economy among 
certain institutions thus increases the economy’s vulnerability to liquidity crises. 
Commercial banks also have limited options to diversify their loan-books and 
this affects the potential of increasing returns-on-equity.
The Rwandan government’s stubbornness and ambition to achieve goals is 
evidenced in its implementation of Basel standards. Yet the desire to achieve goals 
within the government apparatus has not left much space for receptiveness to 
feedback before Basel adoption and implementation, signalling the narrow role 
that BNR has in implementing policy-driven adoption. Indeed, BNR officials and 
commercial bankers all anticipate difficulties with implementing Basel. A senior 
BNR regulator admitted that there ‘will be complications and some of it, we will 
figure it out as we go along’.52 A commercial banker echoed the BNR regulator’s 
observation by saying ‘the approach here seems to be: let’s go for it and address 
issues later’.53 The ‘learn as you go’ approach to implementing Basel was in evi-
dence in February 2018 when a new Basel III liquidity measurement regime was 
rolled out for commercial banks, incorporating Basel III’s flagship Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The introduction of 
NSFR requirements has further exacerbated the already existing problems regard-
ing the lack of availability and affordability of mortgages since banks’ balance 
sheets have to now indicate enhanced maturity matching (Vemuru,  2018). Five 
other liquidity monitoring tools were also issued for banks including maturity 
mismatch analysis, cashflow projections, stock of liquidity assets, diversification 
of funding liabilities, and reliance on parent and other subsidiaries. Ecobank 
publicly stated that ‘this is by far the most comprehensive liquidity measurement 
regime in our coverage basket’ and that ‘voluminous haggles between banks and 
BNR’ were expected during the implementation phase as balance sheets would 
have to be rearranged significantly (Ecobank Research, 2018).
49 Interview, BNR, Kigali, June 2017. 50 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
51 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017. 52 Interview, BNR, Kigali, June 2017.
53 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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It may be surprising that Rwanda—elsewhere classified as a developmental 
state or in similar ways (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012)—is embracing global 
banking standards. This indicates the high degree of international orientation 
among Rwanda’s economic leadership. For the RPF, the pathway to economic 
security depends on regional integration and a reliance on international legitimacy 
in the short and medium term. Given Rwanda’s geographical vulnerability and 
lack of resources, the government has an explicitly externally oriented development 
strategy, with success depending on regional integration. This has been made 
clear in Rwanda’s embrace of Basel standards and amendments made to the 2008 
banking law in 2017, ahead of implementation of Basel standards a few months 
later. The amendments were justified by the need to harmonize Rwanda’s financial 
system in line with regional and international standards. These included small 
changes including replacing the title of ‘Vice Governor’ of BNR to ‘Deputy 
Governor’ (to harmonize titles with other East African countries) to larger changes 
like altering the start and end dates of the financial year and strengthening BNR’s 
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability committees (Kwibuka, 2017).
Rwanda’s development path is very different from the kind pursued in East 
Asia. Though BNR does not impose sectoral lending targets, the central govern-
ment does pinpoint strategic growth sectors. In Rwanda, most loans have been 
concentrated in real estate, hotels, and other service sectors. One commercial 
banker said, ‘today, if there is a problem in the real estate sector, banks will suffer. 
Retail banking is very small and our loan-books are concentrated’.54 For example, 
construction and hotels accounted for 45 per cent of BK’s loan-book in 2016, 
with another 40 per cent being allocated for commerce and transport loans. 
According to one banker, ‘this was done strategically and it is a ticking time bomb. 
In most other countries, the regulator would have seen this as concentration and 
stopped it’.55 For a small country like Rwanda, the pursuit of economic development 
is accompanied by a great deal of instability. That instability is often generated 
through external pressures but resources are also received from international 
sources. Thus, the high degree of internationalization has combined with some 
facets of a developmental state to create a conflicted development strategy, which 
combines aspects of market-led reforms and strategic state interventions 
(Behuria, 2018).
Conclusion
The policy-driven pathway to convergence with Basel standards in Rwanda pro-
vides interesting contributions to our understanding of why developing countries 
54 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
55 Interview, commercial bank, Kigali, June 2017.
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implement Basel standards. First, it highlights how two aspiring ‘developmental 
states’ (Ethiopia and Rwanda) have developed such strikingly different attitudes 
to Basel adoption and implementation. While Ethiopia and even Bolivia have 
highlighted clear distinctions between developmental state objectives and Basel 
adoption objectives, the RPF government has failed to distinguish between such 
objectives (and the contradictions between them). Another interpretation could 
be that the RPF government feels that its services-based development strategy 
requires the adoption of ‘best practice’ financial standards. Yet the announcement 
that the government will reduce its shareholding in BK through a public offering 
on the Kigali and Nairobi stock exchanges highlights how the government’s 
developmentalist ambitions may be at risk. Thus, the implementation of Basel 
standards has brought into focus the inconsistencies within Rwanda’s develop-
ment project where the government ‘want to be all things to everyone’.56
Unlike other policy-driven examples, though, the RPF government has demon-
strated consistent conservative regulation practices in the banking sector. There is 
less political contestation compared to Ghana and the rapid adoption of Basel 
standards has not been opposed. Yet there are severe deficiencies in technical cap-
acity and expertise in the sector and Basel implementation seems largely out of 
touch with the realities of Rwanda’s shallow and underdeveloped financial sector.
There is still a lack of clarity within the banking sector about aspects of the 
implementation process. The government and commercial banks, in their 2018 
annual statements, claim that IFRS 9 has been implemented but in 2017, most 
commercial banks argued that there was no way this would be possible. The con-
sequences of Basel implementation have already led to a restructuring of the 
commercial banking sector, with BK’s ownership and role in the country set to 
change. BK will face challenges to Basel implementation given its status as the 
largest Rwandan bank in a sector where subsidiaries have better-funded and 
more-skilled parent companies. Atlas Mara BPR already faces significant chal-
lenges—particularly in relation to non-performing loans—and will encounter 
additional difficulties. Other banks may find it much more difficult to receive 
returns on their new investments in Rwanda where non-performing loans are the 
highest in the region and return on equity is the lowest.
Basel implementation will undoubtedly bring significant change to Rwanda’s 
financial sector. Yet there is no guarantee that it will help the RPF government 
achieve its goal of becoming a financial sector hub. Unless feedback mechanisms 
are integrated within the implementation process, it is likely to result in negative 
consequences in the short term for banks. Thus, the case of Basel adoption in 
Rwanda provides us with an interesting snapshot of a small developing country, 
which is committed to pursuing economic development, trusting the standards of 
international financial institutions with limited critical engagement. In Rwanda’s 
56 Interview, consultant, Kigali, June 2017.
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ambitious development project, there is little room for BNR and commercial 
banks to voice criticism (in the planning stages) with regards to the scale of the 
ambition of the country’s economic leadership. The consequences will be 
borne out in the coming years as banks and the regulator grapple with Basel 
implementation.  
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Ghana




On the face of it, the trajectory of Basel implementation in Ghana is puzzling. 
Ghana has a reputation as an open economy with a government that is quick to 
adopt international norms, yet it was relatively slow to implement international 
banking standards. The Ghanaian government has pursued a series of financial 
sector reforms since the late 1980s in close collaboration with the World Bank and 
IMF, with a relatively high presence of foreign banks. Ghana was an early imple-
menter of Basel I, but attempts to move towards Basel II in the mid-2000s fal-
tered. The IMF assessed Ghana as having a low level of compliance with the Basel 
Core Principles relative to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Marchettini 
et al., 2015, p. 28). This pattern changed dramatically in 2017 when the government 
embarked on a radical reform of the banking sector, implementing major elem-
ents of Basel II and III and catapulting Ghana to among the most ambitious 
implementers of Basel standards among our case study countries.
This chapter attributes the stop-start nature of Basel implementation in Ghana 
to different interests and policy ideas among Ghana’s two main political parties, 
which meant that the approach to international banking standards varied according 
to which political party was in power. In common with many developing countries, 
Ghana adopted Basel I as the result of World Bank driven reforms in the 1990s. While 
the adoption of Basel I was externally driven, the more recent drive for Basel II and III 
adoption was domestic and came from politicians of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). 
The NPP sought to turn Ghana into an international financial services hub and per-
ceived the adoption of international standards as vital for pursuing this vision. 
Strikingly, the IMF pushed back against early moves towards Basel II implementation 
in the 2000s, advising the Government of Ghana not to proceed with Basel II until it 
had addressed fundamental weaknesses in its basic supervision. The NPP govern-
ment pressed ahead but implementation stalled when the government changed in 
2009 and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) assumed office. It was only after 
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the NPP regained power in early 2017 that the implementation of Basel standards 
resumed in earnest, as part of a radical reform of the banking sector.
The different approaches of the NDC and NPP towards international banking 
standards reflects differences in their ideas about the role of the financial sector in 
development as well as the material interests of the businesses groups they are 
aligned with. As a party the NPP has deliberately set out to position Ghana as a 
financial services hub for the West Africa region, seeking to attract international 
investors into the financial sector and develop strong domestic banks and finan-
cial firms that can capitalise on the sector’s expansion. In contrast, NDC prioritised 
directing credit to productive sectors of the economy and supporting indigenous 
banks; the implementation of a complex and costly set of international standards 
was simply not a priority.
The fact that convergence is policy-driven is surprising because such regula-
tory decisions fall under the exclusive mandate of Ghana’s central bank (the Bank 
of Ghana), which has a high level of formal independence from the executive 
branch and hence from political parties. Yet close scrutiny shows that, in practice 
the central bank has become increasingly responsive to changing policy agendas. 
Since the early 2000s it has become the norm for central bank governors and 
their deputies to step down within a few months of a new political party assum-
ing office, even when their official terms have not ended. In tandem, it has 
become commonplace for senior technocrats at the central bank to leave office 
or be moved. The politicization of government institutions has been observed 
in other areas too (Appiah and Abdulai, 2017; Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, 2012). 
While some argue that this undermines the quality of central bank decisions, 
others argue that it makes the institution more accountable to Ghana’s democratically 
elected leaders.
Despite being the target of these various regulatory initiatives, banks have not 
played a major role in shaping the trajectory of Basel implementation in Ghana. In 
the context of a highly profitable and so-far weakly supervised banking sector, for-
eign banks would not derive any competitive advantage from the implementation 
of more complex regulatory standards. Meanwhile, domestic banks are yet to ven-
ture overseas in a meaningful way, so they have little reason to support implementa-
tion of more cumbersome regulations. Although implementation entails substantial 
costs for these banks, they have not been a source of strong opposition to imple-
mentation, perhaps because they have not expected rigorous enforcement.
Although both political parties have taken different approaches to the adop-
tion of international banking standards, the actual supervision and enforcement 
of banking regulation has historically been lax under both parties. This only 
started to change after 2016 when a snap audit of the banking sector (required as 
part of a new loan arrangement with the IMF) revealed fragility and poor corporate 
governance of several banks, Following its election in 2017, the NPP government 
made a series of moves to strengthen supervision and enforcement.
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The analysis in this chapter is based on a review of the secondary literature, 
official documents, media reports, and twenty-one semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Accra in March 2016 and April 2017. Interviews were conducted 
with current and former representatives from the Bank of Ghana and Ministry of 
Finance, senior representatives from eight banks (headquartered in Ghana, other 
African countries, and the UK), an international accounting firm, a representa-
tive of the Ghana Association of Bankers, a member of the Board of the Bank of 
Ghana, a member of the Monetary Policy Committee, and an MP serving on the 
Parliamentary Finance Committee. Interviews are not directly attributed, in order 
to preserve the anonymity of participants.
The next sections explain the wider political economy context and Ghana’s 
adoption of Basel standards and compliance with Basel Core Principles, and then 
explains the political economy of Basel implementation. The chapter concludes 
by situating the findings and arguments in the wider literature on political economy 
dynamics in Ghana.
Political economy context: mutual dependence  
between banks and government
Ghana has a middle-sized economy relative to others in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and is renowned within the region for its vibrant democracy. It experienced 
high growth rates in the 2000s, partly as a result of the worldwide commodity 
boom and international debt relief, and has achieved one of the best records 
of poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011, it moved into the category of 
lower-middle-income countries and has a GDP per capita of close to US$1,400 
(Table 6.1).
Despite high growth and attempts to diversify its economy, Ghana remains 
heavily reliant on the export of primary commodities including gold, cocoa, and, 
Table 6.1 Ghana: key indicators
Ghana  
GDP per capita (current US$) 1,641
Bank assets (current US$) 10.17 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 27.3
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 11.7
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 19.7
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 10.4
Polity IV score 8
Note: All data is from 2017 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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following recent discoveries, petroleum. As a result of macro-economic shocks 
relating to commodity dependence, as well as high levels of pre-election spending, 
successive governments have struggled with rising public sector indebtedness. In 
2015 the IMF and the World Bank declared Ghana to be at ‘high risk of debt 
distress’ and the Ghanaian government entered into an extended credit facility 
arrangement with the IMF (IMF and World Bank, 2015).
The banking sector has grown rapidly since 2000, with total assets increasing 
from just under US$4 billion (22 per cent of GDP) in 2005, to more than 
US$10  billion (27.3 per cent of GDP) in 2017. The nature of the banking sector has 
also changed as the result of policy reforms. The first wave of reforms occurred in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s under a World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programme (FSAP) which restructured distressed banks, reformed bank regulation 
and supervision, and opened the banking sector to new entrants (Antwi-Asare 
and Addison,  2000; Aryeetey,  2003; Aryeetey et al.,  1997). A second wave of 
reforms in the early 2000s included the introduction of universal banking, which 
allowed banks to engage in commercial, development, merchant, and investment 
banking without the need for separate licenses (Quartey, 2005).
The reforms led to a substantial adjustment in bank ownership patterns 
(Table 6.2). In the 1990s the banking sector was dominated by government-owned 
banks and by 2017 government-owned banks only controlled one fifth of assets. 
Domestic private banks expanded to fill the space, with their market share 
increasing to one third of assets in 2017. Since the early 2000s, about half of bank-
ing sector assets have been controlled by foreign-owned banks. Although the 
share of foreign ownership has remained relatively stable, European banks have 
ceded share to recent entrants from Nigeria and South Africa. The dramatic NPP-
led consolidation of the banking sector during 2017 and 2018, which cost the tax-
payer more than GhC12billion (more than US$2billion), led the number of banks 
to decline from thirty-four in mid-2017 to twenty-three at the end of 2018 (Bank 
of Ghana, 2019; Dontoh, 2019).
Table 6.2 Ghana: changing patterns of bank ownership
  2010 2017
  Number of 
banks




% of total 
assets
Government-controlled 5 28.9 3 16.6
Domestic privately controlled 7 17.7 11 32.2
Foreign privately controlled 14 53.4 17 51.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from IMF databases (2018)
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Banks in Ghana have business models that rely overwhelmingly on the domestic 
market, with domestic assets accounting for more than 90 per cent of the sector’s 
assets (Bank of Ghana, 2017a). Only one Ghanaian bank operates internationally.1
Early banking reforms in Ghana were heralded as one of the most successful in 
Africa (IMF, 1999a). Yet, as in other countries, the reforms have not fulfilled their 
ambitions of creating a competitive banking industry that lends to the private 
sector. Despite an increase in the number of banks and the corresponding 
reduction in market concentration (Figure 6.1), Ghana’s banking sector remains 
uncompetitive, short-term, and expensive, with unusually high interest rate spreads 
and profits (Adjei-Frimpong et al., 2016; Biekpe, 2011; Buchs and Mathisen, 2005). 
Like the banking sector in many other African countries, it is also very profitable 
(Figure 6.2). Since the global financial crisis, return on equity in global banking 
has hovered around 8-10% while it has been twice as high in Africa (Chrionga 
et al. 2018) Although lending to the private sector increased to just above 20 per cent 
of GDP in 2015, this was well below the average of 29 per cent for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Figure 6.3).
High interest rate spreads, highly profitable banks, and a low level of lending to 
the real economy are arguably due to the government’s reliance on the banks as a 
source of short-term finance (Figure 6.3). A strong appetite of successive govern-
ments for domestic borrowing has led banks to invest heavily in high-yielding 
short-term government securities. Between 1998 and 2003, for example, govern-
ment securities accounted for 25 per cent of bank assets, while net loans were 
only 34 per cent (Buchs and Mathisen, 2005). Similarly, in mid-2018, government 
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Figure 6.1 Ghana: banking sector concentration .
Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank (2018a)
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Figure 6.2 Ghana: bank profitability.
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Figure 6.3 Ghana: patterns of bank lending.
Source: World Bank (2018b, 2017)
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bills and securities accounted for 36 per cent of bank assets, while net loans were 
only 33 per cent (Bank of Ghana, 2018a).
The dominance of short-term, high-yielding government securities on the 
books of Ghana’s banks has contributed to banks being relatively safe, well cap -
ital ized, and highly liquid. Average levels of capital have substantially exceeded 
the prudential requirement of 10 per cent of risk-weighted assets (Figure 6.4) and 
capital adequacy and liquidity levels in Ghanaian banks have been well above 
regional peers. However, the quality of assets in the banking sector has varied, 
with spikes in the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) (Figure 6.4). NPLs have 
been caused by a mix of macro-economic shocks and arrears in government 
payments to contractors. They have plagued all types of banks, including rep ut-
able international ones (IMF, 2011a).
While concerns had been raised about the high levels of NPLs, it was only 
when the IMF demanded an asset quality review of all banks in 2016 as part of a 
loan package that it became clear that headline figures masked a high level of 
variation at the level of individual banks. Crucially, the asset quality review used 
a more stringent approach to loan classification than had been the norm. 
Historically, the Bank of Ghana had not required banks to classify loans as non-
performing if they originated from government or had a government guarantee 
(Bank of Ghana, 2016). When reviewed under the stricter prudential standards, 
eight banks were found to be insolvent, illiquid, or both, and a series of corporate 








































































Figure 6.4  Ghana: capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and non-performing loans (NPLs).
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators Database, IMF (2018)
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The results triggered a slew of reforms, first under the NDC (2015–16) and then 
under the NPP (2017 onwards). Reforms included new legislation, new regulations 
in areas ranging from minimum capital requirements to corporate governance, 
the closure of seven banks, and mergers between banks that couldn’t meet the 
new minimum capital requirements.
Interviews in 2016 revealed a lax supervisory environment. Banking supervi-
sion, carried out by the Banking Supervision Department of the Bank of Ghana, 
was by several interviewees to be relatively weak, with supervisors always playing 
‘regulatory catch-up’.2 Interviewees noted that the Bank of Ghana faced signifi-
cant shortages in the number of supervisors with the requisite expertise. 
Supervisors were reported to rely heavily on auditors’ reports, but, as auditors 
were reported to have a very cosy relationship with the banks, interviewees in tim-
ated that the under-reporting of NPLs was common. Moreover, when they 
detected problems, supervisors were often reluctant to initiate any action, par-
ticularly when banks were politically connected.3 Investigations following the 
IMF-promoted audit revealed a series of regulatory breaches, corporate govern-
ance failures, insider dealings, and accounting and financial improprieties, and 
led the Bank of Ghana to close seven banks during 2017-8. As part of wider 
reforms to the sector, the Bank of Ghana created an Office of Ethics and Internal 
Investigations to strengthen the quality of supervision (Bank of Ghana, 2018b).
Ghana’s adoption and implementation  
of the Basel banking standards
Since its first Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) in the late 1990s, 
the government has been under pressure from international financial institutions 
to improve its compliance with the Basel Core Principles. Ghana was relatively 
quick to adopt and implement Basel I. Yet, despite making moves to implement 
Basel II as early as 2004, it was only in January 2019 that elements of Basel II and III 
came into force (Table 6.2).
Basel Core Principles
Since the 1990s, Ghana has been criticized by the IMF and World Bank for weak 
compliance with the Basel Core Principles. Ghana’s banking regulation and 
supervisory practices were first evaluated against the Basel Core Principles in the 
late 1990s (IMF, 1999a). A joint IMF–World Bank FSAP evaluation in 2000 found 
2 Interviews with senior government officials and representatives of private banks, Accra, March 2016.
3 Interview with private sector representative, Accra, 21 March 2016.
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Ghana to be ‘largely compliant’ with the Basel Core Principles, but highlighted 
a series of legal changes needed to bring the Ghanaian framework ‘closer to 
international practices’. The FSAP team criticized the Bank of Ghana’s limited 
independence and stressed the need for supervisors to ‘act more aggressively 
in enforcing prudential standards as they had instead tended to favour moral 
suasion’ (IMF, 2003).
The level of compliance with the Basel Core Principles declined during the 
2000s. Another FSAP was conducted in 2010 and assessed Ghana to be non-
compliant or materially non-compliant with fourteen of the twenty-five Basel 
Core Principles—substantially below the average in the sub-region (IMF, 2011b, 
p. 49). It found that, despite the financial sector reforms of the 2000s, financial 
stability risks had heightened, non-performing loans were high, and commercial 
banks’ internal controls and risk management practices had not kept pace with 
the industry’s growth and changing risks. Even a moderate deterioration in the 
asset quality of banks would have led to the insolvency of several banks 
(IMF, 2011b; Marchettini et al., 2015, p. 28). The Bank of Ghana disputed the IMF’s 
assessments, judging itself to be non-compliant or materially non-compliant with 
eight of the Core Principles, not the fourteen identified by the IMF (Bank of 
Ghana, 2013).
Basel I, II, and III
Ghana was an early adopter of Basel I, adopting prudential regulations based on 
the standard in 1989, only a year after they had been agreed by the Basel 
Committee. Ghana’s Banking Act (1989) introduced capital adequacy require-
ments at 6 per cent of risk-weighted assets. These requirements were modelled on 
Basel I, although the Bank of Ghana’s criteria for risk-weighting assets were sim-
pler, with only two categories of risk weights rather than a spectrum (World 
Bank, 1994, p. 54). The Bank of Ghana’s capital adequacy requirement was lower 
than the 8 per cent stipulated in Basel I but, because the method for calculating 
capital adequacy ratios was more conservative, in practice banks were required 
to maintain capital levels in excess of the Basel minimum (IMF,  2003, 1999b; 
World Bank, 1994).4 From 1992, the Bank of Ghana started to implement Basel I 
to assess credit risk; from 1998 it introduced an assessment of operational risk; 
and from 2000 it started to assess market risk (focusing on the foreign exchange 
exposure of banks).5
4 The Bank of Ghana standards apply higher risk weights for some assets, such as interbank loans, 
and because fixed assets and certain investments are deducted from both the numerator and the 
denominator of the ratio (IMF, 2003).
5 Interview with government official, Accra, 17 March 2016.
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The Bank of Ghana also looked like it would be an early adopter of Basel II. 
Ghana was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to initiate risk-based 
supervision, as a precursor to implementing Basel II (Dosoo, 2006). The Bank of 
Ghana Act (2004) provided for risk-based supervision and all banks were required 
to implement risk-based management practices from 2007 (Bank of Ghana, 2007). 
In 2007, the Bank of Ghana undertook a series of preparatory steps towards 
implementation of Basel II including a readiness and gap analysis of banks, iden-
tifying champions in the banking sector to lead implementation efforts, and 
preparing guidelines for the calculation of the minimum capital requirements. 
It set a target date of 2010 for the full implementation of Basel II (Bank of Ghana, 
2015; IMF, 2009).
Following extensive consultations, the Bank of Ghana and local banks mutually 
agreed to adopt the Basel II standardized approaches for credit, operational, and 
market risk (IMF, 2009). A joint committee comprising Bank of Ghana officials 
and representatives from the banks was formed to oversee Basel II implementa-
tion, and the committee met quarterly to discuss progress (IMF, 2009).
If these plans had come to fruition, Ghana would have been an early adopter of 
Basel II among our case study countries. But implementation was ‘placed on hold’ 
for six years from 2009 to 2015 (Bank of Ghana, 2015).6 It was only in 2015 that 
implementation resumed, although at a slow pace. The Banks and Special Deposit-
Taking Institutions Act (2016) provided the Bank of Ghana with enhanced powers 
to resolve banks and laid the foundations for the implementation of Basel II 
(Asiama, 2017) and the Bank of Ghana announced 2017 as the new target date for 
full implementation (Business and Financial Times, 2017b; PWC, 2016). However 
interviews in 2016 suggested that it was unlikely to happen as neither the regula-
tor nor the banks appeared to be ready. A banking survey carried out by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in early 2017 revealed that the majority of banks did not 
have a detailed plan for how to transition to Basel II and were waiting on the 
Bank of Ghana to issue guidelines (PWC, 2017).
In a move that took banks and observers by surprise, in September 2017, the 
Bank of Ghana announced that all banks had fifteen months to meet a three-fold 
increase in minimum capital requirements, which rose from GhC120 million 
(approx. US$25 million) to GhC400 million (approx. US$80 million). This was 
quickly followed in November 2017 with the issuance of new draft capital require-
ments based on core elements of both Basel II and Basel III. Following a con sult-
ation period with banks, the Capital Requirements Directive was issued in June 
2018 and came into effect in January 2019 (Bank of Ghana, 2018c). The directive 
required all banks to comply with the capital requirements of Basel II (the stand-
ardized approaches to credit, operational, and market risk) as well as the capital-
related requirements of Basel III (Table 6.3).
6 This was confirmed in interviews.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
Ghana 157
The political economy of Basel standards in Ghana
Four sets of actors are central to explaining Ghana’s response to the Basel 
framework: the regulator (Bank of Ghana); the IMF and the World Bank; Ghana’s 
two main political parties (the NDC and NPP); and its banks.
In its capacity as regulator and supervisor of banks, the Bank of Ghana has the 
mandate to decide whether and how much of the suite of international banking 
standards to adopt, implement, and enforce. The Bank of Ghana, along with the 
Ministry of Finance, has a reputation for being a strong and effective government 
institution, with a high level of technical expertise. Although formally independ-
ent, it is heavily influenced by party politics. Crucially, it has become the norm for 
central bank governors and deputies to step down within a few months of a 
change in government, under considerable pressure from the incoming govern-
ment, to make room for the appointment of governors who are closely linked to 
the incoming party. These links are illustrated in two instances when central bank 
governors have later been appointed as the country’s vice president when the 
political party that they served under regained power.
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As an institution, the Bank of Ghana has cultivated strong links with the 
international policy community of the international financial institutions, gener-
ated through successive IMF and World Bank-supported financial sector reform 
programmes. There is a ‘revolving door’ at the level of senior staff: all five central 
bank governors that were in office between 2000 and 2018 previously worked for 
the IMF, World Bank, or African Development Bank. The Bank of Ghana is also 
closely linked to its peer regulators within Africa through its participation networks 
of supervisors, and has particularly strong bilateral relations with the Central 
Bank of Nigeria. It is also engaged in the Financial Stability Board’s Regional 
Consultative Group for Africa, and closely engaged in international policy dis-
cussions at the Bank of International Settlements.
Below I trace the political economy dynamics behind Ghana’s stop-start imple-
mentation of international banking standards and the role of the Bank of Ghana, 
politicians from the two main political parties, the IMF and World Bank, and 
domestic and foreign banks. The analysis is split into four chronological periods, 
each with distinct dynamics.
World Bank in the driving seat: PNDC  
and NDC era (1980s to 1999)
Following the economic and financial crises in the 1980s, financial sector reforms 
started in earnest in 1987 under a World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programme (FINSAP). In addition to restructuring, privatizing, and liberalizing the 
banking sector, the reforms sought to improve Ghana’s banking regulations and 
supervisory capabilities. Bank of Ghana and World Bank officials in con sult ation 
with ‘banking, accounting and other professional bodies in Ghana and abroad’ 
drafted a new banking law, and provisions were ‘broadly patterned upon those of 
the Basel guidelines’ (emphasis added, World Bank, 1995, p. 5). The Basel I stand-
ard was adapted to suit Ghana’s relatively simple banking sector and the low level of 
supervisory resources in the Bank of Ghana, with only two categories of risk weights 
(0 per cent and 100 per cent) rather than a spectrum (World Bank, 1994, p. 54).
Implementation of Basel I standards started in earnest in 1992, with the intro-
duction of assessments of credit risk, and this was followed by the introduction 
of assessments for operational risk in 1998 and market risk (foreign exchange 
exposure) in 2000.7
While there are few documents verifying the politics of banking sector reform 
during this period and few interviewees could recollect details, the available 
evidence suggests that the World Bank and the IMF played a crucial role in 
introducing Basel I and the Basel Core Principles to Ghana.
7 Interview with government official, Accra, 17 March 2016.
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Bank of Ghana drives through Basel reforms: NPP era (2001–8)
The IMF, World Bank, and donor community continued to exert influence over 
policy reforms in Ghana in a variety of policy areas during the 2000s, with vary-
ing efficacy (e.g. Abdulai and Hulme,  2015; Whitfield,  2010). A fantasticating 
aspect of financial sector reforms was that the NPP pursued a vigorous reform 
agenda that was sometimes at odds with the IMF.
The NPP’s drive for financial sector reforms reflected a specific mix of interests 
and policy ideas. The NPP is widely perceived to be a party that supports the 
business class, with strong international connections, and several of its most 
prominent financiers have come from the financial sector. Upon its election in 
2001, the NPP government proclaimed that it would usher in a ‘golden age of 
business’ and its three policy priorities were improved governance, extensive 
government divestiture, and the development of an efficient financial sector with 
proper supervisory standards.
The NPP government’s vision for the financial sector, as articulated in the 2003 
Financial Sector Strategic Plan, was to diversify, grow, and globalize Ghana’s 
financial system (Mensah, 2015). The strategic plan set out a vision for ‘a financial 
sector that is . . . fully integrated with the global financial system and supported 
by a regulatory system that promotes a high degree of confidence’ (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2003).
A cornerstone of the NPP’s vision for the banking sector was to position Ghana 
as a financial services hub for the West African region. The NPP government per-
ceived an opportunity because Ghana’s two main competitors were weak: Nigeria 
had a much larger financial market but its regulatory and legal institutions were 
weak and it lacked policy credibility, while Cote d’Ivoire suffered from political 
instability.8 In line with this vision, the NPP government introduced new laws 
that, inter alia, raised minimum capital requirements, permitted the issuance of 
universal banking licenses, and increased the level of independence of the central 
bank (Biekpe, 2011; IMF, 2011b).
Reforms were led by Paul Acquah, governor of the central bank, who had been 
deputy director of the IMF’s Africa Department, and was recruited by the NPP to 
head up the central bank. Interviewees repeatedly stressed the pivotal role he 
played in driving through financial sector reforms. According to one interviewee 
who was privy to discussions in the top echelons of the NPP government, Acquah 
‘had a vision [for the financial sector] and he sold it to the NPP leadership . . . it 
was a vigorous reform agenda that sought to liberate the economy’.9 Scrutiny of the 
policy documents at the time bears this out: the vision and rationale for a financial 
8 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016, interview with former govern-
ment minister, Accra, 22 March 2016.
9 Interview with former government minister, Accra, 22 March 2016.
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services hub was articulated in greatest detail by Paul Acquah and his senior 
officials. They argued that creating a financial services centre would help insert 
Ghana into the international financial system, opening the economy up to 
cross-border capital flows and global financial markets (Acquah, 2007; Bank of 
Ghana, 2008).
Acquah’s financial sector vision was strongly supported by the president and 
key ministers, and followed an agenda that was closely aligned with the interests 
of the NPP’s financial supporters, whose capital was invested in the financial 
services sector.10 It was also supported by international private investors, who 
honoured Acquah with the Emerging Markets award for the African Central 
Bank Governor of the Year in 2005 (Hammond, 2005). The implementation of 
Basel II and other international standards was seen as vital for attracting inter-
nation al investors into the financial sector. As one former official who had worked 
closely with Acquah explained, ‘If you have adopted best practices, they [investors] 
will be attracted. Investors like to see good practices’.11 The standards were also 
perceived to be important for managing the increased risk that would come with 
closer integration into global finance.12
In preparation for Basel II, officials at the Bank of Ghana assessed the risk 
management systems of banks, and found them to be extremely weak. As a former 
official of the Bank of Ghana noted, ‘Their systems were really simple—the banks 
just looked to see if the borrower had collateral or not. At most they assessed 
credit risk. For anything complex, international banks sent the analysis to their 
headquarters to do’.13
The Bank of Ghana set a target date of 2007 for implementing a risk-based 
supervisory approach as a precursor to the full implementation of Basel II 
(Dosoo, 2006). The Bank of Ghana was aware that a shift to risk-based supervi-
sion and then to Basel II would be demanding. Ghanaian regulators received 
extensive technical support from the IMF, the World Bank, and the West African 
Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM).14 The Bank of 
Ghana also sent staff to the UK and Canada to study their approaches to risk-
based supervision (Bank of Ghana,  2004). It decided to emulate the Canadian 
approach and for several years the Canadian government provided technical 
assistance to support Basel II implementation.15
While the NPP’s interest in financial sector reforms broadly aligned with the 
priorities of the IMF and other major donors, the NPP’s determination to 
10 Financial supporters included Databank Ltd, a local financial services company whose CEO 
would become the Minister of Finance under the NPP government in 2017.
11 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016.
12 Interviews with senior government officials, Accra, 17 and 22 March 2016.
13 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016.
14 Interview with government official, Accra, 17 March 2016.
15 Interviews with government official, 17 March 2016, and former government official, 22 March 
2016, Accra.
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implement Basel II received push-back. The IMF reportedly tried to deter the 
Bank of Ghana from implementing Basel II, arguing that it was too ambitious and 
that Ghana should focus on complying with the Basel Core Principles.16 However, 
as one interviewee explained, the governor and senior officials had a different 
view: ‘[Their] philosophy was that because Ghana’s financial system is still quite 
simple, now is the time to play with concepts so that we are ready when the finan-
cial system gets more complex. [Ghana’s] financial sector is developing fast’.17
The Bank of Ghana went ahead despite the IMF’s reservations, setting a target 
for the full implementation of Basel II by 2010 (IMF, 2009). It undertook a series 
of preparatory steps, including conducting a readiness and gap analysis of banks, 
identifying champions in the banking sector who would lead implementation 
efforts, preparing guidelines for the calculation of the minimum capital require-
ments for pillar 1 for credit, operational, and market risk, and designing Basel II 
reporting formats (Bank of Ghana, 2015).
Strikingly, throughout this period there was no appetite among foreign or 
domestic banks for Basel II implementation. Foreign banks operate as locally 
incorporated subsidiaries and are regulated under the purview of the Bank of 
Ghana. Although foreign banks would have been able to comply with Basel II 
standards more easily than domestic banks, in Ghana’s highly profitable banking 
sector they had no incentive to capitalise on this advantage. Only one domestic 
bank operates internationally, and only since 2012 when it opened a subsidiary in 
Malaysia. Although some domestic banks were raising international finance and 
seeking international credit ratings, this did not translate into support for Basel 
implementation. Interviews with such domestic banks revealed that while they 
were strong advocates of the move to adopt IFRS standards, as they perceived this 
would dramatically improve their creditworthiness in the eyes of foreign investors, 
they did not perceive investors or credit ratings agencies to have any interest in 
Basel implementation.18
IMF in the lead under the NDC (2009–16)
Following elections, an NDC government assumed office in January 2009 with a 
markedly different vision for the financial sector. The NDC is a social democratic 
party and its financial sector strategy focused on encouraging lending to priority 
sectors of the economy including agriculture, industry, and fisheries (NDC, 2008). 
The party’s elite have a much stronger nationalist tradition than the NPP, seeking to 
protect and support indigenous businesses, and are less connected to international 
16 Interview with senior government official, Accra, 21 March 2016.
17 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016.
18 Interview with senior bank representatives (Ghanaian bank), Accra, 17 March 2016.
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policy circles and the international investment community. While its financial 
supporters operate in a range of economic sectors, they are much less involved in 
the financial sector than those connected to the NPP.
Although there is passing mention in the NDC’s 2008 manifesto to creating a 
financial services hub (NDC, 2008), interviewees made it clear that the NDC did 
not share the NPP’s ambition of globalizing Ghana’s banking sector. In particular 
the NDC was critical of the NPP’s moves to further liberalize the banking sector. 
As a senior NDC figure explained during an interview, ‘Paul Acquah [the central 
bank governor under the NPP] thought “capital was capital” and issued lots of 
foreign bank licenses . . . but it isn’t safe to have all the banking sector in foreign 
hands . . . Two Nigerian banks entered in this way—they were poorly regulated 
and he let them in’.19 Financial sector reforms continued under the NDC but at a 
slower pace, and the implementation of Basel II standards stalled.
The dramatic shift in the pace of reforms illustrates the impact of party politics 
and a change in policy priorities on the ostensibly independent central bank. The 
incoming NDC government reportedly perceived the Bank of Ghana to be overly 
aligned with the previous NPP administration. Paul Acquah stepped down and 
was replaced by Kwesi Amissah-Arthur who had previously served as the NDC’s 
deputy finance minister and was widely perceived to be a close ally of the 
President. Senior officials who had worked closely with Governor Acquah felt 
under pressure to leave, even including those who were not politically aligned.20 
Those who had acquired expertise on Basel II and championed its implementa-
tion left, and enthusiasm for Basel II implementation among the technical offi-
cials waned. Many of the remaining officials were ‘risk-averse and thought the 
standards were too advanced for Ghana’, while others had lost faith in the Basel 
standards following the global financial crisis.21
This shift in the pace of Basel II implementation is clearly reflected in cor re-
spond ence between the Government of Ghana and the IMF. In the 2009 Letter 
of Intent to the IMF written while Acquah was still in office, the Government of 
Ghana committed to implementing the Standardized Approach of Basel II by 
2010 (IMF, 2009). Once Acquah had left, the IMF encouraged the Bank of Ghana 
to slow down Basel II implementation. As one interviewee explained, ‘when Paul 
Acquah left, the IMF came in and wanted to put the brakes on [Basel II imple-
mentation]. They didn’t get the rationale’.22 The IMF’s (2011a) report states that: 
‘The planned adoption of the standardized approach of the Basel II framework 
should not proceed without meeting certain pre-conditions. The transition to Basel II 
will require sound project management by the [Bank of Ghana], including 
19 Interview with senior banking sector representative, Accra, 21 March 2016.
20 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016.
21 Interview with senior government official, Accra, 21 March 2016.
22 Interview with former government official, Accra, 22 March 2016.
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extensive technical analysis and some policy decisions’ (emphasis added, IMF, 
2011b, p. 24). Following a highly critical Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
report, the IMF wanted the Bank of Ghana to focus on improving compliance 
with the Basel Core Principles before moving onto Basel II.
The NDC had a much less clearly defined financial sector strategy than the NPP 
and, although the new team at the central bank had some experience with the 
IMF, their professional links were much less extensive than those of the outgoing 
team. Together with the loss of technical expertise, interviewees argued that these 
differences resulted in the IMF having much greater influence over Ghana’s finan-
cial sector reforms. As a former NPP Minister explained, ‘During Paul Acquah’s 
time the IMF was cautious as they knew Paul had experience with the IMF. [The] 
IMF would listen because they knew Paul had done his homework . . . Now the 
team is weak and they don’t push back’.23
Under pressure from the international community, the NDC government 
reversed steps that the NPP had taken to establish Ghana as an offshore financial 
centre. In 2009 Ghana underwent a peer-review by the inter-governmental Group 
Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), which revealed numerous 
shortcomings in Ghana’s implementation of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
standards, judging Ghana to be ‘compliant’ or ‘largely compliant’ with only five of 
the forty-nine standards (GIABA, 2009). Shortly after, the OECD warned Ghana 
of the risks of becoming a tax haven (Mathiason, 2010). Following this criticism 
from the international community, the Bank of Ghana withdrew the only offshore 
banking license it had issued, held by Barclays Bank, and took steps to improve its 
compliance with FATF standards. As the governor explained: ‘At a time that 
Ghana was gaining a reputation for laundry, we did not want to confirm this mis-
perception’ (Dogbevi et al., 2011).
When Ghana entered into an IMF Extended Credit Facility Arrangement in 
2015 following a macro-economic crisis, the IMF took the opportunity to pres-
sure the government to improve the quality of supervision in the banking sector 
and increase compliance with the Basel Core Principles. The IMF Programme 
included a series of structural benchmarks aimed at overcoming the weaknesses 
that had been flagged in the 2010 FSAP, including a requirement that the govern-
ment would complete an asset quality review of banks and introduce new legisla-
tion to increase the central bank’s independence and improve prudential 
supervision (IMF, 2015, p. 74).
The IMF’s push for an asset quality review is significant, as loan classification 
had been an source of tension between the Bank of Ghana and the IMF for many 
years (IMF, 2011b). Crucially, the Ghanaian authorities did not classify loans as 
non-performing if the loan originated from the government on the basis that 
23 Interview with former government minister, Accra, 22 March 2016. This view was corroborated 
in interviews with senior officials in the Bank of Ghana.
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ultimately ‘the government will pay’.24 In a context where banks were heavily 
exposed to the government, interviewees explained how severe fiscal imbalances 
had led to erratic government payments and the build-up of arrears to contractors 
and other private sector companies, and this in turn posed a major source of risk 
for the banking sector.25 However, the Bank of Ghana was reluctant to punish 
individual banks for problems that ultimately originated from the government’s 
persistent fiscal problems.
In line with the conditions attached to the IMF financing agreement, the IMF 
and Bank of Ghana undertook a joint asset quality review of all banks in 2015. 
In the words of one interviewee, this ‘snap audit’ was ‘very revealing’. It showed 
that ‘the auditors were in bed with the banks’, the level of non-performing loans in 
many banks was substantially higher than had been reported, and the risk man-
agement systems of many banks were very weak.26 The IMF criticized the Bank of 
Ghana for its regulatory forbearance, particularly with regard to the impairment 
of loans originating from state-owned companies. Following a second asset qual-
ity review that revealed several banks to be severely undercapitalized, the govern-
ment and the IMF agreed that the Bank of Ghana would review banks’ 
recapitalization and restructuring plans, and initiate resolution procedures for 
banks found to be unviable (IMF, 2016).
As per the IMF loan conditions, the government also passed two new banking 
sector acts in 2016. The Banks and Specialized Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 
2016 (Act 930) provided the Bank of Ghana with greater independence and 
enhanced powers to resolve banks that are deemed to be unviable, while the 
Ghana Deposit Protection Act, 2016 (Act 931) introduced a new deposit insur-
ance scheme. Perhaps because these changes have made Ghana more compliant 
with Basel Core Principles, the IMF started to strongly support a move to Basel II, 
providing technical assistance and supporting the Bank of Ghana in its aim to 
implement Basel II by mid-2017 (IMF, 2016).
NPP resumes office and implements  
Basel II and III (2017–present)
Following elections in late 2016, the NPP resumed office and the central bank 
governor and both deputies stepped down, reportedly under pressure, and des-
pite not completing their scheduled terms in office.27 The NPP appointed Ernest 
Addison as the new governor. He had been a senior official at the central bank 
24 Interview with senior government official, Accra, 15 March 2016.
25 Interview with senior bank representative (foreign bank), Accra, 17 March 2016.
26 Interview with government official, Accra, 17 March 2016.
27 The governor stepped down in March 2017 (three months into the new administration), one 
deputy governor in July 2017, and the other in December 2017.
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during the previous NPP administration and had left to work at the African 
Development Bank when the NDC assumed office.
The change of government ushered in a shift in financial sector strategy as, once 
again, the NPP’s election manifesto prioritized repositioning Ghana as an inter-
nation al financial services centre, citing Mauritius as a model (NPP, 2016). This 
vision was championed by Ken Ofori-Atta, the newly appointed Minister of 
Finance, an investment banker who had worked for Morgan Stanley and founded 
Ghana’s leading investment banking group. In repeated public appearances, 
Ofori-Atta emphasized the government’s determination to turn Ghana into an 
international financial services hub, citing Singapore as an example (Business and 
Financial Times, 2017a). In the 2017 budget statement he set out a vision for posi-
tioning Ghana as an international financial services centre, so that it would 
become the preferred headquarters for all international banks operating in the 
sub-region, and the hub for financial technology and payment systems, and inter-
nation al private equity and venture capital firms (Ofori-Atta, 2017). In early 2018 
Ofori-Atta led a delegation of senior politicians and officials to Singapore and 
Hong Kong ‘to study best practices to inform Ghana’s plan to become a regional 
financial services hub’ (Ministry of Finance, 2018).
As before, while the NPP government continued with banking sector reforms 
agreed with the IMF, it was more ambitious than the NDC had planned to be and 
the IMF demanded. The NPP government sought structural changes in the banking 
sector, rather than simply improving the performance of the existing banks. An 
important first move by the NPP government was to impose far higher min imum 
capital requirements in a deliberate move to spur the consolidation of the banking 
sector. Announced in September 2017, the new requirement of GhC400 million 
(approx. US$80 million) was almost double that which had been planned under 
the NDC (Bank of Ghana,  2017b; Dzawu,  2017). While justified as a move to 
improve the resilience of the financial sector, analysts noted that smaller local 
banks would struggle to raise the capital needed to comply and would either need 
to exit or merge. In public speeches Ofori-Atta, the finance minister, and Ernest 
Addison, central bank governor, explained that they wanted to stimulate the cre-
ation of large Ghanaian-owned banks to ensure that Ghanaians directly benefited 
from the positioning of the country as an international financial services hub 
(Business and Financial Times,  2017a). The example of Nigeria was frequently 
invoked in policy and media discussions, where consolidation in the banking sec-
tor in the 2000s led to the creation of large banks that expanded overseas and 
acquired a major share of the regional market.
While foreign banks were able to meet the new capital requirements relatively 
easily, local banks petitioned the president for an extension of the deadline, but it 
was not granted. The Bank of Ghana revoked the licences of seven domestic banks 
(closing two and amalgamating assets of five others into a new government-
owned consolidated bank). The bank closures, voluntary winding-up of another 
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bank, and several mergers resulted in the number of banks in operation shrinking 
from thirty-four in 2017 to twenty-three at the end of 2018. Leading figures in the 
NDC criticized the NPP’s approach, with the former finance minister arguing 
that the bank closures and related job losses were unnecessary. The NDC would 
have supported the small indigenous banks to recapitalize, rather than closing them 
down (Appiah, 2018).
Alongside the consolidation exercise, a raft of regulatory reforms were imple-
mented to bring Ghana in line with international standards. As the central bank 
governor explained, ‘the global financial system is continually evolving and 
Ghana cannot continue to lag behind in transforming its banking sector in line 
with international standards and practices’ (Ablordeppey, 2017). A new Capital 
Requirements Directive (June 2018) incorporated major elements of Basel II 
(the standardized approaches to credit, operational, and market risk), as well as 
the capital-related elements of Basel III, and banks were given only six months to 
comply (Bank of Ghana, 2018c). The Bank of Ghana also issued new guidelines 
on financial reporting to ensure common standards in line with IFRS 9 (June 2017), 
a new directive on corporative governance based on Basel Core Principles (May 
2018, revised in December 2018), revisions to anti-money laundering guidelines 
(July 2018), and a directive on the voluntary winding-up of financial institutions 
(September 2018).28
The reforms were widely welcomed by international investors and the inter-
nation al policy community. The issuance of the new Capital Requirements 
Directive was deemed ‘positive’ by Moody’s (Ashiadey,  2018), while Governor 
Addison reported that the banking reforms contributed to Standard and Poor’s 
decision to upgrade Ghana’s long-term rating from B- to B (Addison,  2018). 
Meanwhile, the IMF’s Managing Director praised the banking sector reforms as 
‘courageous steps’ (Lagarde, 2018). For the first time, some of the larger banks also 
offered public support for the reform agenda and implementation of international 
standards, arguing that it would help them access international capital. As a 
se nior executive from a locally incorporated foreign bank argued, ‘To ensure that 
Ghana becomes and remains an important global player on global financial mar-
kets, our markets must also conform to international standards. Other African 
markets including Nigeria are in the process of getting their laws amended to 
improve their adherence to international norms and we need to ensure that we 
are not left behind in our bid to attract and retain capital’ (Owusu Kwarteng, 2018).
Implementation of the regulatory reforms is expected to be challenging. In 
2016, interviewees had been sceptical that Basel II could be implemented easily, 
suggesting that many domestic banks as well as the Banking Supervision 
28 A list of directives is available at: https://www.bog.gov.gh/supervision-a-regulation/banking- 
acts-and-directives.
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Department of the Bank of Ghana did not have the requisite capacity.29 A survey 
of banks revealed that while international banks already reporting under Basel II 
and III expected a relatively easily transition, domestic banks anticipated shortages 
of expertise, the need to upgrade information technology systems, and challenges 
in securing the high-quality data required by the Bank of Ghana (PWC, 2017).
The Bank of Ghana was keen to emphasize that it intended to enforce the new 
regulations. Many of the weaknesses revealed in Ghana’s banking sector by the 
IMF-driven audit were due to regulatory breaches, rather than weaknesses in the 
regulatory framework per se. Supervision and enforcement by the Bank of Ghana 
had been lax and banks were found to have obtained licenses through false pre-
tences, circumvented single obligor limits, concealed related party exposures, and 
mis-reported financial data. To safeguard the reforms, the central bank governor 
emphasized the need for strict enforcement, and greater levels of regulatory and 
supervisory vigilance (Addison,  2018). As the deputy governor explained, ‘the 
culture of regulatory forbearance that once prevailed will not be countenanced’ 
(Annerquaye Abbey, 2018) and the Bank of Ghana created an Office of Ethics and 
Internal Investigations to improve the quality of supervision and enforcement.
The focus of the NPP’s reforms was on ensuring financial stability and improv-
ing the reputation of the sector in the eyes of citizens and international investors. 
Much less attention has been paid to increasing bank lending to the productive 
economy. As discussed in Chapter  2, critics of the Basel standards argue that 
implementation may deter banks from lending to the private sector for productive 
investments. A survey of bank executives in 2017 revealed that they anticipated 
reducing their lending to high-risk sectors including agriculture, real estate, and 
downstream energy in order to comply with the new Basel II and III regulations. 
As Ghana’s financial sector remains heavily bank-based, this prompted concerns 
that some sectors of the real economy might be negatively affected by the imple-
mentation of Basel standards (PWC, 2017).
These expectations appear to be borne out in the data, which shows that the 
immediate reaction of banks to the new regulations was to reduce the volume of 
lending to the real economy and increase holdings of government securities. 
Between October 2017 and 2018, the share of bank assets comprising net advances 
(loans) reduced from 36 per cent to 29 per cent, which resulted in a 15 per cent 
contraction of credit to the private sector in real terms. Meanwhile, banks dra-
matically increased holdings of government securities (Bank of Ghana, 2018d). 
However, the NPP government hoped that the consolidation of the banking 
sector would create larger banks that can more readily finance major projects, 
and it has taken steps to restructure the state-owned National Investment Bank 
and Agricultural Development Bank to support industrialization and agricultural 
29 Interview with senior bank representative (foreign bank), Accra, 16 March 2016, interview with 
private sector representative, Accra, 21 March 2016.
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development. Whether the reforms lead to higher levels of investment in the 
productive sectors of the economy remains to be seen.
Conclusion
In Ghana, the IMF has exerted a strong influence over bank reforms throughout 
the period under review. Yet the drive to converge on international standards 
came from a small group of NPP politicians and closely aligned officials in the 
Bank of Ghana. For the NPP government, positioning Ghana as an international 
financial services centre has been a priority, and implementation of the latest 
international banking standards has been perceived as central to attaining this 
goal. This vision was not shared by the NDC, and implementation of international 
standards stalled when it was in office. This difference between the two political 
parties with respect to the adoption of international standards stemmed from 
differences in policy agendas and material interests.
The policy differences between the two political parties were reflected in regu-
latory decisions because the Bank of Ghana is less immune to political changes 
than the formal legal framework suggests. While the central bank has a high level 
of independence on paper, governors and deputy governors routinely resign, 
reportedly under pressure, within a few months of the election of a new political 
party. As some interviewees argued, this arguably makes the central bank more 
accountable to the electorate than the IMF-driven model of independence, which 
seeks to insulate the central bank from party politics.30 Neither the foreign nor 
internationally oriented domestic banks advocated for Basel implementation and, 
although small domestic banks opposed some elements of the reform agenda, 
their complaints went unheeded.
This analysis of the politics of banking regulation speaks to the wider literature 
on political dynamics in Ghana. Ghana’s politics has been described as competi-
tive clientelist as the distribution of power is diffuse and political parties compete 
in tightly fought elections by prioritizing policies that distribute spending among 
voters (e.g. Abdulai and Hickey, 2016; Whitfield, 2011). In many issue areas this 
leads the main parties to converge on very similar policy agendas (Abdulai and 
Hickey, 2016; Whitfield, 2018, 2011). While this is the first research to sys tem at ic-
al ly examine the politics of financial regulation, other studies have also revealed 
how ideational differences and the orientation of the NPP towards international 
capital have resulted in policy divergences, including in the oil sector (Abdulai, 
2017; Hickey et al.,  2015; Mohan et al.,  2018). An interesting area for future 
30 E.g. interview with former government minister, Accra, 22 March 2016.
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research is to tease out the conditions under which policy divergence occurs 
between the two main parties.
The Ghana case study provides two important insights for this volume. First, it 
shows the importance of policy ideas in shaping the responses to Basel standards. 
The main driver for implementing Basel standards has been the development 
strategy of the NPP, a party with strong ideological and material connections to 
international finance, and a vision for repositioning Ghana as a financial services 
hub for West Africa. A similar vision is shared by politicians in Pakistan, Rwanda, 
and Kenya. Second, it suggests that a high level of foreign bank presence will not 
necessarily create incentives for the implementation of Basel standards. Foreign 
banks in Ghana are domestically oriented, with highly profitable business models 
that, like local banks, depend on investing heavily in short-term government 
securities. As domestic banks have yet to expand overseas, there are no strong 
market incentives to advocate for Basel standards, although this may change 
with the consolidation of the banking sector. If this leads to the creation of large, 
internationally active banks, as it did in Nigeria and Pakistan, this may generate 
market incentives for convergence on international standards.
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Central Bankers Drive Basel Under IMF Pressure
Ousseni Illy and Seydou Ouedraogo
Introduction
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)1 adopted Basel II 
and III standards simultaneously on 24 June 2016, and started implementing them 
from January 2018 with a transitional period of one and a half years. Considering 
the weak development of the financial sector in the Union and its poor connect­
edness to the international financial system, this reform was unexpected. How 
can we explain WAEMU’s decision to align itself with international standards?
In this chapter, we explain the political economy of banking reform and the 
adoption of international banking standards—and Basel standards in particular—
in WAEMU. Our findings show that a leading role was played by the supra­
nation al Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), pressured by the IMF, 
while governments and domestically oriented banks did not show any support for 
Basel standards or public opposition to their implementation.
Internationally oriented and well connected to peer regulators, the BCEAO 
used its dominant position in banking regulation at the domestic level to champion 
the adoption of international standards, including Basel I, II, and III. Central 
bank governor Alassane Ouattara, a former Director of African department at the 
IMF, played a prominent role in the adoption of Basel I and is said to be the 
‘godfather’ of the supranational regulation and supervision reform including 
the Banking Commission.2 The multinational dimension of the BCEAO reinforces 
its power by insulating it from political pressure, giving it significant room for 
manoeuvre.
1 WAEMU is a regional economic community encompassing Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea­Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, sharing a single currency, the CFA Franc, issued by a 
common central bank, the Central Bank of West African States (known by its French acronym, 
BCEAO).
2 Interview with central bankers, BCEAO, Dakar (March 2016).
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At the same time, the BCEAO is under the influence of the IMF and has 
experienced enormous pressure to adopt Basel II and III standards, and the 
impact studies and drafting of the new regulations have been conducted under 
IMF technical assistance, through AFRITAC West. IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde explicitly recommended the ‘move to Basel II and III which 
would allow alignment to international standards’ (Lagarde, 2015). This position 
towards WAEMU, which is in sharp contradiction with its recommendations to 
other low­income countries (including the case studies identified in this book), is 
intriguing—even to some BCEAO officials.
WAEMU is an example of regulator­driven convergence. The adoption of Basel 
standards is championed by a regulator with strong links to international policy 
communities, while governments and domestically oriented banks do not play 
an  active role, complicating the implementation and enforcement of the new 
regulations.
The methodology of the study combined a review of literature and an analysis 
of various reports and documents from several stakeholders including the IMF, 
the BCEAO, and the Banking Commission. Furthermore, interviews were con­
ducted in five countries3 with officials and former officials of the BCEAO, the 
Banking Commission, national authorities, private bank executives, diplomats, 
and experts. In total, thirty­eight people were interviewed in thirty­two semi­
structured interviews, conducted from January 2016 to December 2017.
This chapter describes the political economy context of WAEMU (Table 7.1), 
including the evolution of the financial sector. It then discusses the adoption, 
implementation, and enforcement of Basel standards in WAEMU, before examining 
the factors behind convergence on international banking standards in the Union. 
It ends with a brief conclusion.
3 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo.
Table 7.1 WAEMU: key indicators
WAEMU  
GDP per capita (current US$) 756
Bank assets (current US$) 3.25 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 29.915
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 39.34
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 24.05
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP, 2014) 5.62
Polity IV score (2017) 5
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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Political economy context
Economic and financial conditions
Seven of the eight WAEMU countries are classified as low income, while Côte 
d’Ivoire is lower­middle income. Their economies are dominated by a few export 
crops including cocoa, cotton, and coffee, as well as natural resources, gold, oil, 
uranium, phosphate, and bauxite. Their financial systems remain underdeveloped 
even compared to the average of the Sub­Saharan Africa region. A huge difference 
used to exist between WAEMU’s and the Sub­Saharan African region’s ratios of 
private sector credit to GDP, but WAEMU’s performance has improved during 
the past decade and is now close to the continent’s average (Figure 7.1).
Despite increasing financial development, lending to the economy remains 
an important challenge. Banks provide a third of their total loans (35 per cent in 
2015) to the governments, mainly through governments’ bonds. Huge sectorial 
asymmetries exist in credit allocation. In 2015, 32.2 per cent of total loans were 
provided to trade activities and 32 per cent to services. The industrial sector 
accounted for 17.4 per cent and only 3.6 per cent of loans were dedicated to the 
agricultural sector. The remainder of the loans were devoted to mining, construc­
tion, and other activities. In addition, 68.8 per cent of these loans were extended 
as short­term credit (BCEAO, 2016a).
As in most developing countries, banks dominate the financial sector in 
WAEMU. The regional stock market (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières—













































Figure 7.1 WAEMU: bank credit to private sector (% of GDP).
Source: World Bank (2017)
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on the BRWM is about forty, the same as Accra’s stock market. The microfi­
nance sector accounts for 13.9 million clients (September 2014) compared to the 
banking sector which has only 8 million personal banking accounts. However, 
deposits collected by microfinance institutions amount to only 6.3 per cent of 
bank deposits and their total credit is about 7 per cent of bank loans (BCEAO, 
2015a). Mobile banking is also growing rapidly (36 million accounts in 2016) 
(BCEAO, 2016b).
WAEMU’s banking sector operates in a context of low inflation. Indeed, 
changes in consumer prices were close to zero in 2014 and 1 per cent in 2015. 
A  difficult decade culminated in a political crisis in 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Union’s foremost economy, after which the region enjoyed high economic growth, 
reaching 7 per cent in 2015 (Figure 7.2).
Historical evolution of WAEMU’s financial sector
Major changes have occurred in the financial sector in WAEMU during the past 
three decades. Like other countries in Sub­Saharan Africa, WAEMU countries 
were hit by a severe banking crisis towards the end of the 1980s that nearly 
destroyed the entire banking sector. It is estimated that one third of banks in the 
region were in difficulties in 1988 and a quarter of extended credit was unrecover­
able (Powo Fosso, 2000). The crisis has had huge consequences for households, 
firms, and the States more broadly. For instance, the cost borne by States is esti­
mated to be equivalent to 17 per cent of GDP in Benin and Senegal, and close to 
25 per cent in Côte d’Ivoire (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).
With reforms put in place in the early 1990s, the banking sector has returned to 
profitability and been growing rapidly. However, non­performing loans (NPLs) 
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Figure 7.2 WAEMU: economic growth and inflation (%).
Source: BCEAO (2015b and 2012)
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Bank ownership, bank concentration, and competition
After a period of decline, the number of banks has risen from fifty­four in 1996 to 
ninety­two in 2005 and 112 by 2015. New entrants are mainly African banks that 
have challenged the previous dominance of European banks. As in other regions 
of Africa, the rise of pan­African banks (PABs) is one of the most important 
developments in WAEMU’s financial sector in the last decade. Foreign African 
banks took the lead in market share from non­African and European and 
American banks in 2006 and grew to having about 60 per cent of total assets in 
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Figure 7.4 WAEMU: patterns of bank ownership.
Source: Ouédraogo (2017)
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Moroccans lead the banking sector and control 29 per cent of total assets. 
Banks from WAEMU control 28 per cent, and French banks have 15 per cent of 
the market, followed by Nigerian banks with 7 per cent.
The Union’s banking sectors are domestically oriented, and its banks do 
not  access international markets. The various players carry different interests 
and strategies, but their business models remain largely domestically oriented 
(Figure 7.5).
Banks operate in markets with limited competition. While the number of 
players has risen steadily and banking concentration has fallen sharply over the 
last fifteen years (Figure 7.6), it remains high relative to several countries in Sub­
Saharan Africa, including Ghana, for example.
In relation to market concentration, bank profitability is very important 
(Ouédraogo, 2013). Despite a high level of NPLs (about 14.2 per cent of total loans 
in 2015), the banking sector provided a return on equity of about 14 per cent in 2015.
Banking regulatory and supervision set­up
The regulatory and supervision set­up of WAEMU’s banking sector is quite 
complex, with at least four types of bodies involved. Among these are the Council 
of Ministers, the BCEAO, the Banking Commission, and the national authorities 
(ministers of finance). The first two are normally in charge of the initiation and 
adoption of banking regulations. However, as we will see, they are also involved 
to some extent in the supervision process. The Banking Commission and the 






















Figure 7.5 WAEMU: bank market share by bank origin.
Source: BCEAO (2014)
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The Council of Ministers and the BCEAO
The Council of Ministers is principally responsible for monetary policy and 
banking regulation. It is composed of ministers of finance of member states. It is 
worth mentioning that France, which has a seat on the board of the BCEAO and 
the Banking Commission, is not represented on the Council of Ministers. The 
Council is normally assisted in its mission by the BCEAO.4 However, according 
to the Treaty establishing the WAMU, the BCEAO may also initiate regulations 
by itself. Nonetheless, the adoption of those regulations lies with the Council. 
In practice, most regulations are initiated and prepared by the BCEAO, in col­
laboration with members states (ministers of finance), and transmitted to the 
Council for adoption.
The Council of Ministers works under the authority of the Conference of Heads 
of States and Government, which is the highest governing body of WAEMU. 
The Conference does not intervene directly in the regulation process.
The Banking Commission and national authorities
The Banking Commission was created in 1990, in response to the failure of the 
national authorities that were then in charge of banking supervision in member 
states. It comprises nineteen members (commissioners): representatives of states 
(eight), a representative of France as the guarantor of the CFA Franc, independent 
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Figure 7.6 WAEMU: bank concentration Herfindahl­Hirschman Index (HHI).
Source: Calculations based on data from BCEAO (2014b)
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commissioners (nine), and the governor of the BCEAO, who presides over the 
institution. The Secretariat of the Commission is in charge of the technical work, 
notably supervision. It is assured by the BCEAO, which provides all of its staff.
The Commission is mandated to supervise all banks and related credit institu­
tions operating in WAEMU’s member states. This includes issuing and withdrawing 
banking licences; supervising credit institutions; placing administrative measures 
and sanctions against credit institutions and their managers for wrongful acts; 
and appointing provisional administrators or liquidators for troubled banks.
In some of these areas, the Commission shares powers with the finance ministers. 
This is the case in banking licence. For issuing banking licence, the application of 
the candidate is instructed by the Commission but the final decision lies with the 
finance minister of the member state concerned. However, the minister cannot 
issue a licence where the Commission has given a negative opinion. The same pro­
cedure is observed on licence withdrawal: the decision is taken by the Commission 
but its implementation belongs to the finance minister.
Basel adoption, implementation, and enforcement
Basel I
International banking standards were introduced in WAEMU for the first time in 
1991, following the financial crisis of the 1980s.
This occurred in two phases: in 1991, the ‘core capital’ requirement of Basel I 
(Tier 1 capital) was adopted. Later, in 1999, the capital adequacy ratio was 
upgraded to 8 per cent, as recommended by the Basel Committee. Although 
other reforms of the regulatory framework were introduced later,5 the minimum 
capital requirement to address credit risk remained the same.
Basel II and III
Initial moves towards Basel II adoption date back to 2004. However, the process 
never resulted in concrete reforms until the agreement on Basel III was reached 
by the Basel Committee in 2010. Therefore, the BCEAO decided to adopt Basel II 
and III concurrently.
5 In 2007, the banking regulation was amended to increase minimum share capital from 1 to 
5 billion CFA Francs. Another amendment in 2015 raised the minimum share capital to 10 billion 
CFA Francs.
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The process started in 2013, with technical assistance coming from the IMF 
(BCEAO, 2014a). Qualitative and quantitative impact studies were conducted in 
2014 and 2015.6 The process was completed and on 24 June 2016 the Council of 
Ministers finally adopted Decision n°013 establishing the new prudential standards 
of WAEMU. A transitional period was set up for banks to adapt to the new 
standards. Consequently, the regulations entered into effect from 1 January 2018, 
and full implementation of some elements is extended until 2022.
The new regulations are largely inspired by Basel II and III standards. For 
instance, the definition of regulatory capital is taken exactly from Basel III.7 
Furthermore, contrary to the previous regime, where capital adequacy require­
ments covered only credit risk, the new legislation also includes operational and 
market risks, and a standardized approach is retained for all risks (Basel II).
The minimum total regulatory capital adequacy ratio has been raised to 
9 per cent8 of risk­weighted assets, which is higher than Basel III (8 per cent). 
Moreover, common equity tier 1 capital must be at least 5 per cent of risk­weighted 
assets, while the Basel III threshold is 4.5 per cent. Tier 1 capital must be at least 
6 per cent, as recommended by Basel III. Unlike most low­income jurisdictions, 
WAEMU has also adopted two novel liquidity ratios from Basel III, namely the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (Table 7.2).
Basel Core Principles (BCPs)
Neither the BCEAO nor the Banking Commission has ever undertaken an assess­
ment study of its regulatory and supervisory framework with the BCPs. A World 
Bank and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) was conducted 
on WAEMU in 2008. However, the report was never published on the websites of 
these institutions, and our efforts to obtain a copy have failed. Therefore, it is dif­
ficult to ascertain whether WAEMU banking framework complies with the BCPs.
Anti­Money Laundering/Combating Financing  
of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and International  
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
Actions on AML/CFT started in 2003 in WAEMU when the Council of Ministers 
adopted the Uniform Act on money laundering on 20 March. In 2008, another 
uniform act was adopted on financing terrorism. These legislations were criticized 
for not taking sufficient account of international standards (IMF, 2011). They were 
6 Interview with central bank officials, BCEAO, Dakar (March 2017).
7 See Decision n°013, Title II, Chapter 1. 8 This ratio is currently set at 8 per cent.
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therefore revised in 2015 in a new merged Uniform Act on ‘Combating money 
laundering and financing of terrorism in WAEMU’, which has been transposed 
into domestic laws in all member countries.9 The new legislation is in line with 
the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) recommendations on AML/CFT.
In addition, a new banking chart of accounts was passed by the BCEAO in 2016 
aimed at convergence with global financial reporting standards, including IFRS.10
Implementation issues
Implementation and compliance with regulations, the prudential regime in par­
ticular, have always been a concern in WAEMU. Almost all IMF staff reports on the 
region since 2011, including the latest one (2017), have raised the issue. According 
to the 2017 report, ‘the conditions in the banking sector remain challenging’ and 
9 Contrary to the prudential regime, which is directly applicable, uniform acts must be in corp ­
orated into domestic law before being enforceable.
10 Interview with BCEAO officials (Dakar, March 2017).
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‘the current rules—despite being less strict than the newly introduced ones—are not 
effectively enforced’ (IMF, 2017, p. 17).
This non­compliance may be explained by several factors. First, the Banking 
Commission has a notable lack of capacity. As of 2015, the Secretariat of the 
Commission was composed of 120 staff members, of which less than half were 
dedicated to supervision activities (BCEAO,  2015c). This staff had to supervise 
more than one hundred banks in eight countries. The second factor is ‘regulatory 
forbearance’, mainly for economic and political reasons. Indeed, the Banking 
Commission sometimes refrains from taking prudential action when state­owned 
banks make politically sensitive loan decisions.
The political economy of Basel adoption in WAEMU
The analytical framework in this book helps us grasp the role and motivations 
of each actor in setting banking regulation in WAEMU and their responses to 
international standards. In this context, the essential actors are the BCEAO, the 
IMF, banks, governments, and politicians. The BCEAO is the dominant player at 
the domestic level and is internationally oriented. Under the influence of the IMF, 
it played a decisive role particularly in the adoption of Basel I in the early 1990s 
and the recent adoption of Basel II and III. The other actors do not show preferences 
favourable to the recent Basel norms, or an active opposition. The banks, without 
forming a homogeneous group with respect to their preferences for regulation, 
have various reservations but have not coordinated resistance to the adoption of 
Basel II and III. Governments and political parties seem to be the least concerned 
and essentially passive.
The BCEAO’s international orientation  
and peer regulator networks
The BCEAO is internationally oriented, a position that can be identified at several 
levels, especially in the training and appointments of the Bank’s executives and 
leaders, as well as the international network of regulators in which the BCEAO 
participates.
While a large part of its staff is trained in its own centre at the Centre Ouest 
Africain de Formation et d’Etudes Bancaires (COFEB), French academics and 
experts make up most of the body of trainers, and many of the COFEB speakers 
from the BCEAO have been trained in IMF training of trainers’ courses, and relay 
the direct intervention of IMF experts.11 French research and training centres are 
11 Interview with central bank official, BCEAO, Ouagadougou (December 2017).
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part of the COFEB’s Scientific Council in charge of ‘assisting the Governor of 
the BCEAO in defining the orientations and modalities of the training policy’ 
and ‘deliberating on the organization and programs training sessions’ (BCEAO, 
2017, p. 7).12
Governor Alassane Ouattara (1988–90), a former Director of the Africa 
Department of the IMF (current President of Côte d’Ivoire), represents this inter­
national orientation of the BCEAO well. He has played a leading role, as shown 
below, in the reform of regulation and the institutional framework of banking 
supervision at the end of the 1980s. His successors have all spent the essential part 
of their careers at the BCEAO and have maintained this international orientation.
The BCEAO invests heavily in its large network of regulators around the world. 
Supervisory colleges of cross­border banks that operate in WAEMU including 
Nigerian, Moroccan, and even the Union’s own banks (notably Ecobank and 
Orabank) are the most important peer regulators network to which the BCEAO 
is connected. It has developed special relations with the Moroccan banking 
authorities. Indeed, in addition to sharing the same working language, Moroccan 
banks have been the leaders in WAEMU for a few years now. The governors of the 
two Central Banks performed reciprocal working missions, and Bank Al­Maghrib 
is a technical partner assisting the BCEAO in the adoption and implementation 
of Basel II and III standards. The Moroccan Central Bank also participated in the 
exchange seminar on the draft texts of both sets of standards.
The BCEAO and the Banking Commission are also stakeholders in several 
other regional and international supervisory networks. The WAEMU Banking 
Commission participates in three groups of banking supervisors: the Group of 
Francophone Banking Supervisors (GSBF), the Community of African Banking 
Supervisors (CABS), and the Supervisory Committee for West and Central 
African Banks (CSBAOC) (BCEAO, 2016b). Launched in 2004, the GSBF aims to 
‘develop at a high level the cooperation between its members so that the exchange 
of experience and information promotes the spread of best practices and the 
convergence of prudential approaches to common problems’. The international 
regulatory reforms related to Basel II and III are the main topics of the group’s work, 
which aims to facilitate their implementation. The CABS was established more 
recently, in 2013, with the objective, among others, to ‘Capitalize on the experi­
ence of African Central Banks that have implemented Basel II’ (COBAC, 2015). 
The CSBAOC was created in 1994 and brings together more than a dozen African 
countries, and organizes several meetings and training seminars for the benefit of 
its members. Nigeria is the member country that has gone furthest in adopting 
recent Basel standards.
12 The Centre d’études et de recherches sur le développement international (CERDI, France) and 
the Institut Bancaire et Financier International (IBFI) of the Banque de France are members of the 
COFEB Scientific Council. They are also historic and closed partners of BCEAO.
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In addition, the BCEAO was a member of the Basel Consultative Group (BCG) 
and was its only direct representative of an LIC. Nearly all other members are 
from upper­middle­income class or higher, and none of them African. WAEMU 
was also a member of the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG), organized in 
1998 and 2006 by the Basel Committee as a forum for the exchange of experiences 
to promote the implementation of the fundamental principles for effective 
banking supervision.
The BCEAO: the dominant player in banking  
regulation at the domestic level
The BCEAO is the most influential player at the domestic level in terms of 
banking regulation. Four key factors give it this position, discussed below.
Firstly, beyond the formal independence of the BCEAO, its sub­regional nature 
protects its ability to issue regulation from the pressures and games of political 
interest. Moreover, the banking sector, particularly regulation, is almost absent 
from the political debate in WAEMU countries. Politicians and governments 
have little control over the sub­regional level.
Secondly, in practice, the effective division of labour of banking regulation 
assigns the BCEAO a leading role. As noted before, the Bank initiates legislation, 
prepares the draft in collaboration with member states, and submits it to the 
Council of Ministers for adoption. It has significant influence on the Council 
because often it is composed mainly of technocrats that previously worked in 
international financial and economic institutions including the IMF, the UNDP, 
and in many cases the BCEAO itself. Indeed, several finance ministers are 
 seconded BCEAO executives who return at the end of their political mandate.
Thirdly, the BCEAO has significant technical, financial, infrastructural, and 
material resources. Interviews with national authorities explicitly reference this 
technical capacity of the BCEAO. A senior national authority figure said, ‘our 
governments show little interest in the reforms related to Basel II and III. They 
seem to delegate everything to the BCEAO by technical insufficiency. Thus, even 
the consequences of these standards on economies are seldom discussed’.13
This technical precedence and leadership in the reform process is all the more 
asserted as WAEMU member governments often have a weak vision for banking. 
A closer look at seven development plans14 of the WAEMU member countries 
reveals the lack of attention given to the issue, most notably in a failure to address 
banking supervision and particularly regulation. Indeed, no development plan 
explicitly mentions the issue of banking regulation at all. The interviews confirm 
13 Interview with a WAEMU country minister of Trade and Industries (March 2017).
14 All WAEMU countries excluding Guinea Bissau.
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limited knowledge on the part of the member states on international banking 
standards and related issues.15
Finally, the BCEAO and the Banking Commission exhibit significant authority 
over banks. The interviews with bankers repeatedly stressed an asymmetric power 
relationship. Several officials testified: ‘they (the BCEAO) invited us to tell us 
what they decided, it was not a consultation’;16 ‘they do what they want’;17 ‘They 
will decide what they want but we know there will be problems in the application 
that they will have to consider’.18
The IMF’s influence in WAEMU countries
The IMF has significant sway over WAEMU member countries. Since the finan­
cial crises of the 1980s, WAEMU members have signed onto programmes with 
the IMF and the World Bank. From traditional adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
to the current extended credit facility (ECF) programmes, their cooperation with 
the IMF has been continuous. Several ECF programmes have succeeded each other 
in each country. The conditionalities that accompany them do not mention the 
aspects of banking regulation, but these remain at the core of relations between 
the IMF and the BCEAO. In addition, as mentioned previously, the IMF uses its 
technical assistance to the BCEAO as a channel of influence and pressures the 
adoption of international standards.
Regulator-driven adoption of Basel I: the leadership of Governor  
Ouattara of the IMF
Going back to Basel I adoption and the creation of the Banking Commission in 
the 1990s, one may recall the leading role that the then governor and former 
IMF staff member, Alassane Ouattara, played in enacting reforms. He championed 
the adoption of Basel I and the tightening of supervision by creating the Banking 
Commission. The governor of the BCEAO, Tiemoko Koné, recalled his role as 
the  ‘main architect’ of the reforms and ‘designer of the Banking Commission 
of  WAEMU’, for which he was dubbed the ‘godfather’ of the Commission 
(Koné, 2015).19
Indeed, Mr Ouattara came to lead the Bank at a critical time when the region 
was experiencing one of the worst banking crises in its history. The crisis served as 
a permissive context—its costs paved the way to taking strong measures, notably 
15 Interviews with ministers in WAEMU (March and May 2017).
16 Interview with pan­African banker at Dakar (March 2017).
17 Interview with Ivorian Banker, Abidjan (March 2017).
18 Interview with African banker at Ouagadougou (April 2017).
19 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
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the reinforcement of the BCEAO’s prerogatives in banking regulation and the 
replacement of National Commissions with a sub­regional banking commission. 
Supranational centralization constituted a structural change that repositioned the 
BCEAO in its relationship with the states in relation to banking.
Adopting Basel II and III: the BCEAO under the pressure of the IMF
The BCEAO’s crucial role in adopting Basel II and III must be highlighted. These 
reforms were top­down, as there was no demand for them on the ground and 
banks are still struggling to abide by existing rules.
The BCEAO officials’ interviews have displayed their appropriation of inter­
national standards and mention several motivations for the transition to Basel II 
and III.20 Indeed, for them, the emergence of cross­border banks and the influ­
ence of international banks leave the WAEMU member states vulnerable. They 
also mention the need to harmonize regulations in order to interact with foreign 
banks that have implemented and are subjected to the new Basel standards. Thus, 
the reform will have ‘great benefits including the contribution that Basel II and III 
will make to the soundness of financial institutions’.21
The international orientation of the BCEAO and its supranational dimension 
are crucial in understanding the adoption of Basel II and III. They explain both 
the receptivity and permissiveness of the BCEAO to IMF pressures to adopt both 
sets of standards and its room for manoeuvre vis­à­vis domestic actors.
Since starting banking reforms, the BCEAO has relied on the support of the 
IMF. The IMF has not only pushed hard for the transposition of international 
standards, but has also offered the technical assistance required for preliminary 
studies and capacity building—both for training actors and even for writing the 
law. Indeed, the officials in charge of the project at the BCEAO appear to have 
benefited from the support of the IMF throughout the process of the reform. The 
West Africa Regional Technical Assistance Center, AFRITAC West, has contrib­
uted throughout the project.22
Qualitative and quantitative studies recommended the transition to Basel II 
and III. These studies are mentioned in AFRITAC West’s 2014/15 activity report, 
which refers to missions to the BCEAO by a team reinforced with an IMF­hired 
expert on the transposition of Basel II and III to WAEMU (Afritac Ouest, 2015). 
The report specifies the following results: ‘a) Drafting of a study on the readiness 
of banks to transition to Basel II and Basel III; b) completion of a capital impact 
assessment as part of the transposition of Basel III; c) formalization of guidelines 
for the implementation of supervision on a consolidated basis and the subjection 
20 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
21 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
22 Interview with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
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of banking groups controlled by unregulated holding companies; d) preparation 
and training of banks for the impact assessment on capital requirements (Pillar 1 
of Basel II)’ (Afritac Ouest, 2015, p. 29). However, their results are not published. 
The draft texts developed were sent to the IMF and the World Bank23 before being 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2016.
Prior to the completion of the impact study, during the conference she hosted 
at the BCEAO headquarters in January 2015 on the theme of financial inclusion, 
the Managing Director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, recommended the adop­
tion of a regulatory framework ‘based on adequate capital requirements for 
banks, sound prudential standards and strong enforcement of these standards as 
they are fundamental pillars of the stability of the financial sector. There is room 
to consolidate all these pillars in the region and the ongoing efforts to move to 
Basel II/Basel III are extremely encouraging . . . this passage to Basel II, Basel III 
which will also bring it closer to international standards’ (Lagarde, 2015).
This explicitness of the position held by the IMF is very surprising because it 
is contrary to its position on other low­income countries whose cases are exam­
ined in this book, including the better financially developed Ghana. Indeed, the 
adoption of Basel II and III standards is not overtly recommended in all low­
income countries.
The evidence of IMF influence and pressure is further supported by private 
banks and some BCEAO officials. Private bank executives cited, among others, 
the sustained presence of AFRITAC/IMF staff and experts during seminars and 
training they received in preparation for Basel II and III.24 On the part of the 
BCEAO, even though the term ‘pressure’ is not openly mentioned, some of the 
executives we met recognize the ‘central role’ of the IMF in the process.25 Some 
stated clearly that: ‘It is the IMF that is pushing’.26 A high­ranking national authority 
indicates that ‘the Central Bank relays the position of the IMF in order to be well 
graded by it’.27
IMF pressure is not limited to the adoption of Basel II and III; it has also aimed 
at a broader set of international standards. Recently, the Executive Directors of 
the IMF ‘encouraged’ the authorities of WAEMU ‘to speed up the reform agenda, 
particularly the implementation of Basel II and Basel III, to strengthen risk­based 
supervision, to align prudential limits with international standards and best prac­
tices, to enforce existing prudential rules to reduce NPLs, and to avoid regulatory 
forbearance’ (IMF, 2016, p. 2, emphasis added).
23 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
24 Interview with African bankers, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
25 Interview with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
26 Interview with BCEAO officials, Dakar, March 2017 and Abidjan (January 2016).
27 Interview in Abidjan (March 2017).
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The BCEAO has been receptive to these recommendations by the IMF, and 
always committed itself to their implementation. It is striking that the law adopted 
in June 2016 retains all these recommendations verbatim—from the risk concen­
tration threshold and the classification of loans as non­performing to capital 
requirements. In addition, the transition to IFRS standards is expected to be in 
the new accounting plan currently in the works. Through pressure from the IMF 
and its peer networks, the BCEAO takes the local lead and then tries to ‘sell’ the 
reform to the other stakeholders, namely governments and private banks.
The BCEAO’s network of regulators constitutes frameworks for learning and 
disseminating information about international standards to the banking author­
ities of WAEMU. As the Banking Commission itself points out in its 2014 report, 
‘discussions on international reforms, such as Basel II, Basel III or the new 
accounting framework, are also at the heart of the work [of the Bank Supervisory 
Groups] and aim to facilitate their implementation’ (BCEAO, 2014a, p. 66).
Interviews with officials of the BCEAO and current and former officials of the 
Banking Commission support the hypothesis of peer emulation in the adoption 
of international standards. For the BCEAO, these groups are primarily places of 
information and learning through shared experience. In addition, cooperation 
encourages the adoption of seemingly more advanced standards that have been 
implemented by the supervisors of foreign banking groups. From this point of 
view, the interviews confirm that the relationship with Morocco was particularly 
favourable to the adoption of the new standards.28 BCEAO executives empha­
sized the delay with which certain jurisdictions in WAEMU participated in the 
various colleges of supervisors, thus underlining one of the motivations for the 
ongoing reforms.29 However, the interviewees also clearly indicated that the influ­
ence of the IMF is the most decisive.30
The position of the WAEMU banks
The adoption of Basel II and III in WAEMU has not been met with enthusiasm 
amongst banks. Yet they also did not show outright defiance, probably because of 
the BCEAO’s position of power but also because of the nuances in their positions. 
Interviewees gave several indications on shared positions regarding ‘the busy 
agenda’ and ‘the tight scheduling’ of the reform, but highlighted the divergences 
of opinion on the opportunities of the reform, costs of transposition, and inherent 
competitive benefits.
28 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
29 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
30 Interviews with BCEAO officials, Dakar (March 2017).
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Strikingly, all bank executives interviewed, be they from public, domestic, 
pan­African banks, or international banks, agreed on the fact that the reform 
agenda is very demanding. Indeed, the bankers consider that the combined adop­
tion of Basel II and Basel III, with the addition of the new banking accounting 
plan, is carried out on a ‘very tight schedule’ and demands from them ‘a lot of 
resources’.31 These reforms require human resources that are very limited in practice, 
even in international banking groups—especially since in many cases, ‘it’s the 
same teams that are in charge of these projects’.32 The reform ‘requires a tedious 
standardization of all human resources of banks’, including commercial teams in 
international banks. International banks are therefore providing timid support 
for the reform and it is difficult to see any genuine initiative on their part in favour 
of adopting the new international standards.33
The ‘very tight timing of the reform’34 was one of the main concerns expressed 
by the banking sector during the consultation process prior to the adoption of 
Basel II and III. FABEF’s scientific committee strongly advocated for and obtained 
an extension of the implementation deadline, initially set for January 2017 in the 
draft texts and finally decided on for 1 January 2018.
If a consensus is established on the timing of the reform, the opportunity the 
reforms present is assessed differently by different banks. International banks 
whose parent companies are governed by Basel II and/or III generally consider 
the reforms as favourable to the sector as a whole, unlike domestic banks. For 
example, an official from a Moroccan bank said, ‘It’s the agenda that is more 
troublesome than the objectives’.35 This statement was confirmed by that of 
another executive of a French bank.36 Banks with no affiliation to any banking 
group, as well as those with no experience of Basel II and III, are strongly against 
the reforms: ‘if this reform were in place, our bank would have never been able to 
exist and have the journey that it had’; the reform ‘will prevent local initiatives 
like ours to take place in the banking sector’.37
In addition, the cost of transposing standards to the local context is also not 
estimated similarly by the different categories of banks. Large banking groups 
affiliated with parent companies that are already regulated on the basis of these 
new standards report benefiting from their learning and previous experiences. 
They pool the expenses of the different institutions in teams coordinated at the 
regional level—a fact that proves to be the case for the French, Moroccan, and 
Nigerian banking groups. Banking groups from WAEMU do the same, although 
31 Interviews with bankers, Lomé (December 2016); Cotonou (December 2016); Dakar (March 
2017); Abidjan (April 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
32 Interviews with bankers, Dakar (March 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
33 Interviews with bankers, Lomé (December 2016); Dakar (March 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
34 Interviews with bankers, Dakar (March 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
35 Interview with executive of Moroccan bank in Ouagadougou (April 2017).
36 Interview with executive of French bank Abidjan (April 2017).
37 Interview with executive of WAEMU bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
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they do not all have Basel II/III experience. They face much higher costs than 
the large banking groups, which are also their main competitors.38 Unaffiliated 
institutions with no relevant experience pay the highest costs to meet the new 
standards. Many of them have had difficulty meeting the standards already in place.
However, real difficulties are apprehended by all the banks. Foreign organizations 
highlight the challenges that the entire industry is confronted with in implement­
ing the new regulatory standards. The requirement to upgrade computer systems 
is particularly difficult. Indeed, one main operator manages most of the banks’ 
ICT system in the region; the ability of this supplier to satisfy the demand of all 
firms is questioned.39 The constraints are also relative to the banking environment, 
including the dysfunctions of judicial services in WAEMU member countries, the 
ecosystem of banks that is marked by a highly developed informal sector, and 
very pressing information problems, among other factors.
Certainly, the international banks recognize that the reform could be in their 
favour, and that it would eventually put all banks on an equal footing. French banks 
in particular have often explained their decline and the emergence of African 
banks by citing the stronger regulatory requirements imposed on them by their 
parent company in Basel III.40 Banks placed under the control of Moroccan 
groups indicate that their customers complain about the cumbersome nature of 
their new credit procedures because of the reorganizations introduced by parent 
companies.41 Yet these new procedures now give them a lead over competitors in 
implementing Basel II/III.
In sum, international banks have comparative advantages in implementing the 
new regulatory standards, and could profit from their domestic competitors; 
however, they do not seem to have pushed for the reforms, of which they empha­
size the tight timing, the important costs induced, and the constraints posed by 
the context of application. If local banks accuse them of having contributed to the 
reform process, they still concede the decisive role of the IMF and France, which 
would serve the European banks.42
A role for France?
France has a singular position in the monetary and banking institutions of the 
WAEMU member countries. A former colonizing power, it has representatives on 
38 Interviews with executive of WAEMU bankers in Lomé (December 2016); Dakar (March 2017); 
Abidjan (April 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
39 Interviews with executives of French bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017); Abidjan (April 2017).
40 Interviews with executive of French bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
41 Interviews with executive of Moroccan bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
42 Interviews with executives of WAEMU banks, Lomé (December 2016); Benin (December 2016); 
Dakar (March 2017); Abidjan (April 2017); Ouagadougou (April 2017).
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the BCEAO board of directors and on the Banking Commission. France’s 
influence on monetary and banking issues has often fuelled controversy.
The premise of France’s influence on the Basel II/III adoption process is therefore 
based on its colonial legacy and on the decline of French banks in the region. 
Indeed, they have lost their market leadership and explain their decline, in part, 
based on the advantage their competitors derive from the margins of manoeuvre 
afforded to them by the less stringent regulatory constraints they are subject to.43
In our research, France’s role does not come to the fore—indeed, most discus­
sions have converged on the prominent role of the IMF. While the executives of 
the central bank and the Banking Commission recognize the ‘important contri­
bution of the IMF’, they do not recognize any particular action in France.
However, local banks do assign a role to France. One banker said, ‘it is France 
who wants the reform for the benefit of its banks’.44 Another added: ‘this reform 
serves the interests of French banks first and foremost’.45 These points of view 
converge on views transmitted by French banks to French diplomatic circles in 
Africa.46 Indeed, according to interviews, these diplomatic circles suggest French 
banks think that ‘they do not operate on the same footing as African banks’ 
because of the stronger regulatory requirements to which their parent companies 
must adhere.
In addition, several bank officials consider there to be an alliance between 
the IMF and France in favour of banking reform,47 but this is unsupported by 
evidence. As mentioned above, however, the IMF’s recommendations for the 
adoption of Basel II and III in WAEMU are remarkable. In addition, apart from 
the presence of France in WAEMU’s monetary and banking bodies, it should be 
noted that it is one of the main donors of AFRITAC West—indeed the second 
biggest donor after the EU in 2014. It is also interesting that the person responsible 
for supervision and bank restructuring at AFRITAC West has always been a former 
official of the Banque de France or the French Treasury.
All in all, further investigation is needed to inform a possible role France holds 
in adopting Basel II and III standards in the WAEMU member states.
Conclusion
WAEMU is an example of IFI­driven convergence on international standards, 
with an internationally connected regulator advocating implementation under 
pressure from international financial institutions. Based on interviews and 
43 Interviews with French diplomats and executive of French bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
44 Interviews with executive of WAEMU bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
45 Interviews with executive of WAEMU bank, Dakar (March 2017).
46 Interviews with French diplomats and executive of French bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
47 Interviews with executive of WAEMU bank, Ouagadougou (April 2017).
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scrutiny of formal documents, the evidence shows the decisive role of the BCEAO 
in the adoption of Basel II and III. The supranational dimension that gives the 
BCEAO more leeway vis­à­vis local players, and its extensive links to the inter­
national policy community, reflected in participation in peer regulator networks 
and in the training of its executives, explains the regulator’s preference for Basel 
standards.
The IMF also played a decisive role in WAEMU. While the IMF and World 
Bank have been present in other cases and driven financial sector reforms, the 
WAEMU case stands out in the extent to which the IMF exerted significant 
pressure for WAEMU to implement Basel II and III, in contrast to its recom­
mendations in other low­income countries and regions. In addition, the BCEAO 
benefited from IMF technical assistance in conducting reforms and drafting new 
banking standards. Other actors, both governments and banks, showed no appe­
tite for international banking standards. The role of the IMF, and possible links 
with France, deserves greater exploration.
In line with the analytical framework, the reforms undertaken by the BCEAO, 
without the support of the banks, may lead to significant difficulties in implemen­
tation. A good proportion of banks, especially those not belonging to a banking 
group, already had difficulties in complying with the less stringent regulations set 
by Basel I. The WAEMU case, like Rwanda, is an example of regulations moving 
in ways that are out of step with the realities of a shallow and underdeveloped 
financial sector. 
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Tanzania




Despite a consistent commitment to the adoption of international banking 
standards from the outset of its financial reforms in the late 1980s, Tanzania only 
finished implementing risk-based supervision in 2009, and opted for selective 
implementation of Basel II and III standards beginning in 2017. Amongst the 
countries featured in this volume, therefore, Tanzania is a relatively slow and 
cautious adopter of international banking standards. Over the past thirty years, 
Tanzania has been through a fundamental institutional transformation of its 
banking sector, with a far-reaching shift away from state control towards the 
creation of a private market-oriented banking sector that until recently has been 
dominated by foreign banks. Yet, despite twenty years of high growth and global 
integration, Tanzania is one of the least-banked countries in the world (World 
Bank, 2017). Although Tanzania has one of the highest number of banks in Africa 
and one of the most profitable banking sectors on the continent, the economy 
remains cash-based. While Tanzania has been slow to implement and enforce 
international banking standards, the IMF has consistently described Tanzania’s 
regulatory system as being in reasonably good shape for its level of economic 
development (IMF, 2018, 2017a, 2010, 2004).
Tanzania’s approach to international banking regulation has undergone two 
distinct phases. From 1995 to 2008, the enormous institutional shifts occurring 
within Tanzania’s banking sector led to a regulatory hiatus. This was evident from 
the significant disjuncture between its formal commitment to adopting Basel and 
the actual pattern of implementation and enforcement. During the second period, 
from 2009 to 2017, regulation took greater priority, as risk-based supervision was 
finally implemented and the country moved on to adopt and implement elements 
of Basel II and III. However, this period was also characterized by the emergence 
of a more selective approach to Basel adoption—new regulations for segments of 
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the banking and financial sector were introduced that were outside the Basel 
framework. This brought the informal practices of enforcement into closer 
alignment with the formal regulatory framework.
In this chapter, I explain how changes in the preferences and relative power of 
the three key actors—regulators, banks, and politicians—shaped the pattern and 
pace of Basel adoption over the period under study. During the first period, 
Tanzania had a predominantly policy-driven approach to adoption that was shaped 
by the decisive victory of pro-liberalization politicians and the high level of influ-
ence from the IFIs on Tanzania’s emerging regulatory system. Yet the challenges of 
implementing an entirely new type of regulatory relationship from scratch should 
not be underestimated. The kind of policy-based lending that had been practised 
during Tanzania’s socialist period was off the political agenda by the 1990s, but a 
few recent cases of grand corruption involving senior figures within the state and 
banking sector suggest that some groups may have had an interest in maintaining a 
loose regulatory environment. The domestically oriented commercial banks were 
powerful compared to regulators and politicians. Both foreign and domestic banks 
retained very high profitability during this period of regulatory hiatus, and they 
had no interest in pushing for faster implementation of international banking 
standards. These preferences led to a strong professed commitment to implement 
Basel but weak implementation in practice during the first period (Table 8.1).
The preferences of regulators, banks, and politicians all changed during the 
second period, from 2009 onwards. The changing preferences of the regulator 
were the result of two key factors: first, the appointment of a new internationally 
oriented governor at the Bank of Tanzania (BoT), and second, the influence of 
regional commitments to regulatory harmonization within the EAC, which 
provided a hard deadline of 2018 for the implementation of elements of Basel II 
and III. The banking sector’s preferences also changed as the large foreign 
banks began to champion Basel adoption—partly a result of pressures from 
Table 8.1 Tanzania: key indicators
Tanzania  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 936
Bank assets (current US$) 8.9 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 18.8
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) Data not available
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 14.4
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 5.3
Polity IV score (2017) 3
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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parent banks and concerns about AML compliance. In addition, changes in the 
composition of the banking sector that had developed from the end of the 2000s 
led to greater competition within the sector. The large banks were interested in 
enforcing Basel, and especially the higher capital requirements, partly as a way of 
forcing consolidation among smaller banks. Over the same period, politicians’ 
commitment to deep liberalization faltered and demands for policy-based 
lending returned. This resulted in a move away from the blanket adoption of 
Basel and towards attempts to tailor regulation for different segments of the 
banking sector. Thus, in the second period, Tanzania moved from policy-driven 
convergence, which didn’t result in implementation, to regulator- and market-
driven convergence, which has led to selective implementation of Basel II and III. 
While it is hard to perfectly align Tanzania with one of the trajectories set out in 
the analytical framework, the central role of the regulator leads it to exhibit 
dynamics of regulator-driven convergence.
The evidence presented in this chapter is based on twenty interviews with gov-
ernment officials, BoT employees, representatives of commercial and government 
banks, representatives of international development organizations, and academics 
in Tanzania, most of which took place from March to July 2017. Secondary 
sources include government publications, official reports of international institu-
tions, grey literature produced by private sector consultants in the financial 
sector, project appraisal documents, annual reports, and other publications of the 
commercial banks and court cases.
I start with an overview of the political and economic context in which banking 
regulation has been implemented. I then trace the changing approach to Basel 
over time, demonstrating the early adoption, but also its slow and cautious 
implementation until the end of the 2000s, and the shift in the pace and nature of 
implementation in the 2010s. The core political economy argument is presented 
in the fourth section, which shows why Tanzania experienced a shift from policy-
driven to a regulator- and market-driven preferences for Basel implementation. 
To conclude, I argue that the appearance of the banking sector as relatively well 
regulated and stable is partly a reflection of the minimal role that it has played, at 
least thus far, in supporting a more fundamental economic transformation within 
the domestic economy. This points to the mismatch between the characteristics of 
risk in highly financialized economies that are the focus of international banking 
standards, compared to the risks that are inherent in the processes of economic 
transformation of a country with ambitious plans for industrialization.
Economic and political context
Until the mid-1980s, Tanzania was a centrally planned economy with restrictions 
on the private sector while a significant proportion of the economy was under 
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direct government ownership. After a period of economic decline, a structural 
adjustment package was signed with the IMF in 1986, putting Tanzania on a path 
towards economic liberalization and privatization. This was accompanied by 
political reforms that led to the introduction of multiparty elections in 1995—
although Tanzania has consistently remained under the rule of one dominant 
party, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Growth rates started to pick up 
from the end of the 1990s and Tanzania experienced an uninterrupted period of 
high growth for the next twenty years (Figure 8.1).
Economic growth in this period was driven by rising foreign and domestic 
investment and the emergence of a mining sector, growing by around 15 per cent 
per year by the early 2000s (Bank of Tanzania,  2004). But despite economic 
expansion and growing exports and imports, the economy remained largely 
delinked from the global financial system. Most Tanzanians still worked within 
the cash-based rural economy and the urban informal sector. Despite rapid 
urbanization and growing manufacturing output, the country remained one of 
the least industrialized in the world. Insufficient structural change and employ-
ment creation meant that while experiencing the longest period of economic 
growth in its history, Tanzania’s poverty rates remained intransigently high 
over the 2000s.
Tanzania’s banking sector, meanwhile, experienced an enormous transformation 
since the early 1990s, with the break-up of the mono-banking system and the 
proliferation of commercial banks, a majority of which were foreign-owned for 
most of the period under study. During the socialist period, the banking sector 
consisted of six state-owned banks that provided credit in accordance with 
National Credit Plans (Bank of Tanzania, 2016b). Economic crisis and misman-
agement led to a very high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), reaching 
77 per cent of the total loans of the largest bank, the National Bank of Commerce, 
by 1995 (World Bank,  1995). Reforming the banking sector was central to 
Tanzania’s structural adjustment process initiated in 1986, in response to pressure 

































































Figure 8.1 Tanzania: GDP percentage growth (1985–2013).
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2016b, 2004)
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Financial Institution Act (BFIA) implemented in 1991 and the Bank of Tanzania 
Act of 1995 set the legal foundations for a new kind of private and market-oriented 
banking sector.
Like most other low-income countries, Tanzania has retained a bank-dominated 
financial sector with a very small stock exchange and insurance sector. The only 
other significant financial actor over the period has been pension funds, accounting 
for 10 per cent of GDP and around 27 per cent of total financial sector assets 
(IMF,  2016). From the mid-1990s, Tanzania pursued a very liberal approach to 
bank licensing in order to foster competition in the financial sector. This gener-
ated significant growth of foreign and private banks—so much so that by the end 
of the 2000s, Tanzania had one of the highest numbers of licensed banks on the 
continent. By the mid-2000s foreign banks had become dominant, but there was 
an expansion of locally owned banks towards the end of the decade—the majority 
of which were small community banks (see Figure 8.2). Compared to the start of 
the reforms, government control of the banking sector declined dramatically, 
following the break-up and privatization of the National Bank of Commerce 
(NBC), the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), and Cooperatives and Rural 
Development Bank (CRDB). Five new domestic banks were established from 
2005, but the growth of domestic banks in this period mainly reflects the rise in 
small community banks serving particular regions.
Despite the rise in the total number of banks in the 2000s, Tanzania’s banking 
sector has remained highly concentrated. The three largest banks in Tanzania, the 

































































Figure 8.2 Tanzania: number and type of banks (1996–2017).
Source: IMF (2017, p. 8)
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sector assets across the 2000s (IMF, 2010). These institutions all originated from 
the privatization of the dominant state-owned banks. Industry concentration was 
also reflected in the narrow lending profile of the large banks, which continue 
to lend primarily to the government and to serve a limited number of large 
multinational and domestic companies. Despite the expectation that greater 
competition would lead to a vital expansion of credit, rates of private credit to 
GDP remained stubbornly low in the first period of banking sector reform, rising 
from 5 per cent to 17 per cent of GDP from 2003 to 2015 (IMF,  2010; World 
Bank,  2017)—well below the regional average of 21 per cent (Nyantalyi and Sy, 
2015). One reason for this was the availability of low-risk, highly lucrative 
 government securities. The large banks dominated the government securities 
market, holding around 40 per cent of these assets. With zero risk weights and an 
interest rate of around 15 per cent, they had little incentive to extend credit to the 
private sector. Smaller banks, which did not operate so extensively in these mar-
kets, relied on being able to borrow from these larger banks, thus pushing up 
interest rates. Overall in the 2000s, Tanzania had the second highest margin 
spreads in the region after Malawi (IMF, 2010). Fundamental weaknesses in the 
state institutions that underpin financial markets, such as an effective commercial 
court and judicial system, were also key factors in the low level of lending by 
commercial banks to the private sector.
The insularity of the banking sector allowed banks to retain very high levels of 
liquidity in the 2000s and this was one of the causes of the fall in the level of NPLs. 
Dollarization, which was high across the whole sector (around 30 per cent of total 
deposits and total loans), was particularly concentrated in the largest banks where 
dollar deposits were 41–62 per cent by the end of the 2000s (IMF, 2010). Tanzania 
retained capital controls across the 2000s, and only started to take steps towards 
liberalizing its capital account after the EAC Common Market Protocol was 
ratified in 2010. The global financial crisis and the economic downturn led to an 
increase in NPLs across banks of all sizes (Figure 8.3).
Given most of the population has historically had little access to banking, one 
of the most dramatic changes to occur to Tanzania’s financial sector in recent 
years has been the rapid rise of mobile phone-based financial services since 2008. 
By 2015, Tanzania caught up with the front-runner, Kenya, in terms of the scale of 
mobile money services available.
Tanzania’s overall policy approach to the financial sector has undergone a 
marked shift from a policy of rapid general liberalization in the 2000s to a more 
targeted approach to addressing financial inclusion and promoting policy-based 
lending through development finance institutions in the 2010s. Characteristics 
that are frequently associated with clientelism, such as high levels of NPLs and 
the extension of loans without sufficient collateral, have not been prevalent 
amongst the systemically important banks over the 2000s. However, the grand 
corruption scandals that were a feature of Tanzania’s political economy in the last 
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two decades exposed links between politicians and elements of the banking sec-
tor that suggest a more complex relationship between banking and politics under-
neath the surface.
Basel adoption, implementation, and enforcement
Since the liberalization of the banking sector in the early 1990s, Tanzania has 
formally been committed to implementing Basel standards (United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2000). The major regulations contained in the 1991 Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act were in line with the Basel Core Principles and the Act 
introduced a minimum capital requirement of 8 per cent of total assets, which 
was in line with the spirit of Basel I (United Republic of Tanzania, 1991). However, 
as risk weights were not included, this requirement acted as a leverage ratio in 
which all assets were assigned 100 per cent—meaning Tanzania’s capital require-
ments were actually more stringent than required by Basel. The Act also set a 
range of other restrictions, such as collateral requirements for large loans, aggre-
gate large loan limits, and fixed asset ceilings for banks, that were more restrictive 
than Basel I requirements.
Reforms to the institutions of banking supervision started in 1992 when the 
BoT upgraded its Supervision Unit into the Directorate of Banking Supervision. 
In Tanzania’s first FSAP of 2003, the country was deemed to have put in place the 
foundations of a good supervisory system—but with a need for extensive amend-












































Figure 8.3 Tanzania: non-performing loans (NPLs) (% of total loans).
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2016b, 2004)
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the BoT, and a move to risk-based supervisory practices (IMF, 2004). Following the 
first FSAP, the legal framework for banking regulation underwent significant 
changes from 2003 to 2009. The Bank of Tanzania Act, 2006 and the Banking 
and Financial Institutions Act, 2006 set up the foundations for a more stringent 
and independent supervisory system (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). The 
Deposit Insurance Fund was established and licensing became the sole preserve 
of the BoT, reducing the potential for political involvement in decision-making. 
The first steps towards introducing risk-based supervision were taken in 2004 
with a survey of the existing risk management framework in banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (Bank of Tanzania, 2010), which led to the implementation 
of risk-based supervision on a pilot basis in 2006. In 2007, the BoT published 
a  Risk-Based Supervision Manual, and Capital Adequacy Regulations were 
published in 2008. This was followed the next year by the implementation of 
risk-based charges. The general willingness to adopt Basel standards in principle 
was evident in the fact that the BoT signalled its intention to move forward with 
Basel II adoption and implementation as early as 2004, even before risk-based 
supervision had been implemented (Bank of Tanzania, 2004), and a working 




Basel I Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1991
Banking Act (Amendment) 1993 
(capital adequacy ratio brought 




Adopted with the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act (2006)
The banking and financial institutions 
(capital adequacy) regulations, 2008
 
Basel II Credit risk SA, operational risk, 
market risk adopted with 
the banking and financial 
institutions regulations (capital 
adequacy) Regulations 2014
Pillar II—Risk Management 
Guidelines for Banks and 
Financial Institutions, 2010
Operational risk was implemented in 
2017 after a three-year moratorium 
announced in the banking and financial 
institutions capital adequacy 
(amendment) regulations 2015
 
Basel III Capital conservation buffer of 
2.5% adopted the banking and 
financial institutions (capital 
adequacy) regulations, 2014
Implemented in August 2017 
announced in the Monetary Policy 
Statement June 2017
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group was established to draw up plans for the implementation of staged elements 
of Basel II and III (Table 8.2).1
Despite the significant efforts to build up the legal framework for supervision, 
Tanzania’s second FSAP in 2009 found that there were significant weaknesses in 
compliance by the commercial banks and in monitoring and enforcing prudential 
rules by the BoT (IMF, 2010). Significantly, the actual implementation of a risk-based 
approach was lacking entirely. This was partly the result of poor record-keeping 
and capacity constraints at the BoT (IMF, 2010). The FSAP review identified that 
three banks were undercapitalized, prudential limits had been exceeded for a 
number of the banks with large single exposures, and loan-to-deposit ratios were 
in breach in eleven banks. The BoT had shown significant regulatory forbearance 
in pressing these institutions to address their capital shortfall.
As the fourth section below explains, after 2009 the pace of Basel adoption 
and enforcement changed in important ways as Tanzania decided to combine the 
adoption of elements of Basel II and III and push forward with implementation 
by 2018. This began with improving the risk-based supervisory system in the early 
2010s. Several weaknesses in data and the recording of risk-based supervision 
practices that were identified in the 2009 FSAP were resolved with the introduc-
tion of a fully automated reporting system in 2014. Consolidated Supervision 
Regulations were also issued in 2014, and a pilot examination of one commercial 
bank was undertaken in 2016.2 In 2014, a directive to introduce capital require-
ments for operational risk from Basel II was issued, but commercial banks were 
given a three-year phase-in period. The operational risk charge became effective 
in 2017. Tanzania also committed to implementing Pillar 2 of Basel II, consisting 
of the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) by commercial 
banks and the Supervisory Evaluation and Review Process (SREP).
By the end of 2018, Tanzania’s capital adequacy requirements were based on 
Basel I definitions and risk-weightings with some additions (IMF, 2018). Elements 
of Basel III were introduced in 2017 and 2018, including a revised definition of 
capital, a capital conservation buffer, and a leverage ratio (Bank of Tanzania, 2016a; 
IMF, 2018; Ng’wanakilala, 2017). (The BoT committed to revising the capital def-
inition to bring it in line with the Basel III definition by 2018, but argued that they 
would need to adapt this to Tanzania’s specific banking context (IMF, 2017a).) Over 
this period, a tailored approach to Basel adoption also started to emerge in formal 
terms, with a new regulatory framework for investment banks introduced in 2011 
(Bank of Tanzania, 2011) and plans to develop specific supervisory regulations for 
Community Banks (FurtherAfrica, 2016). Regulations targeted specifically towards 
the larger systemic banks were also under consideration, in particular an add-
itional Pillar 2 capital buffer of 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets for systemically 
1 Interview, Bank of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam June 2017.
2 Interview, Bank of Tanzania, June 2017.
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important banks (IMF,  2017a). Another sign of a tailored approach was in the 
adoption of a simplified liquidity ratio that was not equivalent to Basel III, but 
arguably was better suited to the country context and regulatory capacity (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2014). The BoT also continued to reform its supervisory system to 
meet Basel Core Principles in the areas that were identified as deficient in the 
2009 FSAP, and they are now committed to being fully compliant by 2018.3
Money laundering regulations were identified as a particular area of concern in 
Tanzania, given high reported levels of money laundering in the country despite 
measurement difficulties arising from the predominantly cash-based nature of 
the economy (Goredama, 2003). Despite introducing an Anti-Money Laundering 
Act in 2006, Tanzania was ‘blacklisted’ and subject to FATF’s monitoring process 
for AML/CTF compliance from 2009 to 2014 (FATF, 2017). In this period, several 
cases of money laundering were brought to court, but by 2016 no one had been 
prosecuted, highlighting the difficulties of enforcing the strengthened legislation 
(Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2014).
Tanzania’s general eagerness to adopt international standards was also evident 
in its early adoption of international accounting standards; IFRS was adopted in 
2004 for all private sector business entities. But again, the actual enforcement of 
these accounting standards was low. In 2014, the National Board of Accountants 
and Auditors adopted the demanding IFRS 9 standards without amendments. 
While the larger and foreign-owned banks had already prepared to conform 
to  these standards in line with their parent companies, many of the smaller 
banks struggled to prepare themselves for the new capital requirements by the 
2018 deadline.
Political economy of Basel standards in Tanzania
As expected, Tanzania’s regulatory practices have converged with global standards 
over time. Its path of adoption, implementation, and enforcement, however, has 
been shaped by the relative power as well as the preferences of the key actors 
involved in the financial sector. The political economy features influencing these 
preferences have evolved over time, so I first explain the early adoption and slow 
implementation of the first period from 1995 to 2008, and then set out the reasons 
for a change in the approach to Basel in the second period.
3 Interview, Bank of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 2017.
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High adoption; weak implementation and enforcement (1991–2008)
A striking feature of Tanzania’s experiences of Basel has been the early and con-
sistent willingness to signal adoption of the standards. This was in large part due 
to the influence of IFIs on Tanzanian politicians and regulators from the start 
of  the reform process, when the foundations of a new kind of banking sector 
were being established. However, at the outset of the reform process, the commit-
ment of regulators and politicians to this approach was not a foregone conclusion. 
Even after the first structural adjustment agreement was signed in 1986, there 
were considerable differences of opinion between politicians within the ruling 
party about the appropriate role of the state in the economy. Some of the most 
acute ideological struggles occurred over the direction of banking sector reform. 
The ex-governor of the BoT, Charles Nyirabu, was committed to market liberal-
ization and was Chair of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry (PCE) into 
the monetary and banking system set up in 1989. Their report, published in 1991, 
strongly supported the IFI agenda of banking sector liberalization and privat-
ization. However, factions within the ruling party continued to strongly resist 
reforms throughout the 1990s, the most contentious issue being the privatization 
of state-owned banks.
To circumvent opposition within the ruling party, the World Bank decided to 
give the government considerable discretion over the pace and form of privat-
ization (Adams, 2005). Initially the pace of reform was very slow and subject to 
considerable political contestation (Mwakikagile,  2010) but a pivotal moment 
came in 1997 when the Board of the National Microfinance Bank vetoed the 
government’s proposals for privatization. In response, President Mkapa intervened 
and replaced the entire Board, signalling his strong support for the privatization 
process (Cull and Spreng, 2011). By the end of the 1990s, the debates over the 
direction of reform had been decisively won by the liberalizers and international 
best practices were embraced as the standard to which the new banking sector 
should aspire.
Over the next twenty years, the IFIs played a very significant role in shaping 
Tanzania’s approach to banking supervision, through loan conditionality and tech-
nical assistance. The periodic FSAPs were particularly important in setting the 
agenda of action on Basel implementation.4 The limited domestic financing 
options available to the government meant that disbursement conditions on IFI 
loans were a powerful lever of reform. For example, in the process of deciding 
how the National Bank of Commerce should be privatized, Amani et al. found 
that ‘Tanzanian policymakers had selected an option that they had been led to 
believe the World Bank preferred because they believed that such a choice would 
4 Interviews, large commercial bank, Tanzania Bankers Association, Dar es Salaam, 2017.
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simplify subsequent negotiations with the Bank on these issues’ (2005, p. 33). The 
IFIs’ influence on the regulator meant that from very early on, the ‘spirit was to 
adopt international standards’.5 Initially, however, IFI loan tranche releases were 
linked to the approval of plans and enactment of legislation, rather than actual 
implementation (World Bank, 1995).
As privatization got underway, the IFIs turned their attention to strengthening 
supervisory capacities at the BoT. The first Financial Institutions Development 
Project (FIDP) that ran from 1991 until 1996 facilitated the establishment of ‘most 
of the basic skills for supervising banks’ within the BoT (World Bank, 2000, p. 13). 
The focus on strengthening supervision was increased in the FIDP II from 2000 to 
2006 (World Bank, 2000). Technical assistance was enhanced by the establishment 
of the IMF East Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centre (AFRITAC) in 2002, 
based within the BoT in Dar es Salaam. AFRITAC played a key role in providing 
technical assistance to the Bank for Basel adoption, in particular for the move to 
risk-based supervision in the 2000s (Chatterji et al., 2013), and subsequently in 
drafting regulations for Basel II and III implementation (IMF, 2017b).
The period of regulatory hiatus in the 2000s was not the result of a rejection 
of international standards in principle, but reflected the challenges of constructing 
a set of market-based regulatory institutions from scratch as well as a lack of 
incentives to push for greater adoption in a system that served the material 
interests of a number of powerful groups. Despite the dominance of foreign 
banks, the banking sector was domestically oriented and did not need to signal 
creditworthiness to international investors, nor were the domestic banks interested 
in entering foreign markets.6
Enduring links between the banking sector and powerful politically connected 
figures also influenced the extent of banking regulation enforcement. In the 2000s 
a series of grand corruption scandals linking politicians and local and international 
business caused political reverberations within the ruling party (Gray, 2015). Some 
of the most important scandals occurred within the banking sector and involved 
the incumbent governor of the BoT, Dr Daud Bilali, as well as a previous governor, 
Dr Idris Rashidi (IMF, 2018, 2017a, 2010, 2004). A number of commercial banks 
were embroiled in these scandals as significant funds were moved in and out of 
their accounts. While no commercial bank was taken to court as a result of these 
scandals, one did agree to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the UK Serious 
Fraud Office (Serious Fraud Office and Standard Bank Plc, 2015).
Despite these connections, some of the signals of clientelism—such as a high 
level of NPLs, or bank failures due to overstretched capital—that were seen in 
other countries in this study (notably Angola) were not evident in formal records 
in Tanzania. Clientelist practices are always opaque, but the very serious lack of 
5 Interview, Bank of Tanzania, July 2017.
6 Interviews, Tanzania Bankers Association and large commercial bank.
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reliable bank-level data on NPLs identified by the IMF in 2010 (IMF, 2010) further 
obscures the actual practices of lending and supervision in Tanzania in the 2000s. 
Further, the profitability of most of the banking sector, coupled with a lenient 
approach to the enforcement of capital requirements on the smallest banks, led to 
a very low level of bank failure in this first period.
The handful of bank failures in the early 2000s was mainly linked to the failure 
of the foreign parent companies but raised important issues about political dis-
cretion over licensing. Poor bank licensing practices were evident in a chain of 
decisions that led to a bank being closed down as a result of international money 
laundering concerns in 2017. This chain started with the Greenland Bank Tanzania 
Ltd which was established in 1995 and was a subsidiary of Greenland Bank 
(Uganda) Ltd. The parent bank was closed down by the Bank of Uganda after 
concerns about its banking practices and when the Tanzanian subsidiary was 
audited it was found to be insolvent. It was placed under compulsory liquidation 
and its assets were subsequently sold to Delphis Bank (T). Delphis Bank (T) was a 
subsidiary of the Kenyan Delphis Bank which became embroiled in a banking 
scandal involving Kenyan politicians and Kenyan and Tanzanian businesses 
(Dowden, 1993). It was closed down in 2003 and its main assets were quickly sold by 
the Deposit Insurance Fund to the Federal Bank of the Middle East Limited (FBME). 
The central bank was reported to have offered the FMBE quick access to gaining a 
banking licence, three branches, and premises and staff, and allowed FMBE to be 
operational in Tanzania within a few months (TanzaniaInvest, 2006).
The FMBE was looking to move its headquarters from the Cayman Islands 
following more stringent restrictions on the banking sector there (Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, 2016). FMBE became the largest bank in Tanzania, own-
ing over 20 per cent of banking assets by the end of the 2000s. Despite holding the 
largest market share and having its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, it remained 
an overseas bank and held 90 per cent of its assets in Cyprus and mainly served 
wealthy Russian clients (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2016). In 2014 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network identified the Bank as a concern for 
money laundering (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2016). It was subse-
quently blacklisted and a few weeks later, the Tanzanian headquarters were put 
under statutory management by the BoT. The failures to adequately regulate one 
of the largest banks in Tanzania for over a decade suggest that there were signifi-
cant weaknesses in the regulatory system.
In summary, during this first period, Tanzania can be described as an example 
of policy-driven convergence. This was a result of the influence of the inter-
national financial institutions in shaping the preferences of both regulators and 
politicians. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of international standards 
and enforcement of all banking regulation was quite weak. This was due to both 
technical and practical challenges of constructing new market-oriented super-
visory institutions from scratch. During the regulatory hiatus that ensued, poor 
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enforcement may also have served to facilitate some of the clientelism that 
occurred within the political system in the 2000s. Commercial banks had no 
interest in demanding faster Basel implementation and the high profitability 
and insularity of the banking system created a stable and relatively low-risk 
banking sector that generated huge profits for the banks but with limited devel-
opmental impact.
2009–17: Faster Implementation and Enforcement, Emergence 
of Differentiated Rules for Supervision
During the next period, Tanzania continued to signal strong support for adopting 
key elements of Basel but in addition the pace of implementation and nature of 
enforcement changed in important ways over the 2010s. In this period, Tanzania 
can be characterized as having a regulator- and market-driven approach to imple-
mentation. The global financial crisis that unfolded from 2008 played a key role 
in triggering a series of changes in incentives at the international level that influ-
enced all the actors. Changing approaches to the role of the market and state in 
development also affected the preferences of politicians and generated pressures 
for the creation of a more tailored approach to Basel implementation.
Two key factors in combination led to changes in the preferences of the regu-
lators towards a faster pace of implementation of Basel in the 2010s. The first was 
a change in the top leadership at the BoT. After the grand corruption scandals 
under Governor Bilali, President Kikwete selected a highly respected technocrat, 
Professor Benno Ndulu, to take on the position of governor at the BoT from 
2008. Although Beno Ndulu shared a similar background to Bilali in terms of his 
experience of working in an international financial institution, he was seen to be 
a governor who could restore the reputation of the bank and bring greater inde-
pendence to decision-making.7 He had been a few years in advance of Kikwete 
at the University of Dar es Salaam and interviewees reported that Kikwete held 
his professionalism in high regard.8 Governor Ndulu’s approach to the banking 
sector was pro-market and he demonstrated his ability to oppose demands from 
politicians for policies that he disagreed with, for example resisting calls for Tanzania 
to follow Kenya in introducing interest rate caps in 2016 (The Citizen, 2016a). 
His  pro-market approach was also evident in his decision to allow the mobile 
money market in Tanzania to develop initially with minimal regulation (African 
Business, 2017).
The second key factor that influenced the preference of the regulator was the 
emergence of a stronger agenda on harmonization of banking regulation across 
7 Interview, consultant and former Bank of Tanzania official, Dar es Salaam, April 2017.
8 Interview, consultant and former Bank of Tanzania official, Dar es Salaam, April 2017.
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the region that emanated from the East African Community. The initial commit-
ments to establishing an EAC custom union, common market, and monetary 
union was established in the EAC Treaty of 2000s but the agenda only started to 
take a concrete form from the end of the 2000s. The most important EAC 
 commitments on economic harmonization was the Common Market Protocol 
that was ratified in April 2010. The agreement envisaged the phased liberalization 
of trade in financial services and the elimination of restrictions on the free 
movement of capital. In 2013, this was followed by the EAC Monetary Union 
Protocol which committed all members to the creation of a single currency by 
2024 and the establishment of the preliminary elements of a regional financial 
architecture by 2018. Technical and financial support from the IFIs also shifted 
from national governments to supporting the harmonization agenda at the level 
of the EAC. A new project funded by the World Bank to promote harmoniza-
tion, the First Financial Sector Development and Regionalization Project for 
East African Community (EAC) to establish the foundation for financial sec-
tor integration among EAC Partner States, started in 2011 and was eight years 
in length.9
The Monetary Affairs Committee, consisting of the governors of the central 
banks of member states, had responsibility for overseeing the financial harmon-
ization agenda. Ndulu was firmly ensconced within international professional 
networks that supported the implementation of international banking regulation 
and he maintained close professional ties with the other governors on the 
Committee. While the MAC set the agenda, the details of implementation were 
determined by the MAC Finance sub-committee. The Tanzanian delegation was a 
group of officials from the BoT and the Ministry of Finance. It was tasked with 
developing country-level action plans for harmonizing banking regulation and 
moving forward with implementing Basel II and III.
While the top leadership at the bank was more actively supportive of Basel 
implementation than in the 2000s, other actors within the bank and government 
remained more cautious about the need for a faster implementation of Basel.10 
Tanzania had a history of slow financial reforms compared to Kenya and Uganda, 
typified by its resistance to opening its capital account, and Kenya and Uganda also 
proceeded towards Basel II and III adoption at a much faster pace than Tanzania. 
Nevertheless, the roadmap for harmonization was an important factor in leading 
to a more rapid pace of implementation of Basel compared to the 2000s. For 
example, when Kenya and Uganda adopted increased capital charges in 2014 
in   line with Basel II, this was an impetus to Tanzania to move forward with 
9 Component 2—Harmonization of Financial Laws and Regulations and component 3—Mutual 
Recognition of Supervisory Agencies were particularly pertinent.
10 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Dar es Salaam, July 2017.
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implementation.11,12 The consequences of these two factors in combination 
was that the preferences of the regulator supported a faster implementation of 
Basel II and III.
Preferences of the large commercial banks also changed in the second period. 
A significant reason for this was the greater pressure to conform to international 
banking standards emanating from the ‘parent’ banks of foreign commercial 
banks in Tanzania. The large banks were all concerned to improve AML compliance 
in Tanzania and saw Basel adoption as an important component in achieving 
this. In addition, a number of the larger banks were concerned about the rapid 
growth in the number of small commercial banks operating in Tanzania.13 While 
the average capital reserves in the banking sector were consistently higher than 
Basel standards, many of the smaller banks, and in particularly the Community 
Banks, were operating with much lower levels of capital. Moving to introduce 
the higher capital requirements contained in Basel II and III was therefore seen 
as a desirable way to drive consolidation within the banking sector in Tanzania 
(The Citizen, 2016b).
The larger commercial banks lobbied for faster Basel adoption through the 
Tanzania Bank Association (TBA). They established a sub-committee of the TBA 
called the Joint Committee on Regulation, Compliance and Risk. This was made 
up of the five largest banks. The purpose of the sub-group was to participate in the 
planning process for Basel adoption and they engaged in a regular dialogue with 
the BoT on specific aspects of Basel adoption.14 These large banks also influenced 
the BoT’s approach by running training programmes and sharing technical expertise 
on issues such as correspondent banking and AML compliance.15 However, the large 
influential banks were also in agreement that aspects of Basel II, such as internal 
ratings models, were not appropriate for the Tanzanian banking sector and they 
did not lobby for these to be included in the roadmap for Basel adoption.16 Thus, 
the combined interests of the larger banks and the institutionalized channels of 
influence played an important role in moving Tanzania towards a more rapid but 
selective implementation of Basel II and III.
While the changing preferences of the regulators and the commercial banks 
help to explain Tanzania’s more rapid, but selective, move to adopt and imple-
ment Basel II and III after 2009, preferences of politicians also changed in ways 
that encouraged a more tailored approach to Basel implementation and bank-
ing regulation to emerge. Tanzania started to return to a more statist approach 
11 Interview, Bank of Tanzania, July 2017.
12 The Bank of Tanzania issued a moratorium of three and five years for commercial banks and 
community banks to fully comply with the minimum capital requirements following lapsing deadlines 
in Kenya and Uganda.
13 Interviews, commercial banks, Dar es Salaam, April, July 2017.
14 Interviews, Tanzania Bankers Association, commercial banks, July 2017.
15 Interviews, commercial banks, April and July 2017.
16 Interviews, commercial banks, IMF, Dar es Salaam, April and July 2017.
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to economic policy, reflected in the adoption of five-year planning documents, 
a focus on industrialization, and a return to some elements of policy lending by 
state banks.
The kind of directed policy lending that had been at the core of the banking 
system during the socialist period was not viable as many of the potential financial 
control mechanisms of the state were no longer available. Nevertheless, growing 
doubts about benefits of the liberalization agenda led to political demands for a 
more active policy agenda on promoting financial inclusion and directed credit 
for priority sectors. The more interventionist approach first came into evidence in 
the wake of the global financial crisis in 2009, when the government introduced a 
stimulus package through the commercial banks and agreed to guarantee financial 
institutions for loans where repayment had become difficult because of the global 
downturn. The Ministry of Finance started to play a more active role in the devel-
opment of financial sector policy, and the Tanzania Financial Stability Forum was 
established in March 2013, bringing together financial regulators as well as the BoT 
and finance ministry representatives to oversee financial stability and regulation. 
A National Financial Inclusion Framework was launched in 2013.
This new approach culminated in the introduction of a more tailored approach 
towards the regulation of development and community banks in Tanzania. In 2010 
the BoT commissioned a consultant to start working on establishing a supervisory 
framework for DFIs, including specific prudential regulations (Bank of Tanzania, 
2010). The Association of African Development Finance Institutions had already 
developed a document setting out unique prudential standards, guidelines, and 
ratings system for African Development Banks that had been adopted in 2008 
(African Development Bank,  2009), and provided the basis for Tanzania’s new 
system.17 Development Finance Institutions Regulations were issued in 2011.
As a result, Tanzania Investment Bank was split into two parts—a non-deposit-
taking financial institution, the Tanzanian Investment Bank Development Bank, 
and a deposit-taking bank called Tanzania Investment Bank Corporate Finance 
Ltd. TIB Corporate Bank Limited gained its commercial bank licence in 2015. 
In 2015 the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank also gained a licence under 
the new Act. The IMF had consistently opposed the establishment of development 
banks in Tanzania (IMF, 2010, 2004) but the creation of specific regulation in the 
2010s brought a closer alignment between the formal systems of regulation and 
actual practices.
Another example of the emerging tailored approach towards finance was the 
increased pressure on pension funds to invest in priority sectors in the 2010. 
Aside from the development banks, Tanzania’s main vehicles of policy lending 
after liberalization had been the pension funds. In the 2000s, these had been 
operating with very little oversight. In 2005 the IMF found that ‘there is no law 
17 Interview, development finance institution, Dar es Salaam, July 2017.
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or  regulatory body monitoring financial reporting by pension fund’ (World 
Bank, 2005, p. 7). In the 2000s, the investment portfolios of the pension funds 
were not particularly targeted to priority sectors (IMF, 2010). However, funds were 
encouraged to provide investment for industrial projects (Ubwani, 2016). The 
significance of this was that there was less pressure on commercial banks to 
engage in directed lending.
The other area of banking regulation that underwent significant change after 
2010 was the enforcement of regulation on the community banks. Community 
banks had been established in Tanzania since 2003 when the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act was amended to give powers to the BoT to prescribe 
lower capital threshold for the establishment of regional and community banks. 
Throughout the 2000s, these banks had low profitability and poor asset quality, 
very high overhead costs with large boards, and a higher proportion of NPLs 
(IMF, 2016). Community banks were identified as the least compliant groups with 
international accounting standards, and they often failed to comply with credit 
risk disclosure requirements (World Bank,  2005). Despite these problems, no 
community bank was closed down for a lack of capital until the mid-2010s. The 
IMF argued that the BoT had exercised considerable regulatory forbearance 
in dealing with these banks. The BoT may have taken a more lenient approach 
because these banks were seen as critical for promoting a more inclusive banking 
sector and addressing the urgent needs of financial inclusion.18
From the mid-2010s, stricter regulations and enforcement were introduced 
on  community banks. New minimal capital requirements were introduced in 
2015, increasing from Tsh250 million ($154,036) to Tsh2 billion ($1.23 million). 
Community banks were given five years to address the capital shortfall that many 
were facing when operational risk charges were introduced in 2012. The decision 
to take a much stronger approach to poorly performing banks was set out by the 
new President John Magafuli in 2017 (All East Africa, 2017). Mbinga Community 
Bank was closed in May 2017 and a further five community banks were shut down 
in January 2018. This represents a major shift in approach to poorly capitalized 
community banks in Tanzania.
Thus, during this second period preferences of the regulator, large banks and 
politicians led to a faster pace of Basel implementation and greater enforcement. 
This was combined with a move to a more tailored approach to Basel that led to 
selective adoption of Basel II and III and the formalization of different regula-
tory systems for development banks (and pension funds). Overall, this brought 
greater alignment between de facto regulation and de jure practices in the sector. 
Despite the strengthening of formal institutions, there was still evidence of areas 
of regulatory forbearance (IMF, 2018). More stringent capital demands entailed 
by Basel II and III were introduced at a time when the economy was slowing 
18 Interviews, retired Bank of Tanzania officials, Dar es Salaam, July 2018, January 2019.
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down and NPLs were rising in banks of all sizes. This led to a much more chal-
lenging environment for banks overall. The continued willingness to adapt the 
formal regulatory system was in evidence in 2018 when the BoT issued a circular 
for loan classification and restructuring to give regulatory relief to banks in the 
face of rising levels of NPLs (IMF, 2018).
Conclusion
Despite the fact that international banking standards were designed to address 
the challenges of banking systems that bear little resemblance to Tanzania’s bank-
ing system in the 1990s, Tanzania sought to implement Basel standards from the 
outset of its reform process. This was a result of the influence of IFIs on the pref-
erences of politicians and regulators. Their formal commitment to adopt these 
standards did not, however, lead to an effective implementation of standards and 
indeed the regulatory framework was very weak across the 2000s. This was partly 
a reflection of the enormous technical and practical challenges of implementing a 
new regulatory system but also reflected the preferences of the commercial banks 
and some powerful groups of politicians whose interests were not served by 
stronger implementation.
From 2008 these underlying preferences changed in important ways. A number 
of shocks played a role in shaping these new preferences: the global financial crisis, 
the AML blacklisting, as well as the grand corruption scandals of the 2000s led to 
greater pressure to move forward with Basel II and III implementation and to push 
for greater enforcement. At the same time, changing ideas about the role of banks in 
Tanzania’s development led to a formalization of distinct regulations for directed 
lending through development finance institutions and social security funds. This 
helped to bring the actual practices of regulation into closer alignment with the for-
mal supervisory system. As the 2010s draw to a close, it appears that Tanzania has 
entered a new phase of regulation in the banking sector, with stricter enforcement 
of regulations. This has been accompanied by a more statist approach to the bank-
ing sector but so far this has gone hand in hand with a continued commitment to 
implementing Basel standards. The problem for countries like Tanzania that have 
ambitious plans for economic development is that Basel was designed primarily for 
the banking sectors of the richest countries in the world. Creating a system of 
banking regulation that can promote sustainable industrialization will require a 
much more fundamental rethink about the nature of risk and banking supervi-
sion than has taken place so far within Tanzania and beyond.
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Introduction
Two words reoccur when people describe the Kenyan financial and banking sector 
in recent years: ambitious and innovative. Kenya’s banking system made huge 
strides between 2003 and 2015, both in terms of overall financial depth and finan-
cial inclusion. However, efficiency, measured in terms of interest rate spreads, 
remains a major concern (Upadhyaya and Johnson,  2015). The rise of mobile 
banking (MPesa) and local banks following an agency banking model have led 
to  the transformation of both the payments and credit landscapes (Heyer and 
King, 2015).
Kenya was an early adopter of Basel II and III relative to other cases in this 
book. It has taken a selective approach, implementing some elements of Basel II 
and III, in a manner broadly consistent with selective adoption in other periph-
eral developing countries (Jones and Zeitz, 2017). This chapter sets out the level of 
adoption of Basel standards in Kenya in detail, and then traces the drivers of this 
adoption. It argues that Kenya’s high level of adoption of Basel standards is due 
to the alignment of government (politicians and regulators), banking sector, and 
donor interests. These groups share the view that financial growth, stability, 
and financial inclusion are priorities for economic development, and essential to 
the achievement of the country’s Vision 2030 goals—and the implementation of 
Basel standards is perceived to be critical to meeting these objectives. Unlike its 
neighbours Tanzania and Ethiopia, which take a more interventionist approach 
to the financial sector and have been cautious about implementing Basel stand-
ards, Kenya has always followed a capitalist path and there is little commitment to 
government-led industrial policy.
In this chapter, we show how Kenya’s adoption of Basel standards has been 
driven by the regulator and supported by both politicians and banks. The regulator, 
the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), has a high level of independence in both 
theory and practice. It has strong links to the international policy community 
and  is very receptive to international policy ideas. Since 2003, the incumbent 
politicians have also been internationally oriented and keen to adopt the latest 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/02/20, SPi
Kenya 219
international standards. Meanwhile, as the banking sector is relatively well 
cap italized, there has been little opposition to Basel Adoption from banks, with some 
international and large local banks being mildly in favour of it. There is evidence 
to suggest that enforcement of regulations may have been lax before 2015, but this 
may be due to capacity issues and not a form of mock compliance. While more 
stringent application of the rules since 2015 has met with some resistance from 
banks and politicians, the commencement of other international regulations like 
IFRS9 reporting standards means that banks see increased compliance with inter-
national standards as a fait accompli. In terms of our analytical framework, Kenya 
is an example of regulator-driven convergence.
The analysis draws chiefly on primary sources: a systematic review of regulatory 
texts, central bank publications, newspapers, and policy documents; and sixteen 
interviews conducted between April and December 2017 with CBK employees, 
ex-central bank regulators, ex-Treasury officials, policy experts on the financial 
sector, ex-Monetary Policy Committee officials, compliance professionals at banks, 
representatives of the Kenya Bankers’ Association, and experts from the World 
Bank. Interview data is cited in ways that preserve the anonymity of interviewees.
Political economy context: the evolution  
of Kenya’s banking sector
Kenya is one of the largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and a regional 
hub in East Africa, and is known for its vibrant but fragile democracy. In 2013, 
Kenya was classified as a lower-middle-income country, after rebasing its GDP 
(Handjiski et al., 2016).
The economy is still largely dependent on agriculture, which contributed to 
30 per cent of GDP in 2015 (KIPPRA, 2016). While manufacturing growth is slug-
gish, the services sector has been performing well, and the depth of the financial 
sector and stock market capitalization are very high compared to other countries 
with the same level of GDP, both in the region and across the world (see Table 9.1).
At the time of independence, Kenya was one of the few African countries to 
already have a diversified banking sector with both foreign and local banks and 
an established stock market (Upadhyaya, 2011). Unlike many developing countries, 
in Kenya there was no wholesale nationalization of banks after independence. 
International and local private banks continued to operate, though state-owned 
banks and development finance institutions were established (Upadhyaya and 
Johnson,  2015). This reflects the international orientation of the Kenyan gov-
ernment that has persisted since independence. The banking sector has gone 
through a series of reforms, which began with the liberalization of interest rates 
and exchange rates in the 1990s (Ndung’u and Ngugi, 1999). However, by 2000, 
the sector remained extremely fragile: the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
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for three government-owned banks ranged from 42 per cent to 72 per cent 
(Upadhyaya and Johnson, 2015). Since then, banking regulations and guidelines 
have been continuously amended to strengthen supervision and regulation 
(Dafe, 2014). The main changes have been the introduction of guidelines requir-
ing banks to conform to the various capital stipulations in line with the Basel 
Capital Accord, and restricting lending to insiders to 20 per cent of core capital 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2000).1
The most significant impact of strengthening regulation and supervision has 
been on the quality of banking assets. The overall NPL ratio has reduced signifi-
cantly from 2000 to 2012 from a high of 37 per cent to 5 per cent, though there has 
been a slight increase thereafter to 6.8 per cent by 2015 (Figure  9.1). This can 
partly be attributed to weaker macroeconomic conditions, but also to more strin-
gent application of regulations.2 Between 2007 and 2014, the banking sector in 
1 This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
2 This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Table 9.1 Kenya: key indicators
Kenya  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 1508
Bank assets (current US$) 31 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 43.8
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP, 2014) 50
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 32.7
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 13.7
Polity IV score (2017) 9
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); 
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Figure 9.1 Kenya: non-performing loans (NPLs) (% total loans).
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2015, 2014, 2014, 2002)
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Kenya was relatively stable with only one bank failure. However, in 2015, three 
banks were put under CBK statutory management, testing the reputation of other 
private banks (Ngugi, 2016).
There has also been an improvement in banks’ capital adequacy ratios (see 
Figure 9.2). The ratio of total capital to total risk-weighted assets increased from 
17 per cent (in 2000) to 23 per cent (in 2012) and then reduced to 19 per cent (in 
2015), still staying above the required minimum ratio of 14.5 per cent (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2015). Interest rate spreads decreased from 14.24 per cent in 2000 
to 7.8 per cent in 2005, but have remained steady since then—economists and 
policymakers generally agree that the interest rate spread in Kenya is high.3 The 
banking sector in Kenya has a low concentration by regional standards, with an 
HH index of 0.05 in 2012 (see Figure 9.3), and a spread of ownership between 
foreign-, local-, and government-owned banks (Upadhyaya and Johnson, 2015). 
However, profitability of the banking sector has been steadily increasing and the 
return on assets has risen from 0.8 per cent in 2000 to 3.5 per cent in 2011, with 
a slight drop to 2.9 per cent in 2015. This shows that sustained interest rate mar-
gins and spreads have allowed banks to maintain high profit margins. The other 
key challenges relate to the high level of bank assets in government securities, 
3 In September 2016, MPs passed a law capping the interest rate spread. Thereafter there has been a 
drying-up of credit to the private sector which can be attributed to both the rate cap and general eco-









































































Capital Adequacy Ratio Non-performing Loans (%)
Figure 9.2 Kenya: capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and non-performing loans (NPLs).
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators Database, IMF (2018)
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a low level of credit to key sectors including agriculture and infrastructure, and 
low overall savings (Upadhyaya and Johnson, 2015).
Kenya has become an inspiration globally because of the huge strides it has 
made in financial inclusion. The population that is included in formal finance 
has jumped from 26.7 per cent in 2006 to 75.3 per cent in 2016 (Central Bank of 
Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, and FSD Kenya,  2016). This can 
largely be attributed to the rise of mobile money, and Equity Bank and other local 
banks following the agency banking model (Johnson and Arnold, 2012).
Basel adoption, implementation, and enforcement
While Kenya was a relatively late adopter of Basel I, it has made significant efforts 
to adopt and implement Basel II and Basel III and to comply with the Basel Core 
Principles. This section explains that while the level of adoption and implementa-
tion is high, the international standards have been adapted to suit the particular 
needs of the Kenyan banking sector.
Basel I adoption
Kenya began implementing Basel I in the early 1990s. Some of these requirements 
were included in the Banking (Amendment) Act of 1994, including the reduction 
of the ratio of single borrower limit to core capital from 100 per cent to 25 per cent 
(Central Bank of Kenya,  1996, 1995). In response to a spate of bank failures 
by  1998, several changes were brought into force in 1999, including detailed 
guidelines on provisioning and regulatory ratios based on Basel I (Central Bank 
of Kenya, 1999). Thus, while Kenya started the process of adopting some of the 
Basel requirements as early as 1994, the main requirements regarding ratios were 














































Figure 9.3 Kenya: banking sector concentration (asset share of the five biggest banks).
Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank (2018)
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Basel II adoption
In 2006, the CBK issued new prudential guidelines. While these guidelines do not 
mention Basel regulations explicitly, the changes were designed to strengthen 
Kenyan regulations in line with Basel I in preparation for Basel II. The main 
changes included highlighting differences between core capital (Tier 1) and sup-
plementary capital; defining four risk weights for classifying balance sheet assets 
(the standardized approach to credit risk); and the definition of conversion fac-
tors for interest rate and exchange rate contracts based on residual maturity 
periods for market risk (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006).
The Basel Committee had noted that the implementation of Basel II may not be 
a priority for non-members like Kenya (Mwega, 2014). However, CBK documents 
revealed that in 2007 and 2008, it was developing a framework and preparing the 
prerequisite supervisory infrastructure to implement Basel II. In 2008, the CBK 
carried out a Basel II implementation survey that highlighted that the key chal-
lenges to implementation were the lack of both human resources and sufficiently 
advanced IT systems. The CBK noted that many of the relevant institutions did 
not have requisite five-year data to use for their internal models (Central Bank of 
Kenya, 2008). This survey was probably a major factor in the CBK’s decision to 
not make internal models compulsory, but to instead recommend that banks 
use the standardized approach to credit risk; however, with Kenya, government 
securities were given a zero rating even though they are not AAA risk rated.4
New prudential guidelines were issued in 2013, and included many elements of 
Basel II and some of Basel III (see Table 9.2). The main additions to the credit risk 
regulations were rules on operational and market risk. In both cases the standard-
ized approach was implemented.5 The 2013 prudential guidelines also specify 
liquidity requirements, but Kenya has not adopted the liquidity coverage ratio 
that is part of Basel III. In 2013 the CBK also issued risk management guidelines 
and developed a risk-based framework for supervision. While banks were required 
to report their financial statements on a quarterly basis since 2006, stress testing 
of banks for supervision has been done since 2015. However, the ICAAP reporting 
which was in the 2013 guidelines was only enforced in 2017.
Basel III adoption
The CBK, while continuing to implement Basel II, made a series of changes to 
ensure that Kenya was also moving towards adopting elements of Basel III, with 
the most significant modifications being implemented in 2013.
4 Interview 7—Senior Manager, accounting firm, Nairobi, 16 May 2017.
5 Operational risk-weighted assets equivalent is calculated as 15 per cent of average gross income 
for three years multiplied by 12.5 (inverse of 8 per cent). Interview 7—Senior Manager, accounting 
firm, Nairobi, 16 May 2017.
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The main change in relation to Basel III was the inclusion of a capital conserva-
tion buffer of 2.5 per cent applicable to all banks (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013), 
which they were given twenty-four months to comply with (Central Bank of 
Kenya, 2013, p. 88). The CBK has decided not to implement several elements of 
Basel III, including contingency capital ratios, the Basel III liquidity ratios, and 
countercyclical macroprudential regulations,6 all of which were perceived by the 
regulator as less relevant to the Kenyan banking system.7 Unlike some countries, 
the Kenyan central bank decided not to make exceptions for small banks or 
development finance institutions.
Compliance with Basel Core Principles
In 2002, a regulation self-assessment revealed that Kenya had fully complied with 
twelve of the twenty-five Basel Core Principles. The CBK’s report notes that it had 
not fully implemented twelve other core principles, while one was seen as irrele-
vant to the Kenyan context (Central Bank of Kenya, 2002).8 In the FSAP 2009 
Update conducted by the World Bank, the BCP Detailed Assessment Report 
stated that the CBK had ‘made substantial progress in addressing the deficiencies 
highlighted in the 2003 FSAP’ (World Bank, 2013).9
6 Interview 6—Former Treasury official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017; Interview 11—Senior Banker, pan-
African Bank, Nairobi, 19 May 2017.
7 Interview 14—Senior Official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
8 In 2002, the requirement of the CBK to ensure that banks adequately control market risks was 
considered not to be applicable in the Kenyan environment, but by 2007 it was included in the CBK’s 
roadmap to implement Basel II.
9 The WB’s 2005 Financial Sector Assessment report which is based on 2003 FSAP of Kenya men-
tions that an assessment of compliance with Basel Core Principles was done, but the result is not 
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Overall, Kenya has made significant progress in adopting and implementing 
the Basel principles, especially compared to other African countries (Marchettini 
et al., 2015). In particular, the CBK has stood out for its high level of operational 
independence, substantial powers, and engagement in consolidated supervision 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 1997).10 Continuous improvements have meant that the 
number of principles that were assessed as Compliant or Largely Compliant 
increased from sixteen in 2003 to eighteen in March 2013 (World Bank, 2013).
All this means that Kenya is a relatively high adopter of Basel II and Basel III, 
and exhibits a high level of compliance with the Basel Core Principles. Furthermore, 
it has the legal authority to ensure its regulations are enforced.11 This said, there 
is  evidence that despite good adoption of the regulations, enforcement did not 
happen in full, particularly before 2015, which interviewees suggest was the result 
of a lack of resources rather than lack of intent and therefore not a form of mock 
compliance.
The political economy of Basel adoption, implementation,  
and compliance
This section discusses the specific contextual factors that resulted in the inter-
national orientation of politicians, regulators, and banks, and allowed their interests 
to align in support of Basel implementation.
Politicians
In 2003, Mwai Kibaki succeeded Daniel arap Moi to become the third president 
of Kenya, as head of the NARC—the National Rainbow Coalition. In the early 
years, the government had a broad mandate and there was a lot of optimism. This 
sense of hopefulness was captured in the chants of ‘Yote yawezena bila Moi 
(everything is possible without Moi)’ (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006), and pro-
vided the impetus for a drive to change both the structures of government and 
the relationship between the government and private sector.
Under Kibaki’s government, Kenya embarked on an ambitious programme of 
reform. Financial sector reform constituted a key part of the government’s com-
mitment to growth, which included the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth 
discussed in the report that is available online. We have not found a copy of any report based on the 
2009 FSAP on the WB web page.
10 Interview 14—Senior Official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
11 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017; Interview 2—former Senior Banker, foreign-
owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017.
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and Employment Creation (ERS) (Republic of Kenya, 2003) and the Kenya Vision 
2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2007). The ERS explicitly acknowledged that a vibrant 
financial sector was necessary in order to mobilize the domestic resources neces-
sary for investment, but equally recognized that the performance of the financial 
sector was constrained by the high level of NPLs prevalent in 2002 (Republic of 
Kenya,  2003, p. 15). Furthermore, both Treasury and central bank officials had 
internalized some of the messages coming from IFIs that the two goals of financial 
stability and financial inclusion were intertwined and crucial for development 
and growth.12,13 In this context, the goals of international standards like Basel, 
which seek to improve the regulation, supervision, and risk management of banks, 
matched those of the government in its attempt to clean up the banking sector.
Unlike many developing countries, in Kenya successive governments have not 
pursued an industrial policy that includes directed lending to specific industries. 
Instead, bank lending in Kenya has remained market-driven, and Basel regula-
tions are seen to be supporting banks’ own efforts rather than in conflict with 
government policy.14 Recent government documents, including the Sector Plan 
for Financial Services 2013–17, are explicit in saying that the rationale for follow-
ing international standards is to increase stability within the banking sector: ‘The 
CBK used the BIS and IMF defined financial soundness indicators to monitor and 
evaluate the soundness of financial institutions’ (Republic of Kenya, 2003, p. 7).
The international orientation of government policy is also highlighted by the 
close involvement of international consulting firms in the development of the 
national economic strategy, and the policy intention to turn Nairobi into a finan-
cial services hub.15 While there was broad consultation with Kenyan citizens 
when developing Vision 2030, it was openly acknowledged that international 
consulting firms like McKinsey were strongly involved in its development, as well 
as the roadmaps to achieving its goals (Wakiaga, 2015).
The plan to turn Nairobi into a regional finance hub lay at the heart of 
Vision 2030, in plans to establish the Nairobi International Financial Centre. The 
Kenyan government views the Nairobi International Financial Centre as a key 
development tool to increase investment and create employment (Republic of 
Kenya, 2013). While academics have highlighted that the impact could be nega-
tive for development (Waris, 2014), the government’s commitment to this project 
has been steadfast. In July 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed the Nairobi 
International Financial Centre Act, providing the legal framework to facilitate its 
development (Mwaniki, 2017).
12 Interview 6—former Treasury official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017.
13 Treasury and ministry of finance are used interchangeably.
14 Interview 14—senior official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
15 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017; Interview 13—senior banker, large privately 
owned local bank, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
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Interviews and newspaper articles revealed that this policy goal was a key 
driver of recent moves to implement Basel II and III standards. As an interviewee 
noted, ‘If we want Nairobi as a financial hub, players must a have a certain status’.16 
When launching the draft bill for the NFIC, the Cabinet Secretary to the National 
Treasury, Henry Rotich, reiterated that a key source of competitive advantage 
for the NFIC is that ‘Kenya has a robust legal and regulatory framework based 
on international best practices’ (Rotich,  2016). Speaking at the launch of the 
Capital Markets Authority Strategic plan in July 2018, Rotich again reiterated 
the  government’s commitment to establish the Nairobi International Financial 
Centre before the end of 2018 (Amadala, 2018). Thus, while the early impetus for 
Basel adoption came from the desire to clean up the banking sector, more recent 
moves have been motivated by the desire to create an internationally recognized 
financial hub.
Regulator: the Central Bank of Kenya
While the international orientation of the government provided a favourable 
policy context for adoption, it was the regulator—the Central Bank of Kenya—
that was the driving force behind the implementation of Basel and other inter-
national banking standards. Crucially, and in contrast to many other case studies 
in this book, the CBK has enjoyed a high level of autonomy in setting regulations, 
which has given it the leeway needed to adopt and implement Basel standards.
This trend was entrenched under Kibaki, a very hands-off president who 
respected independent offices including that of the Central Bank Governor, and 
gave Treasury and central bank officials the space to drive regulatory reforms.17 
One interviewee stressed that President Kibaki ‘gave a free hand which ensured 
reforms took off ’.18 Still, there was definitely some pushback from the politicians, 
particularly to the independence of the central bank. This quote from Cheserem’s 
autobiography highlights some of the tensions:
At the time of my appointment as Governor in July 1993, the office of Governor 
did not have safety of tenure . . . I faced a lot of resistance in my quest for CBK 
independence. A number of people, especially those in government, questioned 
the wisdom of granting independence to the bank. (Cheserem, 2006, p. 93)
The length of time it took to entrench the independence of the governor, between 
1997 and 2006, shows the process was not easy, but nevertheless it did happen. 
16 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017.
17 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017.
18 Interview 13—senior banker, large privately owned local bank, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
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Furthermore, the independence of all government institutions was strengthened 
under the very progressive Constitution that was passed in Kenya in 2010.19
Compared to many of the case studies in this book, the Kenyan regulator has 
substantial autonomy over the country’s banks. Although several politicians do 
own banks, these are smaller organizations often referred to as ‘Tier 3’ banks 
within Kenya, and they do not have the level of political clout required to push 
back against regulatory changes.
That said, regulators are not completely unencumbered by politics. There is 
evidence of regulatory forbearance before 2015, as stricter enforcement of regula-
tions only after Dr Patrick Njoroge took office in June 2015 led to the closure of 
three banks in late 2015 and early 2016. There is also evidence that politicians 
are trying to push through changes in the CBK Act in order to reduce the powers 
of the governor—but so far these efforts have not been successful (Some and 
Ngirachu, 2017).
International orientation of the central bank
The CBK viewed the implementation of international standards as integral to the 
broader goals of economic development. A regulator notes, the ‘Adoption of BCPs 
or global standards will enable Kenya [to] achieve aspirations of Vision 2030 
which include: improving financial stability; enhancing efficiency in delivery of 
credit and other financial services; promoting East African Community financial 
services integration to facilitate trade, enable cross-border operations and move-
ment of capital; and achieving a well-functioning financial system safeguarding 
the economy from external shocks, and establishing Kenya as a leading financial 
centre in Eastern and Southern Africa’.20
Three specific factors help to account for the CBK’s determination to implement 
Basel standards. First is the extreme fragility of the banking sector in the early 
2000s; second, the view that improved regulation is essential to fostering growth 
within the financial sector; and third, the internationally oriented nature of CBK 
governors, who have been influenced both by the IFIs and their peers.
The fragility of the banking sector, reflected in very high levels of NPLs and 
several bank failures in 2004/5, provided the initial impetus for Basel implemen-
tation. There was widespread agreement among regulators that an inclusive and 
stable financial system was needed to support economic growth (Republic of 
Kenya, 2003). Reformist technocrats within the CBK viewed international stand-
ards as an aspiration worth achieving, and they perceived adherence to these 
standards as a basis for ensuring financial stability and inclusion.21 This perspective 
is captured in a speech by the CBK governor Ndung’u, who in a speech to banks 
19 Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
20 Interview 14—senior official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
21 Interview 4—former CBK MPC member, Nairobi, 4 May 2017.
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in 2013 noted: ‘As you expand and innovate, it behoves you to ensure that adequate 
risk management is employed. It is with this in mind that the central banks have 
continuously adapted international best practices to ensure that financial stability 
is maintained’ (Ndung’u,  2017). In the Kenyan context, international standard 
setting bodies were a source of ideas, rather than a source of pressure.22
To understand why successive central bank governors have been keen to imple-
ment international standards, it is instructive to examine their career trajectories 
and the extent to which they are connected to international policy debates through-
out their careers, their engagement in transnational professional networks, and 
their participation in international training programmes. Examining the careers 
of central bank governors reveals that nearly all of them have a high level of 
embeddedness in international networks and close ties with IFIs (Table 9.3). Prior 
to his appointment as governor, Micah Cheserem worked for a multinational cor-
poration outside Kenya. He notes in his autobiography that he agreed with many 
of the ideas promoted by the IMF and World Bank. ‘Some  people in government 
accused me of being too close to the IMF. I readily agreed with them. I do not 
deny that I was close but I must say that I accepted their conditionalities only if 
they made economic sense’ (Cheserem, 2006, pp. 123, 124).
Dr Andrew Mullei worked for the IMF between 1974 and 1981, with a short 
stint at the UNECA in 1978. Dr Njuguna Ndung’u, while not working directly 
for  the IMF or World Bank, worked for many years for the African Economic 
Research Consortium, which was funded by the World Bank but was also a 
forum for researchers across the world to come together to exchange ideas on 
economic development issues. Dr Patrick Njoroge, who began his term in 2015, 
had also worked for the IMF since 1995. The one exception was Nahashon 
Nyagah, who grew through the ranks of the CBK. During his short tenure he did 
not carry out many changes in regulation, but he was instrumental in developing 
the bond market.23
22 Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
23 Interview 13—senior banker, large privately owned local bank, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
Table 9.3 Kenya: level of embeddedness of central bank governors
Name Tenure Level of embeddedness in international 
networks
Mr Micah Cheserem 1993–2001 High
Nahashon Nyagah 2001–3 Low
Andrew Mullei 2003–7 High
Njuguna Ndung’u 2007–15 High
Patrick Ngugi Njoroge 2015–Incumbent High
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The central bank governors and senior staff have further been engaged 
in transnational professional networks, particularly since the start of Governor 
Ndung’u’s tenure. There were several cross-border visits between the central 
bank governors of East Africa, which led to an exchange of ideas and declar-
ations of intent to adopt international best practices.24 The CBK is also involved 
in several international networks, including the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
through the FSB’s Regional Consultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) through the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESMAALG), and the Association of African 
Central Banks.25
The CBK staff have also been exposed to high levels of international training 
on regulatory issues.26 The role of the IMF’s East Africa Technical Assistance 
Centre (East AFRITAC) should be highlighted here. East AFRITAC has been rec-
ognized in several of the CBK reports as providing training, particularly on 
regional supervision (Central Bank of Kenya, 2014). Membership of these trans-
national professional networks and participation in international training courses 
provide fertile ground for the exchange of ideas and emulation of international 
best practices.
Government engagement with IFIs
Although not in the driving seat, the IMF, the World Bank, and DFID have played 
an instrumental role in Kenya’s implementation of Basel standards. Since the 
Kibaki government took office in 2003, the government has worked closely with 
the IMF and World Bank. Alongside Vision 2030 and other government eco-
nomic blueprints, the two institutions developed the Financial and Legal Sector 
Technical Assistance Programme (FLSTAP), a broad-based lending programme 
to assist the Kenyan government in identifying weaknesses in the financial sector. 
The FLSTAP was agreed between the World Bank and the government in 2004,27 
and was based on the Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAPs) that 
were conducted by the WB and IMF in 2003 and again in 2009. The broad agenda 
of the World Bank, which is captured in the publication ‘Making Finance Work 
for Africa’, centres on its view that stability, certainty, and transparency are corner-
stones for an efficient financial system (Honohan and Beck,  2007). Interviews 
support the idea that politicians and regulators in Kenya took on the World Bank’s 
24 Interview 2—former senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017.
25 Interview 14—senior official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
26 Interview 13—senior banker, large privately owned local bank, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
27 FLSTAP stands for Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Project, which was a lending 
programme of the World Bank.
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position, which helps to explain their desire to incorporate financial growth, 
financial stability, and financial inclusion in broader economic goals.28
Interviews also revealed that in 2003, there was a willingness on the part of the 
Kenyan government to work with IFIs in a way that had not been the case for a 
long time.29,30 There was an explicit recognition that the high level of NPLs in 
government-owned banks was not sustainable (Republic of Kenya, 2003).
It is clear that the World Bank, the IMF, and other donors like DFID played an 
instrumental role in the adoption of international banking standards in Kenya.31 
Many of the changes made to ensure compliance with the Basel Core Principles 
and implement Basel standards were brought in by the Government of Kenya and 
funded through the FLSTAP.32 DFID co-funded this programme as part of its 
support to private sector development, and because it was seen as integral to 
attaining financial inclusion. This reflected a wider emphasis placed by the UK 
government on the implementation of international financial standards, as the 
Prime Minister of the UK at that time, Gordon Brown, was at the forefront of 
the global move towards Reporting on Standards and Codes.33
Although there was some disagreement between the government and World 
Bank on the privatization of government-owned banks, there was genuine enthu-
siasm among government officials for the regulatory agenda of the FLSTAP.34 
Some interviewees explained that the IFIs initially tried to push through 
regulatory reforms via consultants, but after they changed tactics and developed 
the capacity of Kenyans within the Treasury and central bank, the project took off.35 
While the World Bank and IMF did not drive adoption of the standards, the 
CBK took their recommendations seriously, and ‘implementation of the 2003 
recommendations resulted in ceding of operational supervisory powers from 
the Ministry of Finance to CBK. And the 2009 FSAP recommendations led 
to  the development of a legal and regulatory framework for consolidated 
supervision’.36
28 Interview 6—former Treasury official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017; Interview 14—senior official, Central 
Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
29 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017.
30 There was a recognition that at a very low level of inclusion, higher inclusion can lead to 
increased stability as banks have a larger depositors base. But, in turn, inclusion needs stability as 
increased stability allows depositors to trust banks (Interview 6—former Treasury official, Nairobi, 
9 May 2017).
31 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017; Interview 5—senior 
World Bank official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017.
32 Interview 6—former Treasury official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017; Interview 3—former senior official, 
CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017; Interview 5—senior World Bank official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017; Interview 
4—former CBK MPC member, Nairobi, 4 May 2017.
33 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017.
34 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017; Interview 12—for-
mer senior official, World Bank, Oxford, 8 June 2017.
35 Interview 10—senior manager, financial sector donor, Nairobi, 18 May 2017.
36 Interview 14—senior official, Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 14 August 2017.
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Adopting Basel capital standards was seen by the IFIs as one part of the broader 
institutional architecture needed to improve the financial system.37 Other important 
tools included the building of a credit registry, regulations for microfinance insti-
tutions, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives, which were also enacted during 
this period.38 The development of the credit registry was seen as key to helping 
reduce NPLs in the system.39 A project implementation report dated 2013 stated 
that fifteen Kenyan laws had been drafted and passed with the support of this 
project (World Bank, 2013). The World Bank and IMF were also key to providing 
training on Basel, discussed below. Other institutions such as DFID and FSD 
Kenya were important in providing support for other regulations related to the 
financial sector.
Therefore, while the CBK was the driving force as a regulator in ensuring adop-
tion of Basel standards, IFIs played an important role alongside it. They were keen 
to support the broader reform of the financial sector, and their recommendations 
were crucial to providing information and capacity-building on these issues.
Role of the East African Community
In some countries, including Rwanda, regional integration dynamics have pro-
vided impetus for the implementation of international standards. Although Kenya 
has played a leading role in the development of the East African Community, this 
does not appear to have been a motivator for Basel implementation.
Central banks from three East African countries have been cooperating with 
each other to ensure joint supervision of banks. The East African Community 
web page states: ‘With this regard, moving towards legal and regulatory harmon-
ization against the international standards known as the Basel Core Principles 
(BCPs) is critical to achieve an effective functioning of a single market in banking 
services’ (East African Community, n.d.). In practice, however, interviews indi-
cated that there was little evidence that the EAC was a driving force in adopting 
Basel. One interviewee reflected that ‘Kenya is the driver of standards and there 
are so many trade conflicts between the East African Community members that 
issues like Basel are not pushed at EAC level’.40 There is a lot of positive goodwill 
at the very top level with governors of the different East African countries meet-
ing in different forums, but lower down and at the EAC secretariat there doesn’t 
seem to be any movement.41
37 Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
38 Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
39 Interview 5—senior World Bank official, Nairobi, 9 May 2017.
40 Interview 15—financial sector consultant and former senior banker, foreign-owned bank, 
Nairobi, 13 December 2017.
41 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017.
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Market factors
The evidence gathered from interviews suggests that while international or 
 private banks did not lobby for Basel standards to be adopted—because comply-
ing with these standards would be resource-intensive—they were not averse to it 
either. To understand the reaction of banks in Kenya, it is helpful to examine 
the  composition of the banking sector when each set of Basel standards was 
introduced (Table 9.4). When Basel I and II were introduced, the largest banks by 
asset share were foreign- and government-owned (FOB and GOB, respectively). 
International banks were already at different stages of adopting Basel II and III, 
because of their head office reporting requirements, so the introduction of these 
standards in Kenya did not pose problems for them.42 KCB, a GOB, reflects the 
broad improvement in NPLs reflected in the Kenyan banking sector between 
2005 and 2012 and the introduction of a risk management framework in line with 
international best practices was a key reason for this reduction.43 The government 
partially privatized the bank and hired two CEOs with experience from foreign-
owned banks—Gareth Terry Davidson and Martin Oduor-Otieno—to head a 
turnaround and expansion strategy. A reading of Martin Oduor-Otieno’s biog-
raphy shows that the government and board viewed a reduction in NPLs as essen-
tial to KCB’s expansion strategy (Muluka et al., 2012). While there is no specific 
reference to Basel, it is highlighted that one of the key reasons why Martin Oduor-
Otieno was selected to join KCB was because ‘He had the special advantages that 
he was overseeing projects in Barclays which revolved around getting the multi-
national operations in Africa to adopt higher governance standards, brought 
about by Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This, as well as the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards, meant that his recruitment into KCB would raise 
the bank’s operations to international best practices. That international exposure 
was also important to a bank that wanted to branch across borders’ (Muluka et al., 
2012, p. 148).
By 2010, when Basel III started to be introduced, there had been a major shift 
in ownership due to the rise of local privately owned banks (LPOBs), including 
Equity Bank. Crucially, large local banks like Equity Bank were expanding regionally 
and they viewed adopting international standards as aligned with their interests.44 
As of the end of 2014, eleven Kenyan banks had subsidiaries across branches 
within the EAC region and South Sudan. The key banks were: KCB, Equity Bank, 
Cooperative Bank, Imperial Bank, Diamond Trust Bank, CBA, NIC, and I&M 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2014; Irungu, 2015).
42 Interview 2—former senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017; Interview 8—
senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 16 May 2017.
43 Interview 16—former senior banker, government-owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2018.
44 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017; Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, 
Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
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Banks expanding across the region viewed a domestic regulatory architec-
ture based on international standards as a ‘defence mechanism’ that allowed 
them to expand into other jurisdictions without suspicion.45 As articulated by 
the CEO of one private bank, ‘One fear we have as we expand is that regulation 
will be different in different jurisdictions. One therefore wonders if we will be 
treated differently and we therefore prefer to work within the international 
best practice regulation’.46 These newly emerging banks also expected the 
implementation of Basel standards to make it easier to develop and retain cor-
respondent relationships with foreign banks.47 As Kenyan banks have expanded 
regionally, the CBK has set up supervisory colleges to strengthen cross-border 
banking supervision. These colleges manage the risks posed by Kenyan banks’ 
presence abroad and base their work on the Basel Core Principles (Republic of 
Kenya, 2012).
A recent study on the credit risk approaches in Basel II and on the enhance-
ment of capital quality and the introduction of capital buffers in Basel III found 
that the implementation of these requirements in 2013 led to a drop in bank cap-
ital ratios, particularly due to the inclusion of market risk and operational risk in 
calculating capital requirements. However, since the majority of banks in Kenya 
were above the minimum 14.5 per cent ratio, the impact of the increase in capital 
due to these requirements was not significant (Ambasana,  2015). The fact that 
Kenyan banks were well capitalized because of steady increases in capital require-
ments from 1998 onwards helps explain why banks in Kenya have not opposed 
some of the more complicated Basel II requirements.
45 Interview 3—former senior official, CBK, Nairobi, 27 April 2017.
46 Remarks by Mr John Gachora, CEO of NIC Bank at KBA/SOAS/UoN conference, Nairobi, 
8 December 2017.
47 Interview 1—KBA official, Nairobi, 4 April 2017; Interview 2—former senior banker, foreign-
owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017; Interview 4—former CBK MPC member, Nairobi, 4 May 2017.
Table 9.4 Kenya: top three banks at different stages of Basel adoption





Top three banks in Kenya  
(at beginning of 
implementation)





Basel II 2004 2006–13 Barclays Bank (FOB)
Standard Chartered (FOB)
KCB (GOB)
Basel III 2010 2013 onwards KCB (GOB)
Equity (LPOB)
Cooperative (LPOB)
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Interviews showed that smaller banks were generally well capitalized, but 
struggled with adopting the risk-based guidelines mainly because of human 
resource constraints.48 As one respondent remarked, in 2006 when it became 
mandatory for all banks to have a risk manager, there were only three qualified 
risk managers in Kenya and over forty banks.49 Some regulations like the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Process (ICAAP) have been requirements since 2013, but the 
CBK only began enforcing them in 2017. There is some evidence that smaller 
banks found it harder to develop these reports than larger banks because of their 
systems’ inability to generate client-specific data.50 However these smaller banks 
were not strong enough to push back on these regulations. Overall, then, the CBK 
was not constrained by the banks in its push for adoption of Basel.
Conclusion
Kenya is a selective adopter of Basel standards. It has not adopted the standards 
fully but selected those parts of Basel II and Basel III that are relevant to its 
 circumstances.51 In terms of our analytical framework, the dynamics in Kenya 
illustrate how regulator-driven convergence can lead to implementation when 
supported by politicians and banks. Perhaps because the regulator has greater 
institutional capacity than in countries like WAEMU and Rwanda, so understands 
the challenges posed by Basel standards, it has taken a more selective approach 
to implementation.
The regulator received strong support from the politicians and wider govern-
ment. Politicians from the main parties, as well as senior government officials, 
are  strongly steeped in a market-led view of economic development, and they 
staunchly support the internationalization of the financial sector, which they 
believe is at the heart of the development process. As a result, even when govern-
ments have changed, key projects like the creation of the Nairobi International 
Financial Centre have been carried through. This has led them to support the 
CBK’s implementation of international standards, including Basel. The inter-
national orientation of successive central bank governors and their embedded-
ness in international networks highlights the role of ideas in driving Basel 
adoption and implementation. IFIs, particularly the IMF and World Bank, have 
been instrumental, providing information and training about the adoption of 
48 Interview 2—former senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017.
49 Interview 2—former senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 5 April 2017.
50 Interview 8—senior banker, foreign-owned bank, Nairobi, 16 May 2017; Interview 9—senior 
banker, small privately owned local bank, Nairobi, 17 May 2017; Interview 13—senior banker, large 
privately owned local bank, Nairobi, 14 September 2017.
51 This is in contrast to Pakistan, another high adopter where many regulations were brought in 
word for word.
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standards to receptive regulators. Meanwhile, the banks are well capitalized, and 
their ambition to become regional players has meant that they have not opposed 
the introduction of international banking standards.
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Bolivia
Pulling in Two Directions: The Developmental  
State and Basel Standards
Peter Knaack
Introduction
Bolivia had plans for one of the most ambitious implementations of Basel standards 
among lower-middle-income countries around the world. A novel financial ser-
vices law promulgated in 2013 established the legal framework for a wholesale 
adoption of Basel II, including all advanced internal model-based components, and 
elements of Basel III. Among our case studies, Pakistan is the only other country 
where the regulator has taken such an ambitious approach. It is puzzling to see 
such a wholehearted embrace of Basel standards by a left-wing government that 
follows a heterodox approach to economic policymaking. Domestically orient ed 
and opposed to the neoliberal stance of its predecessors, the current administration 
espouses a developmental state model that employs quantitative lending targets 
and interest rate caps to promote economic growth and financial inclusion. Why 
would a government want to combine such financial interventionism with such an 
ambitious plan to adopt Basel standards?
Building on archival research and interviews with twenty-six regulators, bankers, 
politicians, and financial experts in Bolivia, this chapter shows that Bolivia’s case 
is an instance of regulator-driven convergence on Basel standards. Bolivia’s finan-
cial regulatory agency is embedded in transnational technocratic networks with 
regulators in the region and in advanced Basel member jurisdictions, an institu-
tional environment that fosters peer learning and emulation. Bolivian regu lators 
regard Basel as the gold standard in prudential regulation, and they played an 
important role in drafting the law. As the draft law changed hands from regu-
lators to politicians, interventionist policy instruments were grafted onto the 
 prudential regulatory framework. The result is a rather unique combination of 
measures that aim to achieve two different policy goals: financial stability and 
inclusive growth. The latter is not a priority for regulators from the rich jurisdic-
tions that dominate the Basel Committee, but it is an essential prerogative for 
developing countries around the world. Bolivia’s policy innovation—whether 
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deliberate or not—therefore merits attention by regulators in other countries that 
seek to chart a path towards financial sector development that delivers on both 
resilience to economic shocks and inclusive growth.
At the same time, this study finds a significant implementation gap as only a 
small subset of Basel II and III components is currently in force. This gap can be 
attributed to regulatory capacity constraints and a lack of demand for the more 
complex Basel components by market actors and the government. This chapter 
also shows that the process of policy innovation underlying the new law has not 
occurred without friction. The tension between politicians and technocrats in the 
policymaking process led to unintended consequences that may be detrimental 
to financial inclusion and financial stability in the future.
This introduction is followed by a description of the key features of Bolivia’s 
political and economic system that provide the background for the development 
of the new Financial Services Law (FSL). The next section identifies the current 
state of Basel standards adoption and implementation in Bolivia. The fourth section 
presents an analysis of the political economy of Basel adoption in the country, 
highlighting in particular the relationships between a transnationally embedded 
regulator, a government focused on state-led domestic development, and a bank-
ing sector with few international incentives for Basel adoption. The concluding 
section derives lessons learned from the case study.
Political economy context: evolution of Bolivia’s banking sector
Shaken by a financial crisis and political turmoil at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, the Bolivian economy has experienced a remarkable period of sta-
bility, sustained growth, and significant improvement of social indicators over the 
last decade. GDP growth has averaged around 5 per cent per year since 2006, and 
GDP per capita has doubled to over $3000 in current dollar terms (ca. $7000 PPP; 
see Table 10.1). During this period, both the poverty rate and income inequality 
have fallen. This is especially noteworthy in a country where elite cohesion has 
historically constrained the capacity of the state to extract and redistribute wealth 
(Fairfield, 2015).
Like many other lower-middle-income countries, Bolivia’s financial services 
sector is bank-dominated. Few private companies are listed on domestic se cur-
ities markets, and local exchanges serve as venues for the issuance of debt rather 
than equity (S&P Global Ratings, 2016). Public companies are the main issuers of 
securities, and domestic pension funds are the dominant actors on the buy side.
The banking sector is vibrant, and market concentration is not high (see 
Figure  10.1). About a dozen universal banks manage close to 70 per cent of 
de posits and 60 per cent of loans in Bolivia. Three banks that cater specifically to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for a further 5 per cent of the 
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market share. The rest of the financial services sector includes close to one hun-
dred small-scale cooperatives and development finance institutions that tend to 
specialize in microfinance.
The only state-owned commercial bank, Banco Union, has grown at high 
speed, expanding its loan portfolio by an average rate of 34 per cent per year dur-
ing 2007–13. The bank operates on a lower net interest margin and lower profi t-
abil ity than its private competitors. It has grown to become Bolivia’s second-largest 
bank with a 10 per cent market share (Moody’s Global Credit Research, 2013). 
Foreign banks play a very limited role, as the overwhelming majority of Bolivia’s 
banking sector is domestic-owned (see Figure 10.2). One of the three foreign-owned 
banks is part of a private banking conglomerate headquartered in neighbouring 
Peru. The other two are subsidiaries of state-owned Brazilian and Argentine 
banks, with a very small market share.
Commodities represent four fifths of Bolivia’s exports, and the super-cycle of 
the early 2000s has produced a windfall for private agriculture business, the state-
owned hydrocarbon sector, small-scale mining cooperatives, and others.
Table 10.1 Bolivia: key indicators
Bolivia  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017): 3,393
Bank assets (current US$): 18.6 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP): 54.9
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP, 2012): 15.9
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP): 64
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP): 0.9
Polity IV score: 7
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.














































Figure 10.1 Bolivia: banking sector concentration (asset share of the five biggest banks).
Source: World Bank, Global Financial Development Database
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Supported by macroeconomic stability and the commodities boom, Bolivia’s 
financial system expanded massively in recent years, with credit growth rates of 
18 per cent per annum from 2008 to 2014 (S&P Global Ratings, 2016). The  favourable 
economic context allowed banks to maintain capital buffers comfortably above 
regulatory limits and write off sour loans from the financial crisis at the beginning 
of the century (Figure 10.3).
Moreover, the last decade was a period of outstanding profitability for Bolivia’s 
banks, with return on equity peaking at over 21 per cent in 2007, and remaining 
high throughout the global financial crisis (GFC) (Figure 10.4).
The election of Evo Morales and his Movement for Socialism Party in 2005 
marked the end of a long neoliberal phase in the Bolivian political economy. The 
first indigenous head of state in a majority-indigenous country, Morales set out 
to reduce dependence on the Bretton Woods Institutions, implement redistribu-
tionist economic policies, and forge economic and political ties with fellow left-
wing governments in the region, in particular Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. The 
economic outlook of the Morales administration is much more domestically 
oriented than that of its predecessors. Rather than seeking to attract foreign 
investment, the new government increased the role of the state in the economy. 
Within months of assuming office, Morales nationalized the country’s hydrocarbon 
sector, forcing resident multinationals into renegotiations of assets and contracts 
with the state.
Morales’ rise to power coincided with the beginning of the commodities 
 super-cycle. The favourable global environment provided the government with 






























































Figure 10.2 Bolivia: foreign bank assets (% of total bank assets).
Source: Claessens and Van Horen (2014)
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prudent macroeconomic policy, which combined balanced budgets, a stable 
exchange rate, growing foreign exchange reserves, and low inflation. The Bolivian 
economy has remained remarkably stable to date, weathering the GFC and the 
precipitous fall of commodity prices in recent years while many neighbouring 















































































Capital Adequacy Ratio Non-performing Loans
Figure 10.3 Bolivia: capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and non-performing loans (NPLs).
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Figure 10.4 Bolivia: rates of return on assets (RoA) and equity (RoE).
Source: Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus, Bureau van Dijk (2018)
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Private Bolivian banks have been immensely profitable over the last decade, but 
relations with the governing elite are tense. This is because the government has 
issued a series of interventionist financial policies to channel some of the sector’s 
profits towards social purposes. In 2012, it imposed an additional 12.5 per cent 
income tax on financial entities whose returns on equity exceeded 13.0 per cent. 
In addition, all banks have to pay 6 per cent of pre-tax profits into a guarantee 
fund destined for social purposes. Finally, Bolivia’s financial regulator issued a 
rule in December 2015 that requires all banks to retain 50 per cent of net profits 
as a capital buffer. In response, private banks complained about the ‘stigmatisation 
of profits’, without much of a result (ASOBAN, 2015).
Bolivia’s financial regulator prides itself on its relatively high degree of profes-
sional sophistication. Currently headed by a former Morales cabinet minister, the 
regulatory agency is clearly aligned with the financial policies of the government, 
but it self-identifies and operates as a technocratic organization of considerable 
independence.
One distinguishing feature of Bolivia’s banking system is the breadth of its 
financial market. With microfinance institutions at the top of world rankings 
and significant increases in financial access despite low population density and 
difficult geography, Bolivia is at the forefront of a global movement towards finan-
cial inclusion (Ekka et al., 2010). Microfinance entities provide over 30 per cent of 
total credit in the country, and the number of borrowers grew by 70 per cent in 
the period of 2008–15. The microfinance sector operates within the perimeter of 
prudential supervision, and non-performing loan ratios are as low as those of the 
banking sector more broadly. Moreover, Bolivian microfinance institutions have 
made significant efficiency gains that allowed them to lower average interest rates 
from 65 per cent in 1992 to just below 20 per cent in 2015 (Ekka et al., 2010; Heng, 
2015; McGuire et al., 1998).
In sum, Bolivia’s financial sector has experienced a period of sustained 
growth in a stable macroeconomic environment that has allowed banks to clean 
up their balance sheets and make substantial profits. In this favourable environment, 
the government has seized the opportunity to gear the financial services sector 
towards a more pronounced social purpose, albeit with some unintended conse-
quences. Both the governing elite and market actors tend to be domestically 
oriented, and foreign public and private actors play a rather subdued role in the 
Bolivian political economy.
Bolivia’s implementation of Basel banking standards
Bolivia’s regulator had plans for one of the most ambitious Basel implementation 
strategies among lower-middle-income countries around the world. The new FSL 
of 2013 provided the legal framework for a wholesale adoption of Basel II and 
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even parts of Basel III. According to the law, Bolivia has adopted all ten components 
of Basel II and two out of eight of the Basel III components. Yet only a small subset 
of these Basel rules is currently in force.
In the 1990s and 2000s, Bolivia’s banking system was subject to the Banking 
and Financial Entities Law. Issued in 1993 and modified in 2001, the law in corp -
orated capital requirements and risk-weighting methods based on Basel I, and 
required banks to hold higher levels of capital than the international standards 
require. Bolivia has been an over-complier with Basel standards, in that its pru-
dential rules require banks to hold Tier 1 capital equivalent to 7 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets, and an additional 3 per cent of Tier 2 capital.
Supervision of the Bolivian financial system was under the purview of the 
Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras until 2009. Like many regu-
latory agencies in Latin America, the Superintendency featured a high degree 
of  organizational autonomy, a salient professional identity, and strong links to 
techno crat ic peers abroad (Jordana, 2011). Only one year after Basel II was finalized, 
the Superintendencia issued the rules to implement the Basel II standardised 
approach to credit risk (SBEF, 2005). Many organizational characteristics of the 
Superintendencia were carried over to its successor agency, the Autoridad de 
Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (ASFI).
Bolivia’s financial supervisors received a positive assessment from international 
financial institutions. In the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 
the last one undertaken to date, the IMF and World Bank commended Bolivian 
authorities for significant improvement in financial supervision. Bolivia was 
judged to be compliant or largely compliant with nineteen out of twenty-five 
Basel Core Principles, including key aspects such as capital adequacy and provi-
sioning. The IMF and the World Bank even suggested that the supervisor had 
gone too far in financial sector transparency, and recommended easing reporting 
requirements for small financial institutions in order to reduce their administra-
tive burden. On the other hand, the international authorities noted deficiencies 
in  anti-money laundering rules and urged ASFI to move towards a risk-based 
approach to financial supervision, taking into account market, operational, and 
interest rate risk, among others (IMF and World Bank, 2012).
The FSL of 2013 incorporated many of the FSAP recommendations. It estab-
lished the legal framework for the regulation of target markets and operational 
risk. Moreover, the law gave banks permission to use both the standard and the 
internal ratings-based approaches for the calculation of credit, market, and oper-
ational risk (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2013a, para. 35f). Banks are free to 
develop internal rating models, but must submit them to the ASFI for approval. 
The new law maintained the previous requirements of 7 per cent Tier 1 and an 
additional 3 per cent Tier 2 capital, but it implemented a stricter definition of 
capital in line with the new Basel III standards. Banks are required to maintain 
a 10 per cent capital adequacy ratio as mentioned above, but the Executive 
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branch has the authority to increase capital requirements ‘in line with official 
re com menda tions of the Basel Committee’ (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2013a, 
para. 417). In addition, the ASFI can apply a conservation buffer of up to 2 per cent 
at its discretion, bringing the total capital requirement to a maximum of 12 per cent 
of risk-weighted assets. This capital buffer can be used as a counter-cyclical meas-
ure by the regulator—even though it does not follow the technical prescriptions 
of the Basel Committee, it is designed to serve the macroprudential purpose asso-
ciated with the counter-cyclical buffer of Basel III. In fact, counter-cyclical loan-
loss provisioning rules have been in place since 2008, pre-dating the latest Basel 
Accord (S&P Global Ratings, 2016). While the new law did not incorporate Basel III 
liquidity ratios, it carried over pre-existing requirements and obliges banks to 
provide the regulator with evidence that ‘adequate’ liquidity buffers are maintained. 
In sum, other than a modified version of a counter-cyclical buffer and a stricter 
definition of capital, the law did not adopt any components of Basel III.
Regarding prudential supervision (Pillar 2), the IMF and the World Bank com-
mended Bolivia in 2011 for improving risk supervision with a new inspection 
manual for on-site inspections. The ASFI also counts on an off-site information 
sharing system that obliges banks to submit data for ongoing surveillance. Even 
though Bolivia’s supervisory system is compliant with most Basel Core Principles, 
it is unclear to what extent ASFI staff have the capacity to validate the internal 
capital allocation techniques of supervised banks in line with Basel II and III. All 
universal banks are audited and publicly listed, but the small scale and limited 
range of actors in Bolivia’s stock market may limit the effectiveness of market dis-
cipline (Pillar 3) (Table 10.2).
Somewhat unusually, the FSL stipulates the exact risk weights and capital 
requirements for credit risk, rather than leaving the elaboration of such rules to 
the regulator. While risk weights for most asset classes would meet Basel II SA 
equivalence criteria, credit to SMEs and microcredits are subject to more lenient 
risk weights of 50–75 per cent, depending on ‘payment capacity’ to be determined 




Basel I Banking and Financial Entities Law 1993 1993
Basel II Credit risk SA—Circular 492/2005
Credit, market, and operational risk: SA and 
advanced approaches—FSL 2013 (10/10 
components)
Credit risk SA—2005




Basel III Definition of capital, counter-cyclical 
buffer—FSL 2013 (2/8 components)
Rules for both components 
in force since 2013
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by the regulator (AESA Ratings,  2013; Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia,  2013a, 
para. 418). Additional measures to enhance financial stability include the estab-
lishment of a deposit insurance scheme, a credit registry, enhanced anti-money-
laundering rules, and new financial consumer protection provisions. Therefore, 
the FSL broadly represents an ambitious adoption of Basel II, and a selective 
adoption of Basel III rules.
The law, however, does not represent a coherent move towards the kind of 
strictly regulated market-based financial system that Basel Committee best 
practices envision. Instead, the FSL contains a series of policies that pull in the 
op pos ite direction. In order to steer the financial system towards inclusive 
growth, it stipulates several interventionist measures. The law promotes finan-
cing of so-called ‘productive sectors’, including agriculture, mining, construc-
tion, and manu fac tur ing—but not commerce. Banks have to dedicate a 
percentage of their credit portfolio (currently 50–60 per cent) to productive 
sectors and social housing. Moreover, credit to these sectors is subject to inter-
est rate caps, currently 6 per cent for large, 7 per cent for small, and 11.5 per 
cent for micro-enterprises. Deposit rates are also subject to interest rate caps 
(Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia,  2014,  2013b). Furthermore, the law obliges 
banks to channel a portion of profits towards social purposes that are to be spe-
cified by decree. Currently, banks are required to direct 6 per cent of pre-tax 
profits to a so-called guarantee fund that is designed to complement or replace 
collateral for loans in productive sectors or social housing. Thus, borrowers in 
these sectors have the opportunity to take out a loan without a down-payment 
or pledging collateral if they qualify.
The combination of Basel-compliant prudential standards and interventionist 
policies in the FSL can be interpreted in two ways. It could be seen as building 
on  the recognition that classic risk management tends to constrain financial 
inclusion and growth prospects in the real economy. Banks that exclusively follow 
prudential goals have an incentive to lend to big firms with large collateral and 
buy government debt, rather than providing credit for riskier market segments 
such as SMEs and lower-income households. Thus, only a combination of both 
prudential and social objectives could move financial intermediaries towards the 
financial possibility frontier (IMF, 2012), achieving greater financial depth, reach, 
and breadth while respecting the limits of financial sustainability (Yujra, 2016). 
A second interpretation is that financial stability and inclusive growth are largely 
incompatible goals, and their incorporation into the same law merely reflects the 
bounded rationality of lawmakers.
Even though the FSL formally adopts all Basel II and some Basel III compo-
nents, implementation is much less ambitious. As of mid-2017, ASFI has not 
issued capital requirement guidelines for market and operational risk. All banks 
currently use the standard approach for measuring credit risk. None has submit-
ted internal risk-based models for regulatory approval, and only a few large 
banks have even considered taking steps in this direction. Thus, while the legal 
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framework is in place for the more sophisticated components of Basel standards, 
the implementation of these components is much more limited to date.
The political economy of Basel implementation in Bolivia
What explains Bolivia’s embrace of Basel II and III standards in the context of 
its  developmental state and domestically oriented banking sector? This section 
argues that the Bolivian case is an instance of regulator-driven Basel adoption. 
It  shows that financial regulators played a key role in this process, while the 
do mes tic al ly oriented government provided support merely for instrumental 
reasons. Market actors were ambivalent at most. Outward-oriented and involved 
in transnational technocratic networks, Bolivian regulators have championed the 
in corp or ation of Basel II and III into the FSL. In particular, financial regulators’ 
direct involvement in drafting the law paved the way for the adoption of the more 
advanced components of Basel standards. The gap between formal Basel adoption 
and implementation can in turn be attributed to a combination of regulatory 
 capacity constraints and a lack of demand both from the banking sector and 
the government.
However, rather than merely copying Basel provisions off the shelf, the FSL 
represents an innovative approach that seeks to combine prudential regulation on 
the one hand and state interventionism on the other, in order to foster productive 
development and financial inclusion. The combination of these two goals under 
the umbrella of development-oriented financial regulation is clearly not a priority 
for the Basel Committee, but it may serve as a model for the adoption of banking 
standards in other low- and lower-middle-income countries. However, this sec-
tion also shows that regulatory practice in the wake of the promulgation of the 
FSL has produced unintended consequences for financial inclusion. It argues that 
this phenomenon is a consequence of the tension between technocrats and politi-
cians in policy implementation, even though it is not directly related to the Basel 
standards themselves.
In the decades before Morales’ Movement for Socialism came to power, 
Bolivia’s governing elite shared a neoliberal outlook on economic governance, 
privatizing state-owned companies and seeking to generate a market-friendly 
regulatory environment. Several of the major banks were owned by the families 
that also controlled large shares of Bolivia’s agribusiness, and the role of the bank-
ing sector in general was to provide financial services for the dominant domestic 
private commodities producers. The governing elite was thus not outward-orient ed 
in terms of its ambitions to establish Bolivia as a regional financial centre, but it 
tended to follow the policy recipes written in Washington, London, and Brussels 
at the time.
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This changed drastically when Evo Morales won the national elections in 2005. 
A major achievement of his government was the drafting of a new constitution in 
2008/9. It enshrines the rights of the indigenous people by declaring Bolivia a 
pluri-national state, and it lays the foundations for a more interventionist role of 
the state in the economy. Much legislative action in recent years was driven by the 
need to update Bolivia’s laws in order to bring them in line with the philosophy 
underlying its new constitution. Among them, the FSL of 2013 presents significant 
changes from its predecessor. It emphasizes the social role of financial services in 
the country, including universal access and support for integral development. The 
role of the state is that of the ‘rector of the financial system’, an entity that par-
ticipates actively and directly in the design and implementation of measures to 
improve and promote financing within the productive sector, in order to support 
productive transformation, employment creation, and equitable income distribu-
tion (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2013a, paras. 7, 94).
It is puzzling that a government with a heterodox economic outlook and a clear 
domestic orientation would be a major champion of Basel standards. In fact, we 
are not aware of any other jurisdiction that combines ambitious Basel adoption 
and financial interventionism to the extent Bolivia does.
In line with what would be expected from a left-wing government, the Morales 
administration did regard Basel standards as a market-indulging policy recipe 
of neoliberal extraction, at least initially. When the new government took power 
in January 2006, the Superintendency had just implemented the novel Basel II 
Standard Approach to credit risk. Moreover, the agency had created an office 
dedicated to full Basel II implementation, building regulatory capacity in order to 
assess and authorize the use of internal ratings-based models in the near future. 
However, interview partners recall that such implementation efforts stalled as 
soon as the Morales government took power.1
In spite of the political U-turn that the rise of Evo Morales engendered, the 
Superintendency remained outward-oriented. The agency did not take any further 
steps towards Basel II implementation, but it continued to engage with regulators 
abroad in consultation and technical training. Bolivia’s financial regulator is a 
member of the Latin American Banking Supervisory network, ASBA. Crucially, 
ASBA is a hemispheric rather than a regional organization, and its forty-one 
member agencies include the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (all 
US agencies), and the Central Bank of Spain. These regulatory agencies from the 
US and Spain host frequent workshops under the ASBA Continental Training 
Program, which brings together banking regulators for seminars on topics such 
1 Interviews with regulators (former and current), La Paz, 15 and 22 March 2017.
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as risk and liquidity management, banking resolution, stress testing, and Pillar II 
supervisory practices (ASBA, 2017).
Technocratic networks that involve US-trained experts have played an im port-
ant role throughout modern Latin American history. In the 1920s, a commission 
led by Princeton Economist Edwin Kemmerer advised several Andean countries 
on financial institution reform. Bolivia is among the ‘Kemmerized countries’, and 
traces of the ‘money doctor’s’ reforms can still be found today (Drake,  1989). 
From the 1970s onwards, the ‘Chicago Boys’ and other technocratic networks 
played a crucial role in designing and implementing neoliberal reforms in sev-
eral Latin American countries, in addition to and beyond the structural adjust-
ment programmes of the World Bank and the IMF (Centeno and Silva,  1998; 
Teichman, 2001).
In the world of financial regulation, ASBA has arguably played an important 
role in dispensing technical knowledge and enthusiasm for Basel standards across 
Latin America. When the Basel-based Financial Stability Institute conducted 
a survey in July 2004, only a month after the finalization of Basel II, regulators in 
70 per cent of respondent countries expressed their willingness to implement the 
new standard domestically within three to five years (FSI, 2004).
Even though the Morales administration did not champion Basel II implemen-
tation, the Superintendency continued to engage in technical upgrades, following 
international best practices. An ASBA report from 2008 shows, for example, that 
Bolivia is a leading jurisdiction in credit risk management in the region, having 
developed an advanced portfolio classification scheme that lays the foundation 
for internal ratings-based approaches (ASBA, 2008, p. 17f).
The organizational shift from the Superintendency to the ASFI as the central 
financial authority in 2009 is not associated with significant changes to the pro-
fessional identity and transnational embeddedness of regulators in Bolivia. 
Interview partners recall that at the height of the GFC in 2009, ASFI leadership 
called the validity of Basel standards into question.2 But regulators soon returned 
to a pro-Basel stance, and the 2011 FSAP commended the ASFI for ‘aligning its 
regulatory and supervisory framework with international standards’ (IMF and 
World Bank, 2012, p. 21).
In 2011, Bolivia’s Ministry of the Economy and Public Finances decided to 
develop a new law to govern the financial services sector in congruence with 
the novel constitution. It awarded a consultancy for drafting the outlines of the 
new legal framework to a former top regulator with a career in the ASFI and the 
central bank. A technocrat by training rather than a politician, the consultant 
in corp or ated the entirety of the prudential regulatory provisions that make 
Bolivia a high adopter of Basel II and Basel III today. His decision was driven 
2 Interview with former regulator, La Paz, 13 March 2017.
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less by stra tegic considerations of signalling to foreign investors or domestic 
stakeholders and more by a genuine conviction that Basel banking standards 
represent the best approach to safeguarding a banking system, whether in 
advanced or developing economies.3 A Bolivian regulator interviewee employed 
a nautical metaphor to express this consensus among his peers, asserting that ‘for 
us regulators Basel is the North’.4
The law retains many elements of the draft written by the consultant regulator. 
In particular, all references to Basel and the unusual stipulation of risk weights 
remained unchanged. Interview partners in Bolivia advanced different reasons 
for this phenomenon. Some argued that regulatory provisions stayed intact 
because legislators and ministerial staff lack the technical capacity to fully under-
stand them.5
Other respondents asserted that the government welcomed the adoption of 
sophisticated Basel elements because it would signal a commitment to financial 
stability. Key officials in the Morales administration arguably felt the need to 
engage in such signalling because several stakeholders openly criticized the inter-
ventionist measures contained in the FSL.6 As indicated in the section above, 
the law includes provisions for interest rate caps and directed lending to certain 
sectors of the economy—measures that are uncommon in market economies. 
Economic actors from within the country and abroad voiced their scepticism. For 
example, a global credit ratings agency stated that ‘the regulator’s focus has shifted 
somewhat to support social and developmental policies rather than ensuring the 
financial system's stability’ (S&P Global Ratings, 2016, p. 9). For the same reasons, 
another ratings agency changed the outlook for the Bolivian banking system to 
negative (Mendoza,  2014). Even the Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs of 
Bolivia, some of whose members do benefit from the above measures, criticized 
the law for leading to inefficient capital allocation, concentration risk, and financial 
fragility (CEPB, 2013).
The relationship between Bolivia’s government and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions has been tense in recent years. Along with several of his peers in the 
region, President Morales has denounced the IMF in particular for imposing a 
neoliberal agenda onto developing countries. For years, Bolivian authorities have 
publicly rejected IMF concerns and any criticism of domestic economic policies. 
Article IV Consultations continue in all regularity but appear to be rather acri-
monious exercises. In the latest such consultation, the Bolivian government 
3 Interview with former regulator, La Paz, 20 March 2017.
4 Interview with former regulator, La Paz, 20 March 2017.
5 Interviews with former regulators and private sector representatives, La Paz, 13 and 20 March 
2017, and via Skype, 30 October 2017.
6 Interviews with current and former government officials, current regulators, La Paz, 17 and 
22 March 2017, and via Skype, 2 and 11 April 2017.
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‘questioned if the IMF should make policy recommendations for Bolivia’ at all 
(IMF, 2016, p. 19).
In turn, the World Bank and the IMF have expressed concerns regarding the 
interventionist measures of the FSL (World Bank, 2011). The IMF in particular 
has suggested Bolivia’s prudential and development policies are a zero-sum game 
where state intervention for social purposes is creating market distortions that 
inevitably contribute to financial fragility (IMF, 2016, 2015, 2014). The last FSAP 
of 2011 encouraged Bolivian financial authorities to strengthen risk-based super-
vision, but the report refrained from recommending the adoption of Basel II 
or  III provisions (IMF and World Bank, 2012). However, both the World Bank 
and the IMF have welcomed the prudential regulatory provisions of the new law 
(Heng, 2015).
Even though foreign and even domestic investors have played a subdued role 
in Bolivia’s political economy to date, the government was not completely oblivi-
ous to their concerns. After governing Bolivia for almost a decade and success-
fully steering the country through the GFC, the Morales administration had 
established a track record that made it much less vulnerable to shifts in investor 
sentiment than Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva upon taking office in 2003, for 
example. Nevertheless, the imprimatur of Basel may have helped to allay con-
cerns that the Morales administration would embark on a path of financial 
popu lism with the FSL.
Market actors have been neither champions nor opponents of the Basel com-
ponents that are currently in force. Bolivia’s financial services sector is do mes tic-
al ly oriented and not concerned with the reputational benefits of a regulatory 
upgrade to the more complex elements of Basel II and III. Conversations with 
banks’ risk managers reveal that Bolivia’s banks do not associate an upgrade to 
internal ratings-based models with higher profitability or any other competitive 
advantage.7 Moreover, they do not keep separate loan and trading books. In inter-
views, regulators refer to such low complexity of bank operations as the main reason 
why Basel II rules on market risk do not need to be written in yet.8 Adjustment 
costs to the prudential regulatory provisions of the FSL have been negligible to 
date. The new law retains the pre-existing capital adequacy ratio requirement 
of 10 per cent (above Basel standards). It adopts the stringent capital definition of 
Basel III, but this change barely affects banks because most of their Tier 1 capital 
is composed of equity and retained earnings (Galindo et al.,  2011). Domestic 
banks did voice opposition to the interventionist elements of the FSL, but their 
weak political position did not allow them to exert any significant influence in the 
development of the legal text.9
7 Interviews with senior bank officials, La Paz, 14 and 23 March 2017.
8 Interviews with regulators, La Paz, 21 March 2017.
9 Interview with senior bank official, La Paz, 23 March, and government officials, La Paz, 14 March, 
and via Skype, 11 April 2017.
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Foreign banks play a marginal role in the domestic market. Two of them are 
state-owned with headquarters in Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Their busi-
ness model revolves around serving home country clients in their business in 
the neighbouring country, and neither has plans to expand towards a significant 
Bolivian customer base. Because they are headquartered in jurisdictions that are 
members of the Basel Committee, they are subject to consolidated supervision 
under Basel III. But again, Bolivia does not feature prominently in their banking 
business, and lobbying for Basel III implementation in the country would not 
significantly change their competitive position. Foreign banks have thus been 
indifferent towards Basel adoption in Bolivia, but it is noteworthy that they did 
not object to the interventionist measures of the FSL such as the interest rate caps 
and directed lending. During the period in which Bolivian lawmakers developed 
the FSL, both Argentina and Brazil were ruled by left-wing governments that 
shared a critical attitude vis-à-vis neoliberal policies and an affinity for a develop-
mentalist economic model with the Morales administration. Unlike their domes-
tic private peers, the state-owned foreign banks thus did not voice opposition to 
any element of the FSL.
Furthermore, a look at the balance sheet of Bolivian banks reveals that the 
sector is relatively self-contained. The large universal banks do not tend to rely 
on cross-border funding, and the banking sector as a whole is in a net creditor 
pos ition (S&P Global Ratings, 2016). Foreign investors do play a role in the pro-
vision of capital for microfinance institutions, including NGOs. But the transpar-
ency and risk management expectations these actors bring to the table bear only 
a tenu ous relationship with Basel banking standards, chiefly because of signifi-
cant differences in risk management technology between commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions.
For decades, Bolivia’s banking system was vulnerable to volatility in foreign 
capital markets because a large portion of both its deposits and loans were 
denominated in US dollars. Macroeconomic instability in general and the hyper-
inflationary period of the mid-1980s had undermined citizens’ trust in the local 
currency. However, over the last decade financial authorities have instituted a 
series of policies to de-dollarize the financial sector. The central bank raised 
reserve requirements for dollar-denominated deposits by a factor of three. 
Furthermore, the de facto peg to the dollar from 2006 onwards, along with con-
sistently low inflation rates, has boosted public confidence in the boliviano as a 
store of value. Consequently, the share of dollar-denominated deposits fell from 
94 per cent in 2002 to 15.6 per cent by 2016, with dollar loans experiencing a fall 
from 97 per cent to 3 per cent in the same period (IMF,  2016; S&P Global 
Ratings, 2016).
Domestic regulators have played an important role in adopting foreign rules at 
home, a process Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) call policy transfer. Yet the FSL is not 
merely an instance of policy transfer by technocrats embedded in transnational 
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regulatory networks. Rather, its peculiar grafting of interventionist policies on 
prudential regulatory provisions represents a departure from the conservative, 
prudential approach of Basel. Inherent in this policy innovation is the recognition 
that the Basel Committee has a mandate to maximize the resilience of the banking 
sector among its overwhelmingly high-income member jurisdictions, and little 
incentive to take low-income country prerogatives into account (BCBS,  2013; 
Jones and Knaack, 2019). In interviews, Bolivian regulators have confirmed that 
they do not expect Basel standards to foster inclusive financial development in 
their country.10 For example, SME and lower-income households are key actors 
in economic development, yet their access to credit in developing countries is 
severely constrained. This is because they represent relatively high-risk clients, 
especially in countries with deficiencies in collateral markets and the rule of law. 
Under these conditions, it is prudent for banks to minimize their exposure to this 
market segment and focus on large companies and government securities instead. 
A policy framework that addresses this issue with interventionist measures, while 
safeguarding prudential supervision, can be understood as an innovative de part-
ure from global best practices, rather than an incomplete policy transfer.
Even though legislators and ministerial officials did not alter Basel provisions, 
political involvement and modification led to unintended consequences in the 
application of the interventionist measures of the law. The lending quotas and inter-
est rates set by the Executive branch have been effective in channelling bank loans to 
the so-called productive sector (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014, 2013b). 
However, the majority of businesses in the Bolivian economy are small or even 
micro-enterprises in the commercial and services sector. In line with the law and the 
decrees that specify it, microcredit to such ‘un-productive’ sectors is discouraged by 
the lending quota and the interest rate caps that financial institutions must meet 
(Ekka et al., 2010; Heng, 2015; Moody’s Global Credit Research, 2013) (Figure 10.5).
As a consequence, credit to SMEs has stagnated, and microcredit lenders have 
reduced their client base since 2015 (ASOBAN, 2017, 2015; ASOFIN, 2017; ICBE 
Data, 2014). This reduction in financial inclusion is at odds with a financial ser-
vices law that is explicitly designed to ‘promote integral development’, ‘facilitate 
universal access to financial services’, and ‘assure the continuity of the services 
offered’ (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2013a, para. 4). In order to address the 
unintended consequences of this market intervention, regulators could adjust the 
current lending quotas and interest rate caps, at least in principle. The draft provi-
sions of the FSL envisioned these parameters to be set by the central bank. Such 
decisions could thus be taken with a certain degree of isolation from the political 
process, according to technocratic principles. However, ministerial intervention 
in the development of the law transferred the authority to change these key prices 
to the newly created Financial Stability Council (FSC), an organ of high political 
10 Interview, current regulators, La Paz, 21 March 2017.
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visibility. Its decisions are subject to scrutiny by the population in ways that may 
be counter-productive. For example, a rise in the interest rate cap for microcredit 
to productive sectors from 11.5 per cent to 18 per cent may help sustain the busi-
ness model of microfinance institutions and support financial inclusion, but 
could be interpreted by the opposition as a ‘sell-out to the banks’. Even though the 
FSC can adjust rates and lending targets at each of its quarterly meetings, it has 
not changed them once in its two years of operation (Figure 10.6).
In sum, Basel adoption in Bolivia’s FSL can be understood as a largely regulator-
driven process. Market actors lack external incentives to champion any ambitious 
adoption of the Basel standards. Similarly, the country’s governing elite are domes-
tically oriented. They devised the FSL to implement interventionist financial pol-
icies that are designed to foster economic development and financial inclusion. 
Further, the government is no supporter of advanced Basel II and III implementa-
tion. Rather, and to the extent that they were actually capable of a full technical 
appraisal, lawmakers may have retained the more sophisticated Basel components 
in the legal text as a signal of prudential integrity to stakeholders who criticized 
the interventionist measures of the law. The divergence between the provisions of 
global banking standards in the FSL and the apathy of domestic actors has there-
fore created an implementation gap, which remains wide because of both demand 
and supply constraints: market actors show little need for the use of advanced risk 
models. Interview partners also pointed out that the ASFI currently lacks the 
regulatory capacity to assess and approve internal ratings-based models.11
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Figure 10.5 Bolivia: interest rate caps.
Source: Heng (2015)
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In its combination of prudential and interventionist measures, the Bolivian 
approach to financial regulation deviates from global ‘best practices’. It in cor por-
ates the policy goal of inclusive financial development that is of utter relevance for 
developing countries but not for the Basel Committee. Some observers would 
doubt that Basel II and III are supportive of or even compatible with the financial 
policies of a developmental state. The Bolivian experiment seeks to chart a new 
path of combining both, which will inform this debate. There are early indications 
that the FSL entails unintended negative consequences for financial inclusion, but 
this outcome would be attributable to the institutional setup of interventionist 
policies, not the Basel standards.
Conclusion
The Bolivian case can be understood as an instance of regulator-driven convergence 
on international standards. The analysis highlights the active role of techno crats 
in international policy transfer. Even when banking regulators have no direct 
contact with the Basel Committee, they are embedded in transnational networks, 
updating their knowledge of global standards through conferences and technical 
training courses organized by regional organizations or Basel member agencies. 
This study also lends empirical support to the conjecture that a gap between de 
jure adoption and de facto implementation opens when Basel standards do not 
have domestic champions. As long as neither the government nor market actors 
see much benefit to incorporating the more sophisticated components of Basel II 














































Figure 10.6 Bolivia: number of borrowers, small and microcredit institutions.
Note: ASOFIN: Association of Microfinance Entities (Asociación de Entidades Financieras 
Especializadas en Micro Finanzas de Bolivia); FINRURAL: Association of Development Finance 
Institutions (Asociación de Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo)
Sources: ASFI, ASOFIN, FINRURAL
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It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the gap between the number of 
Basel components in the legal framework and the ones in force as an instance of 
mock compliance. Walter (2008, p. 32f) states that mock compliance occurs when 
two conditions are met: signalling compliance and substantive non-compliance. 
In the Bolivian case, there is no evidence for substantial non-compliance with 
the  standard approach to Basel II. The ASFI has shown no signs of regulatory 
forbearance to date, although the stringency of supervision, especially of state-
owned Banco Union, certainly deserves the attention of analysts in the future.
Rather than mock compliance, Bolivia’s implementation gap may be under-
stood as a strategic device with two potential purposes. First, it could serve as a 
non-costly signal of regulatory stringency and sophistication. The reputational 
benefits of an ambitious adoption may materialize even when Basel II and III rules 
are not in force (yet). Second, an encompassing adoption of Basel II and III 
components may influence the relationship between the government and the 
regulatory agency. Because legal changes are cumbersome and subject to political 
negotiations, regulators may consider it advantageous to grant themselves con-
siderable room for manoeuvre to implement individual Basel components as they 
see fit, without having to consult lawmakers.
Further research is needed to assess the plausibility and effectiveness of either 
strategy. In addition, more work is necessary to identify the conditions under 
which the prudential standards of Basel II and III are compatible with interven-
tionist policies designed to promote inclusive financial development, as they 
appear to be in the Bolivian case to date.
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Nigeria
Catch 22: Navigating Basel Standards  
in Nigeria’s Fragile Banking Sector
Florence Dafe
Introduction
If there is one word that has been used extensively since the mid-2000s to 
characterize Nigeria’s banking sector, it is the term ‘potential’. Financial industry 
experts, be they international consultants, financial journalists, or bankers, have 
hailed the size of Nigeria’s banking sector, its international expansion, and the 
adoption of global standards like Basel II and IFRS. That said, there is broad 
agreement among both public authorities and financial industry experts that 
Nigeria’s banking sector is far from realizing its potential. The banking sector has 
witnessed significant and extended periods of fragility since the 1990s; Nigeria’s 
regulators have been slow to implement and enforce Basel standards and mock 
compliance has been an important feature of the engagement with Basel stand-
ards in Nigeria. What explains this gap between aspiration and reality on the 
ground, which is so characteristic of Nigeria’s economy in general? This chapter 
explores why Nigeria’s banking regulators, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
and the National Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), moved to adopt Basel I, 
II, and III but were slow to implement and enforce, and how this is related to the 
fragility in Nigeria’s banking sector.
Two factors, namely conflicted preferences and the international-connectedness 
of regulators, help to explain Nigeria’s engagement with Basel standards. The 
adoption and implementation of Basel II, which is the main focus of this chapter, 
has primarily been driven by regulators with strong links to international finance. 
The two CBN governors who most pushed for the adoption of Basel II—Joseph 
Odele Sanusi, who was in office from 1999 to 2004 and Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, 
who was in office from 2009 to 2014—had both had careers in the management 
of internationally active Nigerian banks before joining the CBN. For the former, 
Basel adoption was imperative for the international expansion of Nigerian banks. 
For the latter, Basel II was the best available practice to manage risks in the 
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Nigerian banking sector. Senior staff in CBN and NDIC, who attended training 
courses on Basel standards run by international consultants and foreign regu-
lators like the US, considered Basel II the most appropriate set of regulatory 
standards to make Nigeria’s large, internationalized banking sector more stable.
While Basel II adoption was not a salient issue among Nigeria’s domestically 
oriented politicians, Nigeria’s internationally oriented banks welcomed the imple-
mentation of Basel II, which began in 2013. These international banks consider 
Basel II an important means to enhance their competitiveness and signal sound-
ness to markets, regulators, and their peers in the international and domestic 
arena. In addition, the banks hope that a later move from standardized approaches 
to advanced internal rating-based components will allow them to reduce their 
capital charges.
Given the support for the adoption of Basel II among Nigerian regulators 
and bankers, why the slow movement towards implementation and weak enforce-
ment? The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that this is because 
Nigerian regulators have conflicting preferences. On the one hand, Nigerian 
regu lators promote Basel II because they consider it the best available set of 
rules for Nigeria’s large and internationally expanding banking sector. On the 
other hand, regulators are reluctant to move faster on implementation and 
enforcement because if they do, several fragile banks would have to be restruc-
tured, if not resolved, and could therefore no longer play their envisaged role 
in supporting economic development by providing employment and access 
to finance for the private sector. Nigerian regulators are concerned about the 
developmental costs of bank resolutions because the CBN has a formal man-
date to support the country’s economic development. In addition, bank inter-
ventions are politically difficult because Nigerian politicians, often lobbied by 
the banks, tend to oppose them, supposedly to ensure the banks’ contribution 
to economic development. Reluctant enforcement of prudential regulation 
perpetuates, however, the weakness of a banking sector that is already fragile 
because of its exposure to a volatile oil sector. All this is, in the words of a 
financial sector expert, a catch-22 situation.1 As mock compliance is driven 
by the conflicted preferences of regulators, it is a case of regulator-driven mock 
compliance.
The chapter is based on official documents by Nigerian authorities and inter-
nation al financial institutions (IFIs), local press reports, and twenty-three semi-
structured interviews. The interviews were conducted with regulators, bankers, 
financial industry experts from the private sector, academia, the donor community, 
and IFIs in Abuja, Lagos, and London.
1 Interview, financial industry expert, Lagos, 22 September 2017.
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Large, international, and fragile: banking in Nigeria  
since the 1990s
Three features of Nigeria’s resplendent and complex political economy seem to 
bear particular importance for developments in Nigeria’s banking sector. First, 
the size of the economy. In 2012 Nigeria overtook South Africa as Africa’s largest 
economy, not least because of significant growth in telecommunications, bank-
ing, and construction sectors. However, in 2016 Nigeria’s per capita income was 
merely about 2500 US$. Thus, it falls into the World Bank’s category of lower-
middle-income countries (Table 11.1).
Second, oil has been at the centre of economic accumulation in Nigeria since 
the 1970s. While in 2013 oil only made up 13 per cent of GDP, it accounted for over 
95 per cent of exports and three quarters of government revenue (IMF, 2017a). 
Because of oil-induced boom and bust cycles, oil dependence has been a continu-
ous source of economic volatility and vulnerability. Another consequence of oil 
abundance is the limited reliance on IFIs like the World Bank and international 
donors more generally. For instance, official development assistance averaged a 
mere 0.5 per cent of GNI between 2010 and 2015, and Nigeria has not borrowed 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the 1980s. As a result, donors 
and IFIs do not hold sway in Nigeria. A former official concludes, for instance, 
that ‘Nigeria had very few IMF programs and even when there was one, there was 
only little influence’.2 Another important consequence of oil dependence is the 
central role of the state in the economy. Owing to the public ownership of oil and 
gas reserves, the state has access to significant amounts of oil revenues. As a result, 
businesses seek to either do business with the state or to benefit from public 
financial assistance, for instance in the form of subsidized credit.
2 Interview, former IFI official, Lagos, 8 September 2017.
Table 11.1 Nigeria: key indicators
Nigeria  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 1969
Bank assets (current US$) 81.7 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 20.2
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 8.8
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 15.7
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 5.8
Polity IV score (2017) 7
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017a); 
Polity IV (2014)
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The third important feature of Nigeria’s political economy is that the state has 
used its resources and central position to intervene significantly in the economy. 
Activist policies have been employed to support the development and diversifica-
tion of the economy as well as to redistribute oil rents to certain constituencies to 
foster political support.
The above features of Nigeria’s political economy—size, oil-, and state-centred 
economic development—are epitomized by Nigeria’s banking sector. Nigeria has, 
at least in absolute terms, the second largest banking sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
just behind South Africa. Both assets and profits accounted for about a quarter of 
the region’s total in 2014 (EY, 2015).
The banking sector, which in 2017 consisted of twenty-two commercial banks 
and five investment banks (referred to as merchant banks), has other notable 
features. One is domestic ownership. Only four commercial banks are foreign-
owned. Their headquarters are in South Africa, Togo, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, respectively. In 2011, 75 per cent of commercial banking assets 
were held by domestic, privately owned banks (IMF, 2013a).
This highlights another characteristic, namely private ownership. Domestic, 
privately owned banks emerged in large numbers in the wake of Nigeria’s finan-
cial sector liberalization, which was an element of Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) which lasted from 1986 until 1992. By the early 1990s, the 
number of banks amounted to more than a hundred because of profitable busi-
ness opportunities arising from arbitrage opportunities in money markets and 
parallel foreign exchange markets as well as from fraudulent activities such as 
pyramid schemes.3 The number of banks only shrank because of bank failures in 
the 1990s, and the CBN’s decision to increase the minimum capital requirement 
twenty-five-fold in 2004 in an effort to create larger and well-capitalized banks. 
The 2004 reform reduced the number of banks from eighty-nine to about twenty-
five banks, all of which were privately owned. While three banks came under 
state-ownership in the wake of Nigeria’s systemic banking crisis in 2009 to 2011, 
these banks have since been resolved. Government-ownership does, however, 
prevail in Nigeria’s seven specialized development banks. These banks provide 
subsidized credit for segments of the economy which are considered a priority for 
development, such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Nigeria’s banks also stand out in the region through their international orienta-
tion. As Figure 11.1 shows, about a dozen Nigerian banks have major operations 
in Sub-Saharan African countries, with Nigerian subsidiaries holding more than 
20–30 per cent of deposits in Benin, Gambia, and Sierra Leone (IMF, 2017b). In 
add ition, some of the leading banks have opened subsidiaries and representative 
offices outside Africa, notably in the US, UK, and Dubai.
3 For an excellent analysis of how the process of financial liberalization rendered the Nigerian 
banking sector the locus of rent-seeking see Lewis and Stein (1997).
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Where Nigeria’s banking sector is lagging behind is the provision of access to 
finance to Nigeria’s private sector. On average, bank credit to the private sector 
as a share of GDP amounted to about 14 per cent between 2011 and 2016, which 
is  below the Sub-Saharan African average of 29 per cent (World Bank,  2017b) 
(see Figure 11.2). Lack of competition, as indicated by the fact that five banks held 
on average 60 per cent of banking assets between 2011 and 2015, might partly 
explain the limited lending. More important seems to be, however, that it is both 
profi t able and safe to lend to the government.
Moreover, as Table 11.2 shows, a dominant share of bank credit is allocated to 
the oil sector, highlighting the dominance of oil in the economy. In sum, Nigeria’s 
banking sector is suggestive of a negative relationship between oil abundance and 
development outcomes and thus of a resource curse in the financial sector.4
The centrality of oil has not only shaped lending patterns in Nigeria but also 
contributed considerably to the vulnerability and fragility of the banking sector. 
As in the case of Angola, oil dependence has been a source of financial distress. 
An important cause of Nigeria’s systemic banking crisis of 2009 was that the 
banking sector had significant investments in the oil sector, which were negatively 
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Figure 11.1 Nigeria: banks’ share of deposits abroad, 2013 (%).
Source: IMF (2017a)
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affected when oil prices declined in 2008. The decline in oil prices since 2014 has 
also been a major factor underlying the distress in the banking sector, which is 
evident in the increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) shown in Figure 11.3. In 
early 2017, there were officially three undercapitalized banks. These banks had a ratio 
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Figure 11.2 Nigeria: Public and private sector lending.
Source: World Bank (2017a)
Table 11.2 Nigeria: sectoral distribution of credit
Sector June 2016 December 2016
 N’ billion Share of  
total (%)
N’ billion Share of  
total (%)
Oil and gas 4511.34 28.78 4890.91 30.02
Manufacturing 2030.67 12.95 2214.98 13.59
Governments 1386.61 8.84 1376.89 8.45
General 1363.54 8.70 1324.10 8.13
General commerce 1071.57 6.83 1038.92 6.38
Information and communication 960.85 6.13 859.16 5.27
Real estate activities 737.96 4.71 820.32 5.03
Finance and insurance 692.94 4.42 737.65 4.53
Power and energy 685.23 4.37 726.29 4.46
Construction 609.68 3.89 633.62 3.89
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 482.71 3.08 529.06 3.25
Transportation and storage 458.85 2.93 452.19 2.78
Source: Redrawn from CBN (2017a)
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for 5 per cent of assets (IMF, 2017b). While on average CARs in the commercial 
banking sector amounted to 15 per cent in 2016, the same figure was about 3 per 
cent among small banks. In times of low oil prices, financial distress does not only 
arise because NPLs to the oil sector increase but also because government entities 
and businesses in other sectors find it difficult to service their loans because their 
revenues are highly dependent on a booming oil sector. That said, the banking 
sector distress in the 1990s and late 2000s was not only linked to oil price drops 
but also to mismanagement and fraud (Apati, 2012; Lewis and Stein, 1997).
The strong role of the state in the economy, facilitated by the state’s command 
of oil revenues, is also visible in the financial sector. The state’s developmental 
strategy, which envisages that banks support economic development and diversi-
fication, is best epitomized by the CBN. The CBN has a mandate not only for 
promoting price and financial stability but also for supporting economic develop-
ment. From the perspective of the CBN, the role of the central bank in a developing 
economy must be different from and more activist than the role of a central bank 
in advanced economies.5 An important part of the CBN’s activities is therefore to 
support the activities of development finance institutions, through the provision 
of financial resources and administering some of the schemes for the provision of 
5 See for instance Sanusi (2010) or Emefiele (2014).
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Figure 11.3 Nigeria: financial soundness indicators (%).
Source: IMF (2017b)
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subsidized credit. The IMF and the World Bank have repeatedly criticized these 
activities but have had little influence on the CBN because the state is not dependent 
on their financial assistance.6
Basel standard adoption, implementation,  
and compliance in Nigeria
As Table 11.3 shows, Nigeria has been an early adopter of Basel standards. In 1990, 
amidst an environment of increasing banking sector distress, the CBN introduced 
a minimum CAR of 7.5 per cent. Two years later, the CBN brought the CAR more 
in line with Basel I and required banks to hold a minimum CAR of 8 per cent, 
with at least half of that being first-tier capital or paid-up share capital and 
reserves (World Bank, 1994). To position the Nigerian banks for the introduction 
of Basel II, the CBN increased the minimum CAR to 10 per cent in 2003 (CBN, 2003). 
This ratio is still in place and was even raised to 15 per cent for Nigerian banks 
with international authorization in response to Nigeria’s banking crisis in 2009/10. 
While the current levels of minimum CARs exceed Basel standards, the defi n-
ition of eligible elements for capital in Nigeria diverges from inter nation al rules. 
The Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) of the IMF and World Bank 
highlighted in 2012, for instance, that in Nigeria Tier 1 capital is defined to include 
6 For such criticism see for instance IMF (2011) and IMF (2013a).




Basel I CBN Circular 1990 Various CBN circulars, notably CBN 
Circular BSD/11/2003
1990 minimum CAR of 7.5%
1992 minimum CAR of 8%
2003 minimum CAR of 10%
Basel II CBN banking supervision annual  
report 2000
CBN banking supervision annual  
report 2001
speech by CBN Governor  
Sanusi 2002
2013 CBN circular BSD/DIR/CIR/
GEN/LAB/06053, in force since 2014
Credit risk: Standardized approach
Market risk: Standardized approach
Operational risk: Basic indicator 
approach
advanced approaches—no rules issued
Basel III 2013 Framework for the regulation 
and supervision of domestic 
systemically important banks  
in Nigeria
2014 (BSD/DIR/CON/LAB/07/026)
D-SIB minimum CAR of 15%
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statutory reserves and reserves for SMEs even though they do not meet the 
requirement of being available immediately to absorb losses.
The extent to which Basel I was enforced in the 1990s and 2000s varied over 
time and is difficult to assess with precision. While the CBN had been reluctant to 
intervene in the banking sector and to let banks fail before 1990s, the government 
and regulators displayed less willingness to accommodate bank distress through 
liquidity injections from 1990 onwards and stepped up regulation (Brownbridge, 
1998). For instance, between 1991 and 1996 alone, the CBN and NDIC took over 
the management and control of twenty-four distressed banks (NDIC, 2017). That 
said, a major criticism in the FSAPs of 2002 and 2012 was regulatory forbearance 
and the limited willingness of regulators to resolve distressed banks. The 2012 
FSAP for instance concludes: ‘Notwithstanding the important and substantial 
progress since 2009, the concern remains that, though the legal and regulatory 
framework relating to corrective, enforcement and sanctioning actions has 
improved substantially, the willingness to act may still be weak’ (IMF, 2013b, p. 140).
There are some parallels between the process of Basel I adoption and enforce-
ment and Basel II adoption and enforcement in Nigeria. The CBN’s Governor 
Joseph Sanusi announced the adoption of Basel II already in the early 2000s. An 
important year was 2001, when the BCBS issued a proposal for the new accord 
and Nigerian regulators, following the discussions in Basel, responded by setting 
up a CBN-NDIC committee to prepare a roadmap for the implementation of 
Basel standards in Nigeria (CBN, 2002a). While Nigerian regulators broadly sup-
ported the implementation of Basel, they were also aware of the challenges to 
transplant the standard to Nigeria’s environment. As a former CBN regulator 
who sat on the committee during its inception recalls: ‘We pointed it out from 
day 1 [when the new accord was announced] that Basel should be adopted . . . We 
did not set out to reinvent the wheel . . . but you have to adapt it to the depth of 
the  financial sector, the skillset of the regulator, the capacity, the public policy 
environment’.7 In line with this, the 2001 annual report of the CBN’s banking 
supervision department made clear that advanced approaches would not be con-
sidered initially (CBN, 2002a, p. 88).
It would, however, take another decade until Basel II implementation began. 
While work in the CBN-NDIC Basel II committee continued throughout the 
2000s, the focus shifted under the next governor, Charles Soludo, towards the 
consolidation of the banking sector and dealing with its repercussions. Only in 
the wake of Nigeria’s banking crisis, which began in 2009, did Basel II move again 
to the top of the regulatory agenda. Under CBN governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, 
Basel II implementation was formally announced in a circular in 2013. The new 
rules, which delineated the basic approaches for the calculation of credit, market, 
and operational risks in Pillar I, as well as guidelines for the implementation of 
7 Interview, former CBN official, Lagos, 20 September 2017.
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Pillar II and III, came into effect in 2014. While the 2013 circular also announced 
the future implementation of Basel III, a draft regulation has not yet been issued. 
Yet the CBN did, in line with Basel III, specify some rules for domestic sys tem ic al ly 
important banks (D-SIBs), notably an increase of the minimum CAR to 15 per cent.
Despite the formal commitment to Basel II, its enforcement seems to be chal-
lenging. In 2016 and 2017, for instance, there were officially three undercapitalized 
banks and the CBN exercised regulatory forbearance (IMF,  2017a). Both regu-
lators and industry experts think the number of undercapitalized banks is even 
higher.8 In addition, the CBN is not enforcing the higher loss absorbency require-
ment it had set for the seven identified D-SIBs because some of them are strug-
gling to meet more stringent regulatory requirements.9 Mock compliance has 
thus become a feature of the regulatory process. What is more, while some banks 
seem to lack the capacity to provide adequate data to the supervisors, others seem 
to make every effort to hide their dismal state.
This is not to say that the CBN has not made significant efforts to address weak-
nesses in regulation and supervision over the past two decades. While Nigeria was 
judged to be compliant or largely compliant with fourteen out of twenty-five Basel 
Core Principles in the 2002 FSAP, it was judged compliant or largely compliant 
with eighteen out of twenty-five core principles in the 2012 FSAP. Moreover, some 
of the deficiencies highlighted in the 2012 FSAP such as weaknesses in the 
Framework for AML/CFT, the lack of a framework for consolidated supervision, 
and the lack of consideration of market risk have been addressed in recent years.10 
That said, the 2012 FSAP also highlighted deficiencies with respect to enforcement 
and the regulation of related party lending, large exposure rules, and the definition 
of Tier 1 and 2 capital. What emerges is thus a picture of early adoption of Basel 
standards but slow implementation and enforcement.
The political economy of Nigeria’s engagement  
with Basel standards
This section deals with the five major phases of Nigeria’s engagement with Basel 
standards. The international orientation of regulators and conflicted preferences 
are critical factors in explaining the gap between the declared commitment to 
Basel standards and the translation of these standards into concrete policies. 
8 Several interviews, regulators, and financial industry experts, Abuja and Lagos, September 2017. 
See also CBN (2017b).
9 Several interviews and regulators, Abuja and Lagos, September 2017.
10 Nigeria was blacklisted by the FATF in 2012 because of weaknesses in its AML/CFT framework. 
In 2013, however, Nigeria was removed from the list because Nigeria’s Presidential Committee on the 
Financial Action Task Force managed to reform the framework quickly. The risk of losing correspond-
ent banking relationships seems to have been an important reason for the quick action and high-level 
political commitment.
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The explanation for Nigeria’s path of early adoption and slow implementation and 
enforcement presented in this section centres on the tension between regulators’ 
incentives to employ best-practice prudential regulation and to enhance the bank-
ing sector’s contribution to economic development in the short term.
Basel I adoption in an inward-looking, 
fragile environment, 1990–2000
When the BIS issued Basel I in the late 1980s, Nigeria’s banking sector was in a 
state of chaos. As a result of the financial liberalization and privatization process, 
a core element of Nigeria’s SAP, the number of banks exploded, increasing from 
forty in 1985 to 107 in 1990 (World Bank, 1994). By 1990, the banking sector was 
very distressed because of a combination of banks’ fraudulent activities, loose 
regulation, and weak supervisory capacity (Brownbridge, 1998).
When the CBN implemented a minimum CAR in 1990 it did so mainly with an 
eye to the domestic sphere. The aim was to stabilize the banking sector through a 
reform package which included a rise in minimum CARs besides other measures 
such as requiring banks to classify loans according to performance and higher 
requirements for minimum paid-up share. The policy preferences of regu lators 
were shaped by domestic rather than international debates because the CBN’s 
senior staff, including the governors, were only weakly embedded in inter nation al 
regulatory debates, as also Table 11.3 shows. While there was some exchange 
between Nigerian regulators and the staff of the IMF and the World Bank in the 
early 1990s, the role and influence of the IFIs were limited because they provided 
only little financing and technical assistance as part of Nigeria’s SAP (Herbst and 
Soludo,  2001).11 If anything, the domestic orientation of Nigerian technocrats 
increased during the 1990s as Sani Abacha’s military regime became internationally 
increasingly isolated because of human rights abuses and the reversal of structural 
adjustment reforms.
Enforcing minimum CARs and other regulations proved difficult for three 
main reasons. One reason was political interference. Politicians limited the auton-
omy of regulators and protected banks from regulatory intervention because they 
played an important role in enhancing regime stability. Nigerian banks were 
largely owned by military officials or individuals that were connected to members 
of the military regimes of Ibrahim Babangida (1985 until 1993) and of Sani Abacha 
(1993 until 1998). Politicians benefited from cheap loans from these ‘political’ 
banks. Bank owners, in turn, were able to earn exorbitant rents from arbitrage 
opportunities in parallel foreign exchange markets and fraudulent activities like 
11 Nigeria embarked on the SAP mainly because international creditors had made an SAP a pre-
condition for debt negotiations, and less to gain access to foreign aid.
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money laundering, and in exchange supported the regime (Boone, 2005; Lewis 
and Stein, 1997).
A second reason for weak enforcement was that banks made every effort to 
evade and circumvent supervision (Lewis and Stein, 1997). Most banks were set 
up to exploit arbitrage opportunities in Nigeria’s foreign exchange and money 
market and were thus firmly domestically oriented. Given the fragile states of their 
finances and banks’ limited interest in attracting foreign investors or expanding 
internationally, the banks had limited incentives to support engagement with 
international standards.
A final and, for Nigeria’s story, important factor is that regulators had conflicting 
preferences. On the one hand, they considered stricter regulations, including a 
high minimum CAR, important to enhance banking sector stability. On the other, 
regulators were keen to avoid a collapse of confidence in banks and hesitant to dis-
close the full extent of problems in the banking sector (Lewis and Stein,  1997). 
Regulatory interventions risked causing a breakdown of the system that the CBN 
sought to develop as part of its developmental mandate.
Looking outward: Basel II adoption, 2001–4
When Abacha died in 1998 and Olusegun Obasanjo won elections in 1999, the 
environment for the engagement with Basel standards changed markedly in Nigeria.
Like his predecessors, Obasanjo’s government had a development strategy 
that  emphasized state-led and oil-financed development and was thus broadly 
domestically oriented. However, Obasanjo also made significant efforts to reform 
Table 11.4  Nigeria: central bank governors, 1980s to the present








1993–9 Limited; career in Nigerian domestically oriented 
bank before becoming CBN governor
Joseph Odele 
Sanusi




2004–9 High; Visiting scholar in European and US universities 
and in the IMF as well as consultant for international 
organizations before becoming CBN governor
Sanusi Lamido 
Sanusi




2014–present High; CEO of internationally active bank before 
becoming CBN governor
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economic governance. In particular, he reformed the public sector by replacing 
key personnel. In addition, Obasanjo was more internationally oriented than his 
predecessors, seeking to achieve Paris Club debt relief and to attract foreign 
investment by improving Nigeria’s international reputation and the business 
environment (Apati, 2012; Reuters, 2000).
The reform orientation of Obasanjo’s government shaped financial sector gov-
ernance in two ways. First, regulators kept more abreast of international policy 
debates because Nigeria’s efforts to secure debt relief required them to engage 
more with IFIs. Second, Olusegun Obasanjo replaced the leadership of the CBN 
and appointed, as Table 11.4 also shows, Joseph Oladele Sanusi, an internationally 
oriented career banker, as CBN governor. With a professional background in inter-
nationally active African banks, Sanusi was familiar with developments in financial 
regulation in the international sphere and convinced of the need to improve the 
capacity of regulators if they were to keep up with developments in domestic and 
international finance. In line with his professional background in banking, Sanusi 
placed a major emphasis on two processes. One was the professionalization of the 
CBN through trainings and hiring well-qualified staff. The second was the reform 
of the framework for banking regulation, a centrepiece of which was the adoption 
of Basel II.12
It is in this context that the CBN adopted Basel II in the early 2000s. For Sanusi, 
the adoption of Basel II was not only an attempt to enhance the stability of the 
domestic and international banking system but also a way to benchmark Nigeria’s 
performance (CBN, 2002b). Moreover, in his view Basel II should ‘be embraced if 
we are not to be excluded from the international financial system. Since our banks 
are competing in a global market, we cannot continue to operate on rules that fail 
to meet international standards’ (CBN, 2002b, p. 4). CBN and NDIC staff on the 
operational level also supported the move towards Basel II but more because of 
domestic concerns. As a former CBN official recalls: ‘We saw it [Basel II] as an 
opportunity to upscale our regulation . . . Basel is at the frontiers of knowledge; we 
wanted to take advantage of it’.13 Thus, for Nigerian regulators, developments at 
the international level offered an opportunity to advance their domestic concerns, 
namely to stabilize a fragile banking sector.
Other actors did not oppose the adoption of Basel standards. The regulators 
had sensitivized the government and the adoption of Basel II was in line with the 
government’s broader strategy of reintegrating into the international community 
following the relative isolation under Abacha’s regime and of improving regu la-
tory oversight over the banking sector (NNPC, 2004). In fact, in the early 2000s 
there emerged a consensus in the presidency that significant financial sector 
reforms would be needed because criminal investigations, in Nigeria and the 
12 Interview, former bank CEO, Lagos, 8 September 2017.
13 Interview, former CBN official, Lagos, 20 September 2017.
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United States, repeatedly showed the extent of malpractice, including money 
laundering and other financial crimes, in Nigerian banks (Apati, 2012). Bankers 
were only informed after the regulators had already decided to adopt Basel but 
were invited to consultations on the implementation of the framework. Largely 
excluded from the discussions were politicians outside the government and rep-
resentatives from the IFIs. Politicians paid little attention to Basel II because it did 
not have enough political salience, especially compared to other regulatory issues 
such as the level of interest rates and bank closures. Nor did the IMF and World 
Bank shape discussions about the adoption of Basel II. While both institutions 
criticized weaknesses in Nigeria’s system of banking regulation, notably the 
limit ed enforcement of existing rules, there is little evidence that the institutions 
pushed for or discouraged the adoption of Basel II or that regulators listened to 
their views on Basel II adoption.
Having been preoccupied with closing and resolving banks in the previous 
years, regulators’ focus shifted in 2002 towards Basel implementation. Regulators 
were aware that implementation would take time. The 2001 annual report of the 
CBN’s banking supervision department highlights a number of challenges that 
stood in the way of implementation such as the infancy of the credit rating agency 
sector, data availability, and supervisory capacity (CBN, 2002a). Another factor 
that turned out to be a crucial impediment in the following years was the lack of 
prioritization of implementing Basel II.
Standstill of Basel II implementation in the context of banking  
sector fragility, 2004–12
Even though financial reform and supporting the international expansion of 
Nigeria’s banking sector remained at the top of the agenda of the CBN, efforts to 
implement Basel II slowed down when Obasanjo appointed Charles Soludo as CBN 
governor in 2004. The reason was not a lack of regulatory autonomy or interest in 
international debates. Soludo had been Obasanjo’s chief economic advisor and 
enjoyed presidential backing for financial reform initiatives. Moreover, as Table 11.3 
shows, Soludo was well integrated in international policy and academic circles 
because he had been a visiting scholar at the IMF and various universities in the UK 
and US and had worked as a consultant for donors like the World Bank. However, 
when Obasanjo was re-elected for a second term in 2003 his priority was to appoint 
a central bank governor who was focused on promoting economic growth, 
diversification, and development (Apati,  2012) and Soludo, who shared these 
developmental aspirations, oriented financial reform towards achieving these goals.
For Soludo, Nigeria’s banking sector exposed major deficiencies, notably: a sig-
nificant portion of weak banks with persistent illiquidity, poor asset quality, and 
unprofitable operations; a weak capital base; reliance on public sector deposits 
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rather than making efforts to mobilize savings from the public; and the preference 
of lending to the government rather than to the productive sectors (Soludo, 2004). 
In his view, addressing these weaknesses required a major financial reform, the 
centrepiece of which was the consolidation of the banking sector through an 
increase of the minimum capital requirement for banks from about US$15 mil-
lion to US$190 million. The rationale for the increase in capital requirements was 
that banks with a large capital base would be internationally competitive because 
of their size, be stronger because of the ability to absorb losses, and face greater 
incentives to lend to the real economy (Soludo, 2004). In other words, the reform 
sought to overcome the fragility and marginality of Nigeria’s banking sector and 
to position Nigerian banks better for financial intermediation. Banks were given 
eighteen months to comply with the requirement, which was envisaged to be 
achieved through mergers and acquisitions by 2005.
It is difficult to say precisely why Soludo focused on the banking sector consoli-
dation to address the fragility and marginality of the banking sector rather than on 
Basel II implementation. One factor seems to have been learning from emerging 
economies considered as peers. Soludo looked in particular to Malaysia and 
Indonesia, where regulators first sought to consolidate the banking sector before 
implementing Basel II.14 In addition, the focus on consolidation was encouraged 
by advice from international management consultants, with whom the CBN works 
intensively. Another important factor seems to be that Soludo did not want to 
prioritize the goal of financial stability as would have been implied by a focus on 
Basel II implementation but sought to promote simultaneously financial and eco-
nomic development. Large, well-capitalized banks would, in Soludo’s opinion, meet 
the two goals of banking stability and creating a financial sector that served the real 
economy. A final factor is that neither the banking sector, which was still largely 
domestically oriented, nor politicians championed Basel II implementation.
Once the process of the banking consolidation began, there was little prospect 
for moving forward with the implementation of Basel II. At first, banks were 
preoccupied with meeting the significant increase in capital and the banking 
supervisors were preoccupied with overseeing the consolidation. When the con-
solidation was achieved and the number of banks declined from eighty-nine to 
twenty-five, supervisory capacity was still bound. One reason was that highly 
capitalized banks had expanded their operations significantly. Specifically, the 
consolidation had encouraged universal banking, retail lending, and expansion of 
banks in the African region, each of which demanded significant supervision. 
Second, even after the banking consolidation, many banks remained fragile, 
demanding the attention of the supervisors. While some banks had found it rela-
tively easy to meet the new capital requirement, others had struggled and merged 
14 Interview, former IFI official, Lagos, 8 September 2017.
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with other struggling banks. Moreover, many banks sought to meet the capital 
requirements through margin lending and engaged in insider-lending and other 
fraudulent activities to invest the large amount of capital they had. As stated 
above, the drop in the oil prices magnified the risks in Nigeria’s large but fragile 
banking system and in 2009 bank examinations revealed that ten out of twenty-
five banks, accounting for about a third of banking system assets, were either 
insolvent or undercapitalized.15
The CBN-NDIC committee on Basel II continued to exist in the years follow-
ing the consolidation. However, all regulatory capacity was focused on overseeing 
the consolidation. Moreover, the committee lacked the support of the CBN’s 
management to drive forward additional reforms since the primary concern of 
the management was to ensure that the consolidation was a success and to avoid 
measures that threatened it. Indeed, the evidence suggests that there was some 
regulatory forbearance with respect to Basel I and other prudential regulations in 
an effort to mask increasing banking sector fragility (Sanusi,  2010). It was not 
until Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who became CBN governor in 2009, resolved the 
banking crisis that Basel II implementation in Nigeria moved forward.
Implementing Basel in the context of a stabilized  
banking sector, 2013–15
Two factors combined to support the implementation of Basel II and the intro-
duction of a framework for D-SIBs from 2013 onwards. One factor was that the 
banking sector had gained some stability following Sanusi’s resolution of the bank-
ing crisis through a combination of liquidity injections and regulatory reforms. 
Banking sector stability was a precondition for the implementation of Basel II 
because the CBN wanted to ensure that Basel II would not result in widespread 
intervention, loss of confidence, and a decline in credit to the private sector, which 
had just recovered from the crisis. Negative effects on credit were not only a 
general concern for the CBN, which sought to increase bank lending to the real 
economy, but also for politicians (Apati, 2012).16
The second important factor supporting the implementation of Basel II was 
the commitment of the CBN, notably of its new leadership, to implement inter-
nation al best practice. Sanusi’s commitment to Basel II was rooted in his career in 
two large, internationally active Nigerian banks, first as risk manager and later in 
their top management. In fact, he had been nominated by President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua as CBN governor because of his insider knowledge of the banking sector 
which provided Sanusi with strong credentials to spearhead reforms to strengthen 
15 For an overview of the causes of the banking crisis see Sanusi (2010) and World Bank (2010).
16 Interview, consultant, London, 3 October 2017.
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banking sector stability. For Sanusi, Basel II was the best available standard for 
risk management since it required banks to understand and monitor different 
types of risks but had to be adapted to the Nigerian context.17 This view was 
shaped not only through the debates prevailing in the banking community but 
also through his experience in guiding the transition of two Nigerian banks 
towards the voluntary operation of Basel II in the late 2000s. The post as governor 
provided Sanusi, who had taken pride in upgrading the banks ‘to the highest 
standard’, with the opportunity to implement this standard at the industry level.
The international orientation of CBN and NDIC staff at the operational level 
also helps to explain why regulators drove Basel II implementation. In particular, 
senior staff learned about Basel II through regular attendance at training in the 
US and continuous exchange with foreign advisors, some of which were funded 
by donors and IFIs. These regulators considered the need to focus on risk man-
agement as a major lesson of Nigeria’s banking crisis of 2009 and Basel as the best 
practice.18 In addition, CBN staff supported Basel II out of a logic of appropriate-
ness. They considered Basel II the most appropriate framework for a country with 
a large and internationalized banking sector like Nigeria.19 Moreover, Nigerian 
regulators pride themselves on adopting international best practices. As one 
regu la tor explains, Basel II ‘allows us to benchmark us with other emerging econ-
omies. We do not compare ourselves to Sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa; 
rather we look to Malaysia, India and the Philippines’.20
While banks were not driving the Basel II implementation, it was probably of 
no small importance that they welcomed it. Large, internationally active Nigerian 
banks supported the move to Basel II and a handful of them had even begun 
to  operate voluntarily according to Basel II in the late 2000s, when regulatory 
reporting still had to meet Basel I standards. Large banks’ support was primarily 
based on the view that Basel II helped to signal investors, regulators, and their 
competitors that they were ‘up to the highest standards’ and financially sound. 
A reputation of soundness would, these banks believed, also enhance their com-
petitiveness vis-à-vis other banks operating in African markets, for instance 
South African banks (Layegue, 2013).21 Moreover, when Basel was implemented 
in 2013, large banks hoped that the CBN would soon move to more advanced 
models as these allowed, from their perspective, a more ‘efficient’—that is, cost-
effective—use of capital.22 While smaller banks were more concerned about 
implementation costs, they also supported a gradual implementation of Basel II 
because they did not want to be seen as non-compliant. In addition, the simpler 
17 Interview, CBN official, Abuja, 11 September 2017.
18 Interview, CBN official, Abuja, 18 September 2017.
19 Interview, consultant, London, 3 October 2017.
20 Interview, former CBN official, Lagos, 20 September 2017.
21 Several interviews, bankers, Lagos, 9 and 21 September 2017.
22 Interview, financial industry expert, Lagos, 8 September 2017.
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financial market structure (for instance, the lack of derivatives and the lack of 
historical data) implied that the use of complex models would not be required 
initially, lowering the costs of adoption.
Gradual implementation and consideration of the domestic environment 
were also principles guiding the CBN’s implementation of Basel II. The CBN, for 
instance, excluded development banks from the operation of Basel II. In addition, 
the CBN required the use of a risk weight of 100 per cent for all corporate credit 
given the limited reach of international and domestic credit rating agencies. The 
CBN has also used some national discretion in defining risk weights, for instance 
assigning a higher risk weighting to exposures to the oil sector in 2014. Most 
importantly, the CBN did not permit the use of advanced approaches, even 
though some banks lobbied to move towards them. The reason was that the CBN 
believed that both regulators and most of the banks lacked the capacity for these 
approaches.23 In addition, the CBN had a deep distrust of the data provided by 
Nigerian banks. Moreover, by 2013 there were major debates in international 
 policy circles about the misuse of advanced approaches, confirming the CBN’s 
distrust of internal ratings-based approaches.
The consideration of the domestic environment does not mean that external 
actors did not shape the design of the Basel II guidelines. The CBN studied the 
approaches of countries considered as peers like Malaysia. International account-
ing firms and management consultants were hired to contribute to selected elem-
ents of Nigeria’s Basel II framework or offered their services pro bono. In addition, 
donors and the IMF have provided technical assistance. The influence of IFIs on 
implementation was, however, limited. The FSAP of 2012 did criticize the absence 
of some elements of Basel II like the lack of a consideration of operational and 
market risk by Nigerian regulators. Yet as a senior IFI official points out, ‘FSAPs 
are pushing on many things. Governments then choose to implement some and 
remain lagging on others; it is up to the authorities what to push and they tend to 
and implement what is least politically costly’.24
Tied hands: Basel standard engagement in times of crisis,  
2015 to the present
The benign economic and political environment for the push for Basel standards 
came to an end in 2015. Banking supervisors remain committed to Basel II and the 
CBN’s new governor, Godwin Emefiele, has been exposed to debates about global 
banking standards because he worked in the management of an inter nation al ly 
active bank before he succeeded Sanusi as CBN governor in 2014. However, in the 
23 Interview, regulator, Abuja, 18 September 2017.
24 Interview, IFI official, Abuja, 13 September 2017.
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second half of 2014, oil prices declined sharply and in 2016 Nigeria experienced a 
recession with growth collapsing to −1.5 per cent. One important consequence of 
the drop in oil revenues and thus of foreign exchange availability was that the 
newly elected government of Muhammadu Buhari exerted significant pressure 
on  the CBN to focus on exchange rate management and financing government 
expenditure (CBN,  2017b). As a result, the autonomy of the CBN declined and 
domestic policy priorities have shaped central bank policy.
The decline in oil revenues has also increased banking sector fragility because 
of banks’ exposure to the oil sector and the devaluation of the Naira. In 2017, four 
out of twenty-two commercial banks are officially undercapitalized, one of which 
is an internationally active bank (CBN,  2017b). Industry stakeholders consider 
the number of banks which fail to meet their minimum CARs even higher.25 
D-SIBs have also struggled to meet their higher CARs and HLA requirements. 
The real extent of banking sector fragility is, however, difficult to know since 
regu lators face challenges in validating banks’ data, partly because of stretched 
supervisory capacities, and partly because some banks conceal their true status.
The CBN has responded to the environment of banking sector fragility and 
limited autonomy as it did in earlier periods, namely by slowing down the imple-
mentation and enforcement of Basel standards. In particular, the CBN has been 
slow to publish documents that specify banks’ requirements with regard to Pillar II 
and Basel III guidelines. Moreover, the CBN exercises regulatory forbearance 
with regard to the four undercapitalized banks and to a breach of single obligor 
limits. The banking sector, in turn, does not push for implementation and 
enforcement because it has been hit hard by the decline of the oil price and thus 
struggles to meet the costs of Basel II compliance, which became more evident 
over the course of implementation.
The reasons for slow implementation and regulatory forbearance are twofold. 
On the one hand, regulators are keen to avoid a collapse of confidence in the 
 sector. On the other, there seems to be a concern that enforcing regulation and 
resolving banks will have adverse consequences on economic development 
through effects on employment and access to finance.26 In 2015, for instance, the 
CBN revoked a rule specifying a risk weight of 125 per cent for loans to the oil 
and gas sector, which it had issued in 2014. The reason was that oil and gas is 
con sidered a development priority sector, not least because of its links with other 
sectors in the economy and the CBN wanted to avoid negative effects on lending 
to the oil sector. ‘This’, a regulator explained, ‘is one example for the trade-offs 
between Basel II and economic development’.27
25 Several interviews, former CBN official and bankers, Lagos, September 2017.
26 Several interviews, regulators and financial industry experts, Lagos, September 2017.
27 Interview, regulator, Abuja, 18 September 2017.
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The CBN has taken significant steps to discipline banks in recent years.28 
However, the catch-22 situation remains where, on the one hand, the CBN seeks 
to promote Basel II because it is considered the best available set of rules to 
govern Nigeria’s large, internationalized banking sector. On the other hand, regu-
lators are reluctant to move faster on implementation and enforcement because 
this may require intervention in distressed banks which, they fear, has negative 
implications for economic development. Widespread bank intervention clashes 
with the developmental mandate of the CBN and mobilizes resistance by politi-
cians, who are often lobbied by the banks themselves. Both banks and politicians 
argue that bank interventions must be avoided because of their effects on employ-
ment and access to finance.29
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the puzzle of early adoption and slow implementation 
and enforcement of Basel standards in Nigeria. The case study has three main 
findings. First, Nigeria’s story suggests that an internationalized banking sector 
provides strong incentives for the adoption of Basel II and III. Banking regu-
lators drove the adoption of these standards because they believed this would 
enhance the competitiveness of Nigerian banks abroad and because they con-
sidered these standards to be more appropriate for a large, internationally 
orient ed banking sector than Basel I. This belief stemmed from learning from the 
experiences of countries considered as peers and from the experiences the cen-
tral bank governors Joseph Sanusi and Sanusi Sanusi had as CEOs of internation-
ally active banks.
The IMF and the World Bank have had, despite the international orientation 
of regulators and in contrast to findings of other studies on Basel standard adop-
tion in developing countries, little influence on regulatory preferences because 
oil revenues have limited the susceptibility of the Nigerian state to advice from 
the IFIs.30 It was, however, important that regulators had political backing for the 
adoption of these standards because it seemed that there were no evident contra-
dictions between their adoption and the larger developmental strategy. Banks, in 
turn, welcomed the fact that regulators drove Basel II adoption because they 
believed that embracing these standards would improve their international 
28 For instance, the CBN removed the management of a bank which breached regulatory thresh-
olds in 2016.
29 Both banks and politicians have made similar claims during previous episodes on banking sec-
tor fragility. Politicians, for instance, requested that Sanusi give greater consideration to the effects of 
his actions to resolve the banking crisis of 2009 on growth and employment (Apati, 2012). It is difficult 
to say whether the objections by politicians merely reflect concerns about economic development or 
whether such objections also serve to protect politically connected bankers.
30 See for instance Wilf (2016) or the case studies of Kenya and WAEMU.
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reputation and competitiveness. An important parallel to Pakistan’s case is that 
a  financial reform that resulted in the internationalization of the business model 
prevailing in the banking sector generated incentives to implement Basel standards.
The second major finding is that conflicting preferences may lead to mock 
compliance. Nigeria is, as one financial industry expert explains, ‘a country of 
rules in books that are not really implemented’.31 While Nigerian regulators have 
had strong incentives to engage with Basel II and III because of their international 
orientation, they have had equally strong incentives for slow implementation and 
enforcement in a context of oil-induced banking sector fragility because bank 
interventions involve high developmental and thus political costs. Conflicting 
preferences also help to explain weak enforcement of Basel I, notably in the run-
up to Nigeria’s banking crisis which began in 2009. This is an important parallel 
to Angola’s case where mock compliance also results from a clash between domes-
tic political realities and imperatives to adopt international standards arising 
from an internationally oriented banking sector. With reference to our analytical 
framework, as mock compliance is driven by the conflicted preferences of regu-
lators, this is a case of regulator-driven mock compliance.
The final, broader point is that Basel standards are not neutral from a develop-
mental perspective. Enforcing these standards may, at least in the short term, involve 
costs, by affecting lending to development priority sectors and requiring bank inter-
ventions, which has effects on employment and access to finance. Considerable 
work lies ahead not only in examining the developmental consequences for Basel II 
and III implementation and enforcement but also in determining what strategies 
could be adopted to reduce the developmental costs of Basel standard adoption in 
the context of fragile, extraverted financial systems.
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Angola
‘For the English to see—the politics  
of mock compliance’
Rebecca Engebretsen and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira
Introduction
Convergence on international banking standards is expected in countries with 
internationalized financial sectors (Jones and Zeitz,  2017).1 The case of Angola 
challenges this expectation. A high degree of financial sector internalization in 
the country has only been weakly matched by adherence to banking standards. 
Rather than acting as advocates, foreign partners and internationally active 
domestic banks remain apathetic to banking standards. Yet in the aftermath of 
the 2008–9 global financial crisis (GFC), the above pattern started to change. In 
2014, Angola authorities moved ahead with Basel II, although implementation 
remains highly varied across the sector. In this chapter we ask what prompted 
Angola to belatedly commit to regulatory reform in the banking sector in line 
with international best standards after having avoided it for so many years.
We argue that engagement with international banking standards (Basel I and II) 
is a result of Angola’s particular form of financial sector extraversion coupled 
with the fact that the domestic banking sector remains deeply politicized. In 
Angola, like in other resource-rich countries, the financial sector plays a key role 
in facilitating outgoing financial flows. At the same time, the extending of loans, 
often without collateral, and handing out of bank licences to political insiders 
remains an important avenue for securing political support for the regime. Before 
the GFC, the particular constellation of extraversion and politicization of the 
financial sector meant that Angola’s drivers of convergence were much weaker 
than its drivers of divergence. Strengthening bank regulation threatened to upset 
the role banks had come to play in Angola’s clientelistic system. However, in the 
wake of the GFC, changes in the international regulatory environment meant that 
non-implementation of standards was no longer an option. For Angolan banks to 
1 ‘For the English to see’: This phrase dates back to a treaty signed in 1826 between Great Britain 
and Brazil supposedly ending the slave trade. The notion of ‘for the English to see’ suggests that the 
signing of the law was purely Brazil’s measure to placate Great Britain, whilst in reality there was no 
intention of ending the trade.
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maintain their link to the global financial market, the country needed to signal its 
readiness to regulate the sector in line with international standards.2 The result 
has been an upsurge in regulatory efforts after 2009, and especially since 2014. 
Yet because the nature of the banking sector has not changed, only some aspects 
of the standards implemented, and they are not enforced, leading to a situation of 
‘mock compliance’. As mock compliance is driven by the conflicting preferences 
of politicians, it is a case of politically driven mock compliance.
This chapter is amongst the first scholarly works to focus on the political 
economy of banking regulation in Angola.3 Our analysis builds on fieldwork 
undertaken in Angola, Portugal, and Washington, DC between 2009 and 2017. 
Thirty interviews were conducted with current and former government officials 
including regulators, public and private bankers, and representatives of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and accounting firms. All interviews were conducted 
off the record.
Following the introduction, the chapter starts by situating Angola’s regulatory 
trajectory in the broader context of financial sector development in the country. 
A description of the country’s engagement with the Basel standards and other 
international banking standards to date follows. The chapter then turns to the 
main analysis to answer the question of what drove regulatory reform in Angola 
and what characterizes the implementation of international banking standards. 
We divide the analysis into before and after the GFC in order to highlight the 
 differences and continuity between the two periods. Finally, we conclude.
Political economy context
In order to better understand Angola’s engagement with banking standards it is 
useful to first put the trajectory of banking regulation in the country in a broader 
perspective.4 Following the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola’s economy grew 
rapidly to become the third largest in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 12.1). The pro-
cess of reconstruction that ensued was managed by the victorious MPLA regime 
under the tight control of President José Eduardo dos Santos (Oliveira, 2015), in 
power from 1979 until September 2017. The impressive growth is inherently linked 
to the extraction of oil, the dominant force in the economy. Whilst substantial for 
decades, oil production took off in the late 1990s, from below one million barrels 
a day in 2002 to reach almost two million by 2008. During the same period, oil 
prices increased from just over US$20 per barrel to US$147.
4 For a more general background of the Angolan banking sector see Ferreira and Soares de Oliveira 
(2018).
2 ‘Managing Angola’s financial sector’, Event at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of 
Oxford, 24 January 2017.
3 See also Ferreira and Soares de Oliveira (2018) and Engebretsen (2018).
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The role of oil in the Angolan economy cannot be overstated and it is within 
this context that the country’s financial sector has emerged. The Angolan finan-
cial system grew exponentially from a small and tightly controlled base aided by 
market liberalization and the end of forty years of conflict in 2002 (Ferreira and 
Soares de Oliveira, 2018). From only US$3 billion in assets in 2003, by 2013 the 
sector held an estimated US$60 billion in assets.5 Sector growth was particularly 
fast between 2007 and 2009, with yearly average asset growth exceeding 66 per 
cent (IMF, 2012) (Figure 12.1).
Table 12.1 Angola: key indicators 
Angola  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 4,170
Bank assets (current US$) 39.4 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 41.3
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) N/A
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 21.1
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 21.2
Polity IV score (2017) −2
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank 
























Bank assets (in per cent of
GDP, right scale)
Figure 12.1 Angola: oil price and bank assets.
Source: IMF (2012)
5 Edward George, ‘Angola’s financial sector: An overview’, Presentation, Oxford, 18 June 2015.
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Despite the impressive growth of the Angolan financial sector, the sector’s 
development impact is limited, adding weight to the theory that there is a resource 
curse in financial development (Beck et al., 2011; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014). 
Like in other resource-rich economies, the sector remains concentrated, with the 
five largest banks accounting for almost 70 per cent of total assets (Wise, 2015). 
Banking operations in the country have long been rudimentary, characterized by 
high fees and a restricted number of services. Angolan banks made ‘the bulk of 
their earnings from government bonds rather than growing their loan books’ 
with a marked preference for short-term operations (Wallace,  2015). Financial 
inclusion is limited as access to services is low: only 29 per cent of those aged fif-
teen or older reported having a bank account in 2014, compared to a Sub-Saharan 
Africa average of 34.2 per cent (World Bank, 2014). Credit to the private sector (as 
a percentage of GDP) stood at 27 per cent in 2015, below the Sub-Saharan average 
of 46 per cent (see Figure 12.2) (World Bank, 2018). Loan opportunities are largely 
limited to politically connected individuals or firms.
The rapid growth of the financial sector, described here, has posed particular 
challenges for the financial regulator, the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA). 
Together with other state institutions, the BNA was deliberately undercut for 
much of the 1990s to allow the then president maximum discretionary power 
over oil revenues (Hodges, 2004). The institution has gained strength since then, 
but ultimately the policy space in which the BNA has to manoeuvre remains at 
the discretion of the executive who, for much of Angola’s modern history, has 
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Figure 12.2 Angola: credit to government and private sector.
Source: World Bank (2017)
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Commercial banks dominate the Angolan financial system with 99 per cent of 
financial assets, whilst non-bank financial institutions, including the insurance 
and pension sectors, are still at an infant stage (IMF,  2012). Another defining 
feature of the Angolan financial sector is the heavy presence of the state. As is the 
case in other resource-rich countries, public ownership of oil and gas reserves 
and equity stakes in the oil and gas industry renders vast revenues to the Angolan 
state at the expense of the private sector (Beblawi and Luciani,  1987). Angolan 
banks, both private and public, are extremely dependent on the state for their 
operations. Public sector entities have equity interests (including minority stakes) 
in around 90 per cent of the banking system (in terms of assets) (IMF,  2012). 
Eight banks (including two of the top five) are directly owned by the state or by 
public enterprises, including the National Oil Company, Sonangol.
The public banks have historically been erratically managed, steered by pol it-
ical purposes rather than on a commercial basis. Angola’s major public bank, 
Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC), lends predominantly to public sector 
institutions and employees.6 Public banks lend with explicit state guarantees, 
including as part of the government’s programme to support micro, small, and 
medium enterprises, Angola Investe (Agência Angola Press, 2012), or with an 
implicit guarantee. In addition to an increasing percentage of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) arising from the large number of loss-making state-owned enter-
prises, there is a large quantity of fraudulent or NPLs originating from credit 
being extended to senior political and military figures. These ‘loans’ are granted 
‘recurrently without any collateral or even risk-assessment’, with prominent 
members of the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) 
not expected to repay (Africa Confidential, 2017a). The extent of the problem is 
amply shown by revelations regarding BPC’s extensive NPL burden. According 
to the BNA, impaired loans reached 30 per cent of BPC’s total loans in 2017 
(Fitch Ratings, 2017).
Emerging from the shadow of Angola’s poorly managed state-owned banks, 
the rise of Angolan private banks signifies the dual purpose of the country’s 
modern banking sector. Angola’s private banks are amongst the most profitable 
on the continent (see Figure 12.3) (Wallace, 2012). Some are partly owned by public 
sector entities, including national oil company Sonangol, or are associated with 
large Angolan private companies (Expansão, 2016). All, however, have so-called 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) amongst their shareholders, including leading 
MPLA politicians, ruling party officials, current and former members of the 
se cur ity forces, or close family members of the above. Elite members possess 
shareholdings in their own names or through front men and/or companies, which 
have subsequently been revealed to represent their interests.
6 Interview, former banker, Luanda, September 2015.
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The category of Angolan private banks is broad, encompassing sizeable (and 
partly Sonangol-owned) Banco Angolano de Investimentos (BAI), which by now 
has operations in Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde, as well as a 
significant number of smaller banks. So far, the smaller ‘political banks’ have had 
limited operations.7
Angola’s private banks also encompass foreign-owned banks, dominating the 
country’s banking sector in terms of total assets and capital. Contrary to the vast 
majority of African banking systems but similarly to that of Nigeria, Angola has 
not been reliant on foreign investments to secure capital flows as sizeable foreign 
exchange is generated by the oil sector. Instead, foreign investors are needed in 
Angola for their sectorial expertise, introducing modern financial tools in the 
country. Foreign partners are also important on account of their (and their home 
jurisdictions’) credibility (Ferreira and Soares de Oliveira, 2018).
Meanwhile, these partnerships are formally (through Angolan majority own-
ership) or informally (a bank’s dependence on the Angolan market) calibrated 
in  ways that guarantee Luanda’s prominence. Although the legal framework 
allows foreign banks to have 100 per cent equity stakes, in the course of the boom 
period of 2004–9, foreign banks generally followed Angolan authorities’ advice 
(and in some cases, such as Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA), were practically 
pushed) to seek local partners and divest their shareholdings to 51 per cent stakes 











































































Figure 12.3 Angola: rates of return on assets (RoA) and equity (RoE).
Source: Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus, Bureau van Dijk (2018)
7 Interview, private bank, Luanda, October 2016.
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interests. This was the case with Angola’s major Portuguese banks, as well as 
South Africa’s Standard Bank (attained by Sonangol before being acquired by the 
former president’s son, José Filomeno dos Santos) (Semanário Angolense, 2008). 
The result was that, between 2005 and 2015, the percentage of total banking assets 
in Angolan private ownership rose from 28 per cent to 49.3 per cent.8
In light of the above analysis, it appears more fruitful to distinguish the Angolan 
banks by the purpose they serve rather than their proprietors, a point stressed by 
Engebretsen (2018). As we have seen, in the majority of cases the proprietor is the 
Angolan state, and its influence is extensive even in cases in which it doesn’t 
have ownership. As the next section will further elaborate, the heavy presence of 
the state in finance and the prominence of politically connected persons leave the 
BNA in a particularly delicate situation.
Basel adoption, implementation, and enforcement
Angola’s engagement with international banking standards appears relatively 
recent and is particularly noticeable following the GFC. Yet, on closer inspection 
it is clear that Angolan authorities’ engagement with standards such as the Basel 
standards is not new but dates back to 1991. As in other countries covered in this 
volume, the early introduction of banking standards in Angola followed engage-
ment by the authorities with the IFIs in the late 1980s. The initial law governing 
Angola’s financial sector (Law 5/91) after sector liberalization incorporated capital 
requirements based on Basel I, requiring banks to maintain a minimum capital 
ratio of 10 per cent (Deloitte, 2012). Additionally, the 1991 Law outlined rules for 
prudential regulation, supervision, and compulsory external auditing (World 
Bank, 1992).
Whilst in line with Basel I, banking standards were at best erratically enforced 
throughout the 1990s (IMF, 2000). Further liberalization of the financial sector 
from 1997 saw the enforcement of a new Central Bank Law (Law 6/97) and the 
new law for Financial Institutions (Law 1/99), both with the stated aim of bring-
ing banking regulation in line with Basel Core Principles (BCPs). To what extent 
the authorities achieved this is difficult to say, however. Assessments from that 
time, evaluating Angola’s banking regulation against international standards, 
were not made public.9
Angola continued to express its commitment to strengthen bank supervision 
and fully implement the BCPs throughout the 2000s (IMF,  2011a, 2010, 2009, 
2000). In 2009, the IMF reported that the BNA had taken necessary measures to 
strengthen regulations in line with the BCPs, including adopting a revised loan 
8 Authors’ estimates based on KPMG (2016) and bank reports.
9 World Bank and IMF reports indicate that such an assessment took place.
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classification and provisioning standard. Banks would now be required to classify 
loans by their risk as well as make provision for expected losses (IMF, 2010). As 
of  spring 2018, the BNA was still working to ‘update the regulatory framework 
and create the conditions for a risk-based approach supervision’ (Agência Angola 
Press, 2017; Santos and Santos, 2018).
Implementation of new prudential regulation, aiming to bring domestic 
regulation closer to Basel II, was due in January 2008 but was postponed (African 
Development Bank,  2008). The BNA reconfirmed its intentions to implement 
Basel II on several occasions over the next few years but little tangible progress was 
made (IMF,  2011b). A Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), a joint 
programme of the IMF and the World Bank, was conducted for the first time in 
2011. The report highlighted the limitations of Angola’s regulatory and supervisory 
framework, noting that the country was compliant or largely compliant with only 
eight out of twenty-five BCPs. Significant gaps were identified especially when it 
came to risk assessment, consolidated supervision, and enforcement (IMF, 2012).
It would take until 2015 for Angolan authorities to officially implement Basel II. 
In one year, draft regulation was published covering all different types of risk 
under Pillar 1 of the standard (FSI,  2015). Speaking to the Financial Times in 
February of that year, then BNA Governor José Pedro de Morais confirmed that 
Angola had drafted forty-one new regulations since 2014, with twenty-three 
issued and the remainder to be published later that year (England, 2016).
Angola went ahead with standardized approaches for calculating risk, discarding 
more advanced requirements that would require each bank to account for all risk 
categories.10 Neither the banks nor the regulators were judged to have the cap-
acity to apply such advanced models. As the IMF noted in 2012, the BNA lacks 
‘clear understanding concerning banks business models and risks’ (IMF, 2012).
With regards to prudential supervision (Pillar 2), Angola has advanced since 
2012 when the IMF wrote that ‘neither the BNA nor the banks conduct sensitivity 
or stress tests to assess vulnerabilities and key data are not readily available’ 
(IMF, 2012). The same year, a Financial Stability Committee was established to 
act as an advisory body to the latter, monitoring evolving conditions and risks in 
the financial system. BNA also started conducting regular stress tests on banks 
under different scenarios from 2012 onwards (IMF, 2015). BNA is obliged to con-
duct inspections of banks (Law No. 16/10) and does this through regular on-site 
inspections and external audits.11 Whilst all banks in Angola are subject to external 
audits on an annual basis, none are publicly listed, thus limiting the effectiveness 
of market discipline (Pillar 3). That said, the introduction of disclosure requirements 
for Angolan banks based on Basel standards as well as International Financial 
Reporting Standards (gradually introduced since 2014) means that there is greater 
10 Interview, private bank, Luanda, October 2016.
11 Interview, private bank, Luanda, September 2016.
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disclosure on the evolution of various financial risks in the financial sector 
(KPMG, 2016a) (Table 12.2).
As part of the larger modernization of the financial sector, Angolan authorities 
also passed corrective legislation in 2014 aimed at removing the country from the 
Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’ (IMF, 2014). Angola was placed 
under the surveillance of the Financial Action Task Force in 2010 and again in 
2012 before being removed in in 2016, signifying the country’s successful efforts in 
bringing the domestic legal framework in line with AML/CFT standards.
Whereas Angola’s recent embrace of international banking standards appears 
impressive, significant challenges remain. From late 2014, banks have grappled with 
‘a dollar liquidity crunch amid regulatory concerns, bad loans and low oil prices’, 
leading industry magazine The Banker to note in 2016 that ‘more work needs to be 
done to enhance system-wide regulation and compliance’ (King, 2016). Whilst oil 
prices have improved since then, more work is needed to ensure that the Angolan 
banking sector complies with international standards (Santos and Santos, 2018). 
In particular, a significant performance gap exists between the banks. Many of the 
larger institutions, often with international shareholders, have  established good 
governance structures and meet international compliance norms, whilst larger pub-
lic banks and smaller private banks have fallen behind. As we will argue in the next 
section, this duality characterizing Angola’s banking sector is key to understanding 
the country’s engagement, and lack thereof, with banking standards to date.




Basel I Financial Institutions Law 5/91 1991
Basel II Pillar 1 (credit, market, and operational risk, 
standardized approaches) in force since 201612
Elements of Pillar 2 in force since 2013










Basel III N/A N/A
12 Notice No. 09/2016 of 22 June 2016; Notice No. 08/2016 of 22 June 2016; Notice No. 07/2016 of 
22 June 2016; Notice No. 06/2016 of 22 June 2016; Notice No. 05/2016 of 22 June 2016; Notice No. 04/2016 
of 22 June 2016; Notice No. 03/2016 of 16 June 2016; Notice No. 02/2016 of 15 June 2016; Instruction 
No. 12/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction No. 13/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction No. 12/2016 of 8 
August 2016; Instruction No. 14/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction No. 15/2016 of 8 August 2016; 
Instruction No. 16/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction No. 17/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction 
No. 18/2016 of 8 August 2016; Instruction No. 19/2016 of 30 August 2016 (KPMG, 2016b).
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The political economy of Basel adoption,  
implementation, and compliance
The foundations for Angola’s financial sector and the state  
of regulation pre-2009
How to explain Angola’s shift from minimal engagement with banking stand-
ards to the active involvement we have witnessed over recent years? And how 
can we make sense of the implementation pattern that has ensued? To address 
these questions, we divide the subsequent analysis in two: the first part deals with 
the period preceding the onset of reforms (pre-2009) and the second deals with the 
period after 2009. In this way, we are able to identify the differences between 
the two periods and the drivers of regulatory reform witnessed in recent years, 
which were absent in the early years.
The Angolan financial sector plays a key role in facilitating the connection 
between the domestic economy and international markets. The bulk of the coun-
try’s banking sector activity continues to be trade financing. The salience of trade 
in the country is due to Angola importing the majority of consumption goods and 
capital goods, alongside services required for local production.13 Cross-border 
banking business is additionally kept high by foreign companies that need to access 
foreign exchange to repatriate their Kwanza-denominated earnings or  to  pay for 
imports. Adding to this, Angolans are large consumers of foreign exchange, using it 
to hedge against an unstable local currency, for travelling and consumption 
(Peralta, 2017). It is commission on these kinds of cross-border transactions that has 
made Angolan banks amongst the most profitable on the continent (Wallace, 2012). 
Yet to execute these transactions, domestic banks rely on correspondent relation-
ships (BIS, 2017). Because Angolan banks have limited branches overseas,14 they 
are only able to access financial services in overseas jurisdictions and provide 
cross-border payment services to their customers through correspondent banks.
Based on the high degree of internationalization of Angola’s financial sector, 
incumbent politicians, regulatory authorities, and banks pursue a strategy focused 
on maximizing through-flow of international financial transactions. In order to 
facilitate these flows, high levels of adoption, implementation, and enforcement 
of bank standards could be expected (Jones and Zeitz,  2017). Yet this has not 
been the case.
We argue that the lack of alignment with international banking standards des-
pite high levels of banking sector extraversion is primarily due to financial sector 
13 During the last five years the imports increased at an annualized rate of 1.7 per cent, from $15.4B 
in 2010 to $16.9B in 2015. ‘Angola Profile’, The Observatory of Economic Complexity (n.d.) (accessed 
9 May 2017).
14 Because of the dominance of the oil industry in Angola, transactions are mainly in US dollars.
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extraversion working differently in Angola. The activities of Angolan banks, as 
described earlier, centre mainly on facilitating outflows of capital. This differs 
from other cases of financial sector extraversion discussed in this book, Kenya 
and to a lesser extent Ghana and Rwanda, where the goal is to attract cap ital. In 
these cases, politicians and regulators use the adoption and implementation of 
international standards to reassure foreign investors of their country’s regulatory 
set-up. As the second largest oil producer in Africa, attracting foreign capital is 
less of a concern for Angola. This is reflected in the way the country has his tor ic-
al ly interacted with banking standards. Contrary to most African cases, the influ-
ence of the IMF and of western donors was always limited (Oliveira, 2015). The 
same is true of so-called ‘regulatory networks’ of reformist central bankers and 
technocrats. As the IMF noted in 2012, there have been traditionally low  levels of 
cooperation with foreign supervisors despite the importance of foreign banks in 
Angola.15 Patterns of regional banking reform likewise have little influence on the 
country’s regulatory response. Angola remains poorly integrated in the broader 
region and does not seek to emulate the policies of neighbouring states.16
Simultaneously, foreign banks have been unassertive in Angola and adapted to 
local terms. Whilst in line with the analytical framework, this finding challenges 
a  common assumption that foreign banks advocate for the implementation of 
international banking standards such as the Basel standards so as to minimize 
their transaction costs and/or to gain a competitive edge over domestic banks 
(Gottschalk,  2010).17 Rather, in the words of an IFI official, foreign banks in 
Angola ‘mind their own business and do not push anything’.18 Internationally 
active Angolan banks are not pushing for greater adherence with banking stand-
ards but are concentrating on tapping the domestic market. In sum, the submis-
sive behaviour of private banks in Angola resembles that of Ethiopia, where an 
environment of steady profits discourages bankers from ‘rocking the boat’.
In the pre-GFC time period, the pattern described above landed Angola in the 
domestic-oriented typology. At the time, Angolan politicians, bankers, and the 
regulator had few incentives to incur the substantial costs associated with adher-
ing to international standards. Several bank insiders confirmed this to be the 
case.19 The disinterest in banking standards held true even for banks that were 
forced to comply with international standards anyway because of their operations 
abroad. Private banks’ lack of interest in pushing for international standards 
appears to have little to do with the individual bank’s interests, however. Rather, 
it  came down to the fact that more rigid regulatory oversight and increased 
transparency in banking sector operations would hurt other parts of the financial 
15 A long-delayed Memorandum of Understanding with Portuguese authorities was signed in 
November 2011 (IMF, 2012).
16 Interview, public bank, Luanda, September 2015.
17 Interview, private bank, Luanda, October 2016.   18 Interview, IFI, Luanda, October 2016.
19 Interview, private bank, Luanda, October 2016; interview, private bank, Luanda, September 2016.
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sector in which the owners of private banks also had an interest. Angolan public 
sector entities hold equity interests in around 90 per cent of the banking system 
(in terms of assets) (IMF, 2012). Eight banks (including two of the top five) are 
directly owned by the state, one through national oil company Sonangol.
Specifically, stricter regulation and compliance with international standards 
was expected to hurt the public banks disproportionally. Public banks continue to 
be central to the MPLA regime’s distribution of patronage through the use of bank 
credit. The widespread use of the banking sector for political purposes is evident 
from the public banks’ historically poor performance.20 As an IMF report from 
2015 cautioned, ‘financial indicators in these [public] banks show relatively high 
non-performing loans (NPLs) in per cent of total loans, declining or negative 
return on average assets (ROA), and low capital adequacy ratios’ (IMF, 2015, p. 15). 
Angola’s biggest public lender, BPC, extended loans to senior political and military 
figures, ‘recurrently without any collateral or even risk-assessment’, with prom in-
ent elite members not expected to repay their loans (Africa Confidential, 2017a). 
In addition to the BPC, other public lenders including national development bank 
Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola (BDA) also required bailout after having 
been granted irrecoverable credit (Africa Confidential, 2017b).
Politicians thus had strong incentives to oppose implementation of bank 
standards seen to jeopardize the abovementioned arrangements. Public banks 
were expected to struggle particularly with complying with minimum capital 
requirements and greater financial disclosure (as required under Pillar 3) as well 
as stricter enforcement of national guidelines for classification of non-performing 
loans. Angola’s smaller banks would moreover struggle under higher compliance 
costs as a consequence of bringing the national regulatory framework in line with 
international standards. Owners of these banks, which include members of the 
most powerful families in the country, offered especially strong resistance to any 
rules seen as jeopardizing the viability of their private interests.
In such a context, Angolan politicians had an interest in keeping regulators 
politically and technically weak, so as to avoid any genuine regulatory interfer-
ence in the banking sector. Whilst the BNA officially gained greater policy 
autonomy from the early 1990s (Law 6/97)—having previously been used mainly 
as a money press for the state—the central bank remained subordinate to the 
political agenda throughout the first decade of the 2000s. This meant that regu-
lators, like politicians, were domestically oriented. Whereas in other countries, 
including Ghana, technical assistance from IFIs was an important factor influ-
encing Basel implementation in the country, Angola’s engagement with IFIs was 
ad hoc.21 To the extent that Angola engaged internationally, this was mainly 
20 For further discussion about the public banks’ historic performance see (Engebretsen, 2018).
21 Angola’s first stand-by agreement with the IMF was in 2009.
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with former colonial master Portugal, also known for its relatively domestically 
 oriented regulators.22
The lack of incentive to push for improved regulation meant that before 2009 
Angola’s engagement with international banking standards was lacking and 
negligible commitment to Basel standards was made. For the banking sector, 
implementation of international standards was unnecessary and even seen as 
counterproductive. This changed after the GFC. As the next section will show, 
changed external circumstances meant that non-compliance was increasingly 
difficult given the banking sector’s important role in facilitating trade and out going 
financial flows. Yet implementation of international banking standards continued 
to conflict with the other important role of the banking sector: allocating resources 
to favoured constituencies. The result has been mock compliance.
Change and continuity post-2009
Following the GFC, it became clear that the equilibrium in Angola’s banking 
sector—characterized by negligible compliance—was no longer viable. This was 
mainly due to three factors. First, a drastic, if relatively short-lived, fall in global 
oil prices resulting from the GFC took the nascent banking sector by surprise, 
undermining its stability. The prices of oil collapsed from $147 in August 2008 to 
$28 later that year (Ferreira and Soares de Oliveira, 2018). Second and alongside 
the economic downturn, accusations surfacing that senior BNA personnel had 
stolen considerable amounts of money degraded the credibility of the BNA lead-
ership (US Senate, 2010). BNA managers were replaced in April 2009 by a new 
team with a reformist mandate.23 Third, already prior to the GFC and the BNA 
scandal, the president and his economic team acknowledged that the rules of 
engagement in international finance were changing. To maintain their connec-
tion with the global markets, Angolan banks needed to adjust or at least signal 
their inclination to do so.24 Accordingly, a heightened emphasis on strengthening 
Angola’s regulatory and supervisory framework along the lines of international 
best practice advanced from 2009. The goal was to ‘bring the banking sector up to 
international standards quickly’ (Wallace, 2014).
The political mandate provided by the president, and his economic team, to the 
regulators was pivotal in transforming the BNA from a passive bystander to an 
active leader of the reform agenda. The new BNA leadership differed from their 
predecessors with their international orientation and background in the private 
22 Interview, IFI, Washington, DC, December 2016.
23 Months later, investigation showed that $137 million was siphoned off to offshore accounts. 
Eighteen BNA and Finance Ministry officials were arrested. Interview, private bank, Portugal, 
September 2016.
24 Interview, private bank, Luanda, September 2016.
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sector, bolstering their standing with Angolan and foreign banks. Between 2009 
and 2012, José de Lima Massano as BNA governor and Ricardo Viegas de Abreu 
as vice-governor successfully manoeuvred a stand-by arrangement with the IMF, 
the first in the country’s history. The regulators were careful, however, in aligning 
the IFI reform agenda with regime priorities. Even when a Financial System 
Assessment Program was carried out in 2012, a prominent Angolan official com-
mented that this was primarily ‘a [diagnostic], not a roadmap for reform’.25
Yet it would be a few years from this initial reform drive before adaptation of 
Basel standards was implemented. We argue that this is because, before 2014, 
Angola’s regulatory deficiencies did not jeopardize the country’s cross-border 
transactions. The costs of going ahead with regulatory reform were still too high 
for politicians to accept in 2009–10. On the one hand, the banking sector still 
played an important redistributive role, which would likely be jeopardized by 
stricter regulations. On the other hand, the effects of the GFC proved brief and 
the Angolan economy rebounded quickly, lessening the financial pressure on the 
government. After an initial setback, banks had quickly resumed the expansion of 
services and operations (KPMG, 2016a). The period between 2010 and 2014 was 
therefore characterized by a degree of reformism, but lacked the sense of 
urgency that had been brought about by the oil price fall in 2009. In 2014 the 
situation changed again as the country faced an even worse, and far more dur-
able, downturn. This time, externally driven pressure for change would prove 
more consequential.
In December 2016, the last supplier of US dollar bank notes to Angola discon-
tinued its service (Almeida et al., 2016). Deutsche Bank followed in the footsteps 
of several banks that had cut correspondent banking relations with the country 
since 2014, rendering it increasingly difficult for the country to manage payments 
for imports and remittances. The worldwide phenomenon of de-risking, which 
led to a withdrawal of correspondent relationships, was not unique to Angola but 
because of the country’s heavy reliance on imports described earlier, the with-
drawal hit it particularly hard (Adriano, 2017). With oil prices falling from 2014, 
banks in Angola were not generating sufficient returns for correspondent banks 
to cover rising compliance costs (IMF, 2017). Whilst the pressure started to mount 
after 2014, it was clear that some foreign banks were dissatisfied with Angola’s 
regulatory compliance before the price fall.26 In 2003, Citibank relinquished its 
profitable business and pulled out of Angola because of concerns about money 
laundering (Almeida, 2010). The more stringent AML/CFT enforcement measures 
taken by the US Department of Justice from 2010 culminated in an investigation 
by the US Senate Permanent Sub-Committee into how politically powerful officials 
in Angola, their relatives, and close associates used US financial institutions to 
conceal, transfer, and spend funds suspected to be the proceeds of corruption 
25 Email correspondence, March 2016.   26 Interview, private bank, Luanda, November 2015.
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(Viswanatha and Wolf, 2012).27 The report uncovered amongst other things how 
HSBC staff had facilitated suspicious wire transfers into the US on behalf of BAI. 
HSBC closed all US dollar accounts and ended fund transfers with Angolan 
banks that year (Almeida,  2010). As the misconduct of banks received greater 
attention in the US and subsequently in the European Union, inter nation al banks 
were increasingly wary of the threat of sizeable settlements and fines (Erbenova 
et al., 2016).28 Attempts by Angolan authorities to leverage its relationship with 
China for the purpose of alternative corresponding bank links proved unfruitful, 
with Chinese banks cautious of falling foul of US and EU restrictions.
It was not only compliance concerns that forced foreign banks to rethink their 
business strategy in Angola. Both Angolan and Portuguese financial sectors were 
taken aback in 2014 when BESA, Angola’s leading lender and subsidiary of 
Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo,29 collapsed with US$5.7 billion in bad loans 
(Africa Confidential,  2014).30 BESA could not identify many of its customers, 
although it emerged subsequently that several were politically influential individ-
uals and groups (Africa Confidential,  2014). The political contours of the case, 
including direct presidential involvement, meant that regulators were reluctant to 
intervene earlier, even though ‘it was obvious to everyone that something bad was 
going on’.31 The BNA was perceived as afraid of ‘ruffling the feathers of the elite’ 
(Africa Confidential,  2014). With BESA, Angola’s supervisory deficiencies and 
regu la tory forbearance came to the attention of the European Central Bank. In 
2015, it ruled that Portuguese banks must reduce their exposure to the Angolan 
market.32 Following the incident, Banco BPI, Portugal’s third largest private finan-
cial group, unwillingly sold its controlling share in Angola’s top private bank, BFA.33
A common feature of the two abovementioned incidents is that they occurred 
in a milieu of decreasing bank returns caused by the 2014 oil price fall. This meant 
that foreign banks were finding it harder to maintain business as usual in Angola 
as it became increasingly obvious that the risks of operating in the country were 
outweighing the rewards. The result was the closing of correspondent bank rela-
tionships and the disinvestment by Portuguese banks, described above, jeopard-
izing financial sector operations in the country.
Striving to maintain the status quo in the banking sector by signalling their 
intention to clean up the banking sector became urgent to Angolan actors. 
27 Including former BNA governor, Aguinaldo Jaime. See US Senate (2010).
28 Especially after Standard Chartered was required to pay over $300 to US authorities in 2012 for 
breaking sanctions on Iran (BBC News, 2012).
29 Parent bank BES held a 55.71 per cent stake in the Angolan affiliate.
30 In late 2013, BESA was the leading lender in Angola with a market share of 27 per cent.
31 Interview, IFI, Washington, DC, December 2016.
32 Angola was until then not included by the European Commission in the restricted list of states 
or territories recognized as having financial institution supervision not on a par with the EU.
33 The president’s daughter Isabel dos Santos holds a controlling share in BFA through telecom 
company UNITEL.
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Forty-one new regulations were drafted between 2014 and 2016, ‘covering issues 
ranging from bank licensing, external auditing, banks’ ownership structure and 
anti-money laundering’ as well as the implementation of Basel II (England, 2016). 
The Basel standards were to apply to all thirty banks in operation,34 including the 
state-owned banks and, perhaps more remarkably, the country’s state-owned 
(and poorly managed) development bank, BDA.35
In lieu of the significant discrepancies in the mandates and resources of the 
country’s different banks, the implementation of Basel II was planned to happen 
in stages, with Angola’s bigger banks implementing the new minimum capital 
requirements first, followed by the smaller banks who were due to do so by the 
end of 2017. Angola’s leading private sector banks spearheaded the process,36 
whilst the state-owned banks were on the other end of the spectrum, needing 
additional capital to comply with the minimal requirements (Fitch Ratings, 2017).37 
As of October 2018, some banks were still due to raise their cap ital requirements, 
having been given a new deadline of December 2018 (Pilling, 2018).
It is important to note that Angola’s efforts to adopt the Basel standards are 
part of a larger clean-up of the financial sector as the country works to restore the 
confidence of the international financial community in its domestic banks 
(KPMG, 2016a). As the partner of a leading international accounting firm noted, 
‘The BNA’s intention is to be close to international rules’.38 Alongside Basel adap-
tation, Angola gradually implemented the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for all financial institutions from 2014.39 Currently, IFRS are 
required for banks and other financial institutions in the country (IFRS, n.d.).40 
Another issue that was subject to increasing concern from foreign partners was 
Angola’s weak framework on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing 
of Terrorism (ATM/CFT). Although current laws on ATMF/CFT date from 2011,41 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has exposed strategic deficiencies in 
Angola’s legal framework on several occasions since. Following Angola’s blacklisting 
by the organization in 2010, several directives, presidential decrees, instructions, 
34 Interview with banker in international bank, Luanda, September 2016.
35 Because the Basel standards were originally meant for internationally active banks (Sobreira and 
Zendron, 2011), the requirements of Basel II are not necessarily compatible with the strategic long-
term objective of development banks like BDA, whose mandate is to take excessive risk. See http://
bda.ao/pt-pt (accessed 12 May 2017).
36 In a 2008 interview, BAI chief executive José de Lima Massano confirmed that the ‘BAI has to 
adopt procedures that still have not been established by the central bank. International banks don’t 
want to see you as bringing risk if you are dealing with them. The more our banks are exposed to 
international rules, the more the central bank will have to adapt’ (Corbett, 2008).
37 In 2015 the IMF noted that public banks suffered from low capital adequacy ratios and since then 
the position of state-owned banks has deteriorated further (Africa Confidential, 2017a).
38 Interview with partner in international accounting firm, Luanda, October 2016.
39 IFRS are a single set of accounting standards recognized globally (KPMG, 2016a).
40 Interview with partner in international accounting firm, Luanda, October 2016.
41 Law No. 34/11 of 12 December 2011.
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and notices have been issued covering ATMF/CFT (FinMark Trust,  2015). 
Corrective legislation was passed in January 2014 criminalizing money laundering 
and terrorist financing, helping to remove Angola from the FATF ‘grey list’ in 
2016 (IMF, 2014).
The speed of Angola’s regulatory upgrading after many years of inaction is 
noteworthy. As one senior official explained, ‘regulatory reform in Angola has 
started to converge with international standards but we are so late in the game 
that we have to run’.42 Yet despite notable reformist measures and progressive 
le gis la tion, Angola’s efforts have so far fallen short. ‘The challenge has been 
implementation’, remarked an Angolan senior official in 2016. ‘At this stage, we 
should concentrate on applying all the reforms we passed in recent years, rather 
than commit ourselves to more reforms’.43 The ‘significant disconnect between 
adaptation and implementation’ in Angola’s financial sector was confirmed by 
another IFI representative. Whilst resource constraints at the BNA and in the 
banks may explain some of this lag, over the last decade an increasing number of 
foreign consultants have been brought in to compensate for the lack of appropri-
ate skills in the sector.44 Rather than resource constraints, implementation seems 
mainly hampered by the lack of political will to change the status quo in the 
financial sector.
In the aftermath of the GFC, regulators could, and to a certain extent were 
encouraged to, improve sector governance. This was especially true for areas of 
banking sector regulation that were the focus of negative external attention. Still, 
we observe that regulators have refrained from exercising their right to intervene 
in the financial sector. ‘The big political decisions are taken higher up’, remarked 
one IFI official when talking about the BNA’s mandate to rein in individual banks 
or to impose costs on bank shareholders. ‘Even when the BNA knew that there 
was something bad going on, they do not have the autonomy to intervene’.45 
Because the banking standards studied here are considerably more rigorous than 
Angola’s pre-existing domestic financial regulatory and supervisory framework, 
adjustment costs have been high for the domestic banks although with consider-
able variation between banks (Fitch Ratings,  2017). On the one hand, most of 
Angola’s private banks (the major exception being BESA) were conservative to 
begin with—extending fewer loans and holding most assets in government 
bonds or abroad—meaning that adjustment was less of an issue for them.46 The 
problem was primarily with Angola’s public banks. As one foreign bank executive 
42 ‘Managing Angola’s financial sector’, Event at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of 
Oxford, 24 January 2017.
43 Email correspondence, March 2016.
44 ‘Managing Angola’s financial sector’, Event at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of 
Oxford, 24 January 2017.
45 Interview with representative of international financial institution, Washington, DC, December 
2016.
46 Private banks were expected to be fully compliant with rules on capital adequacy ratios in line 
with Basel II by late 2017 (Fitch Ratings, 2017).
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complained, ‘While we are saddled with paperwork [from the regulators]’, Angolan 
public banks ‘have serious lacunae but get away with it for political reasons’.47 
The  BNA’s willingness and ability to impose costs of compliance on domestic 
interests—some of which are politically influential—is consequently weak.
In a position like this, where regulators, politicians, and bankers face contra-
dictory pressures of international standards and domestic politics, it is predicted 
that actors ‘often opt for a strategy of mock compliance’ (Walter,  2008, p. 5). 
According to Walter (2008), mock compliance occurs when official legislation 
and regulatory guidelines are not reflected in the behaviour of either regulators or 
banks. This strategy ‘combines the rhetoric and outward appearance of compli-
ance with international standards together with relatively hidden behavioural 
divergence from such standards’ (Walter,  2008, p. 5). In Angola, mock compli-
ance has been driven by the need to signal to foreign partners that domestic 
counterparts are doing something to address their concerns. At the same time, 
the BNA has intentionally refrained from strict enforcement of international 
standards or chosen to enforce such rules only selectively in order to accommo-
date political interests that prefer to have significant parts of the banking sector, 
namely the public banks, remain non-compliant.
Conclusion
In this chapter we argue that Angolan actors find themselves in a difficult situ-
ation, having to balance mounting external pressures with domestic political 
interests. More specifically, over recent years it has become increasingly obvious 
that Angola needs to align its domestic regulatory framework with international 
standards in order to salvage the role that domestic banks have played in facilitat-
ing trade and outgoing financial flows. The problem is that another vital part of 
the banking sector, which concerns itself with securing political support for the 
regime through the granting of bank loans and licences, will struggle if faced with 
such strict regulation. Consequently, we have shown in this chapter that Angola’s 
engagement with the Basel standards—as with other international banking stand-
ards—has historically been characterized by weak compliance. Until 2009, this 
functioned well but following the GFC, non-compliance was no longer an option. 
With greater external pressure banking standard alignment, Angola has resorted 
to mock compliance which has left great variation between the country’s banks.
The combination of financial sector extraversion with deep politicization of 
the banking sector makes the Angolan case an intriguing one. On the one hand, it 
47 Interview, foreign bank, Luanda, November 2013.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/02/20, SPi
Angola 301
challenges a common assumption in the international political economy literature 
that internationally oriented banking sectors will converge towards inter nation al 
banking standards. On the other hand, in line with the analytical framework, 
the Angolan trajectory demonstrates that even in the case of a highly politicized 
banking sector, we might see efforts to align domestic regulation with inter-
nation al standards. Thus, the outcome we observe in Angola and the inter action 
between politicians, regulators, and bankers can be described as conflicting. One 
thing all actors in the financial sector seem to have in common, however, is that 
none are there to ‘rock the boat’. The financial sector has proved beneficial for all 
major actors involved and as long as it continues to be important for the survival 
of the political regime, mock compliance will likely be the way forward. The 
extent to which this is sustainable will depend on external factors, especially the 
price of oil, which Angolan actors have little power over. In relation to the ana -
lytic al framework, as mock compliance is driven by the conflicting preferences of 
politicians, this is a case of politically driven mock compliance.
This chapter is amongst the first to offer a detailed overview of the political 
economy of banking regulation in Angola alongside an analysis of the country’s 
adaptation and implementation of Basel to date.48 We emphasize the uneven pat-
tern of compliance that has emerged in the banking sector but further research is 
needed to evaluate the efforts of particular banks and whether they will keep to 
their assigned schedules. As the banking sector and banking regulation in par-
ticular are policy areas undergoing significant change—not only in Angola but 
internationally—it will be crucial for researchers to keep a close eye on future 
developments. As the example of Angola shows, understanding domestic and 
global dynamics and how the two interrelate is crucial if one wants to understand 
local responses to international banking standards.
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The Dilemma of Bringing Global Financial  
Standards to a Socialist Market Economy
Que-Giang Tran-Thi and Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh
Introduction
The implementation of international banking standards in Vietnam has been the 
subject of contestation between reformist and conservative factions within the 
banking regulatory system. In any given period, the speed of implementation has 
been affected by which of these factions dominates regulatory decision-making, 
as well as the health of the banking sector. The existence of two political factions 
with conflicting preferences regarding Basel standards generates dynamics that 
lead to mock compliance. With regards to the analytical framework, the dynam-
ics are those of politically driven mock compliance.
The adoption and implementation of Basel standards in Vietnam has gone 
through three distinctive periods. In the first period (1999–2006), Vietnam actively 
adopted economic integration as a development strategy. Vietnam signed a bilateral 
trade agreement with the US in 2001, and concluded its World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations in 2006. The economy enjoyed a high growth rate of 7.4 per 
cent in the first half of the 2000s, and everyone seemed to be very optimistic 
about future economic prospects. In this context, the internationally oriented 
reformist faction within the government, which pursued international regulations 
to discipline state-owned banks and improve the functioning of the financial 
sector, won the tug of war with the conservative faction, at least tem por ar ily. The 
central bank, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), which is always subservient to the 
prevailing political agenda, informally adopted Basel I and laid out the roadmap 
for its implementation. Banks—both private and state-owned—did not have a 
voice in setting Basel-related policies, and were indifferent to plans for its imple-
mentation since they thought it was premature and unfeasible.
At the beginning of the second period (2006–13), Vietnam formally adopted 
Basel II standards. However, the country experienced a banking crisis between 
2008 and 2012, when nearly a dozen banks were on the verge of collapse and some 
actually became technically bankrupt. Facing this crisis, even reformists factions 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/02/20, SPi
306 The Political Economy of Bank Regulation
hesitated to move forward with Basel, because implementing the standards properly 
would have exposed the significant weaknesses in both private and state-owned 
banks, exacerbating the crisis situation. The shift in the preferences of the 
reformists and the SBV during this period effectively halted the implementation 
of Basel standards. Meanwhile, the reluctance of banks, many of which were in 
a  difficult situation, made Basel implementation even less feasible than in the 
previous period.
The third period (2014 onward) has been characterized by a return to pro-Basel 
preferences. Once the crisis had passed, and the economic integration process 
had regained its strong momentum, the reformist faction could again push for-
wards with the implementation of international standards. The SBV wants to use 
Basel standards to discipline and clean up weak banks. Moreover, many private 
banks and even state-owned banks now perceive Basel standards as being im port-
ant for managing their liquidity, improving supervision and risk, signalling their 
health, and enduring competitive pressures. Thanks to more genuine interests 
from the politicians, regulators, and banks, the implementation of Basel II has 
been accelerated, and some elements of Basel III such as liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) are reflected in the banking regula-
tions issued by the SBV.
Through an analysis of aggregate data and thirty interviews with regulators, 
bankers, financial experts, and politicians in Vietnam, in this chapter we show 
that Vietnam’s case is an example of conflicting preferences for Basel adoption 
and implementation, particularly in the second period. The reformists rely on 
Vietnam’s international commitments and opt for international standards (Basel 
in particular) to reform the domestic banking sector. At the same time, interven-
tionist financial policies, costly implementation, the low internationalization level 
of the banking sector, and the lack of competent technocrats inside both the SBV 
and domestic private banks have all contributed to a high level of forbearance in 
Basel implementation.
Table 13.1 Vietnam: key indicators
Vietnam  
GDP per capita (current US$, 2017) 2343
Bank assets (current US$) 267.7 bn
Bank assets (% of GDP) 130.4
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 28.6
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 123.8
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 18.1
Polity IV score (2017) −7
Note: All data is from 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI Database, World Bank (2017); 
Polity IV (2014)
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief description of Vietnam’s political economic context for the adoption and 
implementation of Basel standards. The third section traces the three periods of 
Basel adoption and implementation in Vietnam since 1999. The fourth section 
provides a political economic explanation of Basel adoption and implementation 
in Vietnam. The final section concludes and provides some reflections on the 
analytical framework.
Political economic context of Basel adoption  
and implementation in Vietnam
Vietnam began Doi Moi—the transformation from a centrally planned economy 
to a socialist-oriented market economy—in 1986. Since then, international eco-
nomic integration has been a major driver of economic growth, which has become 
an increasingly key factor in determining the performance legitimacy of the 
Vietnamese party-state. A growing list of economic integration commitments, 
including membership in the WTO, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), has created an interest-
ing ‘dualism’ (Vu-Thanh, 2017). On the one hand, in order to continue economic 
integration, the Vietnamese party-state wishes to express itself as being inter-
nation al ly oriented, by complying with international norms and practices. On the 
other hand, as a ‘socialist-oriented economy’, the party-state always wants to 
maintain firm control over the economy, both directly through state-owned enter-
prises (including state-owned banks) playing the leading role, and indirectly by 
means of interventionist regulations.
As of 2017, Vietnam’s financial sector relies heavily on banks in which four big 
state-owned banks account for 45.7 per cent of total assets and 48.3 per cent of 
the credit market share. Private banks are much smaller and rather concentrated, 
with the ten biggest private banks making up 33 per cent of total assets and 31 per 
cent of the credit market share. Foreign-owned banks are of modest size, only 
accounting for 9.5 per cent of total assets, even though they represent 21.4 per 
cent of charter capital (State Bank of Vietnam, 2017). Nevertheless, this group of 
banks has enjoyed quite rapid growth in the last several years, as commitments 
to open up the financial market come into effect.
Vietnam still has a Leninist state in which the party rules over the government. 
The government, in turn, rules over the SBV, and the SBV exercises discretionary 
power over commercial banks. This hierarchical relationship is reflected in the 
policy cycle in Vietnam. Major strategic orientations (e.g. restructuring the bank-
ing system) originate from the Politburo (the highest organ of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam) through its resolutions and conclusions. When it comes to 
technical matters (e.g. banking supervision and safety regulations), the SBV will 
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recommend policies to the government for approval. An approved policy will then 
come back to the SBV for implementation. If these policies are to be legalized, 
draft legal documents will be passed to the National Assembly for de lib er ation 
and approval. After these policies are enacted, commercial banks, which have 
virtually no voice during the policy process, are forced to comply.
The Party Central Committee exerts direct and indirect influence over the 
appointment of personnel to key positions, including Central Bank Governor and 
the chairmen of state-owned banks. This situation creates an ambiguity in the 
positions of politicians, regulators, and bankers. On the one hand, a number of 
politicians are in a position to supervise the banking and financial sector, but do 
not have a professional background in the industry. On the other hand, there are 
many key regulators who are just temporarily rotated through these positions 
before becoming political appointees somewhere else. Moreover, the leadership of 
the SBV plays a ‘triple role’ as politicians, banking regulators, and representatives 
of state ownership in state-owned banks. These overlapping and ambiguous roles 
give rise to many serious regulatory conflicts, as discussed below, where we explain 
how aspects of Vietnam’s implementation of Basel standards are instances of mock 
compliance (Walter, 2008). In sum, the current institutions, whether in the guise 
of politicians or personnel, show widespread outright forbearance by  the SBV, 
particularly during the time of the banking crisis between 2008 and 2012.
Since the mid-2000s, Vietnam’s economy underwent many changes with long-
lasting implications for the financial system. Inheriting a high growth and stable 
economy, the ambitious new prime minister wanted to accelerate GDP growth 
even further by loosening both fiscal and monetary policy (Kazmin and Mallet, 
2008). As a result, inflation reached 28 per cent in 2008, while abundant credit 
inflated stock and real estate bubbles in the 2007–8 period. When the bubble 
burst, a series of banks held huge amounts of bad debt, mostly guaranteed by real 
estate, the market value of which was now much lower, threatening the collapse of 
the banking system.
To make matters worse, also during this period, the SBV decided to upgrade 
rural commercial banks to urban commercial banks, forcing their charter capital 
to increase rapidly in a very short period of time. As a result, the domestic private 
banks quickly became the largest sector (Figure 13.1). However, in order to meet 
charter capital requirements, many smaller banks borrowed from each other or 
partnered with state conglomerates, thereby leading to cross- and pyramidal-
ownership structures. In addition, the rapid GDP growth over this time was 
accompanied by a myriad of unscrupulous credits, which further exacerbated 
the rise in bad loans in the banking sector, especially for those that had recently 
become urban commercial banks.
In 2009, the real estate bubble burst, the stock market plummeted, and state 
economic groups suffered heavy losses. As a result, the banking system went 
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through a serious crisis. At the end of 2011, non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 
banking system were up to 13 per cent according to Fitch Ratings (National 
Assembly’s Economic Committee and UNDP, 2012). Many banks suffered from 
liquidity shortages, and some banks were in principle bankrupt.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the SBV took steps to address financial 
in stabil ity, focusing on the banking sector. In 2011, the SBV classified Vietnam’s 
credit institutions into four groups, and imposed a credit growth ceiling on 
each group (State Bank of Vietnam, 2012a). However, in order to preserve ‘sys-
tem stability’, the SBV did not publish the list of institutions in each group. 
Banks in Group 1 and Group 2 are considered ‘healthy’ and therefore given 
a  ceiling credit growth of 17 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. Banks in 
Group 3 are ‘medium risk’ and given credit growth of up to 8 per cent. Finally, 
those in Group 4 are ‘high risk’ and are not allowed to extend any credit. Facing 
the risk of a banking crisis, the highest priority of the SBV in this period 
was not to implement modern financial standards such as Basel, but rather to 
ensure the safety of the banking system, control interest rates, and ensure its 
leadership role of state-owned commercial banks through various financial 
repression measures.
Since 2014, the economy has been recovering, although the NPL ratio is still 
high at around 10 per cent. The economic recovery has facilitated the resumption 
in implementation of Basel standards. Moreover, the SBV is now keen to imple-













2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Foreign banks Domestic private banks State-owned banks
Figure 13.1 Vietnam: patterns of bank ownership (% of total deposits).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the State Bank of Vietnam’s Annual Reports, State Bank of 
Vietnam (2017)
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The adoption and implementation of Basel  
standards in Vietnam
As described above, there have been three distinct periods in the adoption and 
implementation of Basel standards in Vietnam. In the first period (1999–2006), 
Basel I was informally adopted—at this stage, the SBV never announced the 
adoption of Basel standards explicitly, but incorporated some elements of Basel I 
into its banking regulations. In the second period (2006–13), the SBV strongly 
endorsed the adoption and implementation of Basel I, and outlined a roadmap 
to  achieving Basel II compliance by 2010. However, the banking crisis during 
2008–12 and the resulting shift in politicians’ preferences turned Basel implemen-
tation into nothing more than mock compliance in this period. Since 2014, as the 
economic situation has improved and economic integration has regained momen-
tum, the preferences of politicians, regulators, and banks have shifted again, and 
this time they are conducive to a more genuine implementation of Basel II, and 
even some elements of Basel III. The adoption and implementation of Basel 
standards in Vietnam are summarized in Table 13.2.
1999–2006: The informal adoption of Basel I
Both the Law on the State Bank of Vietnam and the Law on Credit Institutions 
were first issued in 1997. Two years later, the SBV promulgated Decisions 296 and 
297 to introduce Basel-like standards for Vietnam such as customer credit limits, 
minimum capital requirements, and asset classification in four risk categories. 
Under Basel I, banks are required to hold a minimum of 8 per cent of risk-
weighted capital, including both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. However, as revealed in 
our interviews, because of a misunderstanding of the definition of Tier 1 capital 
in the Basel I standards, Decision 297 required banks to hold a minimum of 8 per 
cent of Tier 1 capital. As a result, commercial banks faced fundamental difficulties 
in dealing with the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and were unable to 
meet the minimum capital requirement.
There are two particularly interesting points regarding the implementation of 
Basel-like regulations in this period. First, the lead time between the issuance 
of implementation regulations and the effective date was very short—less than a 
month for both Decisions 297 and 457 (see Table 13.2). This raises the question of 
whether the SBV really understood the difficulties banks faced when they had to 
implement these standards, or whether the SBV issued regulations just to be able 
to say it had without much thought about their enforcement. Secondly, with 
Decision 457, state-owned banks were granted a grace period of three years. 
While this means that the SBV understood that these banks could not meet these 
standards immediately, it also reveals the preferential treatment state-owned 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13.2 Vietnam: adoption of Basel standards
Basel 
component
Adoption Implementation Date in force
Basel I Informal adoption
(There was no public commitment to Basel I, but 
banking regulations were in line with Basel I standards)
Decisions 297 (25 August 1999)
Simple rules on prudential ratios require Tier 1 at 8%
9 September 1999
(+ 3 years of grace period)
  Decision 457 (19 April 2005)
Rules on prudential ratios—define CAR (including Tier 1  
and Tier 2) at 8%
4 May 2005
(+ 3 years of grace period 
for state-owned banks)
  Formal adoption
Prime minister’s Decision 112 (24 May 2006)
Basel I as the supervision standards by 2010
Implement Basel II guidelines and standards after 2010
Established Banking Inspection and Supervision Agency  
under the SBV in 2009
Revised Law on the State Bank of Vietnam and the Law on  
Credit Institutions (16 June 2010)
 
1 January 2011
Basel II (Decision 112/2006-PM)
 
Circular 13/2010 (20 May 2010)
CAR separate and consolidated at 9%; total liquidity reserves (15%)  
and 7 days (100%); requirement on stress-testing and scenario analysis
1 October 2010
 
Prime minister’s Decision No. 254 dated 1 March 2012
Pillar I: Issue Basel II compliance standards
Pillar II: Develop risk management systems consistent 
with the principles and standards of Basel Committee
Pillar III: Disclose information according to Basel 
Committee principles
SBV’s Official Correspondence No. 1601 (17 March 2014)






Circular 41/2016/TT-NHNN dated 30 December 2016
Regulating capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
Credit risk and market risk: SA
Operational risk: BIA




  Prime minister’s Decision No. 1058 (19 July 2017)
Basel II, pillars I and II by 2020 
Roadmap
SBV decision No. 1533 dated 20 July 2017
Action plan in detail
2017–20
   Prime minister’s Decision No. 986 (8 August 2018)
Banking development strategy—BCP and Basel II SA
 
2020–5
Basel III Informal adoption
(No public commitment to Basel III, but banking 
regulations were in line with Basel III standards)
Circular 36/2014 dated 20 November 2014
CAR at 9% and liquidity ratio:
(proxy) LCR 30 days: 50% for VND, 10% for other currencies;
(proxy) NSFR: 10%
2 February 2015
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/02/20, SPi
312 The Political Economy of Bank Regulation
2006–13: The formal adoption of Basel I and Basel II
It was not until 2006 that Vietnamese regulators officially referred to Basel I and 
II in Decision 112 of the prime minister. This decision stipulated a plan for the 
2006–10 period to improve regulations on banking security, supervision, and 
management in accordance with Basel I, and to implement Basel II guidelines 
and standards after 2010. The project, which was implemented in the context of 
Vietnam’s preparations for joining the WTO, aimed to develop the banking 
industry by deepening its integration and strengthening its competitiveness. 
However, no legal document existed that specified a roadmap to ensure the 
implementation of Basel II.
The Banking Inspection and Supervision Agency under the SBV was estab-
lished in 2009, marking an important step towards the implementation of Basel 
standards. The revised Law on the State Bank of Vietnam and the Law on Credit 
Institutions of 2010 made important changes to the definition of the status and 
functions of state-owned banks, including clear definitions of important concepts 
such as banking operations, principles of bank governance, internal control, and 
information transparency.
When Circular 13 on the safety ratios was issued in May 2010, developed 
countries had been on their way to adopt Basel III. This Circular is more ambi-
tious than Basel II, since it sets the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at 
9  per cent. However, it does not consider operational risk, or market risk, or 
Basel III standards for a capital conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer 
requirements. Circular 13 encountered a lot of opposition from banks because 
the lead time given to them was only five months. Once again, the SBV appears 
to have understood that it takes time and a great deal of effort for banks to imple-
ment Basel standards, which they could otherwise only comply with using 
manipulated data.
Although regulatory reforms were made on paper, implementation of Basel 
standards and compliance with Basel Core Principles were limited, reflecting the 
regulators’ priority of controlling the banking system and preventing its collapse, 
as well as the lack of competent SBV technocrats. Available evaluations show that 
by the early 2010s, most Basel Core Principles were complied with either partially 
or not at all. According to the self-assessment conducted by the SBV (NFSC, 
2018), ‘the banking supervision system says 4/25 principles are compliant, 9/25 
are largely compliant, 11/25 largely non-compliant, and 1/25 not compliant’.
Indeed, SBV’s mock compliance with the Basel standards is evident in the fact 
that it has permitted the use of compromised and falsified data by banks. For 
instance, during the time of the banking crisis, the SBV largely overlooked the 
CAR of banks. This results in an ironic paradox: stronger and larger banks often 
reported a CAR of around 10 per cent, while many weaker and smaller banks, 
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which were later acquired or restructured, reported a CAR above 10 per cent or 
even up to 30 per cent (Figure 13.2).
The second piece of evidence of the SBV’s forbearance towards regulation is 
that it turns a blind eye to banks’ NPLs. On paper, most banks in Vietnam have 
met the NPL ratio requirements (i.e. less than 3 per cent). However, NPL figures 
from other sources seem to be at odds with official figures (Figure 13.3). According 
to the SBV, the official average NPL ratio in June 2011 was 3.2 per cent, while 
according to Fitch it was about 13 per cent. In 2012, the bad debt shown in bank 
reports fluctuated around 4.4 per cent, while the supervisory agency reported 
8.6 per cent, and other independent institutions estimated it at around 15–17 per 
cent. Later, the SBV also admitted the bad debt had occasionally been 17.2 per cent 
in 2012.1
Thirdly, in this period, when the banking system was in trouble—liquidity 
risks and bad debts were high, and some banks were bankrupt at times—the SBV 
decided to wholeheartedly support these banks in every way it could. This 
included adjusting the rules to help them hide bad debt, and establishing the 
Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) to help banks freeze bad debts 
and clean up their accounting books.
1 Report No. 36/BC-NHNN dated 4 April 2017 of the SBV to review the enforcement of legal regu-
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Figure 13.2 Vietnam: bank capital adequacy ratios (2011).
Source: STOXPLUS data (30-Sep-2012). Vietnam Banks - A Helicopter View - Issue 4. Asset and 
Capital Quality
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Interestingly, faced with the banking system’s severe liquidity problems and 
bad debts in the 2008–12 period, the prime minister’s Decision No. 254 from 
March 2012, titled ‘Decision on Approving the Scheme of Restructuring the 
System of Credit Institutions for the period of 2011–2015’, referred to Basel II as 
the solution to the problem. The focus was ‘to issue capital adequacy standards in 
line with Basel II, providing standards for disclosure of information by credit 
institutions in line with reality in Vietnam and the principles of the Basel 
Committee’. However, in the context of widespread troubles in banks and capital 
shortages, Basel implementation was essentially impossible, and perhaps merely 
cosmetic. Indeed, in this period, the State Bank even promulgated regulations 
that assisted banks in reclassifying debts (see SBV’s Decision No. 780, State Bank 
of Vietnam, 2012b) in order to improve their operational safety ratios and keep 
their NPL ratio within limits.
2014 onwards: The acceleration of Basel II
In the third period, the implementation of Basel standards accelerated. Basel II 
was strongly emphasized in the SBV’s Official Correspondence No. 1601 in March 
2014, regarding implementing capital adequacy regulations.  Specifically, ten 
domestic banks were selected to carry out the capital and risk management pilot 
under Basel II standards.2 It was expected that by 2015, these ten banks would 
2 These banks are BIDV, Vietinbank (CTG), Vietcombank (VCB), Techcombank (TCB), Asia 
Commercial Bank (ACB), VPBank, Military Bank (MBB), Maritime Bank (MSB), Sacombank (STB), 























































































Figure 13.3 Vietnam: non-performing loans (NPLs) in times of crisis (2011–13).
Source: Vu-Thanh et al. (2013)
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follow the standardized approaches with respect to evaluating credit risk, market 
risk, and operational risk under Basel II, and would be fully in line with Basel II 
standards by 2018. Foreign-invested banks and banks with 100 per cent foreign 
capital were expected to implement the same Basel standards as those adopted by 
their parent banks, and from 2015 they were required to implement standards at 
least as stringent as Basel II. All other domestic private banks were expected to 
implement basic Basel standards II at a minimum by 2018. In sum, according 
to the roadmap laid out by the SBV in 2014, all banks in Vietnam were expected 
to be implementing the basic standards of Basel II by 2018. Circular 36 (November 
2014) regulated the safety ratios of credit institutions and was considered a stepping 
stone for further development of Basel II in the sector. This Circular also adjusted 
liquidity risk requirements and brought them closer in line with Basel III.
Despite these intentions, by the end of 2015, after the assessment of data gaps3 
and the quantitative impact study (QIS) of ten pilot banks, the original plan was 
abandoned because the original ten banks did not meet the requirements and 
there remained a serious lack of enforcement by the SBV. In our interviews, pilot 
banks pointed out that there was a significant difference between the CAR calcula-
tions in the SBV’s guidance and international standards.4 Indeed, the SBV did not 
truly force the pilot banks to follow the roadmap because its immediate concern at 
that time was ‘crisis management’ (i.e. avoiding bank failures) rather than improv-
ing banks’ governance. At the same time, banks got used to the SBV’s ‘compromise’, 
in the form of ad hoc forbearance or modification of regulations—sometimes right 
before their effective dates—and did not make serious efforts to comply.
By 2016, the goal of preventing banks from failing was viewed as accomplished, 
at least according to the government’s judgement, and the SBV returned its focus 
to strengthening banks’ governance, in order to prevent future failures. In 
November 2016, the National Assembly issued Resolution No. 24 on the Economic 
Restructuring Plan for the period 2016–20. Its aim was to ‘generally complete the 
restructuring of credit institutions, step up settlement of bad debts and gradually 
apply Basel II to credit institutions. By 2020, it is expected that commercial banks 
have their own capital satisfactory to Basel II including at least 12–15 commercial 
banks in which Basel II is successfully applied’.
Following this National Assembly Resolution, in December 2016 the SBV 
issued Circular 41, which will enter into force by 1 January 2020, and which pre-
scribes the capital adequacy requirements for commercial banks. It is worth 
3 According to an SBV leader who is in charge of Basel implementation, banks’ current data can 
only meet about 45 per cent of Basel II requirements. Also, more information is needed to develop 
internal credit rating models and systems.
4 According to the National Financial Supervisory Council, applying Basel standards to calculate 
CAR for ten pilot banks shows a much lower ratio than the current one, mostly due to increased risky 
assets. For the four State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), the current CAR is about 9 per cent, 
while it would be lower than 8 per cent if Basel II were used.
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noting that this time it is not only the ten pilot banks that are subject to the 
new regulation, but all commercial banks (including foreign-invested banks and 
100 per cent foreign-owned banks) are required to participate. Circular 41 is 
con sidered to be very close to Basel II standards, and even refers to elements of 
Basel III, as well as the most up-to-date Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
discussions on incorporating Basel criteria for a standard approach and the 
internal ratings-based approach. The resolve to implement Basel II seems to be 
stronger than in previous periods. The prime minister and SBV approved the plan 
to restructure credit institutions and deal with NPLs—the so-called Project 
1058—and Basel II was highlighted as a benchmark for improving the financial 
and governance capacities of credit institutions. Banks also appear to be taking 
implementation more seriously. Although progressing at different rates, in the 
last few years the group of pilot banks have demonstrated considerable efforts to 
implement Basel II in a more genuine way than just for the sake of meeting the 
requirements of the SBV.
The acceleration of Basel implementation is part of a wider trend by the SBV to 
apply international financial standards in Vietnam. The SBV has also begun to 
introduce international standards on anti-money laundering (AML), credit rating 
agencies, CAMELS standards, anti-dollarization, and the reduction of cash 
transactions.
The political economy of Basel adoption  
and implementation in Vietnam
Although Vietnam has a unitary political system, within the Vietnamese 
Communist Party there are factions with different views on state-owned banks 
and financial reform. While reform-minded politicians, who are often more 
internationally oriented, expect to use international yardsticks such as Basel 
standards to impose discipline on state-owned banks and reform the banking 
system, conservative-minded politicians fear that imposing ‘capitalist rules’ on the 
state-owned banks not only makes the Party look bad, but also exposes the weak-
nesses of these ‘leading’ state-owned banks. These conservatives, therefore, face 
a dilemma: they are aware that in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the Party-
State’s performance, economic integration (i.e. opening trade, investment, and 
finance) is inevitable; at the same time, they fear that economic integration will 
erode the primacy of the state-owned sector, and, therefore, Vietnam’s socialist 
orientation.
The SBV is a ministerial-level agency under the government, which in this 
Leninist state makes it subservient to politicians, meaning it has hardly any 
autonomy (Vu-Thanh, 2011). In addition, the SBV is expected to pursue multiple 
goals simultaneously: it plays the role of both a central bank and a government 
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bank; it is supposed to stabilize the currency value as well as ensure the safety of 
the banking system; it is also given the political task of ‘contributing to the socio-
economic development along the socialist orientation’; and it is the regulatory 
body that supervises the credit institution system and, at the same time, the rep-
resentative of state ownership in state-owned banks. These multiple goals and 
mandates give rise to many conflicts in banking regulation. Moreover, since 
leaders of the SBV are political appointees, when these conflicts emerge, they are 
supposed to follow the Party’s instructions and safeguard its legitimacy.
Commercial banks in Vietnam can be classified into three groups according to 
their ownership: state, domestic private, and foreign. In Vietnam state-owned 
banks, despite their ineffectiveness and lack of transparency, are always con-
sidered by the party-state as an important instrument for controlling the mon et-
ary market and ensuring macro-economic stability. Meanwhile, domestic private 
banks have grown very quickly since the early 2000s, to become the biggest actor 
in the banking sector in Vietnam today. This group can be divided into two sub-
groups. The first consists of relatively weak banks (those with small assets and 
high NPLs), most of which were upgraded from rural banks in the early 2000s. 
The second subgroup is made up of the relatively strong banks (i.e. large assets, 
moderate NPLs) that have the ambition to expand by searching for foreign stra-
tegic shareholders or advancing into international markets. The third group is 
made up of foreign banks, and currently accounts for only about 10 per cent of 
market share. As noted above, private banks, both domestic and foreign, have 
virtually no voice in the policy process.
The remainder of this section provides a political economy explanation of how 
and why Basel implementation has changed over time in Vietnam, with a particu-
lar focus on the second period (i.e. 2006–13). The summary of our analysis is 
presented in Table 13.3.
Informal adoption and slow implementation of Basel I
The period from 1999 to 2006 witnessed some of Vietnam’s most important and 
successful market reforms since Doi Moi. As the country recovered from the 
negative impact of the Asian financial crisis, Vietnam stepped up its domestic 
reforms and international integration.
The reformist faction of policymakers took advantage of this exuberant domes-
tic reform and international integration to introduce international standards in 
order to discipline state-owned banks and improve the functioning of the finan-
cial sector. The SBV, which is always subservient to the prevailing political will, 
informally adopted Basel I and laid out the roadmap for its implementation by 
issuing Decision 297 in 1999, and Decision 457 in 2005, to require banks to satisfy 
























Table 13.3 Vietnam: preferences of major actors with respect to Basel adoption and implementation
 Economic context Politicians Regulator 
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Note: [+] means ‘support Basel’ [−] means ‘not support Basel’ [+/−] means ‘conflicting preferences’ [~] means ‘indifferent’ SOBs: state-owned banks; POBs: private-owned 
banks; SBV: State Bank of Vietnam
Source: Authors’ evaluation
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going well, and no one, including the reformist faction, was asking many questions, 
even if SBV officers knew at the time that there were a lot of inefficiencies, they 
had an incentive to keep quiet or otherwise risk harming their own careers as 
political appointees.
Having little experience with banking reforms of the likes of Basel, the SBV 
imposed very demanding requirements on commercial banks. As mentioned 
above, Decision 297 required banks to meet Tier 1 capital requirements of up to 
8 per cent, while Basel standards required 8 per cent for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 
cap ital together. When no bank met this ambitious requirement, the SBV issued 
Decision 457, which was more in line with Basel I standards. However, the SBV 
gave banks only one month to meet this new regulation, a timeline that was 
impossible for the banks to meet.
In summary, the excitement of reform and the integration efforts of reformist 
politicians led the SBV to informally adopt, but prematurely implement, Basel I. 
It is not surprising to see that the SBV’s Basel-implementing regulations merely 
existed on paper, without effective compliance from banks.
Mock compliance with Basel II
During the period 2006–12, mock compliance with the adoption and implemen-
tation of Basel standards was prevalent. Why was this? We argue that this mock 
compliance resulted from conflicting preferences at various levels.
At the core of Vietnam’s political economic system, there has always been an 
inherent tension between economic openness and political ‘closed-ness’. The pro-
cess of opening up and integration at an international level over the course of 
Vietnam’s joining the WTO in 2007 has had many implications for the financial 
system. One of these is that Vietnam is seeking to foster international- and market-
oriented policies in a bid to improve the country’s competitiveness and attract 
foreign investment. The adoption of international practices in corporate govern-
ance, accounting and auditing, and banking and financial systems is perceived to 
be vital to achieving these aims. From our interviews with a senior SBV officer 
who is a member of the SBV’s Basel Task Force, and with several commercial 
banks’ senior managers who are part of their respective Basel Project Management 
Offices, it was confirmed repeatedly that the first motivation to implement Basel 
comes from their need to ‘speak the same language’ as foreign partners in the 
process of international integration.
If economic openness is an essential means for enhancing the party-state’s 
legitimacy, then political closed-ness is necessary for preserving its absolute 
power. This also implies that economic integration, and its accompanying adop-
tion of international norms and best practices, is valued only as long as it does not 
interfere with the party-state’s legitimacy and its control of the economy.
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In the mid-2000s when the economy was booming, everybody was optimistic; 
economic integration was on the rise, and Basel II was formally adopted in the 
prime minister’s Decision 112 in 2006. However, two years later, macro-economic 
imbalances and the banking crisis took hold, and even the reformists lost their 
enthusiasm for implementing Basel standards—doing so would suddenly expose 
all the hitherto unaddressed weaknesses in domestic banks, both private and 
state-owned, and therefore exacerbate already-difficult banking conditions. As a 
result, the reformists and conservatives together reached a consensus to hold 
back further Basel implementation.
It is important to emphasize that weaknesses in the domestic banking sector 
during this period had a lot to do with the biggest state-owned enterprises—the 
so-called state economics groups (SEGs) or state general corporations (SGCs). In 
this period, these state conglomerates were given directed lending and allowed to 
invest in multiple sectors even outside their core businesses. Their heavy losses 
during the 2007–8 crisis resulted in a large number of NPLs in the banking sys-
tem. A proper implementation of Basel standards would inevitably expose these 
significant and non-transparent NPLs, and for this reason politicians avoided 
addressing the issue.
The SBV had an even deeper understanding of the detrimental consequences 
of implementing Basel II during the time of crisis. Indeed, as a ministry under the 
government, the SBV was supposed to keep politicians informed about the risks 
of properly implementing Basel standards. Moreover, as the ministry responsible 
for ensuring financial security, the SBV had the strongest incentive not to create 
or aggravate any financial instabilities during times of crisis. Predictably, then, 
during this period the SBV repeatedly reassured the market that it would never 
let any banks fail.
As mentioned earlier, the SBV’s ambiguous and overlapping roles gave rise to 
conflicting incentives, and these conflicts were intensified over this time. For 
example, a president or CEO of a state-owned bank who later became an SBV 
Governor or a high-profile politician would have tended to turn a blind eye to the 
weaknesses of their own bank at the time, for some of which they might have to 
take personal responsibility down the line. In other cases, it was difficult to main-
tain the SBV’s objectivity, as it filled the roles of both the regulator and the owner 
of state-owned banks, especially with regards to costly sanctions and enforce-
ment. These ambiguous and overlapping roles of the SBV therefore resulted in 
widespread regulatory forbearance on the whole.
During this period, banks were passive players that wanted to adopt a better 
system of risk management but were constrained from doing so by limited finan-
cial and human resources. Coupled with having to take the lead from the SBV, this 
made them reluctant to implement Basel, particularly during a systemic crisis.
Notably during this period, even if the politicians, regulators, and banks had 
wished to implement Basel II standards properly, they would have faced major 
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institutional and technical challenges. The SBV has always lacked independence 
and its technical human resources have been limited. Low institutional and gov-
ernance quality throughout the banking system continue to pose important barriers 
to the effective implementation of international standards such as Basel. In add-
ition, fully implementing CAR in accordance with Basel II would have forced the 
SBV either to recapitalize state-owned banks (at a time when its budget was 
already in distress), or allow participation by foreign investors (something the 
political leadership has long been averse to). Moreover, fundamental institutional 
problems persist: the banking database system is not centralized, credit transactions 
are not updated, cash transactions are still popular, there are no independent 
 rating agencies, and the accounting system is not up to international standards. 
These factors together have led to a low level of data credibility, implying that 
regulators and even bank owners may not know exactly the bank’s real financial 
position, and the data can be easily manipulated in order to comply with the 
SBV’s requirements.
Our interviews reveal that in this period, even banks with strategic foreign 
shareholders did not have the right incentives to implement Basel II. In Vietnam, 
because of the fear of losing control and the desire to maintain the dominant role 
of state-owned banks, the government restricts foreign ownership in Vietnamese 
banks to less than 30 per cent (no individual can own more than 5 per cent, and 
foreign owners cannot own more than 20 per cent). This level of ownership does 
not provide foreign shareholders with sufficient incentives to transfer technology 
and governance systems in accordance with their international parent bank’s 
practices. Initially, some foreign counterparts suggested that Vietnamese banks 
adopt international practices, but after calculating the associated costs and bene-
fits, they reconsidered and decided to follow the practice of Vietnamese banks. 
Moreover, even in cases where the foreign partners are in charge of risk manage-
ment, they are unlikely to have sufficient and adequate data to do their job in the 
Vietnamese context, because of the differences in accounting practices and data 
manipulations commonly found in banks. Thus, in Vietnam, the implementation of 
Basel and other international practices—such as internal controls and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accounting—is rarely promoted or initiated 
by foreign shareholders.
A shift towards accelerated and more genuine  
implementation of Basel II
In a way, the context from 2014 onwards is somewhat similar to the period 
between 1999 and 2006: the economy began to recover from the crisis, brighter 
economic prospects returned, and Vietnam stood on the threshold of its highest 
level of international integration, joining several trade agreements in 2015/16. 
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In  this context, politicians and regulators decided to complete the unfinished 
business of Basel adoption and implementation.
The most important difference between periods 1 and 3 probably lies in the 
preferences of the banks themselves. After struggling with the crisis, strong banks 
restructured, weak banks had been consolidated or faced bankruptcy, and the 
others knew that they had to become competitive in order to survive, especially 
in the context of increasing market pressure from foreign banks as financial 
integration increased. These shifting incentives continue to have significant 
implications for the implementation of Basel standards, because ultimately, such 
standards need to be implemented by banks themselves.
As already mentioned, in 2014 when the SBV announced a roadmap for Basel II 
implementation, it selected ten domestic banks to participate in a pilot programme.5 
In our interviews with these pilot banks, they all agreed that their participation 
in the programme was perceived as a credible and positive signalling device to the 
market.6 If, during the time of a bank crisis (e.g. 2008–12), being in Group 1 (the 
‘healthy’ group) was considered to be a positive thing, then since the roadmap for 
Basel II was announced, being a pilot bank selected by the SBV has similarly been 
interpreted as being one of the best banks in the market. This signalling device 
proves to be very valuable in creating a good reputation for banks’ investments 
and trading partners, particularly in an environment characterized by pervasive 
asymmetric information, as is the case in Vietnam.
An interesting question is how these ten banks were selected. Responses 
from our interviewees reveal that the institutions were not selected on the basis 
of clearly defined and publicly available criteria. The biggest three state-owned 
banks were selected for an obvious reason, i.e. their size and leading position 
in the sector. However, some of the banks that were selected were not at all 
among the top ten biggest banks, measured either in terms of total assets or 
charter capital.
Another interesting question is to whom the banks were signalling. Obviously, 
the signal was not for the SBV’s benefit, since it was the SBV itself that hand-
picked these pilot banks. Neither was the signal intended for the depositors, 
because the SBV virtually guarantees that no bank will ever fail in Vietnam. 
Interview answers suggest that the main targets for this signalling mechanism 
were foreign stakeholders and future partners. Most of the ten pilot banks have 
foreign shareholders, and all of them have been rated by Moody’s. In addition, 
5 In this period, although Basel III has not yet appeared in official regulations, some Basel III elem-
ents such as LCR and NSFR have been adopted. However, the exact definition of these concepts is 
somewhat different from Basel III. For instance, under Basel III, the minimum LCR required is 100 per 
cent irrespective of the type of assets, while the minimum LCR under Vietnam’s regulation is 50 per cent 
for VND and 10 per cent for foreign currencies.
6 At the beginning, the initial pilot programme consisted of only eight banks, but two other banks 
successfully lobbied the SBV to join.
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these banks are either listed, or were about to be listed, on the stock exchange in 
Hanoi (HNX) or Ho Chi Minh City (HOSE).
The SBV’s clear roadmap for Basel implementation, including in Correspondence 
1601 in 2014, provided important impetus for banks to move forward with the 
regulations. Interviews with bankers, both inside and outside the Basel pilot pro-
gramme, show that since 2014, many banks started working with consulting firms 
to prepare their own roadmaps for Basel II implementation. Thanks to their 
proven resilience during the banking crisis, the ten pilot banks had a wider lee-
way to adopt Basel and improve their risk management and banking governance. 
However, even for these banks, strict application of Basel standards would in ev it-
ably have reduced their liquidity coverage ratio, CAR, and return on equity 
compared to the status quo. As a result, banks had little incentive to implement 
Basel until the SBV’s Basel implementation roadmap became credible and banks 
believed they would be liable to strict SBV supervision.7 Once this happened, the 
leading banks invested efforts in meeting the deadlines more sincerely, thereby 
creating pressure for other banks to keep up. Our interviews show that non-pilot 
banks have already prepared for Basel II by evaluating their data gaps. These banks 
understand that implementing Basel now will send a positive signal to the market, 
and that once the Basel regulation is officially issued, it will apply to the whole 
banking system, so it is better to start sooner rather than later.
Big banks, especially the ten pilot banks, need to raise more capital to meet the 
new CAR requirements. These institutions have found that Basel II offers a way 
of reducing their cost of capital. They all argue that if a bank adopts Basel II, it 
will become more transparent and its risk management system will be better, so 
that their credit rating could be improved, implying a lower cost of debt issuance 
and making it easier to attract international investors. As the domestic financial 
market is not big enough, these banks really need to raise capital from inter-
nation al investors, and are seeking strategic shareholders from foreign financial 
institutions to do this.
Expansion overseas provides further incentive for banks to support Basel II 
implementation, as is illustrated with the experiences of Vietinbank (one of the 
ten pilot banks). Vietinbank chose to establish its first representative office in 
Europe in Frankfurt (Germany) in April 2010. A year later, in July 2011, its first 
branch office was approved by BaFin, to be opened in Frankfurt (Tuyet, 2011). Its 
second branch office was opened in May 2012 in Berlin. One of our interviews 
revealed that the main motivation for Vietinbank to open these branch offices 
7 A rational roadmap is necessary for its credibility. Even pilot banks, especially the state-owned 
banks, experience great difficulties raising capital to meet the CAR requirement of Basel II. This is 
why Decision 41 (December 2016) on Basel implementation pushes the implementation deadline to 
January 2020 from 2019, and CAR has been reduced to 8 per cent from 9 per cent as required by 
Circulation 13 (2010).
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was to send a positive signal and help it improve its reputation as the first and 
only Vietnamese bank to comply with European banking standards. Although the 
effort to comply with European standards in operating and managing these two 
branches does not imply that Vietinbank headquarters will necessarily implement 
Basel standards, this overseas venture has indirectly compelled the bank’s Board 
to educate itself about international standards, and facilitated the discussion of 
Basel adoption in its strategic planning. Vietinbank is considered to be among the 
most advanced of Vietnamese banks in implementing Basel II.
Finally, competition has been providing strong incentives for banks to adopt 
and implement Basel standards. For a few leading banks trying to establish their 
activities in advanced economies, meeting the host country’s standards (includ-
ing Basel) is not a matter of choice (Nguyen, 2017).8 For most banks, trying to 
keep up with increasing competition even in Vietnam is hard enough. Financial 
liberalization and economic integration create a much more competitive environ-
ment for domestic financial institutions. Indeed, ten years after joining the WTO, 
the number of foreign-invested and foreign-owned banks has increased rapidly 
(Tran, 2017).
In sum, shifts in the domestic banking sector and increased engagement with 
international finance have created new incentives for banks, especially the stronger 
ones, to support the implementation of Basel and other international standards. 
For weaker POBs, the adoption of Basel II is perceived more as ‘compliance’. For 
stronger POBs, however, it is considered as a means to differentiate themselves 
from weaker banks and send a positive signal to their partners. The pressure to 
implement Basel comes not only from the SBV, but also from the intrinsic needs 
of banks, which view Basel as an opportunity to improve their governance and 
attract foreign strategic investors.
In 2016, a new political leadership took office and has being trying to signal a 
wave of reform. Whether it is Politburo direction or National Assembly Resolution 
or a government decision, virtually all policy messages refer to the priority of 
restructuring the banking sector. This is indeed an important factor driving the 
SBV’s efforts to implement banking restructuring measures, including the imple-
mentation of Basel II. As the banks have somehow managed to bring down the NPL 
ratio, they are readier to implement Basel standards. Meanwhile, from the SBV’s 
perspective, the implementation of Basel is perceived as a mech an ism for pre-
venting further financial crises and has therefore been carried out in a more active 
and substantive manner. This time, the roadmap is more rational, considering the 
readiness of banks, and the implementation timeline has been delayed to 2020 
and then until 2025.
8 Vietcombank, ACB, and BIDV have also been allowed by the SBV to open a representative office 
in the US. However, only Vietcombank has been approved recently by the US Federal Reserve. 
Vietcombank receives a permit to open representative office in the US (2018, 1 November) (Nhan Dan 
Online, 2018).
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Conclusions and reflections on the analytical framework
This chapter argues that regulators, politicians, and banks face conflicting inter-
ests and incentives when it comes to Basel adoption and implementation. The 
country’s politics are domestically oriented and closed, but its economy is inter-
nation al ly integrated and open. Economic openness is an essential means for 
enhancing the legitimacy of the party-state’s performance, while political 
closed-ness is imperative to retaining its absolute power. As for the regulator 
(the SBV), ambiguous and overlapping roles have given rise to conflicting regu-
latory pol icies. Finally, banks have been passive players who want to approach 
international standards, but are constrained from doing so by limited financial 
and human resources, and the SBV’s discretionary interventions. Politicians are 
the most powerful actors when it comes to deciding banking regulations, and 
the approach to Basel standards reflects the preferences of the political faction 
that won the tug of war. These conflicting interests and incentives have given 
rise for the longest time to extensive forbearance in the enforcement of banking 
regulations, and to mock compliance with Basel adoption and implementation. 
With reference to the analytical framework, this is an instance of politically 
driven mock compliance.
The existence of conflicting interests and incentives at all levels implies that the 
context in which Basel standards are adopted and implemented is critically 
important. In the case of Vietnam, economic difficulties unfolded during the 
2008–12 period with the mounting problem of NPLs, and then the adoption of 
Basel presented an obvious dilemma: implementation would help signal the gov-
ernment’s continued reform efforts, but it would expose the substantial inherent 
weaknesses of most commercial banks, which could plausibly have triggered a 
series of bank runs.
It is instructive to compare the experiences of Vietnam and Ethiopia, because 
of their common socialist legacy and shared model of a developmental state. 
Indeed, the economic system of Ethiopia today is very similar to that of Vietnam 
before Doi Moi, and the two countries’ financial systems were quite similar 
until the late 1990s. The Ethiopia chapter of this volume essentially argues that 
the shift from Basel I to Basel II would empower the market and market access 
in a way  that is totally against the power of the regulator, and that Ethiopia 
decided not to implement Basel II and III because it wanted to retain control 
over its economy. As discussed earlier, the Vietnamese party-state also wants to 
exert firm control over not only the financial sector, but also the economy as a 
whole. The key factor that sets the Vietnamese and Ethiopian experience apart 
is that while Vietnam’s politics remain closed, a political decision has been 
taken to open up the economy in order to stimulate economic growth. This 
fundamental political economic principle shadows almost every aspect of the 
Vietnamese economy, including the adoption and implementation of Basel 
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standards. How this dilemma unfolds will determine not only the divergent 
paths Vietnam and Ethiopia take, but also the economic futures of both coun-
tries entirely.
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Raising a Vegetarian Tiger?
Toni Weis
Transforming Ethiopia into an East African tiger is hardly possible 




The Ethiopian economy, among the fastest-growing in Africa for fifteen years 
and counting, defies many of the common ideas about the continent’s economic 
resurgence. Although Ethiopian politicians embrace the slogan of a ‘rising’ 
Ethiopia, the country’s developmental trajectory differs sharply from the modal 
patterns of the Africa Rising literature (Mahajan, 2011). The latter is driven to a sig-
nificant extent by images from the financial sector—the success of pan-African 
banks, for example, or the success of fintech innovations like Kenya’s M-Pesa. 
Ethiopia’s financial industry, on the other hand, is among the less impressive aspects 
of the country’s economic transformation: small and shallow, technologically back-
wards, dominated by public institutions, and closed to foreign competition.
Ethiopia’s financial regulators are similarly inward-looking. Despite significant 
exposure to international banking standards through donors and the IMF, 
banking supervisors at the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) have little use for 
the Basel framework, at least in its more recent iterations. Neither Basel II nor 
Basel  III are currently being implemented, and there are no plans to introduce 
them in the near future—in fact, an introduction of Basel II was briefly considered 
in 2009, but ultimately rejected. The capital adequacy requirements enshrined in 
Basel I were adopted during the partial liberalization of Ethiopia’s banking sector 
during the mid-1990s, and the Basel Core Principles are occasionally referenced 
as good regulatory practice. However, even these elementary standards have 
been  adapted to the realities of the Ethiopian financial sector rather than 
adopted wholesale.
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Ethiopia’s reluctant approach to the Basel framework does not just stem from 
the relative isolation of its banking sector or its regulators, but is the result of a 
strong preference for political control over the financial industry. The Ethiopian 
government seeks to emulate the example of East Asian ‘tiger’ economies for 
whom financial repression represented a key tool in the pursuit of rapid industri-
alization. After more than twenty-five years in power, the ruling party’s control 
over the regulatory apparatus, including the central bank, is complete and uncon-
tested. Regulators, in turn, enjoy wide-ranging powers over the financial industry, 
which remains dominated by state-owned players and off limits to foreign institu-
tions. Ethiopia is therefore a powerful illustration of policy-driven divergence. 
The domestic orientation of all key actors—politicians, regulators, and banks—
has thus far outweighed the preferences of the IMF and foreign investors. As a 
consequence, Ethiopia is a case of policy-driven divergence from global stand-
ards. However, as Ethiopia’s domestic banks struggle to sustain transformative 
growth and the political leadership is relaxing its approach to state-led economic 
development, pressures for greater financial opening (and, by extension, for 
increased regulatory convergence) are beginning to mount.
Despite its obvious significance for understanding the economic policies of a 
‘developmental’ state regime, the issue of financial regulation has received little 
academic attention in the Ethiopian context.1 The present study, therefore, draws 
chiefly on primary sources: a systematic review of regulatory texts, central bank 
publications, and policy documents; newly compiled data on Ethiopian private 
banks as well as the professional background of financial regulators; and a total of 
fifteen interviews with central bank regulators, risk and compliance professionals 
at both private and public banks, and experts from IMF and the World Bank.
Political economy of the Ethiopian banking sector
Ethiopia is a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa which, despite significant 
economic gains in recent years, remains among the world’s poorest. As the only 
African polity that escaped colonization by European powers, Ethiopia’s recent his-
tory has been characterized by a relatively inward-looking, nationalist political cul-
ture. During the second half of the twentieth century, Ethiopia’s political economy 
underwent a series of transformations as three fundamentally different regimes 
followed each other in rapid succession. The feudal government of Haile Selassie 
(1931–74), the socialist military dictatorship of the Derg (1974–91), and the ‘revolu-
tionary democrats’ of the EPRDF (1991–current) all pursued ambitious visions of 
national development, but they disagreed radically on the respective roles of gov-
ernment and private sector in bringing about this transformation (Table 14.1).
1 An exception is Alemu Zwedu (2014).
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This is particularly true for the financial sector. Control of Ethiopia’s banks was 
a common concern for all three regimes, yet the level of control (and its effect on 
the nascent banking sector) differed starkly from one set of leaders to the next. In 
1963, Haile Selassie established the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), the 
state-owned behemoth which continues to dominate the sector to this day. Private 
commercial banks, including banks with (minority) foreign ownership, began to 
operate shortly after. A military coup in 1974 put an end to this experiment, as 
private banks were nationalized and integrated into the CBE. However, the CBE 
retained a significant amount of managerial autonomy and escaped relatively 
unscathed when the Derg government fell to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front, a coalition of ethnic insurgent movements, in 1991.
Despite being firmly rooted in Marxism-Leninism itself, the EPRDF signed off 
on a structural adjustment programme which included a partial liberalization 
of  the banking sector. Two landmark pieces of legislation—the Monetary and 
Banking Proclamation (83/1994) and the Licensing and Supervision of Banking 
Business Proclamation (84/1994)—reorganized the country’s financial industry, 
and the first private bank of the post-socialist era was established in 1995. 
However, the EPRDF fought hard to avoid what it considered to be excessive 
demands for liberalization. It refused to open the Ethiopian banking industry to 
foreign competition, restricting ownership of financial institutions to Ethiopian 
citizens. Just as importantly, the EPRDF rejected the IMF’s calls to privatize the 
remaining state-owned banks or break up the CBE (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 31).
The EPRDF’s shift towards a ‘developmental state’ framework since the early 
2000s has brought about a final transformation of the Ethiopian banking sector. 
State banks are increasingly taking on a policy lending role: the CBE was funda-
mentally restructured and turned into a highly profitable institution whose revenue 
finances key infrastructure projects and the expansion of state-owned enterprises. 
A second state-owned bank, the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), was 
tasked with providing long-term financing to priority industries. Regulators 
Table 14.1 Ethiopia: key indicators
Ethiopia  
GDP per capita (current US$) 767
Bank assets (current US$) 6.86 bn (2008)
Bank assets (% of GDP) 25.33 (2008)
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) N/A
Credit allocation to private sector (% of GDP) 17.71 (2008)
Credit allocation to government (% of GDP) 5.99 (2008)
Polity IV score −3
Note: All data is from 2017 unless otherwise indicated.
Source: FSI Database, IMF (2018); GDI database, World Bank (2017); Polity IV (2014)
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have  also been brought in line with the government’s new economic vision. 
Controversial regulation introduced in 2011 is forcing private banks to reduce 
liquidity by purchasing NBE bills which, in turn, are used to expand the DBE’s 
portfolio. The central bank has also kept interest rates artificially low to encourage 
investment, yet high levels of government borrowing are pushing the private 
sector’s access to credit well below the regional average (IMF, 2016, p. 106).
At the same time, accelerated growth has resulted in a significant expansion of 
the financial sector. The combined assets of Ethiopia’s commercial banks have 
almost tripled since 2010, from US$9.3 billion to US$26.5 billion, and are growing 
at about twice the rate of GDP (see Figure 14.1).2 Although the number of private 
banks has risen to 16, the CBE continues to control about two thirds of these assets. 
Financial intermediation has expanded as a result; in 2016, total bank deposits 
stood at US$20 billion—up from US$7.6 billion in 2010—while annual loan dis-
bursement doubled during the same time. Nevertheless, the industry remains 
minuscule by global standards: in 2016, the total assets of the Ethiopian banking 
system amounted to roughly 1 per cent of the assets managed by HSBC UK.
The Ethiopian banking sector also remains exceptionally shallow. Ethiopia has 
neither a secondary equity market nor a secondary market for corporate debt, 
although the creation of these institutions has been discussed occasionally since 
the early 1990s. A recent NBE directive (SBB/60/2015) clarifies that banks must 
limit themselves to ‘customary’ banking activities and that ‘[n]o bank shall deal in 
securities’. An interbank money market exists; however, since Ethiopian banks 
rarely suffer from short-term liquidity problems, it has not seen any transactions 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all data in the remainder of this section has been compiled from the 
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Figure 14.1 Ethiopia: total assets of commercial banks (in US$ million).
Source: Data from Abdulmenan (2017) and IMF (2016)
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in  almost a decade (Alemu Zwedu, 2014, p. 12). The continued isolation of the 
Ethiopian banking industry also means that the country remains cut off from 
wider trends and innovations in the banking industry: Ethiopia is one of just two 
African countries without foreign banks, and one of only four countries where 
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Figure 14.2 Ethiopia: capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and non-performing loans (NPLs).
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Figure 14.3 Ethiopia: rates of return on assets (RoA) and equity (RoE).
Source: Data from World Bank (2018)
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The characteristics outlined above translate into a relatively conservative risk 
profile, at least among private banks. Market power is relatively dispersed among 
the latter, interbank lending is negligible, and the law provides strict limits on the 
extent of cross-ownership and capital concentration. The isolation and lack of 
depth of Ethiopia’s banking sector means that it is sheltered from the vagaries 
of the global financial markets, and the country has not experienced a major finan-
cial crisis. Ethiopia’s commercial banks are also highly capitalized and profitable. 
Their average capital adequacy ratio is hovering between 15 and 20 per cent, well 
above the 8 per cent stipulated by Basel I, while the ratio of non-performing loans 
has remained exceptionally low (see Figure 14.2). A substantial interest rate spread, 
combined with low costs and high non-interest income, also provides domestic 
banks with a safe business model and a strong return on assets (see Figure 14.3).
The role of the Basel standards
The inward-looking nature of the Ethiopian financial sector is reflected in the 
regulatory framework that governs the country’s banking industry. Unlike some 
of its African peers, Ethiopia has been highly selective in adopting global stand-
ards, and its financial regulators do not consider compliance with international 
‘best practices’ a value in itself. This is particularly evident with regard to the 
implementation of the Basel framework for banking supervision. Ethiopian 
regulators are well aware of the Basel standards and have implemented their most 
basic element—Basel I’s minimum capital requirement. At the same time, NBE 
regulators do not consider the more complex (and costly) supervisory elements 
of Basel II and III to be a necessary upgrade at this stage, and they have not sig-
nalled any intention to adopt all or part of these frameworks (Table 14.2).
The Basel framework represented an important point of reference when 
Ethiopia began re-licensing private banks in the mid-1990s. The federal proc lam-
ation that established the new supervisory framework included the minimum 
Table 14.2 Ethiopia: adoption of Basel standards
Basel component Adoption Implementation
Basel I 1994
(minimum capital requirement 
of 8% established in Supervision 
of Banking Business 
Proclamation)
1995
(simplified Basel I risk weights 
introduced in NBE’s Computation  
of Risk-Weighted Asset Directive)
Basel II n/a n/a
Basel III n/a n/a
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capital requirement of 8 per cent stipulated in Basel I (Supervision of Banking 
Business Proclamation 84/1994). This provision has been reaffirmed by subse-
quent laws and regulations. However, the rules implemented by the NBE are de 
facto a simplified version of Basel I, as many of the asset classes included in Basel I 
do not exist in the Ethiopian financial sector (Computation of Risk-Weighted 
Asset Directive, SBB/9/95). This includes on-balance sheet assets such as mort-
gages and municipal bonds, as well as most kinds of off-balance sheet assets. 
What is more, the NBE’s banking supervisors do not distinguish between Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital.3
Ethiopia is not currently implementing any elements of Basel II or III, nor are 
there plans to do so in the near future. An internal study conducted as part of a 
wider restructuring of the NBE in 2009 considered the introduction of Basel II, 
but the idea was ultimately rejected.4 The NBE’s Monetary Policy Committee at 
the time asserted its commitment to ‘improve the existing macro-prudential indi-
cators for banks based on [the] Basel Standards’ (NBE, 2009, p. 11), but did not 
further specify any particular element of the framework. A working paper by 
Getnet, who draws on interviews with NBE staff, asserts that Ethiopian regulators 
have no interest in adopting Basel II or III ‘as a package’ but might introduce 
individual elements that ‘fit to the Ethiopian context’ (Alemu Zwedu, 2014, p. 33). 
However, interviews conducted for this study did not indicate that this is happen-
ing at present. Instead, an NBE banking supervisor assessed that central bank 
staff are only following developments around Basel III ‘distantly’.5
Despite Ethiopia’s lack of interest in Basel II and III, the broader work of the 
Basel Committee has served as an important point of reference for its banking 
supervisors. When the country’s main state-owned bank suffered from an excess 
of non-performing loans in the early 2000s, the NBE assured IMF staff that it was 
working on ‘bringing prudential regulations in line with Basel standards’ (IMF, 
2001a) and would base its measures on ‘Basel Committee guidelines for the 
restructuring of troubled debt and credit risk’ (IMF, 2001b). Documents published 
by the Basel Committee also informed the NBE’s strategy for gradually moving 
towards a risk-based supervision system. The NBE’s updated risk-management 
guidelines, issued in 2010, draw heavily on the Basel Core Principles, at times 
reproducing sections of these documents word for word (Basel Committee, 2004, 
2003, 2000a, 2000b; NBE, 2010).
Ethiopia’s commercial banks have responded by introducing new risk- 
management policies of their own. Compliance staff at Wegagen Bank, a large 
private bank with ties to the EPRDF government, showed familiarity with Basel, 
but did not draw on Basel Committee documents in the development of their 
comprehensive ‘enterprise risk assessment’ system.6 Staff at the private NIB bank, 
3 Interview, NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 15 February 2017. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
6 Interview, compliance manager at Wegagen Bank, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2017.
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on the other hand, specifically looked to Basel when designing their internal 
risk-management processes, citing their will to be one step ahead of the regulatory 
requirements of the NBE. For example, NIB’s management monitors the bank’s 
net stable funding ratio, an indicator of liquidity borrowed from Basel III.7
While Ethiopian officials are showing little inclination to move beyond Basel I 
in banking supervision, they have advanced the adoption of international financial 
standards in other areas. Ethiopia recently adopted a law mandating businesses to 
comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS; Financial 
Reporting Proclamation 847/2014); however, implementation remains patchy. 
In a similar vein, Ethiopia began working with the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) in 2009 but has struggled to satisfy the group’s expectations. Ethiopia 
introduced anti-money laundering legislation in 2009 and began with the estab-
lishment of a Financial Intelligence Centre. Nevertheless, the country was 
‘greylisted’ as a ‘jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies’ from 2010 until 2014, at 
which point the FATF considered Ethiopia’s commitment to a mutually agreed 
reform agenda to be satisfactory. Citing ‘a lack of effective implementation’, the 
FATF put Ethiopia back on alert in early 2017 (FATF, 2017).
The politics of banking regulation in Ethiopia
As the previous sections have shown, the relatively low level of financial-sector 
development in Ethiopia limits the relevance and applicability of global financial 
standards. However, a simple reference to the regulatory fit of Basel II and III is 
not a satisfactory explanation for why Ethiopia’s banking supervisors have shown 
little enthusiasm for the framework—especially compared to their counterparts 
in other cases discussed in this volume. Understanding the interests of Ethiopian 
regulators, and those of other key actors, requires a look at the politics behind 
the regulation of Ethiopia’s banking industry. The remainder of this chapter 
therefore traces the ways in which the EPRDF’s mission to create an Ethiopian 
‘developmental state’ provides these different groups with an inward-looking set 
of incentives, while Ethiopia’s dependence on foreign funding is raising pressures 
for financial opening.
The primacy of political control
Ethiopia has been following the statist developmental model exemplified by the 
East Asian ‘tiger’ economies since the early 2000s, when the leadership of state 
and ruling party was consolidated under prime minister Meles Zenawi (Abbink 
7 Interview, risk manager at NIB Bank, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2017.
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and Hagmann, 2016; Vaughan, 2011; Weis, 2016). The EPRDF’s avowed ambition 
is to turn the country into a mid-income manufacturing powerhouse by 2025, 
following a strategy of ‘agricultural development-led industrialization’. Massive 
investments in public infrastructure—industrial parks, electricity, roads, and 
railways—have been undertaken to attract companies producing for the export 
market, while new state-owned enterprises seek to reduce the dependence on the 
importation of basic commodities such as fertilizer or sugar. The five-year Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP), now in its second phase (2015–20), coordinates 
the efforts of different ministries, while key operational decisions are taken within 
the prime minister’s office.
Government control of the financial sector plays a crucial role in the develop-
mental state: as Woo-Cumings (1999, p. 10) puts it, ‘[f]inance is the tie that binds 
the state to the industrialists’.8 This is particularly true with regard to the banking 
sector, as state-led economies have traditionally preferred credit-based—rather 
than market-based—financial systems (Zysman, 1984). By influencing the process 
of financial intermediation, governments gain the ability to allocate capital across 
firms and industries. They are also able to maintain interest rates beneath the 
market rate, thus lowering the cost for capital investment and government bor-
rowing alike. Whether such a policy of financial repression can ultimately be 
bene fi cial to low-income countries has been subject to much debate; however, the 
fact that the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies have in fact been built ‘over the dead 
bodies of [. . .] savers’ seems hard to dispute (Woo-Cumings, 1999, p. 17).
In their policy and internal training documents, the EPRDF and its govern-
ment have been remarkably explicit on how their interventionist approach to 
financial-sector development fits with the movement’s larger political agenda. 
As the latter changed over time—from orthodox Marxism-Leninism during the 
guerrilla years to the uneasy liberalism of the 1990s, and on to the current para-
digm of the ‘developmental state’—the EPRDF’s attitude towards the banking 
sector evolved as well. The EPRDF’s first manifesto from 1989 demanded that 
‘economic institutions must be brought under the control of a genuine people’s 
government’. After coming to power, the EPRDF embraced the idea of (partial) 
financial liberalization while establishing a foothold in the fledgling private finan-
cial sector. An internal position paper from 1993 thus advised the party to 
‘monopolize rural credit services’ while establishing private banks in the urban 
centres; within three years, the EPRDF had founded Wegagen Bank, as well as 
microcredit institutions serving its rural heartlands.
The first formulation of the current approach, which looks at financial regula-
tion primarily through the lens of industrial policy, can be found in an internal 
party document published in 2000 as part of the EPRDF’s ‘renewal’ campaign. 
8 For a more recent theorization of the role of finance in the context of ‘developmental state’ policies, 
see Heep (2014, p. 26).
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The paper argues that the Ethiopian underdeveloped financial market is charac-
terized by pervasive market failures, which inevitably result in a misallocation of 
capital. Consequently, ‘it is mandatory for the state to establish its own banks’ and 
direct credit to those firms that offer the greatest economic promise (EPRDF, 
2000, p. 15). Because foreign banks threaten to undermine this policy, the state 
should ‘bar them temporarily until the financial and banking system of the coun-
try becomes stable’ (ibid., p. 16). In an incomplete draft of his 2006 master’s thesis, 
Meles Zenawi develops these ideas further. He suggests learning from Taiwan 
and South Korea, whose governments ‘largely replaced the financial market and 
allocated investible resources in accordance with their development plan’ (ibid., 
p. 18), adding that ‘financial repression can be a powerful instrument to promote 
growth and investment’ (ibid., p. 27).
If the approaches and arguments have evolved over time, one theme has 
remained constant: the primacy of the political sphere over the financial market 
and its interests. From the beginning, the EPRDF government has been acutely 
aware of the enormous gap in capacity between international banks and local 
regulators, and it has sought to preserve the autonomy of the latter. This position 
was most clearly expressed by Meles Zenawi (2012) at a World Economic Forum 
event in Addis Ababa, shortly before his death, and is worth quoting in full:
These giants [major international banks] can wreck giant economies such as that 
of the United Kingdom. Ours is a flimsy one . . . They come in, they use instru-
ments we cannot control, that in most instances we can’t even understand. The 
best of us can’t even understand. How are you going to regulate them? How 
are  you going to regulate these people? It’s not possible. We don’t have the 
capacity now.
So what did we do? We allowed the private sector in Ethiopia, which is not in fi-
nite ly more complex than the public sector, and which therefore could easily be 
regulated by the public sector, we allowed the private banks to operate here. Is it 
going to be a permanent feature? No. As we grow, as we develop, and as we 
become more sophisticated in our regulatory capacity, of course we’ll liberalize. 
But not now. And we have lost nothing because of this policy.
Domestic regulators: professionalism, not autonomy
The centrality of the banking sector to the political vision of the EPRDF govern-
ment ascribes particular importance to those in charge of regulating it. Staff at the 
National Bank of Ethiopia consequently resort to ‘developmental’ vocabulary 
when talking about their employer: one senior expert in the NBE’s banking 
supervision directorate describes the central bank as the ‘engine of economic 
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transformation’,9 while a former colleague characterizes it as ‘a key policy agent in 
the developmental state system’.10 Interestingly, this ‘developmental’ ambition has 
also found its way into the legal framework of the central bank: the federal law 
which formally re-established the NBE in 2008 tasks the bank with creating con-
ditions ‘conducive to the rapid economic development of Ethiopia’ (Proclamation 
591/2008, emphasis added), while the original 1994 banking law instead spoke of 
‘balanced growth’ (Proclamation 83/1994).
Given the high degree of political intervention in the Ethiopian financial 
system, it comes as no surprise that the Ethiopian central bank is a thoroughly 
political rather than a politically independent institution. The political nature of 
the NBE reflects the EPRDF’s attitude towards the civil service more broadly, 
which emphasizes professionalism over autonomy: the government has invested 
significant resources in building the technical capacity of public servants, but it 
expects them to implement policy, not to shape or question it (Vaughan and 
Tronvoll, 2003; Weis, 2016, p. 160). Regulators must maintain their independence 
from those they regulate, not from those they serve; in Meles Zenawi’s terms, 
‘autonomy must be defined in class terms, not institutional terms’ (cited in de 
Waal [2013, p. 473]). Measures that increase the regulatory independence of pri-
vate banks, such as the promotion of internal risk models or a general deference 
to ‘market discipline’ (introduced under pillars 2 and 3 of Basel II, respectively), 
thus run counter to the EPRDF’s philosophy.
The political role of the Ethiopian central bank is enshrined in its governing 
documents. Article 4 of the 2008 NBE law stipulates that the bank ‘shall be 
accountable to the Prime Minister’, while the seven members of the NBE’s board 
of directors are also appointed by the federal government. The board is dominated 
by senior members of the administration and ruling party, such as the minister of 
finance, the head of the national planning commission, and the chief economic 
adviser to the prime minister (who currently serves as chairman of the board). 
Teklewold Atnafu, who served as governor of the NBE for almost two decades 
until June 2018, was a key member of the macro-economic team in the prime 
minister’s office—the command centre of the EPRDF state—as well as a member 
of the central committee of the SEPDM, one of the four ethno-regional parties 
that form the EPRDF coalition (Sebsibe, 2015). His successor, Yinager Dessie, is a 
career politician who most recently served as head of Ethiopia’s National Planning 
Commission and is a senior member in the EPRDF’s Amhara party (Addis 
Standard, 2018; Fortune, 2018).
The EPRDF government is also exerting efforts to ensure that lower-level central 
bank staff are aware of, and subscribe to, the NBE’s political mission. A govern-
ment directive issued in 2008 which lays out the rights and obligations of NBE 
9 Interview, NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 15 February 2017.
10 Interview, former NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 1 March 2017.
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staff thus specifies that ‘[a]ny employee shall . . . respect and implement govern-
ment policies’ (Council of Ministers Regulation 157/2008). The NBE has certainly 
succeeded in ensuring that its employees remain on message: one World Bank 
official describes the bank as ‘monolithic’, with a highly disciplined staff that 
‘sings  from the same hymn book’ when communicating with outside experts.11 
Nevertheless, NBE regulators strongly reject the allegation of private bank 
employees that the central bank is a political institution—referring to it as ‘highly 
independent’ with ‘no government influence’—and argue that there is no differ-
ence between its relationships with private and state banks.12
At the same time, the Ethiopian government has invested heavily in building 
the technical and supervisory capacity of the central bank. Between 2005 and 
2012, the NBE benefited from a World Bank-led capacity-building programme 
which focused on introducing risk-based supervision methods, establishing new 
liquidity forecasting and macro modelling tools, and updating the bank’s IT 
infrastructure (World Bank, 2012a). The NBE also continues to increase its tech-
nical staff: in 2011, there were twenty-seven experts in the NBE’s banking supervi-
sion department, of whom only one had a higher academic degree (World Bank, 
2012b); by 2017, the number of staff had grown to forty, a dozen of whom held 
graduate degrees. Despite the progress made in recent years, however, NBE staff 
still consider the ‘brain drain’ towards the private banks and the resulting short-
age of skilled supervisors to be essential challenges.13
IFIs and the importance of ‘policy independence’
If Ethiopian financial regulators are conscious of the domestic political context 
in which they are embedded, they are even more determined to retain their inde-
pendence from the international financial institutions. Ethiopia’s state-led economic 
model, as well as the highly interventionist financial policies that underpin it, goes 
against the grain of the reform measures promoted by the World Bank and the IMF, 
and Ethiopian policymakers regularly find themselves at odds with the representa-
tives of these organizations. Arkebe Oqbay, the head of the Ethiopian Investment 
Commission and one of the main thinkers behind the country’s economic agenda, 
summarizes the stance of the EPRDF government thus:
Ethiopia is able to achieve this because it chose its own development path. We 
have not always been good students of the IMF and other financial institutions. 
We have always been choosing our way because policy independence is im port-
ant to us. (cited in Tamrat, 2015)
11 Interview, World Bank financial sector expert, Washington, DC., 21 February 2016.
12 Interview, NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 15 February 2017.
13 Interview, former NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 1 March 2017.
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This emphasis on ‘policy independence’ expresses itself in two ways. On the one 
hand, it means that the professional culture of Ethiopia’s financial regulators is 
inward-looking, concerned primarily with domestic concerns rather than devel-
opments in the global financial centres. In contrast to other African economies, 
Ethiopia’s banking regulators are trained and recruited locally; exposure to the 
global financial industry is both less prevalent and less relevant than in other 
countries. Money is certainly an important factor in this context: salaries at the 
central bank range from US$150/month for entry-level positions to US$900 at 
the director level,14 while jobs in the modern private sector, international or gan-
iza tions, or the non-profit sphere are considerably higher and receive greater 
attention from Ethiopians who received an international education.
A review of the LinkedIn profiles of 126 current and former technical experts at 
the National Bank—while certainly not a fool-proof methodology—highlights 
some interesting patterns in this regard: of the 126 NBE staff, only five received an 
education outside Ethiopia, while the remaining 121 were trained inside the coun-
try. Just as importantly, the majority of the latter—seventy-three in total—studied 
at one of Ethiopia’s new regional universities, whose academic credentials have 
often been disparaged; a large minority of forty-eight employees graduated from 
Addis Ababa University, the most prestigious—and, until the mid-1990s, the 
only—university in the country. Central bank staff also tend to join the NBE quite 
young and inexperienced; out of the total 126 employees, eighty started working 
for the bank within one year of obtaining their undergraduate degree. Lastly, staff 
tend to migrate from the NBE to the private banks, rather than vice versa: at least 
twenty-two out of sixty former NBE employees reported a new position at a pri-
vate bank, while only one of sixty-six current NBE employees previously worked 
for a private bank.
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s insistence on ‘policy independence’ has made for 
a rocky relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions, and particularly the 
IMF (Gill, 2010, pp. 79–96). Ethiopia’s difficulties with the Fund reach back to the 
1990s, when government officials and IMF staff clashed over the EPRDF’s reform 
agenda and loan disbursement was suspended twice. Relations improved later on 
without ever becoming cordial. In 2014, the IMF closed its office in Addis Ababa 
because of the government’s lack of interest in engaging with the Fund beyond 
the bare minimum of activities: Ethiopia is one of very few countries of its size 
that has never requested a Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), and 
publishing reports or even press releases on the annual Article IV consultations—
otherwise a mere formality—has often been a contentious issue in Ethiopia.15
This is not to say that there are not areas of mutual collaboration. Today, World 
Bank and Fund officials largely acknowledge the government’s reluctance towards 
14 Interview, NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 15 February 2017.
15 Interview, IMF official, Washington, DC, 27 April 2017.
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greater financial liberalization and try to ‘work in the margins’.16 They also do not 
push for the adoption of the Basel II or III packages, acknowledging that these do 
not represent a good fit with Ethiopia’s regulatory capacity or requirements.17 
Ethiopian officials regularly request IMF or World Bank assistance on specific 
technical issues, and foreign consultants from these institutions have been 
involved in a range of projects at the central bank recently, from the development 
of a liquidity forecasting model to assisting in the drafting of directives in new 
issue areas.18 NBE regulators also attend trainings and experience-sharing meet-
ings at the IMF’s Regional Technical Assistance Center (AFRITAC) in Tanzania 
(Gottschalk, 2015, p. 9); however, these are primarily concerned with macro-
economic rather than regulatory issues, and NBE staff are perceived to be less 
integrated into regional expert networks ‘because they do not have to be’.19
The acquiescence of private banks
In debates (if indeed the term is warranted) about financial regulation in 
Ethiopia, the voice of the commercial banks themselves—and of the private 
banks in particular—is noticeable mostly by its absence. Somewhat surprisingly, 
all private bank employees interviewed for this study characterized their com-
munication with the central bank as constructive: they reported that central 
bank staff regularly consult with private banks—both at the board level and with 
technical experts—during the development of new laws or regulations. However, 
they also did not feel that their feedback was ultimately taken into account by 
the NBE.20
As a consequence, controversial or openly punitive measures may provoke 
initial protest from private bank staff, but are enforced and obeyed nevertheless, 
and with little attempt to push back. The most striking example is the introduc-
tion of a regulation in 2011 that requires all private banks (but not the CBE) to 
purchase five-year NBE bills equivalent to 27 per cent of new loan disbursements. 
The 3 per cent interest paid on these bills is well below the rate of inflation, and 
their maturity far exceeds that of the average bank loan. In the absence of a sec-
ondary debt market, this means that a growing part of private bank assets are 
invested in government debt, which has in turn been used to finance long-term 
industrial projects. Ethiopia’s private banks initially protested vigorously against 
the new rule (Mesfin, 2011). However, the Ethiopian government remained 
16 Interview, World Bank financial sector expert, Washington, DC, 21 February 2016.
17 Interview, IMF official, Washington, DC, 27 April 2017.
18 Interview, NBE banking supervisor, Addis Ababa, 15 February 2017.
19 Interview, IMF official, Washington, DC, 27 April 2017.
20 Interview, compliance manager at Wegagen Bank, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2017; and interview, 
risk manager at NIB Bank, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2017.
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unimpressed by the objections (including those of the IMF later on), and the rule 
remains in place today.
The relative lack of power of Ethiopia’s private banks vis-à-vis their federal 
supervisors is partly a reflection of market structure. With two thirds of the coun-
try’s total banking assets under the control of the CBE, systemic risk is largely 
concentrated within one state-owned institution. Meanwhile, the structural risks 
emanating from the private banking sector are modest. The largest of the sixteen 
private banks, Awash International Bank, has a market share of just over 5 per 
cent. Risk exposure between different private banks is minimal, as interbank 
lending and cross-ownership are non-existent. What is more, Ethiopian banking 
law prevents the concentration of ownership structures: the 2008 Revised 
Banking Business Proclamation stipulates that an individual or family can own 
no more than 5 per cent of a bank’s total shares,21 while an ‘influential share-
holder’ owning 2 per cent of a bank’s shares or more cannot purchase stock in any 
of the other institutions.
Remarkably, and in contrast to other ‘developmental’ states, there are also few 
indications of outright clientelism between banks and political elites which could 
raise the former’s influence with policymakers. The CBE’s annual reports, for 
example, list all of its major non-performing loans, and none of the firms and 
individuals listed are known to be major political operators (CBE, 2014). A small 
number of private banks do have ties to the EPRDF—most importantly Wegagen 
Bank, an institution which was established with funds accumulated by the EPRDF 
during the war against the Derg, but is now formally part of a charitable endow-
ment. However, they do not seem to benefit from preferential treatment, and 
there have been few allegations levelled against them recently. At the same time, 
the central bank has not been involved in any of the high-profile corruption cases 
which the Ethiopian courts have (very publicly) prosecuted in the past years.
There is, of course, another reason for the relative acquiescence of Ethiopia’s 
private banks: the fact that they are, overall, among the main beneficiaries of the 
NBE’s inward-looking and protectionist policies. According to data compiled by 
Abdulmenan (2017), Ethiopia’s private banks are profitable without exception, 
and have been so since at least 2010. Operating in a rapidly growing yet signifi-
cantly under-banked economy, private banks have their pick of relatively safe 
short-term and highly collateralized loans. Non-interest income from banking 
fees, forex services, and trade financing represents an additional revenue stream, 
amounting to a third of total revenues on average. Opening the financial sector to 
foreign banks would expose domestic institutions to a much more difficult com-
petitive environment; as long as their profits are safe, there is thus little reason for 
private banks to rock the boat.
21 This number was revised downward from the 20 per cent figure included in the original banking 
law of 1994.
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Pressures for financial liberalization and convergence
Even foreign observers who are generally sympathetic to the EPRDF’s vision of 
state-led economic transformation, however, question the financial arrangement 
that underpins it (Bienen et al., 2015). The ‘developmental’ financial policies of the 
East Asian tigers were premised on high savings rates, a sizeable private banking 
sector, undervalued currencies, and a large current-account surplus. In Ethiopia, 
the situation is the exact opposite: the savings rate is low and the banking industry 
in its infancy; the Ethiopian birr is propped up by strict capital controls, and the 
rapid increase in imports far outpaces the sluggish export growth (World Bank, 
2016a, pp. 20–1).
The result has been a growing financing gap, which has in turn increased the 
demand for foreign capital. From 2010 to 2015, total investment—disproportionally 
driven by public spending—increased from 22 to 40 per cent of GDP (NPC, 2015, 
p. 13), while savings remained at 22 per cent. Since the Ethiopian financial sector 
is struggling to sustain economic growth by mobilizing the necessary amount of 
savings at home, the country has to bring in foreign savings. The growing inter-
action with global financial markets that results from this dependency has 
increased the linkages between an otherwise isolated Ethiopian financial sector 
and global capital markets. This, in turn, is slowly introducing new pressures for 
financial opening and regulatory convergence.
While there is no indication that the Ethiopian banking sector will be opened 
to foreign competition in the immediate future, it is slowly starting to acquire an 
international outlook. On the one hand, the state-owned Commercial Bank has 
become the first Ethiopian bank to venture out of the country.22 In April 2017, the 
CBE opened a new branch in Djibouti, the main economic gateway for land-
locked Ethiopia (Yewondwossen, 2017). According to a CBE representative, this 
move is part of a larger expansion plan which will see the bank opening offices 
primarily serving the growing Ethiopian community in diaspora hubs like 
Washington, DC, Dubai, and Johannesburg. At the same time, foreign banks have 
also begun opening representative offices in Ethiopia. These offices act as overseas 
correspondent banks for their Ethiopian counterparts and underwrite letters 
of  credit for local businesses who trade internationally. In 2007, the German 
Commerzbank was the first to open such an office in Addis Ababa (Kifle, 2007). 
Since 2014, several other banks—notably (pan-)African banks such as Ecobank 
and Standard Bank—have followed (Strydom, 2015).
Outside the banking industry, the gradual internationalization of Ethiopia’s 
financial sector has manifested itself even more strongly. One key event was the 
22 The CBE maintained an office in Djibouti which was closed by Djiboutian regulators in 2004, 
and it also opened several offices in South Sudan after 2009, most of which have since been closed 
again.
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issuing of Ethiopia’s first Eurobond in 2014—the country’s first foray into the 
global debt market, and oversubscribed by 260 per cent. In Ethiopia’s first credit 
ratings, obtained just before the issue, the agencies specifically commented on the 
particularities of the Ethiopian financial sector and their impact on the country’s 
sovereign credit risk. Moody’s, for example, noted ‘the high concentration in the 
banking sector and the dominance of state-owned banks’ which, in addition to 
government policies undermining the process of credit allocation, had ‘a negative 
effect on the development of the financial sector’ (Moody’s, 2014). While these 
declarations do not create any immediate pressure for reform in the financial 
sector, they certainly introduce a new set of incentives.
The EPRDF government has made it clear that it does not consider the current 
level of financial restriction as a goal in itself, but rather as a means to an end, to 
be phased out over time. As Meles Zenawi (2012) said at the World Economic 
Forum, ‘[a]s we grow, as we develop, and as we become more sophisticated in our 
regulatory capacity, of course we’ll liberalize’. The trends outlined above all create 
pressures in this direction. The long-term objective of Ethiopian regulators is 
convergence with global regulatory standards, but at their own pace, and without 
sacrificing control over the process. In the words of one World Bank official, 
where the Ethiopian government does show an interest in global financial norms, 
it is primarily interested in ‘future compliance’: there is no urgent need to be com-
pliant quite yet, but once Ethiopia’s financial regulators introduce a new set of 
reforms, they do not want to be taken by surprise.23
In the meantime, the Ethiopian central bank is undertaking a number of meas-
ures to strengthen the competitiveness of local commercial banks. In 2017, the 
NBE announced a likely increase in minimum capital requirements, which had 
already risen rapidly in recent years: not accounting for inflation, the NBE’s min-
imum capital requirement for the establishment of a new commercial bank rose 
by a factor of 200 (from 10 million birr to 2 billion birr) between 1995 and 2015. 
The NBE also raised the prospect of promoting the consolidation of the commer-
cial banking sector through mergers between private banks, something that has 
not happened since the EPRDF government first started licensing private banks 
in 1994 (Taye, 2017). Similarly, the second phase of the Growth and Transformation 
Plan, in a section on capacity building in the financial sector, announces plans to 
develop ‘regulations that meet international standards’, although the latter are not 
further specified (NPC, 2015, p. 110). And the establishment of a working group 
on financial-sector reform—with the participation of experts from both IMF and 
World Bank—by the new NBE Governor Yinager similarly indicates a willingness 
to revise existing institutions and policies (Fick and Maasho, 2018).
However, it would be short-sighted to see these instances of gradual change 
towards greater compliance with global financial norms as signs of a more radical 
23 Interview, World Bank financial sector expert, Washington, DC, 21 February 2016.
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shift in the immediate future. To date, every reference by Ethiopian politicians 
and regulators to the eventual liberalization of the financial sector has been 
accompanied by a caveat that the time for this measure has not yet come. To com-
plete Meles Zenawi’s quote from above: ‘. . . of course we’ll liberalize. But not now’.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Ethiopia’s divergence from international standards in 
banking supervision is not simply a reflection of the bad regulatory ‘fit’ of Basel II 
and III, but more fundamentally a consequence of the policy orientation and 
strong domestic orientation of key actors. The EPRDF government sees itself as a 
‘developmental’ regime in the tradition of the East Asian tigers and therefore con-
siders control of financial markets to be a key component of industrial policy. 
Central bank regulators, on the other hand, take pride in increasing their tech-
nical competence, but their loyalty lies with domestic political leaders rather than 
with foreign institutions or networks. As key beneficiaries of the ERPDF’s protec-
tionist policies, finally, domestic commercial banks have little incentive to go 
abroad. However, the growing need to attract foreign capital is likely to usher in a 
gradual internationalization of the Ethiopian financial sector, and with it a greater 
interest in global financial standards.
As a highly aid-dependent country with significant exposure to the donor 
community, Ethiopia should be expected to converge on international standards. 
The analytical framework presented in this volume helps explain why this is not 
the case. It does so by drawing attention to the preferences of key actors: while 
Ethiopia’s politicians, regulators, and banks are well aware of global norms and 
the community that promotes them, this awareness alone is not sufficient to sway 
them from their strong domestic agendas. Ethiopia provides an excellent example 
of the dynamics behind policy-driven divergence. This straightforward causal 
story is complicated only by the need to account for likely moves towards greater 
regulatory convergence in the future. Vietnam, for example, is regularly cited as 
an example of the kind of economy Ethiopia’s state-led industrialization strategy 
might eventually engender (e.g. World Bank, 2016b). However, whether Ethiopia 
will mirror Vietnam’s approach of gradual financial liberalization—and, conse-
quently, demonstrate a similar willingness to embrace global standards like the 
Basel framework—remains speculation at this point.
The contrast between Rwanda and Ethiopia, countries that are held up as 
African ‘developmental states’, is striking. Like Ethiopia’s EPRDF, the government 
of Paul Kagame has its roots in an armed insurgency movement and has rejected 
calls for political liberalization in favour of a state-led approach to economic 
transformation (Matfess, 2015). However, the two countries follow fundamentally 
different economic strategies. In contrast to Ethiopia’s focus on labour-intensive 
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industries with strong backward linkages to agriculture, the Rwandan government 
pursues the development of a skills-based service economy. As Behuria argues in 
this volume, the promotion of a competitive financial industry is a key aspect of 
this endeavour. In comparison to their Ethiopian counterparts, Rwandan politi-
cians and regulators therefore have a more internationalist agenda for the financial 
sector, and they are more likely to embrace compliance with international stand-
ards as a means of boosting the competitiveness of the Rwandan banking sector.
Comparison with the Angolan case highlights the importance of distinguish-
ing conceptually between politically driven and policy-driven lending. As the 
discussion of the Angolan banking industry in this volume illustrates, both 
kleptocratic and ‘developmental’ regimes are driven by domestic concerns which 
motivate them to control the banking sector—elite enrichment and economic 
transformation, respectively. Although both regime types can be expected to 
reject supervisory frameworks that reduce their control over the process, the 
implications for financial regulators are very different. This highlights the im port-
ance of closely examining actor preferences.
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The preceding chapters have provided a wealth of empirical evidence on the 
political economy dynamics that lead regulators in peripheral developing 
countries to converge on, and diverge from, international standards. In this 
chapter we distil key findings, highlight areas for further research, and make a 
series of policy recommendations, proposing ways to reform international 
standard-setting processes to better reflect the interests of peripheral developing 
countries.
Our case studies provide compelling evidence of the powerful reputational, 
competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that 
lead regulators to adopt international standards, even when they are ill suited to 
their local context. A striking finding from our case studies is that politicians and 
regulators were the main drivers of convergence. In the countries where imple-
mentation was most ambitious, politicians played a vital role, championing 
the  expansion of financial services and integration into global finance as an 
im port ant component of their country’s development strategy. In some cases, 
regulators advocated convergence on prudential grounds, concerned about the 
increasing risks posed by internationally active banks. But we also found evidence 
of strong reputational incentives to implement the latest international standards, 
which are considered the ‘gold standard’ in international policy circles.
Where there were pressures to diverge, these usually came from politicians and 
regulators as well. In several countries, politicians were concerned implementa-
tion of international standards would undermine their ability to allocate credit to 
productive sectors of the economy, as part of a developmental state model, or to 
channel credit to political allies. In many cases regulators were sceptical about the 
suitability of international standards for their jurisdiction, particularly the most 
complex aspects of Basel II and III. Where politicians and regulators faced 
conflicting preferences, this led to mock compliance. A striking finding is that 
banks were rarely central players in these dynamics of convergence or divergence.
We explain how our findings speak to wider debates in the literature, including 
over the agency of actors from peripheral developing countries in the global 
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economy; relationships between firms, politicians, and the state in developing 
countries; the importance of policy ideas, particularly the role of the financial 
sector in economic development; and the inner workings of bureaucracies in 
developing countries. We highlight areas for future research, including fine-grained 
analysis of political dynamics within government institutions in developing 
countries, and the trade-offs associated with independent regulatory institutions.
Our final contribution is to set out some detailed policy proposals to reform 
international banking standards so that they are better aligned with the interests 
of peripheral developing countries. We highlight the different strategies that 
regu lators can use at the national level to modify international standards at the 
point of implementation. We also propose ways to improve the voice of governments 
from peripheral developing countries in international standard-setting processes, 
by improving their representation, consolidating the evidence base from which 
regulators can develop alternative policy proposals, and strengthening collaboration 
among regulators from peripheral developing countries.
Insights from case studies: drivers  
of convergence and divergence
Our case studies provide compelling evidence that regulators in peripheral devel-
oping countries face very strong incentives to converge on international banking 
standards. Moves to implement international standards reflects some prudential 
concerns, with regulators seeking to regulate internationally active banks. But the 
most powerful drivers of convergence are political, emanating from politicians 
and regulators, rather than banks. We also found evidence of strong incentives to 
diverge from international standards. Again, politicians and regulators tended 
to oppose implementation the most, with banks playing a relatively minor role. 
We provide a summary of how each of our case studies maps onto our analytical 
framework in Table 15.1, and discuss the most salient features below.
Drivers of convergence
In five of our cases (Pakistan, Rwanda, Ghana, Angola, Vietnam), the main im petus 
to converge on international standards came from politicians. In Pakistan, Rwanda, 
and Ghana politicians championed the expansion of financial services and integra-
tion into global finance as an important component of their country’s development 
strategy, and perceived implementation of the latest inter nation al banking standards 
as vital for signaling the attractiveness of their financial services sectors to pro spect-
ive investors. In Vietnam, reformist politicians championed the implementation 
of international standards as part of a wider strategy to integrate their country 

























Table 15.1 Drivers of convergence and divergence in our case studies
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Table 15.1 Drivers of convergence and divergence in our case studies (Continued)























Country Drivers of convergence Drivers of divergence Pathway Outcome 















































































Notes: ✓✶ denotes factor that was strongest influence in driving convergence or divergence; ✓ denotes influential factor; (✓) denotes factor that was present but weak (e.g. there are 
domestically oriented banks in all case study countries, but they did not always mobilize to shape regulatory decisions); ✕ denotes factor was not present in a meaningful way. With regards 
to outcomes: Ambitious implementation = includes at least one of the more complex components (internal models under Basel II and/or liquidity or macroprudential/liquidity standards 
under Basel III); Selective implementation = standardized approaches under Basel II and only microprudential capital requirements under Basel III; Mock compliance = on paper, not 
enforced.
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In contrast to the logic of politicians seeking deeper integration into global 
finance, in Angola, and to some extent Pakistan, there were pressures to implement 
international standards to stay connected to global finance. These were particularly 
strong in the wake of blacklisting by the Financial Action Taskforce. In Angola 
the implementation of international standards was seen by politicians as an 
un attract ive but necessary condition for maintaining linkages to international 
banks, a vital mechanism for channelling profits from the oil sector out of the 
country. Implementation was a defensive move made to restore the country’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of international actors and maintain connections to inter-
nation al finance, rather than an offensive move to expand financial services.
In another five cases (West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
Tanzania, Kenya, Bolivia, Nigeria) the main impetus to converge on international 
standards came from regulators, although they tended to be more circumspect 
than politicians. Regulators were aware of the challenges that international stand-
ards pose in nascent financial sectors and in the face of acute resource constraints, 
and were more likely to push for selective rather than wholesale implementa-
tion. In some cases, regulators acted out of prudential concerns. This was most 
notable in Nigeria where the regulator sought to upgrade regulations and 
improve supervision in order to manage the risks posed by increasingly com-
plex and inter nation al ly active banks. In other cases, regulators advocated 
implementation to improve home-host supervision and coordinate with other 
regulatory authorities.
Beyond these more functional drivers, we found evidence that regulators face 
strong reputational incentives to implement the latest international standards, which 
are considered the ‘gold standard’ in the international policy circles in which 
regu lators are engaged. This was particularly striking in Bolivia. In other coun-
tries extensive engagement with the IMF, and to a lesser extent the World Bank, 
generated incentives to converge on international standards. In the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), there was direct pressure from the 
IMF to implement Basel II and III standards.
In most other cases, the IMF and World Bank played an important, but indirect, 
role. They were a major source of training and technical advice on bank regula-
tion and supervision, and a striking number of central bank governors and senior 
officials in our case studies had spent portions of their career in international 
financial institutions. While the advice and training rarely advocated implemen-
tation of the full suite of international standards, extensive engagement with 
international financial institutions helped create a culture of receptivity to inter-
nation al standards and ‘best practices’ within regulatory authorities. For many 
senior officials, implementing the latest international standards became a source 
of professional pride, providing kudos and legitimacy in international policy cir-
cles and at home. These dynamics were particularly striking in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Ghana, and Pakistan.
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Surprisingly, banks were not a major driver of regulatory outcomes in any of our 
countries. In Pakistan the role of banks was most pronounced, but they only emerged 
as a powerful lobby for convergence once the financial services sector had gained a 
preeminent position in the economy and domestic banks had reoriented their busi-
ness models to the international market. Thus it was the changes brought by policy 
and regulatory decisions that created a powerful vested interest group in favour of 
convergence, which arguably makes the convergence trajectory hard to reverse.
In Nigeria there was also a critical mass of large internationally active domestic 
banks, but the drive for convergence came largely from the regulator’s concerns 
about the risks international domestic banks posed, rather than advocacy by the 
banks themselves. A few domestic banks in Vietnam and Kenya had international 
operations and while they were generally supportive of convergence, they were 
not strong advocates. Larger banks in Tanzania expected to derive a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis their smaller competitors from the implementation of inter-
nation al standards. They acted collectively through a business association and the 
creation of institutionalized channels gave them substantial purchase over regula-
tory decisions accelerating convergence.
The local subsidiaries of internationally active banks were not strong advocates 
of convergence. In Angola, and to some extent Tanzania, foreign and domestic 
banks perceived compliance as an unattractive yet important move in the face 
of  rising concerns about compliance with anti-money laundering standards. In 
other countries, notably Kenya, foreign subsidiaries were a source of technical 
advice and support to domestic banks and regulators but did not actively call for 
the implementation of international standards.
The relative absence of banks as the main driver of convergence is surprising, 
as statistical analysis of Basel implementation in countries outside of the Basel 
Committee shows that banks with international operations are significant drivers 
of convergence (Jones and Zeitz, 2019). The discrepancy between the findings of 
the case studies in this volume and this wider statistical analysis is likely explained 
by our focus on countries with nascent levels of financial sector development, a 
stage at which there are few internationally active domestic banks. As the Pakistan 
case study suggests, it is only when domestic banks have a substantial international 
presence that they become champions of convergence.
Drivers of divergence
Our research also highlights powerful drivers of divergence from international 
standards. These were most pronounced in Ethiopia, where regulators have opted 
not to implement any elements of Basel II or III. However, there were strong 
incentives to diverge from international standards in eight other countries too, 
with Pakistan and Rwanda as the only exceptions.
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In five countries (Ethiopia, Bolivia, Tanzania, Vietnam, Angola), politicians were 
wary of implementing international standards. In Ethiopia and Bolivia, and to a 
lesser extent Tanzania and Vietnam, governments are pursuing a developmental 
state approach and using a variety of policy instruments to direct credit, which 
sits uneasily with the market-based approach to credit allocation assumed in the 
Basel framework. In Vietnam, which is transitioning from a socialist economy to 
a market economy, conservative factions of the political elite were opposed to the 
implementation of international standards lest this speed up the marketization of 
the financial sector and wider economy. Political considerations loomed large for 
politicians in Angola where politicians were concerned that implementing inter-
nation al standards would undermine their extensive control over domestic banks 
and allocation of credit to political allies.
Regulators in most of our case studies were sceptical about the suitability of 
some aspects of international standards for their local contexts. While many faced 
strong reputational incentives to implement international standards, and pressure 
from politicians, many officials we interviewed questioned the applicability of 
more complex aspects of Basel II and III for regulating banks in their jurisdiction. 
While some regulators were able to reconcile these tensions through selective 
adoption and modifying standards to fit the local context, regulators did not 
always have the support from governors and politicians to deviate from what is 
perceived to be international ‘best practice’ and design more suitable alternatives.
Regulators also opposed implementation where they thought that it would pub-
licly expose the fragility of some banks and, in the worst case, precipitate a financial 
crisis. These concerns were particularly pronounced in Vietnam and Nigeria.
Pathways to convergence, divergence, and mock compliance
Overall, the balance of incentives and political economy dynamics between 
politicians and regu lators tipped countries towards convergence, with seven of 
our eleven cases converging on international standards, albeit to varying extents 
(Pakistan, Rwanda, Ghana, WAEMU, Tanzania, Kenya, Bolivia). As we might 
expect, convergence was most extensive when politicians, regulators, and banks 
supported implementation, as the case of Pakistan illustrates. Convergence also 
tended to be higher when poli ti cians were the main drivers of convergence than 
when the impetus came from regulators. Where politicians dominated the 
dynamics of regulatory convergence, the regulator tended to have less autonomy 
and fewer resources, and was less likely to be a source of sceptical push-back. This 
led to more ambitious levels of implementation.
Conversely, where regulators drove the convergence process, usually in cases 
where they had a relatively high level of autonomy from politicians and substantial 
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institutional strength, they tended to be more aware of the challenges and while 
they drove convergence, they took a more selective approach to implementation. 
This was the case in Kenya and Tanzania. In Bolivia, there was a high level of 
contestation between regulators who sought very ambitious levels of implemen-
tation, and politicians pursuing interventionist financial policies who opposed 
implementation. This led to a far lower level of implementation than the regula-
tory authorities had hoped for.
In three cases (Nigeria, Angola, and Vietnam), conflicting incentives on the part 
of regulators and politicians led to mock compliance. In Nigeria, the regulator was 
both eager to implement international standards to better supervise large inter-
nation al banks, and worried that implementation would be detrimental to smaller 
banks. The result was regulatory forbearance towards the smaller banks. In Angola, 
politicians were conflicted, feeling under pressure to implement inter nation al 
standards in order to persevere correspondent banking links, and worried that 
implementation would undercut their ability to distribute credit to their allies. In 
Vietnam, there was contestation among reformist politicians who sought to imple-
ment international standards as part of wider efforts to open the economy, and 
conservative politicians who opposed further marketization. Meanwhile, regu-
lators were attracted to international standards as a means of communicating with 
bank supervisors in other countries, yet worried that implementation would cause 
the collapse of weak banks.
Ethiopia is our one case of divergence. Its regulators have remained with Basel I 
standards and opted out of Basel II and III. Ethiopia is striking as it is the one 
country where no actor championed implementation. While it is tempting to 
attribute this to the fact that there are no foreign banks in Ethiopia, and domestic 
banks are prohibited from operating internationally, we have seen from our other 
case studies that the interests of banks have not been a decisive factor in explain-
ing convergence. Instead, Ethiopia’s decision to diverge is the result of politicians 
pursuing a state-led development strategy in which the government retains a high 
level of discretionary control over the allocation of credit. The regulatory author-
ity is fully aligned with this policy. It is striking that Ethiopia and Rwanda, which 
are often cited as examples of developmental states in Africa (e.g. Clapham, 2018; 
Goodfellow, 2017; Mann and Berry, 2016), have responded in such different ways 
to international banking standards. We reflect on this more below.
Insights for scholarship and areas for further research
Several aspects of our research stand out when we situate our findings in the 
wider literature on developing countries in the global economy, and on the pol it-
ics of economic reform within developing countries.
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Constrained agency in the global economy
It is striking that our cases defy the stereotype of peripheral countries being 
pressured by international actors to converge on international standards. Such pres-
sures undoubtedly exist in many areas, including other aspects of international 
finance (Chwieroth, 2010; Drezner, 2007; Gallagher, 2015; Jawara and Kwa, 2003; 
Phillips, 2017; Sharman, 2008; Simmons, 2001). Yet coercive pressure played a minor 
role in our case studies. Only in WAEMU, where the IMF championed imple-
mentation, and Angola, where the threat of correspondent banks withdrawing their 
services catalysed action, were external pressures significant drivers of convergence.
Instead convergence was driven primarily by politicians and regulators, and to a 
lesser extent internationally oriented domestic banks, actively seeking greater 
levels of integration in the global economy and international policy circles. It was 
this dynamic of actively seeking insertion into international processes that led to 
convergence. This does not mean politicians and regulators in our case study coun-
tries did not face external constraints; their policy options and regulatory choices 
were heavily circumscribed by the international context in which they operated. 
Crucially, because politicians and regulators had few alternative mech an isms for 
signalling to international investors and professional peers, their quest for inter-
nation al capital and international recognition led them to support the implemen-
tation of international standards that were cumbersome and ill suited in many 
ways to their local contexts.
More profoundly, the preferences and interests of politicians and regulators have 
been conditioned by their countries’ precarious position in the global economy. 
Vulnerability led to long-term relationships with the IMF and World Bank which, 
as we have shown, decisively shaped the types of regulatory institutions that exist 
in our case study countries, and close ties to these institutions continued to mould 
the underlying preferences of regulatory authorities. Similarly, profound levels of 
underdevelopment and a shortage of capital led many politicians to make attract-
ing international investment a policy priority. We have shown how the actions of 
politicians, regulators and banks, are shaped by their connections to international 
finance as well as domestic factors, and how they manoeuvre within external and 
domestic constraints. In doing so we contribute to a growing body of literature 
that draws attention to the agency of actors from weak states in the global econ-
omy (e.g. Brown, 2013; Cooper et al., 2009; Jones, 2013; Jones et al., 2010; Lee and 
Smith, 2008; Mohan and Lampert, 2013; Whitfield, 2009).
The weak influence of banks in the politics of regulation
We have been struck by the finding that banks played a relatively minor role in 
the domestic politics of banking regulation in our case study countries. Banks 
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rarely exerted a direct influence over regulatory outcomes. In some countries, 
banks were subordinate to the state, or politicians. In other countries banks had 
greater autonomy from the state and politicians, yet they rarely mobilized to try 
and shape regulatory outcomes.
This finding is striking as banks play an out-sized role in shaping regulatory 
outcomes in more advanced economies and in larger developing countries (e.g. 
Johnson and Kwak, 2011; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Maxfield, 1991; Pepinsky, 2013; 
Stigler, 1971). They also shape international standard-setting processes. Private 
associations of major firms have played a leading role in setting international 
standards in areas like accounting and, even when they aren’t the principal 
decision-makers, large financial firms have become adept at shaping inter-
nation al standards (Baker,  2010; Goldbach,  2015; Johnson and Kwak,  2011; 
Pagliari and Young,  2014; Romano,  2014; Tsingou,  2008; Underhill and 
Zhang, 2008; Young, 2012).
The difference appears to lie in the nascent nature of the financial sector in 
many low and lower-middle income countries, where banks have yet to develop 
the economic and political clout to decisively shape regulations. As we have shown, 
this leads a distinctive set of political economy logics around banking regulation 
in low and lower-middle income countries, in which the preferences of politi-
cians and regulators are decisive, and the anticipated reactions of international 
market actors loom large.
Given how important finance is in processes of development, we have been 
surprised at how thin the literature is on the politics of credit allocation in low and 
lower-middle income countries. The relationship between banks, businesses, 
poli ti cians, and regulators in low-income countries deserves greater scrutiny by 
scholars, as we have seen how influential these relationships have been in other 
emerging economies on the trajectory of economic development (e.g. 
Hutchcroft, 1998; Maxfield, 1991; Pepinsky, 2013). There is a literature on the role of 
business associations in developing countries, including in African countries, which 
identifies a series of conditions under which business associations facilitate or 
impede economic growth (e.g. Bräutigam et al., 2002; Doner and Schneider, 2000). 
So far scant attention has been paid to the role of banks and other financial institu-
tions in economic development trajectories in low- and lower-middle-income coun-
tries, particularly in Africa, and this would be a fas cin at ing area for further research.
The role of policy ideas
While the narrow material, party-political, and reputational interests of poli ti-
cians and regulators played a role in shaping regulatory outcomes, it is hard to 
overlook the powerful impact of ideas. Ideas about the financial sector’s role in 
the wider economy, and the role banks should play, decisively shaped regulatory 
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outcomes. This was most striking in Ethiopia where a very strong set of policy 
ideas focused on state-led industrialization in which the state retains control over 
credit allocation. These policy ideas help explain Ethiopia’s divergence from inter-
nation al standards.
Equally strong yet very different sets of ideas explain why Pakistan, Rwanda, and 
Ghana were ambitious adopters of international standards. In these cases, and to 
some extent Kenya, convergence was driven by policy agendas focused on becom-
ing a financial services hub, as politicians looked to emulate countries like 
Mauritius, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Implementing the very latest international 
banking standards is seen as imperative for establishing a financial services hub, 
just as keeping up with these standards is a priority for many existing financial ser-
vices hubs (Brummer, 2012; Sharman, 2009). A similar vision has propelled other 
developing countries to look to expand their financial services sectors (Ghosh, 2007; 
Patnaik,  2007). In India, a commission was appointed to develop Mumbai as a 
regional financial centre, on the understanding that the financial centre would gen-
erate real sector development throughout the country (Reddy, 2010).
These policy agendas are linked to the fast growth of the global financial sector 
since the 1980s, and the expansion of pan-regional banks in many developing 
countries in the past decade. As McKinsey notes in a recent report, ‘Africa’s bank-
ing markets are among the most exciting in the world. The continent’s overall 
banking market is the second-fastest-growing and second-most profitable of any 
global region, and a hotbed of innovation . . . Africa’s retail banking markets are 
ripe with potential and present huge opportunities for innovation and further 
growth’ (Chironga et al., 2018, pp. 3–4).
Among academics there is a growing literature on industrial policy and the 
insertion of African countries into global value chains (e.g. Oqubay, 2016; UNECA, 
2016; Whitfield et al., 2015). Scholars are, so far, paying much less attention to 
policies focused on the expansion of financial services and the re-orientation of 
economies to serve regional markets. In today’s age of financial globalization, the 
strategies of governments in peripheral developing countries towards global 
finance deserve greater scrutiny.
The accountability of independent government institutions
Our research shows the value of opening up the black box of ‘the state’ in peripheral 
developing countries, unpacking the rules, the motives and motivations, and the 
tensions, capacity, and interests inside bureaucratic institutions. All too often the 
state is treated as a black box, with little attention paid to the politics within and 
among government institutions. Our work highlights the importance of central 
banks as economic and political actors and contributes to the literature on the 
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trade-offs associated with delegating important policies to independent regula-
tory institutions.
The creation of independent institutions for regulating banks has long been 
hailed as an important move to insulate policy decisions from predatory in clin-
ations of politicians, particularly in developing countries (Barth et al.,  2006). 
Having an independent central bank can act as an important commitment device 
for reassuring international and domestic actors of policy continuity (Ghosh, 2007; 
Gilardi, 2007; Maxfield, 1997).
But the role of independent institutions is also highly political, and has sub-
stantial trade-offs. The global financial crisis and its aftermath have stimulated a 
very live debate about the merits of central bank independence in countries at the 
core of the global financial system (e.g. Restoy, 2018; Tucker, 2018). Central to this 
debate is the observation that central banks have become powerful actors, yet 
operate with very little oversight. This has led to calls for greater transparency in 
decision-making and structural reforms to improve political accountability (e.g. 
Balls et al., 2018).
Scholars have asked similar questions about the merits of independent regulatory 
institutions in developing countries. While praised by some for being islands of 
efficiency in a sea of unprofessional corrupt states, such institutions have also been 
criticized for removing policymaking from the democratic arena (Dargent, 2015). 
Boylan (2001) argues that central bank independence is often used by right-leaning 
authoritarian governments to tie the hands of unwilling successors during transitions 
to democracy, to ensure continuity of economic policies that favour powerful 
business interests. Teodoro and Pitcher (2017) raise important normative questions 
about the desirability of creating independent regulatory institutions, particularly 
in fragile democracies. Rather than insulate technocrats from politics, engage-
ment between bureaucrats and interest groups is important for fostering long-
term, politically sustainable policies.
Our research contributes to this debate by revealing the ways in which inde-
pendent regulatory institutions are not only dis-embedded from local politics, 
but are also more likely to be embedded in international processes that make 
them receptive to international policy ideas, pressures, and incentives. Such 
embeddedness may lead to learning and an improvement of the quality of 
decision-making. But we have also have shown how it can also lead to the 
adoption of international standards that fail to reflect local realities, a phe-
nomenon of ‘dysfunctional policy transfer’ (Sharman,  2010). Scholars have 
found a similar trend in other areas, including in intellectual property rights 
(Deere-Birkbeck,  2009). Dysfunctional policy transfer is particularly likely 
when regulatory institutions have independence but few resources, making 
them receptive to international policy solutions without the ability to critically 
appraise and push-back against them. The WAEMU case shows how the 
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supranational nature of regional institutions renders them particularly vulnerable 
to detachment from local politics and contexts.
More generally, there is the need for more fine-grained research on the role of 
bureaucrats and inner workings of government institutions in developing countries. 
This is particularly true for African countries where the literature on bureaucratic 
politics is thin and scholars are too quick to dismiss formal bureaucratic institu-
tions as ineffectual (Pitcher and Teodoro, 2018; Teodoro and Pitcher, 2017). Our 
case studies illustrate the substantial variation in the autonomy and power that 
regulatory institutions have over banking regulation, and we started to explore 
some of the reasons for this. Given how important government institutions are 
and yet how little we really know about their inner workings in African countries, 
this is an important area for further research. From where do bureaucrats derive 
power? How insulated are technocrats from political considerations, and with 
what implications? How can we account for variation in the politics of bureaucracy 
across institutions within the same government, and across governments?
Policy implications
Our research generates a series of insights for policymakers that contribute to a 
wider policy discussion on how to reform international banking standards so 
they better reflect the interests of developing countries.
Given the problems that implementing international standards poses for 
peripheral developing countries, many experts advocate greater reliance on 
sui  generis national regulations and strengthened roles for host regulators 
(Eichengreen et  al., 2018; Persaud,  2013). For instance, national authorities 
could insist that foreign banks can only operate as subsidiaries, not branches, in 
their jurisdictions, thereby en ab ling peripheral governments to have greater con-
trol over their operations (Persaud, 2013; The Warwick Commission, 2009). They 
could also make greater use of capital controls and macroprudential measures to 
help temper destabilizing inflows and outflows of capital (Rey,  2015; Gallagher, 
2015; Griffith-Jones et al., 2012; Gallagher, 2015; Akyuz, 2010).
Yet we have shown how the uneven distribution of structural power in 
the  global financial system limits the extent to which national authorities in 
peripheral countries can act unilaterally, as it can be costly to diverge from 
international standards. Politicians and regulators in small developing coun-
tries, particularly those with nascent financial sectors, are often looking to 
attract international capital, maintain (or attain) investment grade ratings from 
international ratings agencies, and stay on good terms with international finan-
cial institutions like the IMF. Our research highlights the powerful reputational, 
competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that 
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lead regulators to adopt international standards even when they are ill suited to 
their local context.
Given these strong incentives, regulators can modify international standards to 
suit their local context, in order harness their reputational benefits while avoiding 
the costs of an off-the-shelf implementation. But modifying international stand-
ards is costly—sifting through the full suite of international standards and adapt-
ing them to fit the local context is a painstaking and resource-intensive task. Such 
an approach also shifts the burden of retrofitting international standards onto the 
world’s most acutely resource-constrained regulators. An alternative option is to 
redesign international standards so that they can be more readily used in a wider 
range of contexts, including low- and lower-middle-income countries.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, there were calls for international 
standards to be simplified and to build proportionality into their design. But little has 
changed. The Basel Committee set up a Task Force on Simplicity and Comparability 
in 2012 but the Task Force paid no attention to the implementation challenges faced 
by developing countries (BCBS, 2013). Despite concerns raised by regulators from 
developing countries about the complexity of specific elements of Basel III, the Basel 
Committee has not addressed them (World Bank, 2015; BCBS, 2017).
Redesigning international standards to better reflect the interests of peripheral 
developing countries requires providing peripheral developing countries with 
greater influence over decision-making processes. This in turn requires greater 
representation of peripheral developing countries at the tables where decisions 
are made, a stronger evidence base from which to make alternative proposals, and 
greater institutionalized cooperation among peripheral developing countries, so 
that they can better champion reforms.
Below we discuss the steps that national regulators in peripheral developing 
countries can take to modify international standards, and then discuss the reforms 
needed in international standard-setting.
Modifying international standards before implementing them
Regulators in peripheral developing countries have substantial room for  manoeuvre 
when they implement international standards. International standards are soft-law 
(Brummer, 2012) and countries outside of the Basel Committee are not subject to 
peer-review assessments. In previous chapters we have highlighted the manifold 
incentives and pressures that regulators in developing countries face to implement 
inter nation al ‘best practice’ standards. While this means it is extremely difficult for 
regulators to develop their own sui generis regulations and abandon international 
standards altogether, they still have room to substantially modify international 
standards before implementing them.
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A first option, common among the regulators in our case studies, is to implement 
international standards selectively. As we have seen, Basel II and III are in practice 
compendia of different standards so regulators can select those components 
that are most desirable and feasible to implement. In many peripheral countries, 
regulators are choosing not to adopt the controversial internal model approaches 
for assessing risk. They are also cautious in implementing the macroprudential 
components of Basel III, which pose significant technical and data challenges 
for regulators.
Regulators can also modify the elements of the standards that they opt to 
implement, rather than copying and pasting form the Basel II and III rulebook. 
They can use their intimate knowledge of the domestic financial system to write 
rules that match local circumstances better than the Basel template. In the 
Philippines, for example, regulators have adjusted the risk weights for small and 
medium enterprises to reduce the incentive of banks to move away from lending 
to these firms.1 In a more dramatic move, regulators can adjust the perimeter of 
banking regulation, so that regulations that are aligned with international stand-
ards only apply to large internationally active banks, and simpler (although not 
necessarily less stringent) rules apply to small commercial banks. This approach 
is common in countries belonging to the Basel Committee (Castro Carvalho et al., 
2017). Although regulators in our case study countries are making some minor 
modifications to international standards, our over-riding impression is that they 
are nowhere near as bold as many Basel member countries in tailoring the stand-
ards to suit their local circumstances.
Greater representation of peripheral developing  
countries in global standards-setting
A more optimal approach would be to modify international standards to better 
reflect the interests of developing countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, the vast 
majority of developing countries do not have a seat at the table where inter-
nation al standards are negotiated. The prevailing system imposes a rigid divide 
between the countries at the core of global financial governance which set the 
standards, and countries on the periphery, which have no voice in the process.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the G20 asked standard-setting institu-
tions to assess the implications of international financial standards for developing 
countries, and to further open up decision-making processes. In response, the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) created an internal workstream on the effects of 
regulatory reform on emerging market and developing economies (FSB et al. 2011). 
It also established six Regional Consultative Groups where members and non-
members exchange views on financial stability issues and the global regulatory 
1 Discussion with regulator, via videoconference, September 2018.
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reform agenda. Little is known about the nature of participation and quality of 
 dialogue because public summaries of the meetings carry very little information, 
but our interviews with regulators suggest that these fora do not provide meaning-
ful input into or influence over the design of international standards. Instead they 
function as fora for regulators to trouble-shoot implementation.
There have been calls for a more radical overhaul of global financial governance 
since the global financial crisis, and many proposals would provide peripheral 
developing countries with greater representation. Proposals include the creation 
of an entirely new inter-governmental organization featuring wide or even uni-
versal membership in a constituency system akin to that of the IMF or the World 
Bank, where members of the governing board represent several member coun-
tries (Claessens, 2008; Eichengreen, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010).
Yet there is little appetite at the level of the FSB for radical reforms. The FSB 
members considered, and dismissed, the proposal of conversion into a classic 
inter-governmental organization as undesirable. They also rejected the proposal 
of adopting a constituency-based membership system because it would be incon-
sistent with its institutional model (individual financial agencies are members 
of  the FSB, not states) and because it ‘would make FSB discussions more rigid’ 
(FSB,  2014, p. 1). In 2014 the FSB rearranged the Plenary to give more seats to 
officials from emerging market member jurisdictions (FSB,  2014). At the same 
time, it reduced the seats of international organizations such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, who could in principle represent developing country voices, but in 
practice have done so with negligible effectiveness.
While there is little political appetite for a radical overhaul of global financial 
governance, more moderate reforms could be pursued. The Basel Committee 
could amend its charter to explicitly recognize the need for differentiated standards 
and commit to build proportionality into their design, so that Basel standards can 
be readily adapted for use in a wide range of jurisdictions. It could also broaden its 
mandate beyond an exclusive focus on financial stability to recognize the importance 
of other objectives such as financial sector development and financial inclusion. 
Even bringing these in as secondary considerations would incentivize more care-
ful analysis in international standard-setting. It would also better align the Basel 
Committee’s mandate with the domestic mandates of regu lators from most devel-
oping countries, and a sizable minority of high-income countries, which include 
objectives beyond financial stability (Jones and Knaack, 2019). Rather than waiting 
to see whether standards generate adverse impacts on developing countries, the 
Basel Committee could undertake ex ante assessments.
An interesting proposal is the creation of a small multilateral organization to 
audit international standard-setting bodies, akin to auditor-generals in national 
jurisdictions, or the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF and Independent 
Evaluation Group of the World Bank (Helleiner and Porter, 2010). Outside of 
the Basel Committee, the Basel Consultative Group could review its member-
ship to ensure it is broadly representative, inviting new members from low- and 
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lower-middle-income countries. The Basel Consultative Group and the Regional 
Consultative Groups could move away from the current top-down modus operandi 
of focusing on the implementation of global standards towards facilitating bottom-
up proposals to influence their design (Jones and Knaack, 2019).
Creating influential clubs of regulators from peripheral  
developing countries
Strengthening professional networks among regulators from peripheral developing 
countries could strengthen their voice in international standard-setting. Informal 
clubs among the regulators from the world’s largest financial centres, often including 
senior executives from the world’s largest financial firms, have had an outsized 
impact on the design of international financial standards. Yet there are few fora in 
which regulators from peripheral developing countries meet to develop strong 
ties and alternative policy proposals.
Regulators from advanced countries, and senior officials from the world’s lar gest 
financial firms, have used informal clubs to shape international financial institutions. 
The G30 brings together, on an invite-only basis, very senior representatives from 
the public and private sectors and academia to work on international economic 
and financial issues, with international banking a core focus area.2 Such clubs are 
together by elite peer recognition, common and mutually reinforcing interests, and 
pursuit of a common goal. There is competition for ideas and influence but dis-
cussions are highly protected from outside pressures, and clubs tend to converge 
around specific sets of policy ideas (Tsingou, 2015). The fostering of close relations 
between members of elite clubs can have a powerful effect on decision-making in 
other fora, including standard-setting bodies in international finance, which are 
often dominated by members of these informal clubs (Baker, 2009).
Regulators from peripheral developing countries are at a disadvantage because 
they do not have the equivalent clubs in which to meet and forge a strong sense 
of identify and cohesion. Thus, even when regulators from developing countries 
gain a seat at the decision-making table, they encounter a level of cohesion among 
their counterparts from advanced countries which they do not match. Regulators 
from peripheral developing countries do meet, particularly through regional pro-
fessional networks, but the level of engagement and cooperation varies from region 
to region, and there are very few fora for regulators from different regions to meet 
each other and strategize.3 Moreover, these networks rarely publish proposals for 
the reform of international financial standards. Investing in the creation of an 
informal club to generate a stronger sense of common identity and formulate 
2 http://group30.org.
3 A notable exception is the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, which brings together regulators from 
developing countries to promote financial inclusion: https://www.afi-global.org.
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alternative policy proposals, is a mechanism through which regulators from 
peripheral developing countries could strengthen their influence over international 
financial regulation.
Strengthening the evidence base for regulators in peripheral 
developing countries
Our research highlights the paucity of information and evidence available for 
developing country regulators seeking to diverge from international standards, 
and develop alternative policy proposals.
The Bank for International Settlements is the primary international institution 
for supporting central banks to ensure monetary and financial stability, and is 
renowned for its high-quality research. However it focuses almost exclusively on 
the regulatory priorities of developed countries. The Financial Stability Institute 
(FSI), which is a small organization housed within the Bank for International 
Settlements, does conduct research on countries outside of the Basel Committee, 
but its core mandate is to support worldwide implementation of global standards, 
rather than shaping their design.4
The IMF and World Bank are the other high-profile international organizations 
with a focus on financial regulation and, as we have shown in this book, they 
engage extensively with regulators in low- and lower-middle-income countries 
Yet, so far they have focused on providing technical advice on how to implement 
international standards, rather than supporting developing countries to shape 
these standards during the design phase. Despite experts closely affiliated with 
the IMF and World Bank challenging the relevance of Basel standards for 
peripheral developing countries (e.g. Barth and Caprio,  2018; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache,  2010) and strong connections to standard-setting bodies, the 
IMF and World Bank have invested little effort in shaping international standards 
to better reflect the needs of developing countries. In the context of Financial 
Sector Assessment Programmes, the IMF and World Bank have warned against 
hasty Basel II or III implementation in some low- and lower-middle-income 
countries, but to date they have provided little systematic analysis of how regu-
lators can modify international standards to their needs.
The Bank for International Settlements, IMF, and World Bank could invest 
greater resources in analysing international financial standards from the perspec-
tive of regulators from low- and lower-middle-income countries, increasing their 
dialogue with regulators from these jurisdictions, and making recommendations 
to the Basel Committee. Rather than focusing on ways to minimize the harm 
4 For details on the Financial Stability Institute, see here: https://www.bis.org/fsi/index.
htm?m=1%7C17%7C629.
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and  challenges that international standards pose for developing countries, this 
research agenda should start from the question of what regulations are most 
needed in peripheral developing countries. This will help to address the fact that 
there are glaring gaps in the current international regulations, including on regu-
latory measures to mitigate volatility in international capital flows and address 
commodity price shocks, two of the biggest sources of financial instability in 
low- and lower-middle-income countries (Gottschalk, 2016, p. 61; Kasekende 
et al., 2012; Repullo and Saurina, 2011).
Recognizing the inherent conservatism of these institutions, a challenge associ-
ated with the continued dominance of advanced economies in their governance 
structures, it is equally important that resources are channelled to strengthen pol-
icy institutions led by experts from low- and lower-middle-income countries. As 
we have seen from the international trade sphere, inter nation al experts from the 
global South have been instrumental in supporting the governments of developing 
countries in their efforts to shape international rules (Scott, 2015). Strengthening 
such research and policy institutions would help to generate the policy alternatives 
that are badly needed in order to ensure that financial regulations support sustain-
able development in countries at the periphery of the global economy.
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